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Summary 
This study focuses on the political perspective of the process and context of 
strategic leadership, in three top international Business Schools, MM, INSEAD and 
London Business School. It remedies three inadequacies in the current literature. These 
are: first, the scarcity of empirical studies on strategic leadership with a processual 
perspective, despite the interest demonstrated in theoretical studies on leadership in the 
last decades-, second, the lack of links between the leadership and strategy fields; third, 
scholars' call for studies on leadership from a political perspective. 
Longitudinal and comparative case studies were conducted with the purpose of 
describing the Strategic Leadership Process (SLP) in each and across the three Business 
Schools, over the period 1990-2004, through strategic agenda-building and -executing, in 
relation to a specific strategic initiative: Becoming a top international Business School. 
Findings show firstly, that among the three key actors (Board, Dean and Faculty), 
the Dean is the main key actor in the SLP because of his critical role of building and 
executing the School's strategic agenda. Secondly, for the Dean to succeed, it is crucial to 
deliver an inclusive approach with regard to the other key actors' (Board and Faculty) 
interests and priorities. Thirdly, Performance represents a precondition for the Dean to be 
credible and receive support from Faculty and Board. Fourthly, for an effective direction- 
setting, the Dean's capacity to scan and understand the external voice, signals and trends 
and raise them to the School's strategic agenda is fundamental. Fifthly, the ability to 
articulate and communicate vision through coalition-building combined with adequate 
delegation, represent critical competences to raise and execute breakthrough initiatives 
for the School. 
xix 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. Research Objectives 
This study attempts to contribute to the understanding of strategic 
leadership as a process within a particular organisational setting -Business 
Schools - and from a political perspective. Various different reasons justify this 
interest: on the one hand, there are at present three limitations to the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the field of leadership: firstly, scholars' failure to view 
strategic leadership as a process, embedded in an organisational and 
environmental context (House & Aditya, 1997; Boal & Hooijberg, 2001); 
secondly, their failure to link leadership and strategy (Hambrick, 1989; 
Chakravarthy et al., 2003); this study intends to shed light on the synergies 
between the strategic leadership process and the strategy process. Thirdly, it tries 
to give an answer to the call for more studies on leadership from a political 
perspective (Ammeter et al., 2002). 
On the other hand, Business Schools - knowledge-intensive institutions, 
fuelled by globalisation trends - have shown outstanding growth during the last few 
decades. In an era where the knowledge revolution is gaining momentum with far- 
reaching strategic implications for organisations in both the corporate and private 
sectors (Lorange, 2005), Business Schools need to develop in specific and clear 
directions which will enable them to respond rapidly to the marketplace. It is only 
through strategic leadership that Business Schools will be able to succeed in setting 
key priorities, and continue to develop value creation. 
I 
Moreover, Business Schools are also relevant for the observation of the 
strategic leadership process (SLP) over time, because of their precise 
organisational characteristics: shared power, dual authority, collegiality, 
autonomy, etc. These organisational traits facilitate the observation of dynamics, 
interrelations and tensions among different key constituencies, putting them into 
sharp focus while allowing the researcher to observe the strategic leadership as a 
process in context, over a period of time. 
Three top European Business Schools have been chosen to visualise how 
strategic leadership as a process was enacted during the period 1990-2004: IN/11D, 
INSEAD and London Business School. These Schools represent particularly 
mteresting examples because of their top positions in the international management 
education industry. 
The longitudinal and comparative case study method is used in the study. A 
longitudinal design enables the study of long-term processes; it provides the 
researcher with the opportunity to examine the continuous processes in context, and 
thus pennits the depiction of reality and of the course of events, their chronology 
and how they evolve over time. The insight gained thereby into the time order of 
variables eventually facilitates causal inferences (Bryman, 2001). As a result, 
causation and connectivity can be determined and patterns identified and explained 
(Pettigrew, 1990). 
A holistic approach enables the reader to visualise the SLP, across multiple 
levels within and outside the organisation. Accordingly, the study treats the SLP as 
2 
a sequence of inteffelated decisions, actions and events, embedded in time and 
context, across multiple levels, and linked to the strategy of the organisation as well 
as to the decisions and actions of individual leaders and top management teams. 
In order to set boundaries to the concept of the strategic leadership process, 
this is broken down into tivo elements: strategic agenda-building and strategic 
agenda -executing in relation to a particular strategic issue (e. g. that of becoming a 
top international Business School) that acts as a 'vehicle' for the observation of the 
SLP in each School. For better observation of this strategic issue, it is divided into 
different episodes according to the set of initiatives that trigger decisions and 
actions, over time. This facilitates the observation of the way in which initiatives 
are prioritised in the strategic agenda of the Business School; how they are 
legitimated or delegitimated; and how power is mobilised in setting the School's 
strategic agenda and in executing it, over time. 
2. Leadership 
Although the study of leadership has been approached by various authors 
from different perspectives, scholars seem to be at one in considering leadership as 
a social influence process (Northouse, 2001; Yukl, 2002; Middlehurst, 1993; 
Heifetz, 1999; Gibson et al., 2000; Grint; 2000; Bums, 1978; Bass, 1990). While 
leadership is seen as the process through which leaders influence the attitudes, 
behaviours and values of others, strategic leadership is considered as the leader's 
ability to anticipate, to envision, to maintain flexibility, and to empower others to 
create strategic change as necessary (Hagen et al., 1998). Strategic 
leadership 
3 
"focuses on the people who have overall responsibility for the organisation and 
includes not only the titular head of the organisation (Dean) but also members of 
what is referred to as the TMT or dominant coalition (Faculty)" (Boal & Hooijberg, 
2001). 
However, researchers have not paid much attention to the organisational and 
environmental context that surrounds the conditions, timing and means of the 
strategic leader's actions (Boal & Hooijberg, 2001). They assert that the literature 
on leadership fails to stress the impact of the leaders on the whole organisation's 
strategic decision-making, and suggest that there is an emergent need to consider 
the strategic leadership concept in a way that involves all the members of the 
organisation who impact the strategic agenda and not just those who belong to the 
strategic apex (Mintzberg, 1979; Boal & Hooijberg, 2001). 
For decades, studies of leadership have approached the issue from different 
psychological and sociological perspectives. Research conducted since the 1930s 
can be classified as Supervisory Leadership Theories, which include the Trait, 
Behavioural, and Contingency approaches (House & Aditya, 1997; Boal & 
Hooijberg, 2001; Bryman, 2001). These theories focus more on the person of the 
leader - skills and personal characteristics. 
In this sense, they centre on the 
individual leader and his or her leadership style, and equate the 'leader' with 
'leadership' (Parham, 1994). 
Later on, the scope is broadened and the New Leadership Theories are 
introduced and operationalised by Charismatic, Transformational, Transactional 
4 
and Visionary leadership (Boal & Hooijberg, 2001; House & Aditya, 1997). This 
paradigm introduces into its scope of study the dyadic relationship between the 
leader and the follower; the use and nature of power and influence; the impact of 
organisational culture; and the connections between leadership and change., 
leadership and charisma, and leadership and vision, among others. 
Finally, the shared leadership paradigm (O'Toole et al., 2002; Pearce & 
Conger, 2003) is introduced. This integrative perspective of leadership refers to 
leadership enacted by a group of people, a constellation of co-stars (Heenan & 
Bennis, 1999). Even though it suggests an even more expanded role for followers 
in the leadership process (Pearce & Conger, 2003), and thus, a broader 
perspective, it remains within a sociological approach to the leadership 
phenomenon. 
As a result, there is little theory conceming organisational variables such 
as size, organisational environment and type of strategy that require different 
behaviours from leaders. Leadership studies seem to be context-ftee (Hunt & 
Dodge, 2001; House & Aditya, 1997). Moreover, it can be argued that scholars 
have mostly approached the field in terms of leadership in organisations rather 
than leadership of organisations (Bryman, 2001,1992; Hunt, 1991). They have 
focused mainly on the characteristics of leaders, what they do and how they do it, 
without addressing the role of the organisational context in which leadership is 
enacted (House & Aditja, 1997). 
In connecting leadership with organisations, the approach to the study of 
leadership, focusing on strategic leadership, represents a further step. However, 
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even though focusing on strategic leadership implies moving forward in relating 
leadership to its organisational setting, most of the studies on strategic leadership 
centre predominantly on the content (what leaders do) or on the types of policies 
and strategies that lead to effective organisational performance (House & Aditya, 
1997). "Relatively little attention has been paid to the processes by which 
strategic leaders affect organisations" (House & Aditya, 1997: 447). 
A processual perspective on strategic leadership focuses on its own 
-I- . dynamics, interrelations and interconnections between people, history, culture, 
time and other contextual factors that influence the strategic leadership 
phenomenon, over time (Pettigrew, 1997). It is designed to account for and 
explain not only the 'what' but also the 'why' and the 'hoW of the links between 
contexts, processes, and outcomes (Pettigrew, 1997). 
A political perspective on the study of the strategic leadership process in 
Business Schools facilitates the observation of how people use and mobilise 
power to influence decisions. Such a perspective enables us to visualise different 
interests and demands that arise and compete for organisational attention and 
resources (Ammeter et al., 2002). Given the distinctive idiosyncrasy 
("loosely- 
coupled" according to Weick, 1976) of the setting where power tends to 
be shared 
between the Dean and the Faculty (besides other key constituencies), a political 
n 
approach enables the observation of strategic leadership as a social 
influence 
process with a contextual approach. 
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3. Business Schools 
Globalisation trends over the last several decades have forced today's 
business world to place a premium upon knowledge as a source of competitive 
advantage, creating the need, at individual, firm and policy level, to pay special 
attention to the development of knowledge (Starkey & Madan, 2001). As a result, 
the knowledge revolution is gaining momentum (Lorange, 2005), creating the 
need, at all these three levels, to pay special attention to the development of the 
knowledge stocks of organisations, managers, professionals and employees in 
order to prepare them to cope successfully with the demands of the old and new 
economies (Starkey & Madan, 200 1). More than ever before, knowledge is itself 
becoming part of value creation in an organisation (Lorange, 2005). Thus, 
enterprises require individuals with a relevant knowledge base who can spot new 
business opportunities before their competitors. 
This state of affairs has placed Business Schools and other institutions of 
management education in a position to experience, much magnified, the 
consequences of those transformations triggered by globalisation trends, making 
the challenge of survival critical (Van Baalen & Moratis, 2001). Thus, in order to 
survive the times ahead, Business Schools need strategic leadership to set a clear 
strategic direction which can guide them "through the 21" century playing field of 
management education" (Van Baalen & Moratis, 2001: 167). 
4. Research questions 
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In an attempt to understand and analyse the SLP in context, and from a 
political perspective, this study intends to answer the following research 
questions: 
I. Who are the key actors? How do they interplay in influencing strategic 
agenda-building and -executing over time? 
2. What are the main features of the inner and outer contexts that influence 
the School's strategic agenda-building and -executing over time; and how do they 
influence? 
3. How do key actors mobilise (build and use) power in order to influence 
strategic agenda-building and -executing over time, according to their 
prioritisation of interests? 
In trying to answer these questions the study looks for similarities and 
differences in order to find patterns over time (past, present and future). To do so, 
an "eclectic approach" (Pettigrew, 1973: 64) consisting of both the longitudinal 
and comparative case study methods (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 1984), has been 
applied to three top European Business Schools (EAD, INSEAD and London 
Business School) over the period 1990-2004. 
5. Limitations 
The main limitation to, the study of the strategic leadership process in 
Business Schools, over time and from a political perspective, is the particular 
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approach that has been chosen. In this regard, in analysing the Cuban missile 
crisis, Alison & Zelikow (1999: 387-388) state: 
"The glasses one wears magnify one set of factors rather than another in 
ways that have multifarious consequences. Not only do lenses lead analysts to 
produce different explanations of problems that appear to be the same. Lenses 
also influence the character of the analyst's puzzle, the evidence assumed to be 
relevant, the concepts used in examining the evidence, and what is taken to be an 
explanation. ... Each analyst emphasises what 
he judges relevant and important, 
and different conceptual lenses lead analysts to different judgements about what is 
relevant and important. " 
Accordingly, given that a political perspective has been chosen for the 
better analysis of the SLP in Business Schools over time, in choosing this 
perspective the study intends to focus on the social influence process: how people 
use and mobilise power to influence and achieve particular goals and objectives 
through coalitions, bargaining processes, and the interests and demands of the 
different constituencies which give place to conflicts. Thus, the strength of the 
political analysis lies on the fact that it facilitates the understanding of 
interpersonal dynamics through the observation of the political behaviour of key 
actors and the way such behaviours both affect the SLP and are in turn affected 
by 
it. 
However, this approach does not allow the visualisation of the rational 
aspect of decisions, actions and events. In fact, because the 
focus of a political 
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approach is centred on the political behaviour of key actors throughout an 
organisational setting, programmed decisions - i. e. repetitive and routine 
decisions, worked out through a fixed procedure (Pettigrew, 1973; Simon, 1960) - 
would not be part of this kind of analysis, given that they are not breeding 
grounds for the emergence of politics. Thus, programmed decisions do not seem 
to entail differences in interests, conflict and misunderstanding; rather, they are 
more likely to be characterised by problem-solving than by bargaining. 
The focus of the rational-analytic conception is on strategy content. It 
neglects the turbulent undercurrents of organisational politics manifest in the 
interactions among various coalitions within the organisation as they endeavour to 
influence strategic decisions. The political perspective brings these dynamics into 
sharp focus. From this perspective, the content of strategic decisions is viewed as 
an outcome of transactions of power and influence. Thus, political processes in 
. organisations gain causal import in explanations of strategic decisions. The 
implication is that an examination of strategy content alone is insufficient to 
explain strategic choices. Only by investigating the "organisational processes out 
of which strategies emerge, can one understand and explain why they come to 
be" 
(Narayanan & Fahey, 1982: 27). 
6. Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is presented in nine chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the 
study, justifying its relevance and outlining the gaps in the 
literature both on 
leadership and on the importance of Business Schools in the current management 
education industry and business world. 
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Chapter 2 is concerned with the theoretical aspect of the thesis and is 
divided into three sections. First, it tackles the evolution of the study of 
leadership, over time. Then, it focuses on the strategic leadership process in the 
specific setting that has been chosen for the purpose of the study: Business 
Schools. Finally, it looks at the political approach to the study of the SLP in 
Business Schools, over time. 
Chapter 3 tackles the empirical aspect of the thesis, its research strategy 
and methodology. First, it refers to the epistemological underpinnings of this 
study of the strategic leadership process in Business Schools, over time. Second, 
it describes the methods used in gathering data and analysing it. Finally, the 
research questions that form the framework of this study are discussed. 
Chapter 4 describes the Business School sector with its driving forces and 
trends, and key drivers competition. Firstly, it refers to the Business School 
background with regard to the central role they play and criticisms of them. 
Secondly, it tackles the history of US and EuroPean Business Schools. Thirdly, 
the Business Schools' response to the main trends towards globalisation and 
increasing competition are discussed. Fourthly, the study refers to the specific 
influence of rankings and accreditation agencies in the Business School sector. 
Fifthly, it reviews the challenges facing Business Schools, and the forces driving 
them. Finally, the study presents some implications for the SLP in Business 
Schools. 
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Chapters 5,6 and 7 cover the three case studies: IMD, INSEAD and 
London Business School. Each of the three cases is described and analysed. 
Chapter 8 gives a comparison of the three Business Schools. Similarities and 
differences are highlighted in order to establish patterns within the SLP over time, 
across the three Business Schools under study. And finally, Chapter 9 presents the 
findings and conclusions, and also suggests a focus for further research regarding 
the study of the strategic leadership process in Business Schools. 
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Chapter 11: THEORY 
I. The study of Leadership over time 
1.1. Introduction 
Over time the study of leadership has been approached from various 
psychological and sociological perspectives. Some scholars have sought to 
broaden the concept of leadership, addressing it from the perspective of 
organisational theory. This viewpoint responds to the trend within the leadership 
field to widen the approach which has evolved over the last decades, moving from 
the person of the leader to his behaviour, the situation in which leadership is 
enacted, the dyadic relationship between leader and follower, the role of influence 
and finally, the leadership phenomenon analysed as a process within a specific 
organisational context. In other words, since the study of leadership has been 
approached as though leadership were being enacted in a vacuum, there has been 
a shift, switching the focus from leadership in organisations to leadership of 
organisations (Bryman, 2001). 
The study of leadership is a topic that has attracted the attention of many 
researchers for most of the twentieth century, and is still an issue of interest for 
many academics. It has been undertaken since the very beginning from several 
perspectives, which despite their differences, all consider leadership as a process 
of social influence: i. e. leadership is given within an interaction between a leader 
and afollower in which each is affected by the other (Yukl, 2002; Bryman, 2001; 
Northouse, 2001; Gibson et aL, 2000; Heifetz, 1999; Middlehurst, 1993; Bass, 
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1990; Bimbaum, 1989; Bums, 1978; Cribbin, 1972). It is a reciprocal process 
(Kouzes & Posner, 1990) that occurs between people; an interactive phenomenon 
(Mintzberg & Westley, 1989). 
Some authors feel that the major problems confronting the study of 
leadership are the incongruity of approaches, the narrow focus used by many 
researchers, and the absence of broad theories in organisational settings that 
integrate the fmdings from different approaches (Parham, 1994). Many of the 
theories appear to be plagued with conceptual weaknesses and seem to lack strong 
empirical support. Studies on leadership come to contradictory and inconclusive 
results, and do not always manage to find an integrated way to characterise the 
concept (Yukl, 2002,1989; Bass, 1990,1985; Stogdill, 1974). 
In reviewing the leadership theories and their evolution over time, early 
scholars began by adopting a narrow scope which focused on the personal 
attributes of the leader (Yukl, 2002; Bryman, 2001; Northouse, 2001; 
Middlehurst, 1993). Subsequently, not only the leader's personal attributes were 
considered but the leader's behaviour, style and situation as well (Yukl, 2002; 
Bryman, 2001; Northouse, 2001; Middlehurst, 1993). 
Later, the scope broadened again; the dyadic relationship between the 
leader and the follower was introduced (Yukl, 2002; Bryman, 2001; Northouse, 
2001; Middlehurst, 1993). However, at this stage, different questions were raised 
about the level of influence that the follower has within the dyadic relationship. 
Researchers began to argue that followers exert their influence on the leader 
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(Grint, 2000; Parham, 1994) as well as vice versa, and thus, differences between 
power and influence were highlighted (Yukl, 2002; Middlehurst, 1993). While 
power was viewed as the ability to give orders enforced by actions, influence was 
seen as the ability to change the actions of others by persuasion (Middlehurst, 
1993). Followers are part of the inner context and therefore, they impact on the 
leadership process through their influence. 
When the concept of influence is addressed, the study of leadership 
focuses on charisma, vision and change, which - according to the perspective 
from which they are studied - are called transformationalltransactional 
leadership, charismatic leadership or visionar leadership. These different y 
perspectives are included in the 'New Leadership theories' (Middlehurst, 1993; 
Bryman, 1992). The study of leadership began to include other aspects such as the 
impact of organisational culture on leadership, the connections between 
leadership and change and between leadership and vision, motivation, and 
guidance towards the achievement of organisational goals. 
Even though the new leadership theories refer to the influence of others, 
these are not considered as part of the leadership model until the concept of co- 
leadership (Heenan & Bennis, 1999) or shared leadership (O'Toole et al., 2002; 
Pearce & Conger, 2003) is introduced. This paradigm refers to leadership enacted 
by a group of people, a constellation of co-stars (Heenan & Bennis, 1999). 
In broadening the approach to the study of leadership, a step forward is 
made by understanding leadership as an organisational process that enhances 
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performance in organisations. Performance is thus considered to be determined in 
great part by strategic choices and other major organisational decisions made 
within the firm (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Some scholars use the term "[ ] 
'strategic leadership' because it connotes management of an overall enterprise 
[] and it implies substantive decision-making responsibilities" (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick: 1996: 2). 
In summary, the approach to the leadership phenomenon from the 
viewpoint of strategic leadership represents a shift, broadening the scope of the 
study of leadership from a narrow focus upon the leader towards the study of 
leadership and its impact within the organisation. At this point, two alternative 
paths arise for the study of leadership: on the one hand, to concentrate on the 
impact of leadership upon the performance of the organisation as a whole 
(strategic leadership); and on the other hand, to focus on a contextual approach to 
strategic leadership which sees it as a process within a specific organisational 
context. Here, different people and features from both inner and outer contexts 
(history, culture, systems, economic performance, environment, etc. ) not only 
exert influence, but are in their turn influenced, in defining the strategic agenda 
and executing it over time. 
Next, we will trace the evolution of the concept of leadership. 
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1.2. Leadership 
Even though there are almost as many different definitions of leadership as 
there are people who have tried to define it (Northouse, 2001), this study intends 
to establish the similarities among them in order to define the concept. Table I 
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Despite the multitude of ways that leadership has been conceptualised, 
several components can be identified as central to the phenomenon of 
leadership. Firstly, most scholars seem to agree that leadership is a process of 
social inflitence whereby the leader exerts an impact on others by inducing 
them to behave in a certain way. Secondly, scholars also note that this process 
of social influence is conceptualised as taking place in a context that conditions 
the process. One context arises Erom the particular situation, and another from 
the relationship of the folloivers both among themselves and with the leader. 
Thirdly, within the leadership process, the leader influences the behaviour of 
group members in the direction of the common goals with which the group is 
faced. For goals to be common to all, group members need to understand them 
and agree not only with them but also about what needs to be done to achieve 
them. Effective leadership will be that which accomplishes the common goals. 
Finally, some scholars state that leadership involves values, motives and 
culture. These influence the leadership process as well since the values, motives 
and culture embedded in the organisation will enable the fulfilment of the 
vision. When group members share values, motives and culture, common goals 
are easily attained. 
However, even though the definition of leadership in terms of the 
elements just mentioned (social influence process, attainment of common goals, 
context and values, motives and culture) tends to hold sway in much of the 
history of leadership theory and research, it is most applicable to theory and 
research conducted up to the 1980s. Later definitions tend to dwell on the 
leader as a 'manager of meaning' (Smircich & Morgan, 1982; Bryman, 2001). 
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Some scholars assert that this phrase is meant to draw attention to the defining 
characteristic of true leadership as the active promotion of values, which 
provide shared meanings about the nature of the organisation (Bryman, 2001). 
This emphasis has the further potential to differ from the earlier definitions of 
leadership in that the focus on meaning might be taken to imply that a wider 
constituency of organisational members is implicated in leadership. In this way, 
meanings will tend to be the product of the interpretation of the messages 
intended by the leader. 
However, evolution in leadership definitions results from evolution in 
leadership theories. A reading of the literature shows that scholars broaden their 
scope of study over time, modifying their definition of the concept. This will be 
discussed next. 
a) Supervisory theories of leadership 
Although the phenomenon of leadership has been around since antiquity 
(Bass, 1990), the systematic social scientific study of leadership began in the 
early 1930s. For decades, scholars have approached the study of leadership 
from different psychological and sociological perspectives. The research that 
has been conducted since the 1930s can be classified as supervisory leadership 
theories, which include the trait, behavioural, and contingency approaches 
(Bryman, 200 1). These theories focus mainly on the person of the leader, on his 
or her skills, personal characteristics and leadership style, equating 
'leader' 
with 4leadership' (Parham, 1994). 
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i. Trait approach 
An example of these theories is the trait approach (Yukl, 2002; 
Bryman, 2001; Northouse, 2001; Kekale, 2001; House & Aditya, 1997; 
Middlehurst, 1993; Bass, 1990; Bimbaum,, 1989; Bensimon, 1989) that 
dominated the scene up to the late 1940s. Trait theories aim to determine the 
personal qualities and characteristics of leaders. They focus on the key skills 
that make the leader an exceptional person, fitted to be effective in coping with 
different challenges. Thus, the unit of analysis of the trait approach is the 
person of the leader. 
This approach emphasises the attributes of leaders such as personality, 
motives, values and skills (Yukl, 2002). The theories that were developed were 
referred to as 'great man' theories because they focused on identifying the 
innate qualities. and characteristics possessed by great social, political, and 
military leaders. It was believed that people were born with these traits and only 
the 'great' people possessed them (Bass, 1990; Jago, 1982). In this regard, 
some people are natural leaders who are endowed with certain traits not 
possessed by other people (House & Aditya, 1997). Its longevity gives the trait 
approach a measure of credibility not afforded by other approaches; it lays 
down benchmarks for what is needed by those wanting to be leaders. 
Furthermore, it is intuitively appealing since people have a need to see their 
leaders as gifted people and this approach fulfils this need (Northouse, 200 1). 
21 
Studies within the trait approach (e. g. Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Lord 
et al., 1986) look for a significant correlation between the attributes of the 
individual leader and the criteria of leader success. However, they do not 
examine any explanatory processes (Yukl, 2002). Moreover, in spite of 
extensive research efforts, no trait has been found that guarantees leadership 
success (Northouse, 2001; Parham, 1994). In this sense, decades of research 
have been unsuccessful in detailing the general and universal qualities or 
abilities of good and successful leaders (Bensimon, 1989). 
In addition, the notion of personal traits represents a somewhat static, 
indeed uni-dimensional view, and an inadequate explanation of the dynamic 
phenomenon of leadership (Kekale, 2001). This is the case because there is a 
lack of attention to intervening variables in the causal chain that can explain 
how traits will affect a delayed outcome, such as group performance or leader 
advancement (Yukl, 2002). 
Another problem with the trait approach is that there is little empirically 
substantiated personality theory to guide the search for leadership traits. 
Consequently, there are few replicated investigations of particular traits. Also, 
the methodology applied was not well developed during the time when trait 
studies dominated leadership research. As very little information about the 
psychometric properties of the trait measures has been reported, many of the 
measures have limited validity. As a consequence of the lack of theory and of 
valid instruments of measurement, the traits and their operationalisation vary 
widely among investigators (Northouse, 2001). 
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Finally, research within the trait approach is based almost exclusively 
on observations of supervisors and lower-level managers, rather than 
individuals in significant positions of leadership, such as high-level managers 
and chief executives with overall responsibility for organisational performance 
(House & Aditya, 1997). As a result, researchers have begun to examine how 
people actually behave, and to look at the relationship between their acts and 
their effectiveness (Parham, 1994). Following the disenchantment with trait 
theories, the scope of the study was broadened and leaders were studied either 
by observing their behaviour in laboratory settings or by asking individuals in 
field settings to describe the behaviour of persons in positions of authority, 
relating these descriptions to various criteria of leader effectiveness (House & 
Aditya, 1997). 
ii. Behavioural approach 
Researchers made progress in discovering how leader attributes are 
linked to leadership behaviour and effectiveness. Although the unit of analysis 
was still the person of the leader, the focus was centred on the behaviours and 
styles that make leaders more effective rather than on the leader's personal 
skills. This approach began in the early 1950s and researchers agreed at that 
time to call it the behavioural approach (Yukl, 2002; Bryman, 2001; 
Northouse, 2001; Kekale, 2001; House & Aditya, 1997; Middlehurst, 1993; 
Bass, 1990; Bimbaum, 1989; Bensimon, 1989). 
One of the major empirical contributions of the behavioural theories is 
the identification of two broad classes of leader behaviours - task-oriented and 
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person-oriented behaviours. This shift denotes an alteration in the practical 
implication of leadership research. While the trait approach draws attention to 
the kinds of people who are selected to become leaders, the behaviour 
approach emphasises training, rather than selecting leaders, since it is believed 
that leader behaviour is capable of being changed (Bryman, 2001; Northouse, 
2001). 
The initial guiding assumption of the behavioural approach is that there 
are some universally effective leader behaviours, and these are discovered by 
either observing leaders in action or by asking subordinates about the behaviour 
of their immediate superiors. As a result, the focus of the study is expanded to 
include what leaders do and how they do it but, since there is no justification 
for any of the leader's behaviour, patterns regarding effectiveness cannot be 
identified. Behavioural studies are frequently based on questionnaires that seek 
. to elicit subordinates' recall of the behaviour of their superiors, presumably 
reflecting global historical patterns of behaviour and relationships between 
leaders and followers, as well as specific recently enacted behaviours (Yukl, 
2002; Northouse, 2001; House & Aditya, 1997) and thus, have facilitated 
predictions regarding effective leadership behaviours. 
As in the case of trait research, research into the behavioural approach 
is largely inductive, and lacks theoretical orientation. Thus, basic theoretical 
concepts have not yet been developed. This approach 
is also Plagued by 
limitations of measurability, since many of the questionnaires are of dubious 
validity. 
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Moreover, little thought is given to the specific role demands of leaders, 
the context in which they function, or differences in the dispositions of leaders 
andfollowers. As researchers do not consider these factors, they are not able to 
identify leader behaviours that have universal effectiveness (Yukl, 2002; 
Bryman, 2001; Northouse, 2001). 
Although many research studies could be categorised under the heading 
of the behaviour approach, the Ohio State studies, the University of Michigan 
studies, and the studies by Blake and Mourton (1964,1978,1985) are strongly 
representative of the ideas found in this approach (Northouse, 2001). The Ohio 
State studies analyse how individuals act when they are leading a group or 
organisation. This analysis is conducted by having subordinates complete 
questionnaires about their leaders. The questionnaire used was constructed from 
a list of more than 1,800 items describing different aspects of leader behaviour. 
Responses clustered around two general types of leader behaviours: initiating 
structure (task behaviours) and consideration (relationship behaviours) 
(Northouse, 2001). 
The Michigan studies (Katz et al., 1950; Katz et al., 1951; Katz & 
Kahn, 1952) explore leadership behaviour, giving special attention to the 
impact of leader behaviours on the performance of small groups. The 
programme identified two types of leadership behaviours, called employee 
orientation (behaviour of leaders who approach subordinates with a strong 
human relations emphasis) and production orientation (leadership behaviours 
that stress the technical and production aspects of a job) (Northouse, 2001). 
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The Blake & Mourton Managerial Grid is perhaps the best-known 
model of managerial behaviour. It first appeared in the early 1960s and since 
that time, it has been refined and revised several times. This Leadership Grid is 
designed to explain how leaders help organisations to reach their purposes 
through two factors: concern for production (how a leader is concerned with 
achieving organisational tasks) and concern for people (how a leader attends to 
the people within the organisation who are trying to achieve its goals). The 
Leadership Managerial Grid joins concern for production and concern for 
people in a model that has two intersecting axes. By plotting scores from each 
of the axes, various leadership styles can be illustrated (Northouse, 2001). 
Even though these two approaches, in essence, attempt to find a 
universal 'one best way' to lead, their contribution is limited. Researchers 
realised that they do not demonstrate conclusively the relationship between 
leadership and effectiveness, and recognised that leadership effectiveness 
depends upon the situation. Scholars began to understand that in order to be 
effective, leaders must be flexible enough to adapt to the differences between 
theirfollowers and a given situation (Parham, 1994). 
Consequently, researchers began to appreciate the need for a more 
comprehensive vision of the influence of a particular situation on leaders and 
followers. There are still some questions to be answered, such as: in what way 
do internal and external constituencies influence leaders and followers? Do 
these constituencies affect leaders' and followers' behaviour? And if they do, in 
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what way? These questions are the first steps towards a consideration of the 
influence of context on the leadership process. 
iii. Contingency approach 
Therefore, in order to reconcile differences among the findings 
concerning leader behaviours, in the late 1960s, researchers made another shift 
towards a new approach to the study of leadership: contingency theories. This 
an roach views leadership as being entirely situational; situation is a key factor 
in influencing the leader's task and behaviour (Yukl, 2002; Northouse, 2001). 
Contingency theories included five different theories: Fiedler's 
Contingency Theory of Leadership (Fiedler, 1967; 1971); the Path Goal Theory 
of Leader Effectiveness (House, 1971; House & Mitchell, 1974); the Life Cycle 
theory (Hersey & Blanchard's (1982); the Cognitive Resource Theory (Fiedler 
& Garcia, 1987), and the Decision Process Theory (Vroom & Yetton, 1973). 
Proponents of these theories place situational factors such as the nature of the 
task, the external environment, and the abilities of the followers in the presence 
of effective leadership (Kekale, 2001; Middlehurst, 1993; Birnbaum, 1989), 
towards the centre of any understanding of leadership (Bryman, 2001). They try 
to specify the situational variables that will moderate the effectiveness of 
different leadership approaches. Hence, as focus is placed on the impact of the 
environment on the leader's behaviour, the unit of analysis becomes the 
situation - i. e. different situations demand different kinds of leadership. 
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Researchers seem to find this approach valid and reliable in explaining 
how effective leadership can be achieved. It provides data on leaders' styles 
that can be useful to organisations in developing leadership profiles. Moreover, 
contingency theories emphasise the importance of focusing on the leadership 
contexts, particularly the link between the leader and the situations (Northouse, 
2001). 
However, although the contingency approach represents a considerable 
improvement, in that it introduces situation as a key factor in influencing the 
leader's task and behaviour, it is still weak at offering a completely satisfying 
account of leadership. The leader-follower interactions, the follower's 
influence on the leaders, the differences in leadership at various organisational 
levels and the contrasts between different leadership influences are not 
considered (Kekale, 2001; Middlehurst, 1993). 
Overall, contingency theories are supported more strongly in field 
studies than in laboratory studies. However, field studies are susceptible to bias 
Erom correlated observations, as all the variables involved are measured using 
reports from the same source (Northouse, 2001). 
Moreover, since these theories view leadership as being entirely 
situational, the personal characteristics of the leader are not predictive of 
leadership ability. As a result, the situation seems to be overemphasised, and 
the personal nature of leadership underemphasised (Parham, 1994). 
Table 2 
surnmarises the study of leadership through the trait, 
behaviour and 
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contingency approaches, which join into 'supervisory leadership', defined as 
behaviour intended to provide guidance, support, and corrective feedback for 
the day-to-day activities of work unit members (Middlehurst, 1993). 
Table 2: Supervisory Leadership 
Period Approach Focus 
Up to late 1940s Trait theories Leadership is linked to personal qualities. 
Focus on leaders' attributes. 
From early 1950s Behavioural Leadership is associated with behaviour and style. 
theories 
From late 1960s Contingency Leadership is affected by the context and situation. 
theories 
Sources: Yukl (2002); Northouse (2001); Mddlehurst (1993); Bass (1990). 
These theories focus predominantly on certain aspects of leadership 
(leader traits, behaviour and situation), without considering other relevant 
aspects, such as other people involved in the leadership process. Moreover, in 
studying the supervisory theories of leadership, it seems that focusing on the 
person of the leader - trait and behavioural theories - or on the relationship 
between the leader and the situation - contingency theories - leads to the 
problem of whether the research ought also to focus on the followers. It should 
not be forgotten that the role of the followers may become as important as that 
of the leaders. Followers may exert considerable influence on leaders whose 
power is constrained by followers' expectations (Ekhart & Klein, 
2001; Grint, 
2000; Middlehurst, 1993). 
Figure I shows how leadership may be affected by the interaction 
between the leader, the follower, and the context. The leadership process is not 
static but dynamic. It is a process 
involving the leader, the follower and the 
29 
present context, and the leadership process will vary according to the different 
characteristics of leader, follower or context. 
Figure 1: The Leadership Process 
Thus, researchers nowadays conclude that the reciprocal relationship 
between leaders and followers should be considered. "Leadership is an 
essentially social phenomenon: without followers there are no leaders. " (Grint, 
2000: 6). However, some questions still remain to be answered about the way 
in which the followers impact the leadership; are there any followers who exert 
more influence than others? Are there any variables that transform the way 
followers view themselves or their task? These variables are tackled by theories 
formulated later, the new leadership theories, which are described in the next 
section. 
b) New leadership theories 
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By the 1980s a major paradigm shift was beginning to take place. 
Attention was centred not only on the interactive dyadic relationship between 
the leader and the follower but also on the use and nature of power and 
influence; the impact of organisational culture on leadership; the connection 
between leadership and change - at both individual and organisational levels; 
leadership and vision; motivation and guidance towards the achievement of 
collective goals; and the nature of charisma in relation to leadership 
(Middlehurst, 1993; Conger & Kanungo, 1988). Power and influence make up 
the fine texture of organisations and indeed of all interactions, where influence 
is the process and where power is the force that enables the leader to make 
decisions (Handy, 1985). 
Considering the perspective of this new paradigm, leadership is not 
based on the characteristics or traits of any individual. Rather, it must be 
I examined within a given system that involves roles and interactions among the 
individuals fulfilling those roles (Parham, 1994). Hence, the unit of analysis of 
these theories is no longer the leader but the interactive social influence 
process. This new change of focus gives birth to what Bryman (1992) calls New 
Leadership Theories. These theories represent a substantial change in the basic 
approach to the understanding of leadership since they release the study of 
leadership in organisations from the theoretical constraints imposed 
by focusing 
on the social psychology of small groups. Thus, scholars now 
tend to focus on 
processes of top-level leadership of entire organisations 
(Conger & Kanungo, 
1988). 
i. Charismatic Leadership 
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Among the new leadership theories, charismatic theories of leadership 
include the 1976 Theory of Charismatic Leadership (House, 1977), the 
Attributional Theory of Charismatic Leadership (Conger & Kanungo, 1987), 
and the Value Based Theory of Leadership (House et al., 1996). These theories 
stress the personal identification of the follower with the leader. They conceive 
leadership primarily as an attributional phenomenon - i. e. an attribution made 
by individuals who work in organisations in respect of certain leaders. 
According to this perspective, the key issue becomes that of revealing the types 
of behaviour that are most likely to lead to the attribution of charismatic 
leadership. The starting point is a vision, which breaks with the status quo - "an 
idealised goal that the leader wants the organisation to achieve in the future" 
(Bryman, 1992: 102). In order to be effective, charismatic leaders need to have 
high power motivation to advocate the vision of a better future for the 
organisation and for their followers (House, 1977). 
ii. Transformational Leadership 
The Theory of Transformational Leadership suggested by Burns (1978) 
and further developed and operationalised by Bass (1985) entails both leaders 
and followers raising each other's motivation and sense of higher purpose. This 
higher purpose is One in which the aims and aspirations of leaders and 
followers join into one (Bums, 1978). The transfonning leader seeks to engage 
the follower as a whole person, and not simply as an individual with a restricted 
range of basic needs (Bryman, 1992). Focus is moved away 
from the leader 
towards the follower. The leader's unique contribution may be to collect and 
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integrate the components of a vision provided by the followers, and then to 
make the vision come alive through persuasive articulation (Yukl, 1989). 
Since the advent of transformational leadership theories, leadership has 
been seen as consisting of leaders influencing followers and then being 
influenced by their responses in return (Bums, 1978). These theories 
acknowledge the importance of the relationship in terms of the leader's effect 
on the followers and the transcending of seff-interest by the folloivers for the 
good of the organisation. These theories grant followers great importance 
within the dyadic relationship (Parham, 1994; Bums, 1978), since the role of 
the follower is not merely to follow but to keep the leader in control of the 
situation. Even more, the importance of the followers' contributions leads to an 
understanding of leadership effectiveness. Some scholars assert, however, that 
followers are not a dependent variable responding to the motivational talents of 
leaders, since there can be no leader without a follower (Parham, 1994). 
iii. Transactional Leadership 
By contrast, transactional leadership theories entail a bargaining 
process within the interaction between both leader and follower; an exchange 
between leader and follower, such as the follower receiving wages or prestige 
for compliance with the leader's wishes. There is a kind of implicit contract 
beyond which the followers are not prepared to venture in meeting their formal 
obligations. Leadership takes place, but it does not bind "leader and 
follower 




The difference between the transfortnational and transactional 
conceptions of leadership is important because of the implication that a leader 
can be both transactional and transfon-national. While transformational 
leadership comprises charisma, inspiration, individualised consideration and 
intellectual stimulation, transactional leadership comprises contingent reivard 
and management-by-exception (Bass, 1985). 
iv. Visionary Leadership 
Finally, the visionary theories of leadership were advanced by Kousnes 
& Posner (1987), and Bennis & Nanus (1985), operationalised by Sashkin 
(1988), and extended by Nanus (1992). They refer to the identity that describes 
what is central, distinctive and enduring about the organisation. These theories 
aim at transforming an organisational culture in line with the vision articulated 
by the leader, which shows where the organisation should be heading. Here, the 
personal capacities and abilities of certain individuals may be seen as crucial to 
their potential as visionary leaders (specially the need to achieve power). 
Scholars highlight three central features of visionary leaders: distinctive 
personal characteristics, such as the need for power; decisive impacts on 
organisational functioning such as changing the organisation's culture to 
express the vision; and distinctive behavioural patterns (Sashkin, 1988). These 
new leadership theories have several common characteristics. Firstly, they all 
attempt to explain how leaders are able to lead organisations. Secondly, they 
also attempt to explain how certain leaders are able to achieve extraordinary 
levels of follower motivation, admiration, respect and trust. Thirdly, they stress 
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symbolic and emotionally appealing leader behaviours. Finally, the leader 
effects include identification with the leader's vision (House & Aditya, 1997). 
c) Shared Leadership 
Thus far, the study has addressed what Pearce & Conger (2003) would 
have referred to as the typical top-down paradigm of leadership. In this regard, 
Locke (2003) suggests four models for describing the mechanisms through 
which leadership and influence may be exercised and travel within a group of 
people: top-down, bottom-up, lateral (which he calls 'shared leadership) and 
integrated - i. e. a combination of top-down, bottom-up, and lateral leadership. 
However, recent studies have focused on the shared leadership 
paradigm. Pearce & Conger (2003: 1) define shared leadership as "a dynamic, 
interactive influence process among individuals in groups for which the 
objective is to lead one another to the achievement of group or organisational 
goals or both. This influence process often involves peer, or lateral, influence 
and at other times involves upward or downward hierarchical influence. " 
Shared leadership is about co-leadership: inclusive, not exclusive. "It celebrates 
those who do the real work, not just a few charismatic leaders, often isolated, 
who are regally compensated for articulating the organisation! s vision" 
(Hennan & Bennis, 1999: 5). 
The underlying rationale of this new perspective of 
leadership refers to 
the newer generation of organisations and their key characteristic: 
they do not 
have a centralised, unitary command structure. Rather, they are often a 
loose 
35 
alliance built around a common interest (Dunphy, 2000). In this regard, 
leadership is often shared across the various partners or members, making it 
difficult for a single individual of one entity to truly lead the alliance or 
network. 
Proponents of the shared leadership paradigm view an expanded role for 
followers in the leadership process (Pearce & Conger, 2003); "Anyone can be a 
co-leader" (Heenan & Bennis, 1999: 6). It seems relevant to note that shared 
leadership is not just an issue at the top of organisations; rather, it refers to 
people at all levels of organisations (O'Toole et al., 2002). Many of the key 
tasks and responsibilities of leadership are institutionalised in the systems, 
practices, and cultures of the organisation. These key organisational variables 
are not included in research based on a solo leadership model (O'Toole et al., 
2002: 82). 
Along these lines, Heenan & Bennis (1999) suggest that power and 
responsibility are dispersed, giving the enterprise a whole constellation of co- 
stars - co-leaders with shared values and aspirations, all of whom work 
together toward common goals. 
Thus, shared leadership represents a valuable step forward in the study 
of leadership since it provides a broader perspective on the leadership 
phenomenon, considering not just the person of the leader and top management 
team, but also other people. It goes beyond the formal authority, 
including other 
people who wield influence. However, this perspective remains within a 
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sociological approach to the leadership phenomenon in organisations. This 
study is focused on leadership of organisations - i. e. leadership considered as a 
process that critically impacts on the organisation, its positioning, performance 
and character. 
Table 3: Leadership research concentrated on supervisory 
leadership, new leadership theories and shared leadership 
Period Approach Focus 
Up to late Trait theories Leadership is linked to personal qualities. Focus on 
r- 1940s leaders' attributes. 
From early Behavioural theories Leadership is associated with behaviour and style. 
0 "a 1950s 
.2 From late Contingency theories Leadership is affected by the context and situation. 1960s 
Charismatic Leadership is an attributional phenomenon. 
leadership 
un Transformational Leadership refers to intellectual stimulation, 
From 1980s leadership individual consideration and inspiration. 
Transactional Leadership is a bargaining process between leader 
leadership and follower. z Visionary leadership Leadership aligns organisation with vision. 
Towards the Shared leadership Leadership as a dynamic, interactive influence 
end of process among individuals in groups for which the 
1990S objective is to lead one another to the achievement 
= "a 
of group or organisational goals or both 
Sources: Pearce & Conger (2003); Locke (2003); U "I oole et al. (2. UU2); Y UJKI (2. UU2. ); 
Northouse (200 1); Heenan & Bennis (1999); House & Aditya (1997); Nfiddlehurst (1993); 
Bryman (1992); Bass (1990). 
1.3. Strategic leadership 
In broadening the scope of the study of leadership, the focus is on the 
impact of leadership in organisational performance. With this purpose in mind, 
and mainly during the 1990s, multiple studies approached the phenomenon of 
leadership and its impact on the overall organisational performance as strategic 
leadership. 
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In studying strategic leadership, scholars focus on executives who have 
overall responsibility for an organisation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
Their view is that the impact of the actions of strategic leadership within the 
organisation is related to the influence of the organisation in the tasks facing the 
leadership. Top managers are often constrained by factors in their 
environments, organisational inertia resulting from fixed costs and prior 
commitments, and the limitations of the executives themselves. These 
constraints limit the effects of the executives' decisions and behaviour on 
overall organisational performance (House & Aditya, 1997). 
This approach to strategic leadership has led scholars to the need to 
consider contextual variables that influence strategic decisions, factors such as 
size, organisational environment (inner and outer context), the stages of life of 
the organisation and its type of strategy, technology, and organisational form. 
These variables are all likely to impose different demands on leaders and, thus, 
to require specific leader behaviours (House & Aditya, 1997) according to the 
leader's beliefs and values. Within an organisation, decision-making is 
influenced by people in general (not only the top management team) and by 
events. Leaders will act according to the influences upon them within the 
context in which they perforra their duties. In this sense, "[ ... ] 
if leadership is 
embedded in social and cultural beliefs and values, then leadership cannot be 
ftilly understood apart form the context in which it exists" (Biggart & 
Hamilton, 1987: 437). 
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Strategic leadership is the variable that brings about the strategy 
formulation and implementation process and is indicated by the direction, 
purpose, adaptation to the environment, and the allocation of resources present 
in the organisation (Parham, 1994). It is defined as a person's ability to 
anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility, think strategically, and work with 
others to initiate changes that will create a viable future for the organisation 
(Ireland & Hitt, 2005; 1999). 
In summary, strategic leadership includes decisions and actions such as 
"[ ] creating and communicating a vision of the future; developing key 
competencies and capabilities; developing organisational structures, processes, 
and controls; managing multiple constituencies; selecting and developing the 
next generation of leaders; sustaining an effective organisational culture; and 
infusing ethical value systems into an organisation's culture" (Boal & 
Hooijberg, 2001: 516). This kind of leadership contributes to clarifying the 
vision and mission of the organisation, where vision refers to "the kind of 
organisation that people aspire to create in the long term" (Kotter, 1990: 39) 
and mission to the "primary task, or reason to be" (Schein, 1992: 52). 
Thus, there is a new shift in the study of the leadership phenomenon. 
Scholars realise that organisational perfonnance is affected not only by 
decisions and actions of executives at the strategic apex of the organisation but 
also by contextual variables such as size and organisational environment. Table 
4 displays different strategic leadership definitions according to various 
researchers. They mostly agree that strategic leadership 
is about leadership of 
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organisations (Bryman, 1992) and that it is marked by a concern for the 
evolution of the organisation as a whole, including its changing aims and 
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In addressing the concept of strategic leadership, some authors focus on 
the isolated actions of the people at the strategic apex of the organisation. They 
centre predominantly on the content, or types of policies and strategies that lead 
to effective or ineffective overall organisational performance. For example, 
among theoretical and empirical studies on strategic leadership, Lieberson and 
O'Connor (1972) compare the influence of corporate and environmental factors 
with the leadership effects among 167 major publicly owned corporations 
between 1946 and 1965; Salancik & Pfeffer (1977) examine the effects of 
mayors on city budgets for 30 US cities between 1951 and 1968; Smith, Carson 
& Alexander (1984) study the careers of senior United Methodist ministers 
over a 20-year period; Fiedler (1996) bases his study on a survey of 269 
industrial and organisational psychologists by Schippman et al. (1995). 
Moreover, Finkelstein & Hambrick (1996) analyse the role of top 
executives and their influence on organisations from a strategic leadership 
perspective with the purpose of suggesting a new research agenda for the 
future. They show that the decisions made by individuals and/or team, along 
with their actions, have important effects on a firm's performance. The two 
authors refer to leadership by any or all of the people who have an impact on 
the organisation as a whole through their decisions (strategic leadership), as 
opposed to the leadership of only one person or TMT. 
The strategic leadership approach has answered the call to "put top 
managers back in the strategy picture" (Hambrick, 1989: 5), 
for the 
understanding of strategic leadership benefits the understanding of the strategy 
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process (Chakravarthy et al., 2003). Accordingly, the disconnection between 
the fields of leadership and strategy that has been taking place over the last few 
decades is now coming to an end. In studying the leadership phenomenon from 
the perspective of organisational theory, a more contextual approach is 
necessarily adopted: leadership of organisations rather than in organisations 
(Bryman, 2001). 
However, by focusing on top executives, Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1996) do not mean to imply that all strategic choices are generated at the apex 
of the organisation. In this sense, they affirm, "Strategies come from the top, 
but they also bubble up and accrete from below" (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996: 3). 
In summary, the study of leadership over time has moved from a focus 
on the leader and his or her personal traits, how he or she adapts to different 
situations, the relationship between the leader and the follower and the 
influence exerted between them, the focus on co-leadership or shared 
leadership (not as a solo leadership model), towards strategic leadership with a 
focus on the content of leaders' decisions and actions that impact organisational 
performance. Even though the approach to the study of leadership has evolved 
through considering the organisational context in which strategic leadership is 
enacted, Hal e attention "has been paid to the processes by which strategic 
leaders affect organisations" (House & Aditya, 1997: 447). 
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Most of the studies on strategic leadership adopt a perspective limited to 
the decisions and actions as singular events or static pictures, with neither past 
nor future (e. g. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). There still exist some 
limitations due to the insufficient attention devoted to the dynamics, 
interconnections and interrelations of decisions, actions and events - i. e. to the 
processual perspective of the study of strategic leadership. 
1.4. Strategic leadership as a process in organisational 
settings over time 
The study of strategic leadership as a process highlights the complex 
pattern of interlocking, sequential and simultaneous value-added activities of 
leadership situated at different levels in the organisation (Burgelman, 2002). It 
helps explain paradoxes, vicious circles, dilemmas, and tensions that derive 
from the activities of leadership who are differentially situated in the 
organisation and respond to different external and internal pressures 
(Burgelman, 2002). 
The driving assumption behind process analysis is that social reality is 
not a steady state. It occurs as a dynamic process rather than merely existing 
(Sztompka, 1991). Processual analysis enables us to catch reality in flight 
(Pettigrew, 1997); processual analysis of strategic leadership is designed to 
account for and explain the 'what? ', 'why? ' and 'how? ' of the links between 
context, processes and outcomes (Pettigrew, 1997). The processual perspective 
focuses primarily on what leaders do to mobilise others in a system of 
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interrelationships rather than on 'what they are' (Denis et al., 2001). It 
visualises the tactics (Denis et al., 2001; 1996) that leaders use to influence the 
course of events as well as the types of organisational outcomes they promote. 
The findings of Denis et al. (200 1) are an example of research that 
considers strategic leadership as a process taking place in an organisational 
setting and views strategic leadership as a collective phenomenon to which 
different individuals can contribute in different ways. Denis et al. (200 1) 
examine the dynamics of leadership and strategic change in the Canadian health 
care sector, over time. Their findings suggest that there are 'leadership role 
constellations' within organisations which complement each other. This implies 
an adequate coverage of all activity domains as well as the existence of 
mechanisms allowing different actors to play their respective roles in a 
concerted manner. The fact that members of leadership role constellations 
intervene within their organisations causes strategic leadership to be considered 
a dynamic phenomenon, which views structure and action as mutually 
influencing one another over time, with individual action being constrained by 
structure and yet simultaneously modifying that structure. 
This study refers to the strategic leadership process as the 'set of 
decisions, actions and events produced by the whole set of key people and 
features from both inner and outer contexts, in providing direction, influencing 
major strategic choices and implementing them, in order to achieve the 
organisational mission, over time' (Boal & Hooijberg, 2001; 
Grint 2000; House 
& Aditya, 1997; Kotter, 1996; Schein, 1992; Collins & Porras, 1991; Pettigew, 
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1997,1973; Dutton, 1986). However, it seems relevant to acknowledge that 
when considering such a set of decisions, actions and events within the SLP, 
this study does not focus only on those that actually take place but also on those 
options not considered (Camall, 2003), the non-decisions - i. e. covert issues 
about which the decision has effectively been taken that they will not be 
decided (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). 
Thus, in order to set boundaries within the broad concept of the 
strategic leadership process (SLP), this study will observe the SLP from the 
perspective of more specific and concrete activities, as elements within the 
main SLP: strategic agenda-building and strategic agenda-executing. While a 
different grouping could be given to these activities, and this approach is one 
alternative among several, we suggest that it includes the most critical 
dimensions within the SLP in trying to understand and analyse the SLP over 
time, as the main level of analysis for this study. 
1.5. Strategic Leadership Process (SLP) as strategic 
agenda-building and -executing, over time 
a) Strategic agenda 
We have just defined the SLP as the set of decisions, actions and events 
produced by the whole set of key people in providing direction. Scholars 
identify this as direction-setting and declare it to be crucial within strategic 
leadership (Lorange, 2002; Van Baalen & Moratis, 2001; Hagen et al., 1998). 
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Through direction- setting, leaders establish organisational goals and strategic 
actions (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2002), giving purpose, meaning and guidance 
according to the core beliefs and values embedded in the organisation (Collins 
& Porras, 1991). 
Direction- setting results from a combination of strategic choices 
(Lorange, 2002) that are constrained by environmental forces. Organisations 
usually seek to interpret these forces by looking into the environment. This 
managerial activity of learning about events and trends in the organisation's 
environment is defined as "environmental scanning" (Hambrick, 1981 a: 299). 
The available evidence suggests that environmental scanning is not necessarily 
a formal task assigned specifically to certain executives (Hambrick, 1981a). 
Middle- and top-level executives usually conduct this activity on an informal 
basis. Of course, in organisations some scanning is conducted on a formal basis 
through planning offices and market research staff (Hambrick, 198 1 b). 
Environmental scanning can be conceived of as the first step in the 
ongoing chain of perceptions and actions that lead to the individuals in an 
organisation acting on those issues to which their attention is drawn (Hambrick, 
1981a). Thus, individuals carry out activities and processes by which they 
translate the data and stimuli which result from scanning the envirom-nent into 
focused issues and the issues explored (Dutton et al., 1983). Such issues, 
defined as "strategic issues " (Dutton et aL, 1983: 307), become relevant 
because they are likely to have a significant impact on the organisation's 
present and future strategies. 
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Accordingly, environmental scanning examines how decision-makers 
identify and monitor issues emanating from the external environment (Dutton et 
al., 1989). However, identifying strategic issues through the diagnosis enabled 
by environmental scanning does not rely solely on observation of the external 
environment but also builds on existing openings in the organisational context 
(Denis et al., 1996). In this sense, decision-makers hold concepts and beliefs 
determined by "cognitive maps" (Dutton et aL, 1983: 3 10) that provide the lens 
through which they view the world. 
In carrying out the strategic issue diagnosis, the interpretative lens of 
cognitive maps selects certain aspects of an issue as important and links them to 
certain actions and consequences, while ignoring others (Dutton et al., 1983). 
The consequentiality of issue diagnosis awakens the different interests of 
decision-makers who attempt to influence the process to suit their own needs 
(Narayanan & Fahey, 1982). 
Moreover, given the impact of organisational context in shaping issue 
mterpretations, several studies support the idea that it is an important influence 
on decision-makers (Capelli & Scherer, 1991). In this connection, Denison et 
aL (1996) refer to three aspects of organisational context: organisational 
experience in the issue domain, organisational inertia, and organisational 
resources as interpreted by individuals. 
These attempts at influencing are manifested in the distortion and/or 
selective control of data in order to create a particular 
focus and direction 
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(Dutton et al., 1983). This process of paying attention to strategic issues is 
conceptualised as an "agenda-building" process (Dutton, 1986: 3), where 
it agenda" (Dutton, 1986: 6) is the structure that limits and orders an array of 
issues for top-level decision-makers in organisations. 
In observing "how issues come to be issues in the first place" (Kingdon, 
1990: 1), researchers focus on a process that takes place during the early stages 
of decision-making, when issues are first identified and diagnosed: issue-selling 
(Dutton & Ashford, 1993). This process refers to individuals' behaviours that 
are directed toward affecting others' attention to and understanding of issues. 
Issue-selling prompts top management to attend to issues where they might 
otherwise not do so, fostering their legitimisation as organisational issues 
(Dutton & Ashford, 1993). 
b) Strategic agenda-building and -executing 
The strategic agenda is the product of forces at multiple levels of the 
organisation that -consciously or subconsciously work to make an issue 
consensual, legitimate and resource-consuming (Dutton, 1986). Thus, when this 
process of agenda-building is formalised, organisations employ strategic issue 
management systems to identify and legitimate a subset of potential strategic 
issues for further consideration. On the other hand, when this process is 
informal and implicit, organisations have no clear identifiable system for 
generating the set of strategic agenda issues (Dutton, 1986). 
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In trying to understand the conditions under which strategic issues are 
likely to receive attention, Dutton (1986) develops a model of strategic agenda- 
building. She concludes that the probability that any particular issue will be 
placed on the strategic agenda depends on the conditions of three interactive 
factors at any one point in time: firstly, issue salience, which refers to the 
different levels of interest in and exposure to an issue according to its 
consequentia ty and urgency, and results in the admission of some issues onto 
the strategic agenda, and the denial of others. Secondly, issue sponsorship, 
related to the political foundation of an issue. This idea acknowledges that the 
activation of interests over the definition of strategic issues politicises the 
process of strategic agenda-building. Here, the key point is to understand that 
certain individuals become attached to strategic issues. Whether acting 
autonomously or as members of a coalition, sponsors latch onto issues and 
mobilise interest and spread awareness about a particular issue, translating a 
concern into action by its placement on the strategic agenda (Dutton, 1986). 
Thus, issue sponsorship will be likely to depend on the sponsor's centrality and 
his or her particular characteristics. Finally, agenda structure refers to the entry 
of a new issue onto the strategic agenda, facilitated or constrained by the form 
or structure of the organisation's agenda at the time an issue is being initiated 
(Dutton, 1986). 
In sum, the tactics for managing agenda-building in organisations rely 
upon actions that influence the three factors that detennine an issue's force: 
issue salience, issue sponsorship and agenda structure. By influencing any of 
these three interactive factors that foster the legitimation of strategic issues 
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throughout organisations, the likelihood that a particular issue or set of issues 
will -gain agenda status is altered. These actions have a profound influence on 
the strategic direction of the organisation (Dutton, 1986). Once certain strategic 
issues have finally been included in the strategic agenda of the organisation, the 
ensuing decision-making processes will result in decisions that are formulated 
and implemented for the organisation to fulfil its strategy. 
It seems relevant to note that the range of potential decisions and actions 
taken to resolve a strategic issue "falls along a continuum ranging from modest, 
small-scale change to far more extensive radical and dramatic changes" (Dutton 
& Duncan, 1987: 286). Thus, strategic issues involving a turning point in the 
strategic agenda of the organisation produce breakthrough initiatives with a 
high impact on the organisational agenda; whereas strategic issues which carry 
on strategies previously set, produce only incremental initiatives. 
Moreover, in carrying out decision processes, decision-makers find 
themselves compelled to adapt to contextual antecedent factors (Rajagopalan et 
aL, 1993), such as diverse environmental demands (Rajagopalan et aL, 1993; 
Sporn, 1999), organisational conditions and decision-specific characteristics 
(Rajagopalan et al., 1993). In this regard, decision processes can be viewed as 
the result of human and organisational constraints, which influence the course 
of events in a way that suits some individuals' ends or blocks the objectives of 
others. On some occasions, influence drives decisions into the sphere of 'non- 
decisions'. 
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This limitation applies not only to those individuals engaged in the 
process, but also to those who, although only indirectly involved, still exert 
some influence (Miller et al., 2001). Different issues will attract different 
individuals who will want to be concerned because they are affected by what is 
being decided, or because they see a chance to influence matters in their favour. 
Thus, decision-makers face the need to undertake a variety of decisions; in fact, 
not just decisions in the sense of specific commitments to action (Mintzberg et 
al., 1976), but various strategic decision-making processes: - i. e. important 
actions and dynamic factors that begin with the identification of a stimulus for 
action and end with the specific commitment to undertake that action 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
Accordingly, strategic decision-making is crucial for this study on the 
strategic leadership process because it involves the fundamental decisions that 
shape the course of an organisation (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992); the 
consequential ones which govern what things are done and shape the future 
direction of the organisation and the lives of the people within it (Miller et al., 
2001). They are "... important, in terms of the actions taken, the resources 
committed, or the precedents set" (Mintzberg et al., 1976: 246; Eisenhardt 
& 
Zbaracki, 1992: 17): i. e. those infrequent decisions made by the top leaders of 
an organisation that critically affect organisational health and survival. 
A strategic decision is "one which is new to the organisation adopting 
it, 
no matter how old the programme or policy may 
be or how many other 
organisations may have adopted 
it" (Walker, 1969: 881). Wilson (1982: 133) 
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defines strategic decisions as those "made about issues previously 
unencountered or unexplored in an organisation". Moreover, strategic decisions 
are the set of decisions that result in the rmulation and im lementation of fo 
strategies designed to achieve the major objectives of the organisation. These 
decisions involve complex long-term, future-oriented issues (Pearce et al., 
1987) that are already part of the strategic agenda of the organisation. 
In the same way that strategic decision-making results from the 
formulation phase of organisations' strategy, the implementation or execution 
phase deals with how to convert decisions into actions to achieve predefined 
goals (Chakravarthy et al., 2003). As a result of the way strategic decision- 
making is carried out, the decision resulting from the formulation phase may 
assume different forms: commitment to action; postponement of a decision to a 
-r- - future date; a non-decision or dropping of the issue from the strategic agenda of 
the organisation; transformation, or portraying the issue as a symptom of a 
larger issue yet to be resolved (Narayanan & Fahey, 1982). 
Since decisions are valueless unless put into effect, sometimes decision- 
makers push execution to get decisions adopted (Nutt, 2001). Thus, in order to 
guarantee the embracing of those decisions which result from the strategic 
decision process, decision-makers "use implementation" (Nutt, 2001: 233). To 
do so, they create environments in which decisions can survive and take root 
(Nutt, 1986). 
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In sum, the term strategic agenda-building and -executing refers to the 
processes through which strategic issues gain decision-makers' attention and 
are legitimated in the organisation. The expression highlights the effort and 
resources that individuals expend to have an issue made a strategic agenda item 
(Dutton, 1986). 
This has been a brief overview of the research paradigms and of some of 
the existing theories that have historically been most prominent in the 
leadership literature. Their main assumptions and limitations, as well as any 
remaining unanswered questions to date, have been exposed, starting from the 
supervisory theories o leadership (trait, behavioural and contingency ýf 
approaches) and passing through the new leadership theories (charismatic, 
transformational, transactional and visionary) all the way to the modem 
emphasis on the strategic leadership of the executives who have overall 
responsibility for an organisation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) and on the 
call for more organisational focus. 
The study of the strategic leadership process in organisational. settings is 
intended to shed light on the set of decisions, actions and events involved in 
providing direction (strategic agenda-building), influencing major strategic 
choices and implementing them (strategic agenda executing), in order to 
achieve an organisational mission, over time (Boal & Hooijberg, 2001; Kotter, 
1996; House & Aditya, 1997; Collins & Porras, 1991; Grint, 2000; Schein, 
1992; Pettigrew, 1973,1997; Dutton, 1986). In tracing the study of the 
leadership phenomenon from its early trends, scholars have approached it as if 
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leadership were enacted in a vacuum - i. e. were context-ftee - since 
organisational variables have been completely ignored. Since then there has 
been a shift in the study of leadership, and scholars nowadays refer to it as a 
collective phenomenon that contemplates the dynamics of decisions and 
actions. In this way the scope has been broadened to refer to the study of 
strategic leadership as a process in context. 
In order to shed light on the contextual and processual perspective of 
strategic leadership, this study will approach strategic leadership as a process 
within a specific organisational setting. The following section addresses the 
particular setting in which the strategic leadership process is observed. 
2. Strategic Leadership as a Process in Organisational Settings: 
Business Schools 
2.1. Introduction 
Up till now, we have approached the study of the leadership 
phenomenon from several perspectives. Initially, the focus was on the person of 
the leader, his personal traits and characteristics (trait theory); his behaviour 
and style (behavioural theory); and then the leader's situation (contingency 
theory). Later, a shift in the study caused the role of the follower to be 
addressed, and with it the focus moved from the role of the leader to the 
dyadic 
relationship between leaders and followers. The new 
leadership theories 
introduce power and influence, vision, and change to the leadership scenario. 
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At this stage, the shared leadership paradigm is introduced. This 
conceptualisation of leadership stands in contrast to traditional notions. The key 
distinction between shared leadership and traditional models of leadership is 
that the influence process involves more than just downward influence on 
subordinates by an appointed or elected leader (Pearce & Sims, 2000; 2002). 
Rather, leadership is broadly distributed among a set of individuals instead of 
centralised in the hands of a single individual who acts in the role of a superior 
(Pearce & Conger, 2003). 
Interest then arises in understanding leadership as an organisational 
process that leads to enhanced perfonnance in organisations. Scholars are 
beginning to employ the concept of strategic leadership, although in a limited 
way, since it is not only a-contextual but also a-processual. To remedy this 
inadequacy, this study focuses on the strategic leadership process in 
organisational settings, over time. It intends to shed light on the set of 
decisions, actions and events produced by key people in building and executing 
the strategic agenda in order to achieve the organisational mission, over time. 
Accordingly, this set of decisions, actions and events is the result of different 
constraints on contextual factors provided by the organisational setting in which 
the strategic leadership process is enacted. 
This study has chosen Business Schools as the specific organisational 
context for the observation of strategic leadership as a process. 
Two 
characteristics make Business Schools particularly attractive 
for this purpose. 
Firstly, like most higher education institutions, they present some 
key 
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organisational characteristics, such as shared and diffused power (Cohen & 
March, 1974; Denis et al., (1996,2001); collegiality and consensus-based 
decision-making (Ramsden, 1998; Chaffee, 1983; Hardy, 1991) around an 
organisational. purpose; dual authority (Hardy, 1991), since in academic 
institutions authority is embedded in the knowledge of academics, and the 
administrators' authority has a double-track. These key characteristics make it 
easier to show how context shapes the strategic leadership process (SLP) 
because a greater transparency of process is typical of Business Schools as 
compared to other organisations. 
At this distance, it seems relevant to note that the shared leadership 
paradigm would be an adequate approach given that it focuses on how people - 
basically, 'knowledge workers' (Pearce, 2004) - interact. However, this 
perspective still represents a sociological approach not necessarily linked to 
organisation theory. This study aims to analyse and understand strategic 
leadership as a process, from the perspective of organisational theory: the 
interlocking of the leadership and strategy fields. 
Secondly, Business Schools have been very successful in developing 
and transmitting the knowledge required for managers to face current 
environmental challenges. As a result, there has been increasing demand for 
executive education over the last few decades. Business Schools need clear 
strategic direction if they are to respond appropriately to a changing and 
increasingly competitive marketplace. 
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2.2. Why Business Schools? 
Since the advent of the so called 'global era', a number of elements 
related to society and business have evolved and/or changed: intensive 
innovation has become the prime driver of competitive advantage, and current 
models of management research and education need to adapt to a model that 
deals adequately with the collective learning and un-leaming necessary for such 
innovation (Hatchuel & Glise, 2004). In this regard, it seems relevant to declare 
that the 21" century social-economic landscape has brought about the 
importance of knowledge. Accordingly, transferring knowledge and developing 
the right competencies and skills have become the prerequisites for individual 
and organisational manoeuvring (Van Baalen & Moratis, 2001). 
Scholars agree that changes occurring in the business environment are 
leading to more complex, flexible and responsive organisations (Oblinger & 
Verbille, 1998). Today's enterprises are indeed flexible and adaptive to 
changing market and environmental circumstances (Van Baalen & Moratis, 
2001). This state of affairs has generated both opportunities and risks for 
individuals and organisations at large (Cornuel, 2005). Management has 
changed accordingly and the present-day manager is confronted with different 
fast-changing competitive and organisational. realities (Van Baalen & Moratis, 
2001). More than ever, business relies on higher education to prepare students 
for this rapidly changing enviromnent, expecting it to help develop their critical 
thinking and analytical abilities (Pfeffer & Fong, 2004). 
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Within the education industry, even though universities have undergone 
various periods of drastic change since their creation, it is the scale and scope 
of the consequences that current changes are bringing about that pose serious 
questions about their future viability (Van Baalen & Moratis, 2001). Among 
these consequences, Business Schools have become particularly affected by 
new entrants, new competitive dynamics, institutional change, and the highly 
differentiated demand for education (Van Baalen & Moratis, 2001). 
Their close contacts with industry have enabled Business Schools to 
witness most of the developments that form the basis of the current challenges. 
More than ever before, Business Schools are networked with business and with 
other key institutions in society (Lorange, 2005). The Schools thus have a 
crucial role to play in optimising the way institutions are managed, with the 
objective of ensuring the best possible level of growth and thereby a dramatic 
improvement in people's lives (Comuel, 2005). Their important role in the 
present economic and social context (Crainer & Dearlove, 1999) is based on 
their ability to influence the different sectors of the economy, spreading ideas 
through academic research, developing important relevant knowledge, and 
serving as a source of critical thought and inquiry about organisations and 
management (Pfeffer & Fong, 2004). 
In this role, Business Schools stand connected to but also somewhat 
apart from business and other organisations, providing objective research and 
critical consideration of business and business practices, and their effects on 
people and society, in an effort to serve not only business but also broader 
59 
social interests and concerns (Pfeffer & Fong, 2004). Thus, the overarching 
mission of Business Schools is to be responsible both for the continuous 
dissemination of new and evolving bodies of knowledge available to 
practitioners, and also for the institutionalised development of a new Faculty to 
continue the process of discovering and developing knowledge (Harvey et al., 
2006). 
Business Schools are both custodians and communicators of knowledge 
about the business practices used in society. As Higher Education Institutions 
(HEIs), they are "knowledge-producing institutions" (Bargh et al., 2000: 2) in 
which the creation and transmission of knowledge by academics constitutes the 
essence. Beyond this, they foster the research process that enhances general 
understanding and the cognitive capacity of society (Harvey et aL, 2006). Thus, 
since they fmd themselves at the interface of the business and academic worlds, 
they must allow themselves to respond to demands for business relevance and 
academic rigour within an ever more international environment (Prince, 1999; 
Hitt, 1998). 
A new competitive map for today's Business Schools is emerging 
(Lorange, 2002), from which one can imagine them not just as knowledge- 
bearers (Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002) but as, potentially, a new kind of 
space, an ý4 agora" (Nowotny et aL, 2001: 203) in action where different 
stakeholders and different disciplines interact and learn from each other 
(Starkey et al., 2004). To achieve this, Business Schools will have new strategic 
choices to make, relating to how they would prefer to serve the new, networked 
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society (Lorange, 2005). Thus, they require a strategic leadership process to 
guide them effectively through the 21s' century (Van Baalen & Moratis, 2001; 
Hitt, 1998) enabling them to respond to demands for business relevance and 
academic rigour within an ever more globalised environment (Prince, 1999; 
Hitt, 1998). 
2.3. Business Schools and Professional Service Firms 
(PSFs) 
In reviewing the abundant literature on PSFs and Business Schools, a 
number of common characteristics emerge. These imply that Business Schools 
can be considered to fall within the generic category of professional service 
organisations. In fact, various authors such as Mintzberg (1989), Morris & 
Empson (1998), Lowendahl (2001) and Brock (2006), refer to higher education 
institutions,, among which Business Schools can be included, as a type of PSF. 
This study will now review two key aspects of PSFs - their essence and their 
key organisational characteristics - and will then look at the evolution of the 
archetype concept that clearly influences their governance. 
a) What i's a Professional Service Firm? 
There is a significant body of research that analyses one particular 
dimension of PSFs, rarely comparing different types of PSF, or PSFs in 
different countries. Despite the diverse nature of this veritable stack of research 
studies, one common characteristic is the initial description of what is meant by 
professional service. Traditionally, the literature states that lawyers, architects, 
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and auditors, among others, deliver professional services even to the extent of 
being excluded from selling their services if they are not members of the 
corresponding professional association. Other vocational groups, such as 
business consultants, have not succeeded in firmly establishing their 
professional association. There is no set body of knowledge for business 
consultants as such, and in fact, many management consultants are members of 
established professions in addition to being consultants. Moreover, there is no 
licensing of management consultants, and there is no professional organisation 
with the right to supervise and potentially exclude consultants from practising. 
Lowendahl (2000) does not attempt to classify those people delivering 
professional services, but finds it more meaningful to talk about professional 
services as a special type of service. She suggests that "... management 
consultants may deliver a service regarded as professional as that of lawyers" 
(Lowendahl, 2000: 19). 
Nachum (1999) defines professional services differently, taking two key 
characteristics as a standpoint: firstly, professional knowledge is their core 
resource, and forms both the input and the output of their production processes; 
and secondly, the clients of professional service firms are other firms or 
organisations; the output of the PSFs is used as an intermediate input in the 
production processes of these other firms or organisations. Moreover, Nachum 
(1999) adds that such knowledge is derived from professional training and is 
associated with recognised professional associations. Nachum (1999) also 
describes the PSF production process as being based on the analysis and 
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application of knowledge by professionals or "highly educated employees" to 
provide "a one-time solution to specific clients' problems". 
Lowendahl (2000) mentions that a professional service possesses the 
following characteristics: firstly, it is highly knowledge-intensive, delivered by 
people with higher education, and frequently closely linked to scientific 
knowledge development within the relevant area of expertise; secondly, it 
involves a high degree of custornisation; thirdly, it involves a high degree of 
discretionary effort and personal judgement by the experts delivering the 
service; fourthly, it typically requires substantial interaction with the client firm 
representatives involved; and fifthly, it is delivered within the constraints of 
professional norms of conduct, including setting clients' needs higher than 
profits and respecting the limits of professional expertise. 
According to Lowendahl's perspective, PSFs are knowledge-intensive 
firms (KIFs), but not all such knowledge-intensive firms deliver professional 
services. For example, schools are knowledge-intensive establishments, but 
they are not professional service firms (not specialised, no customisation, etc. ). 
"The difference between professional and non-professional organisations lies in 
the characteristics of the service delivered, rather than in the characteristics of 
the people employed" (Lowendahl, 2000: 19). 
Mintzberg (1989) refers to PSFs and knowledge-intensive firms in an 
inclusive way. He considers the following establishments to be examples of 
PSFs or KIFs: universities, general hospitals, accounting firms, law finns and 
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engineering firms. Like most of the foregoing authors, Mintzberg (1989) 
underlines certain differential aspects, such as: standardised high proportion of 
knowledge and skills, autonomy and discretional judgement based on 
professional expertise; a close relationship between professionals and clients; 
difficulty in coordination; duality between the power of professional and 
administrative bureaucracy. 
Finally, Morris & Empson (1998) assert that PSFs (accounting firms 
and consulting firms, among others) can be considered as KlFs, although they 
recognise that the role knowledge plays in PSFs has received little research 
attention, and that it might be important in the future to consider it as an 
objectively definable and a key resource. 
b) Key organisational characteristics of PSFs 
i. Individual Professionals 
As Lowendahl mentions (2000: 41), PSFs provide innovative problem- 
solving services, based on a high degree of professional expertise and 
individual judgement. The author then adds: "The core of the resource base of 
the professional service firm resides in the professionals employed and their 
ability to solve whatever problems the clients may want them to solve. " 
Therefore, professionals are key resources and one of the main challenges for 
PSFs is attracting and retaining the most valuable professionals in the 
marketplace. 
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Therefore, PSFs should be run by taking into account the unique 
characteristics of the professional. The literature on the subject focuses mainly 
on four broadly defined unique characteristics of individuals, which the leaders 
of PSFs should consider: firstly, autonomy; secondly, career development 
focused on professional expertise; thirdly, a stronger link to professional 
standards and values than to the PSF that employs them; and finally, power 
based on professional expertise. 
One could first mention professionals' need for autonomy, which 
mainly implies that they intend to create their own role, thereby differentiating 
themselves internally according to their work interests. In this regard, Hall 
(1968) and Scott (1965) define autonomy as independence in defming problems 
and generating solutions without pressure from clients, non-members of the 
professions, or the employing organisation. Thus, one might say that one of the 
most outstanding characteristics of professionals is their need for autonomy 
(Kerr et aL, 1977). This constitutes a challenge for PSF leaders, a subject that 
will be addressed later. 
The second main characteristic of the professional is a tendency to focus 
his/her career development on professional expertise and to aim to avoid 
repetitive or managerial tasks. Hinings et al. (1991) identify professional 
expertise as the main source of power in PSFs. This may be a reason why a 
professional's career development is more focused on professional expertise, 
rather than on progress within the administrative or management hierarchy. 
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Thirdly, it could be said that professionals show a stronger link to their 
professional standards and values than to the PSF that employs them. This can 
be seen in the importance that professionals attribute to their reputation among 
their peers, and in their adherence to professional standards and ethical values. 
Finally, since a professional's work demands a high degree of skill, 
knowledge and expertise, they believe that only their profession and peers can 
accurately assess their performance (Friedson & Rhea, 1965; Goode, 1960). 
Bucher & Stelling (1969) also mention this. They confirm both the idea of 
power based on professional expertise, rather than management positions; and 
the importance of peer-acknowledgement derived from the conception of 
'professionals' as a select group beyond other types of recognition 
(collegiality). 
Empson (2000) also emphasises similar characteristics in individual 
professionals, when she states that "-professionals have been traditionally 
characterised as highly autonomous individuals, resistant to bureaucratic 
control, committed to the ideals of their profession, and loosely associated with 
the commercial objectives of their employing organisations". 
ii. Professional Competences 
The current literature on PSFs refers to members' need to have 
'professional competencies' rather than 'professional knowledge' -defined as 
the ability to master the tools of the profession. The underlying logic of this 
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statement is that 'professional knowledge' is not enough to succeed in building 
reputation and trust in the marketplace. Therefore, one could say that the 
employees of PSFs should possess 'professional competencies', which includes 
professional knowledge, skills and attitudes. In addressing the nature of the 
relationship between PSFs and its professional service personnel, Paulin (2000) 
suggests it is transactional. This is the rationale for creating client-perceived 
value, which she believes is "... dependent to a large extent on the specialised 
skills, techniques and experience of contact personnel interacting in a socio- 
economic context with the client" (Paulin, 2000: 453). She even suggests that 
professionals who interact with clients "... must balance technical, 
administrative and social competencies" (Paulin, 2000: 470). 
Empson (2000) considers that the PSF's main input is professional 
expertise, and that the output includes the services or products created to solve 
clients' problems. However, according to this author, knowledge is not merely 
based on "objective facts" but is also socially constructed. Therefore, 
knowledge is altered by beliefs about what is useful and what is not, or about 
what generates value and what does not. Morris and Empson (1998) suggest 
that knowledge in PSFs or knowledge-based organisations (KBOs) could be 
viewed as information which professionals acquire through experience and 
training, together with the judgement they develop over time. which enables 
them to deploy such information effectively in order to deliver client service. 
Lowendahl (2000) suggests that the more innovative and idiosyncratic 
the service, and the larger the knowledge gap, the more complex 
this first 
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process is likely to be. Furthermore, Pettigrew and Fenton (2000) affirm that 
one of the most relevant challenges of running PSFs concerns "... the efficient 
and effective capture and dissemination of knowledge in the context of a 
growing global business" (Pettigrew & Fenton, 2000: 3). 'Information 
asymmetry' is closely related to knowledge-updating. "PSFs primarily create 
value through processes that require them to know more than their clients, 
either in terms of expertise or in terms of experience in problem-solving 
situations" (Lowendahl, 2000: 32). 
Because of the idiosyncrasy of professional services, the degree of 
information asymmetry varies not only from one client to another, but also 
from one project to another. In such a demanding atmosphere, professionals 
should always remain one step ahead of their clients with the necessary 
competence to continue delivering valuable services. As Lowendahl (2000) 
states, "... the challenges of the knowledge gap between the professional service 
provider and the client representative(s) lie at the very core of the management 
of professional service firms, and contain both a fundamental and a strategic 
dimension" (Lowendahl, 2000: 37). The strategic dimension can be found in 
the type of projects the PSF takes on. 
Given the complex nature of the PSF's outcome, professionals need to 
have several skills. First we should mention the relevance of individual 
judgement, applied to identifying what is necessary to solve the client's 
problem. Maister (1993) comments on the relevance of individual judgement in 
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each --service encounter" with the client. PSFs, therefore, are often centred on 
named individuals rather than on the PSFs themselves. 
As mentioned above, Paulin (2000) stresses that representatives of PSFs 
should possess interpersonal skills, because of the nature of the relationship 
between client and service provider. Furthennore, the intangibility of the PSF's 
outputs gives more relevance to the impact of interpersonal relationships on the 
client's perceived value. 
Aharoni (1997) also discusses the active role of clients throughout the 
delivery process, which leads to a close interaction between professionals and 
client-firm representatives. "The output is produced in close relation with the 
client, making the latter an active participant in the production process and a 
significant determinant of the output" (Aharoni, 1997). 
On the other hand, information asymmetry involves the positioning of 
the firm in relation to the different types of clients, since the delivery process 
will differ from client-firms who have specialists in the sub ect and those who j 
do not. Lowendahl suggests that the wider the knowledge gap, the more 
pedagogical the service provider must be, therefore providing not only a service 
but also a learning experience to its customer. Therefore, information 
asymmetry requires that professionals possess pedagogical skills in order to 
guarantee that the knowledge transfer processes are managed conscientiously. 
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However, it is interesting to note that the development of these skills - 
individual judgement, and interpersonal and pedagogical skills - has a two-fold 
impact. As regards the client-PSF relationship, they strengthen the link with 
potential and current clients. And in terms of the internal communication 
processes, they promote interaction with other professionals, regardless of their 
area of expertise. 
Finally, concerning attitudes, one may say that only open-minded 
professionals will be able to develop the required skills and to comprehend the 
diverse situations that they face in every new project. 
Pettigrew & Fenton (2000), quoting Liedka et al. (1997: 47), mention 
the "service oriented workforce" as a unique characteristic of the PSF. In order 
to deliver custornised and innovative solutions to clients, professionals require a 
high degree of service orientation, so that they can understand clients' needs 
and manage the work team throughout the delivery process to meet such needs 
efficiently. 
Innovation is also a key component of the professional services delivery 
process. Regarding factors that promote innovation in PSFs, Mintzberg (1989: 
190) comments: "In the professional organisation, major innovation also 
depends on cooperation. The single professional may perfect existing programs, 
but new ones usually cut across the established speciality [ ... ] and so call 
for 
collective action. As a result, the reluctance of the professionals to cooperate 
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with each other and the complexity of the collective processes can produce 
resistance to innovation. " 
Thus, as mentioned by Pettigrew & Fenton (2000: 23), there are 
increasing demands from customers, who are "becoming more discriminating 
and demanding" and operating in a more competitive market both in terms of 
price and newcomers onto the marketplace. Therefore, it is the clients 
themselves who are pushing for higher standards and PSFs need to respond not 
only fast but also effectively; only flexible professionals have the ability to 
respond fast and effectively. 
Skills development seems to be a current issue in PSFs, where according 
to Pettigrew & Fenton (2000) in their study on the transformation of PSFs into 
integrated global networks, PSF members are spending more time in groups: 
'Inot just in work teams, but in teams to develop skills or markets and business 
planning" (Pettigrew & Fenton, 2000: 26). 
One could also identify cooperation as a key skill for PSF members. 
Through the professional's desire for autonomy and the 'dual authority' system, 
cooperation is a relevant social mechanism to align and coordinate the actions 
of all PSF members. Bartol (1979) states that one of the specific attitudinal 
dimensions of professionalism is "ethics", as a responsibility to avoid self- 
interest and emotional involvement with clients in the course of rendering 
services, as well as a dedication towards providing the client with a high quality 
service. 
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As regards skills development, Pettigrew & Fenton (2000: 38) affirm 
that effective sanctions, such as reward and recognition systems, might be 
successful in encouraging positive behaviour. However, in their study they 
found that "... no firm could give examples of rewards for cooperative 
behaviour". Thus, it appears that skill development is a key issue for the PSF's 
strategic setting, with a two-fold impact: internally, in motivating professionals 
and facilitating coordination, and externally, in differentiating between and 
attracting projects from current and potential customers. 
iii. Shared Power 
Another noteworthy key characteristic of PSFs is the diffusion of power 
among shareholders, mainly professionals who expect to participate in strategic 
decision-making as a sign of trust and respect from the organisation. Marcson 
(1961) describes this shared power as a system of control, in which authority is 
shared by all members of the working group; however, he also points out that 
authority is deemed to rest in the group rather than in the individual. 
On the contrary, other authors (Bucher & Stelling, 1969; Montagna, 
1968) state that the unique characteristics of this type of shared power system 
are its emphasis on collegiality, peer evaluation, autonomy, informality, and 
structure flexibility. Greenwood et al. (1990: 733) propose an even narrower 
definition of shared power, which is reflected in "collegiality, peer evaluation, 
and autonomy". Moreover, the authors also point out that in PSFs -sometimes 
with a partnership structure - authority is a key component because of its 
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collegial and fragile nature. The authors further note that in such systems, there 
is only a minimal hierarchy, consisting of a chief executive who holds office at 
the will of his colleagues and acts within a system of shared decision-making 
on all major policy issues. 
Bucher & Stelling (1969) address the difference between authority and 
power, stating that authority is generally defined as a relationship in which the 
subordinate voluntarily surrenders his own judgement and ability to make 
decisions, and bases his actions on the commands of his superior. However, as 
has already been mentioned, the professional's need for autonomy may hinder 
the existence of this type of relationship. In contrast, Bucher & Stelling (1969), 
define power as the extent to which individuals and groups can control their 
working conditions. Therefore, one may conclude that in PSFs, professionals 
are likely to have both authority and power. This shared power may be limited 
. to professional work-teams, and is derived from the unique characteristics of 
professionals (autonomy, a strong link to professional standards, the relevance 
of reputation and peer evaluation). 
However, as noted by Greenwood et al. (1990), there is a minimal 
hierarchy that leads to a 'dual authority' phenomenon. The main asset of a PSF 
is its group of qualified professionals who possess the required 'professional 
competencies' to deliver innovative solutions to clients' problems. But PSFs 
also need a management structure, to coordinate and support the work of their 
professionals. 
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Mills et al. (1983) point out that in PSFs, many of the traditional 
management or administrative tasks are delegated to non-professional staff 
members. Managers have become the link between the administrative core and 
the operation units. Moreover, with increasing demands from clients, 
professionals have become more dependent on the efficiency of the non- 
professional members of the PSF. Furthermore, professionals have access to 
and control over crucial information, and this is a significant source of power 
for them. Professionals also have the right to determine what is to be done and 
how it should be done. 
Greenwood et al. (1994) mention that because of the potential stress 
between professionals and managers in PSFs, there is a clear awareness of how 
authority is exercised. Mintzberg (1989) states that the unique configuration of 
PSFs resides in their democracy, reflected in the dissemination of power 
throughout the whole organisation. In contrast to Marcson's (1961) opinion, 
however, power here is directed to every member, and does not reside in the 
group itself This provides PSFs with extensive autonomy, freeing professionals 
from the need to coordinate closely with their colleagues. Professionals in these 
organisations are free to serve clients in their own way; they are limited only by 
established professional standards (Mintzberg, 1989). 
Thus, it would seem that the 'dual authority' phenomenon represents a 
considerable challenge for the leaders of PSFs. They are responsible for 
guaranteeing the aligment and efficiency of the entire organisation, because an 
efficient interaction between both groups - managers and professionals - is 
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essential for fulfilling current client demands and for building trust both inside 
and outside the PSF. 
iv. Intangibility 
The inputs and outputs of the PSF, as well as its main assets - 
professionals' knowledge, skills and attitudes and the PSF's reputation in the 
marketplace - have the particular characteristic of being intangible. Some of the 
literature on the subject focuses particularly on the intangibility of PSFs' inputs. 
Winch and Schneider (1993) mention the undeployable nature of PSF assets as 
the most striking difference between professional services and other types of 
service industries. The latter deploy their assets - such as production facilities, 
aeroplanes, hotels, or even liquid assets (banks) - and although service 
industries are often called 'people organisations' they largely depend on their 
inErastructure. Winch & Schneider (1993) also refer to the intangibility of PSF 
assets, but they concentrate more on the constraints that this places on the 
strategic preconception of PSFs. Strategic planning in PSFs involves two main 
tasks: firstly, dealing with the development of professional skills, the reputation 
of the partners (in the case of a PSF with a partnership structure); and secondly, 
maintaining a balanced 'dual authority' system. 
In contrast, other authors focus on the intangibility of PSF outputs. Mills 
et al. (1983) argue that services are perishable, and thus inventory is 
impossible. The intangible output of the service organisation is either consumed 
immediately, or lost for ever, in contrast to the tangible products produced by a 
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manufacturing entity. Larson (1977) affirms that what distinguishes a 
professional service from other services is that its 'output or product' is 
sufficiently intangible to prevent it from being traded as a commodity, yet 
sufficiently standardised to enable differentiation of the PSF. "Due to the 
intangible nature of the PSF's output, these firms have focused more on quality 
and reputation than on minimising transactional costs" (Pettigrew & Fenton 
2000: 6). 
There is also literature that stresses the intangibility of both the inputs 
and outputs of PSFs (Lowendahl, 2000; Maister, 1993; and Empson, 2000). 
Moreover, Pettigrew and Fenton (2000: 3) emphasise that the PSF's unique 
characteristics "... signal the extreme reliance upon named individuals, rather 
than the tangible entity of the firm to drive the business in value creation". 
While intangible production factors are undoubtedly the most critical in 
the production processes of professional services (Lowendahl, 1997; Nachum, 
1999), and their utilisation is the major determinant in terms of productivity, 
capital seems to be an increasingly important factor for production today. 
Capital mainly implies the purchase of office space and communication 
facilities (both within the firm and with clients) and transportation costs. As 
firms increase their international coverage and IT becomes more capital- 
intensive, these expenses account for an increasing part of the total costs 
associated with the production of professional services (Nachum, 1999). 
v. Standardisation-Customisation 
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It could be said that the nature of PSFs is highly complex, due to a wide 
range of factors, as follows: its dual authority (professionals and managers); its 
intangible assets (reputation, knowledge, professional competencies); its 
intangible output (innovative solutions to clients' problems); and finally, the 
pressure to be efficient in a competitive and changing environment. One 
possible approach to the latter factor would be to increase efficiency through 
standardisation. The characteristics of PSFs make standardisation a complex 
challenge, although a certain degree of standardisation is necessary - for 
example, to measure professional performance. 
Pettigrew and Fenton (2000: 3) define PSFs as knowledge-intensive 
organisations, "... having a high degree of customisation, relying almost 
exclusively on the discretionary effort and subjective interaction with the 
client". These authors focus mainly on the internalisation of PSFs, and they 
point out that due to the requirements of competitive forces, PSFs tend to 
concentrate on developing either markets or regions, in order to provide 
specialised services through a standardised delivery process (Pettigrew & 
Fenton, 2000). 
Morris and Empson (1998) refer to 'codification of knowledge' as a 
way of standardising tasks, thereby enabling more delegation from senior to 
junior staff (generally known as leveraging). Firms without high leverage need 
to charge higher rates, and this also hinders junior staff development (Maister, 
1993). Morris and Empson (1998) also refer to certain factors that might 
eopardise the transfer of knowledge. One factor identified by Mintzberg (1989) 
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is the lack of coordination between professionals. Mintzberg (1989) notes that 
innovative problem-solving requires inductive reasoning - that is the inference 
of the new general solution based on a particular experience. Therefore, since 
such inference differs from one individual to another, it leads to a lack of 
coordination and standardisation. 
vi. Trust 
Given the idiosyncrasy of the professional activity, and the intangibility 
of PSFs' assets (e. g. reputation and credibility) and services, building up 
relationships and networks as a basis for the creation of trust that will make 
interaction possible seems crucial. "These reputations are built up over time and 
are not replaceable or imitable in the market place" (Pettigrew & Fenton, 2000: 
3). 
Within the interaction between the PSF and its client-firm, oPPortunism 
may occur on both sides. In the finance literature, this challenge is defined as 
the 'double moral hazard'. indicating that there is a hazard involved for the 
client in terms of the supplier cheating, and a similar hazard involved for the 
supplier in terms of the client cheating. 
In the case of commercial banking, Paulin (2000) mentions that there 
needs to be a mutual agreement between the bank and the client as regards the 
responsibilities of each. "The client was to be transparent and honest with 
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information, and the major responsibility of the bank was to provide 
professional services through the bank's network" (Paulin, 2000: 469). 
Because of the intangibility of the PSF's output, client evaluation of 
their services is more complex. "Unlike tangible goods and even business-to- 
business services, professional services are often difficult to evaluate with 
confidence, even following purchase and consumption" (Sharma, 1999: 152). 
Thakor (2000) found that when services are thought to require expertise, to 
comprise credence qualities, to be heterogeneous, or to be critical, 
recommendations are considered important. 
Thus, the relevance of 'trust-building' is directly related to the following 
factors: firstly, the intangible nature of the PSF's assets, such as 'reputation', 
4professional knowledge' and 'professional competencies'. Secondly, the close 
interaction between professionals and client-firms' representatives requires 
trust-building. Moreover, the increasing demands for efficiency require fluid 
communication and excellent coordination among PSF members. Therefore 
internal trust-building is also a key issue. Thirdly, the professional's respect for 
the norms of the profession implies certain common ideas about how the job 
should be done. Fourth, 'information asymmetry' between professionals and 
client-firms' representatives might lead to Professionals applying their 
discretionary judgement with unclear purposes, such as experimenting with 
new tools or selling solutions that are not actually necessary to solve the 
client's problem. 
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Finally, client-firms might require 'confidentiality' from the PSF; 
disregarding this issue could be fatal for the PSF's reputation, therefore trust- 
building with clients also implies managing confidentiality. Pettigrew and 
Fenton (2000) state that trust must be founded on the basis of most social and 
professional relationships. Trust is hard to build but easy to lose. They also note 
that reputation is critical in reducing behavioural uncertainty and that it 
provides the basis for the development of trust. 
Pettigrew and Fenton (2000: 3 1) suggest that one current issue for PSFs 
is the shift from "a highly individualistic culture to a team-based one. " 
Moreover, these authors also propose the development of strong ties among 
professionals as a way of reducing opportunism. Therefore, the role of 
organisational culture is extremely important as regards trust-building. 
The following Table 5 shows the key characteristics of PSFs according to 
different authors. 
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Table 5: Key Characteristics mentioned by authors 
Authors \ Key Indivi al Professional Shared Intangibility Standardisation 
Characteristics Professionals Competencies Power Customisation Trust 
Lowendahl (2000) x x x 
Bartol (1979) x x 
Bucher & Sterling 
(1969) x x 
Montagna (1968) x x 
Hall (1968) x 
Scott (1965) x 
Keff, von Glinow & 
Schriesheim (1977) x 
Hinings, Brown & 
Greenwood (199 1) x 
Friedson & Rhea 
(1965) x 
Goode(1960) x 
Hrebiniak & Alutto x (1972) 
Empson (2000) x x x 
Paulin (2000) x x 
Pettigrew & Fenton x x x x (2000) 
Maister (1993) x x x 
Aharoni (1997) x 
Liedtka, Haskins, 
Rosenblum & Weber x 
(1997) 
Mintzberg (1989) x x 
Greenwood, Hinings x & Brown (1990) 
Mills, Hall, Liedecker x x & Margulies (1983) 
Greenwood, Hinings x & Brown (1994) 
Winch, & Schneider x 
(1993) 
Larson (1977) x 
Nachurn (1999) x 
Morris & Empson x 
(1998) 
Sharma (1997) x 
Thakor(2000) x 
Bloom (1984) x 
IFEll & Neeley (1988) x 
I-Ell & Motes (1995) x 
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c) The evolution of the archetype concept of PSFs and its impact on 
their governance 
As has already been mentioned, the specific characteristics of PSFs, 
such as shared power, the contribution of individual professionals, collegiality 
and intangibility, make the governance of these organisations a complex task 
with some particular features. 
This study has chosen Business Schools (a type of PSF) as the specific 
organisational context for the study of the strategic leadership process. PSFs 
present certain key characteristics that are crucial in shaping Business Schools. 
In this regard, leadership within all PSFs will be dramatically influenced by 
their key characteristics. 
Howard (1991) underlines the importance of leadership in PSFs by 
pointing out that it is the most critical factor in managing these kinds of 
organisations, whose authority structure is diffuse. He recognises the 
importance of management in PSFs, which are characteristically based on 
professionals who resist authority and are looking for independence and 
autonomy. Howard suggests that management is relevant, but leadership is 
crucial in these organisations. This is, firstly, because it seems that leadership 
as a social phenomenon is of special importance in PSFs, since they are 
organisations where the key resources are people, and whose main assets and 
services delivered are intangible. 
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Secondly, the leadership process may be challenged from inside, 
because of characteristics such as shared power and the spread of authority, due 
to collegiality, partnership and the influence of peer reference within 
professional organisations. Autonomy and the individual discretionary 
judgement of professionals mirror the fragmentation of the work, which is of an 
-adhocratic' nature, because of its project-based nature. As Denis et al. (1996) 
point out, the ambiguity of authority in PSFs is due to the duality of power and 
collegiate or consensus-based decision-making, which makes collective 
leadership crucial, but at the same time, a difficult challenge for anyone running 
this type of organisation. There is also another challenge, from the internal 
context: to some extent, most of the professionals reject management 
responsibilities, which makes it even more difficult to find the right person to 
take charge of these tasks. 
Thirdly, just as the outer context demands increasing customisation 
along with increasing competitiveness in a global and turbulent environment, a 
strong leadership process is necessary to provide strategic direction in making 
key decisions such as the definition of targets, in terms of both markets and 
clients, defining alliances at international and regional level, improving 
efficiency by establishing standards, managing knowledge, identifying critical 
competences, staffmg,, the use of information technology and the delivery of 
custornised solutions to clients, among others. 
As Pettigrew & Fenton (2000) point out in their study of the 
internationalisatiOn of PSFs, changes such as the impact of globalisation and 
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internationalisation influence these organisations in different ways. These are 
knowledge-based firms, which are especially sensitive to developments in 
information technology because of their need to capture and disseminate 
knowledge efficiently and effectively. Also PSFs, with their characteristic 
custornisation and client supplier interaction, have been dramatically affected 
by the increase in the intemationalisation of business. Finally, the two authors 
underline the crucial role of leadership in driving these processes of change and 
in accomplishing their vision. 
It seems relevant to note that among the characteristics of PSFs as 
knowledge-based institutions, the three particularly related to the need for 
shared leadership are interdependence, creativity and complexity. As these 
three characteristics increase, the need for shared leadership also increases 
(Pearce, 2004). However, this study intends to move a step forward towards the 
study of leadership from the perspective of organisational theory, by 
interlocking leadership and strategy fields. It seems likely that observing 
strategic leadership as a process will enable an identification of the process of 
social influence in building and executing a strategic agenda that involves 
"consensus-based vision, clear goals and set priorities" (Lowendahl, 1997: 95). 
Thus, the fact that PSFs have become so important in the current 
economic global context leads to the need for a broader and deeper 
understanding of the way in which these organisations work. In a 
comprehensive article which reviews the different archetypes of professional 
service firms, Brock (2006) observes that different forces for change, such as 
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deregulation, competition, technology and globalisation, have challenged the 
scheme of PSFs over the last decades, and eventually delegitimated the existing 
organisational archetypes or configurations (Miller, 1996). 
Greenwood and Hinings (1993: 1052) define the organisational 
archetype as -a set of structures and systems that reflects a single interpretive 
scheme". In effect, increasingly competitive markets have induced the classical 
model of 'professional partnership' and 'professional bureaucracies' to adopt 
more corporate and managerial modes of operation in search of increased 
efficiency. 
Brock (2006) refers to different archetypes of PSFs. He identifies the 
professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1989), where professionals seek 
collective control over administrative decisions that affect their operations; a 
decade later came the professional partnership (Greenwood et al., 1990), with 
its P2 model which differs from other types of firms in two key aspects: first, 
professional partners not only own and govern the firm, but also manage it and 
provide the professional services; second, the primary task involves the 
application of expertise to complex problems which require a significant degree 
of discretion. 
An evolution of the classical professional organisation took place 
between the 1960s and the 1990s. According to Brock (2006), power rests in 
the hands of professional experts, managers administer the facilities and 
support the professionals, decisions are made collegially, change is slow, and 
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strategy is fonnulated consensually. There is little hierarchy and a relatively 
high degree of vertical and horizontal differentiation. 
In observing some of the critical forces for change, Brock et al. (1999) 
and Greenwood and Lachman (1996) identify several external, environmental 
factors such as deregulation of professional markets and increased competition, 
financial constraints and cost pressures, changes in government policy, 
globalisation, the demands of international, increasingly sophisticated clients, 
and technological change. These have encouraged the emergence of 
rationalisation; the adoption of more efficient structures; and greater focus on 
business development and the marketing of professional services (Greenwood 
et al., 2004). 
Moreover, large professional bureaucracies such as hospitals and 
universities have also moved towards a corporate governance structure in order 
to clarify lines of accountability and improve management performance. In 
summary, a corporate govemance system has emerged to replace the 
partnership model with a more business-oriented one. 
In the same direction, technological developments and globalisation of 
services are pressuring the governance system of PSFs and driving a shift 
towards archetypal coherence and convergence and, some time in the future, 
one clearly dominant archetype should emerge. Moreover, professional service 
firms have evolved, becoming less distinctive when compared with for-profit 
business corporations. Increased segmentation of professional organisational 
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fields may result in quite separate niches for strategic development that enable 
the ongoing coexistence of different types of professional organisations. 
As HEI, business schools are "knowledge-producing institutions" 
(Bargh, Bocock, Scott & Smith, 2000: 2). Therefore, as in PSF, knowledge 
plays a key role. In this regard, the creation and transmission of knowledge by 
academics constitutes the essence of business schools. In the same way that 
knowledge and professionals are key assets to PSF, knowledge and academics 
are the main components of business schools. 
2.4. Strategic Leadership Process in Business Schools 
This study has already observed that since the mid-1990s, the demand 
for business education has surged worldwide. In response to that demand, many 
business programmes and entire Business Schools have been established 
around the world (Hawawini, 2005). In the US alone, during the last decade, 
the number of Business Schools has grown to 750, and according to the 
Association of Advanced College Schools of Business (AACSB) records, the 
number of MBA graduates is continuing to grow. 
The growth of UK Business Schools over the last few decades reflects 
their ability to meet a diverse range of customer needs, from undergraduate 
business studies degree programmes to postgraduate and professional 
programmes and in-company programmes. They train and develop millions of 
employees (Prince, 1999). 
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In the last 50 years, there has, globally, been increasing growth in the 
number of people with MBA degrees. In 2000,100,000 Masters graduated in 
the US and 12,000 in Europe. According to the Graduate Management 
Admission Council (2004), in the US alone graduates holding Business 
Master's degrees were more than double the number of law and medical 
graduates combined, quite a notable achievement for a degree that provides at 
best a voluntary professional certification (Cabrera & Bowen, 2005). There has 
also been an increasing demand for MBA graduates in Southern Asia and in 
Latin America. 
Some scholars feel that the MBA degree is perhaps the world's first 
global degree (Starkey & Tempest, 2001). This degree, offered by hundreds of 
accredited Business Schools worldwide, has become a defacto requirement for 
managerial positions in many corporations and professional service firms, and 
management is one of the most popular professional choices among college 
graduates (Cabrera & Bowen, 2005). In short, Business Schools have been one 
of the major success stories of higher education in the last hundred years, a 
central feature of the higher education map (Starkey & Tempest, 2001). 
However, current environmental changes have shaken the foundations 
of higher education in general and Business Schools in particular (Stevens, 
2000). Their multifaceted role as institutions engenders contradictory demands 
for both stability and adaptation. On the one hand, they are expected to function 
smoothly as repositories and disseminators of knowledge; on the other hand, to 
be creative, bold wellsprings of new practices since the share of population 
88 
serviced by them has grown and the complexity of the required administration 
has increased (Harvey et al., 2006). 
There is, therefore, every reason to argue for the importance of strategic 
leadership in Business Schools in the world of today. Some scholars agree that 
leadership is the single most important issue facing management education in 
the 21" century. In leading Business Schools, change is a powerful influence 
that must be anticipated and managed (Stevens, 2000). It is only through 
success in developing and exercising leadership that Business Schools will be 
able to cope with the significant changes occuffing in the social, political and 
economic environments (Cowens, 1998). 
Thus, Business Schools have new choices to make, related to how they 
would like to serve the new, networked society: what students need to know at 
the point when they enter the marketplace, which Faculty really understands the 
importance of effective knowledge utilisation, what model of MBA programme 
to offer (Lorange, 2005). 
More than ever before, the modem Business School needs to choose 
where to focus, in order to be able to play a more effective role in the modem 
knowledge-based society (Lorange, 2005). However, we may ask: "What type 
of strategy will take the modem Business School to the cutting edge, the 
forefront? " (Lorange, 2005: 787). It is through strategic agenda-building and 
executing that it will be able to set a clear direction and remain focused on it. 
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Strategic leadership has become critical for these institutions to develop a value 
creation proposition and not only survive but also prosper. 
The critical importance of strategic leadership in Business Schools has 
been highlighted in various empirical studies (Trieschmann et al., 2000; Morris, 
2000; Segev et al., 1999; Twomey & Twomey, 1998; Gore et al., 1998; Beeby 
& Jones, 1997). However, none of these studies reveals how the SLP is 
operationalised and carried out. An understanding of the way the strategic 
leadership process operates in these institutions makes it possible to understand 
how they are facing up to the current demands of the business industry, and 
making strategic choices to enable them to respond to these demands. 
Next, the study addresses the political perspective that has been chosen 
to approach the study of the strategic leadership process in Business Schools. It 
also describes the way in which a political approach is used to capture the 
dynamics and interrelations that take place within the strategic agenda-building 
and -executing over time. 
3. A Political Perspective on the Study of the Strategic Leadership 
Process in Business Schools 
3.1. Different perspectives in studying organisations 
In studying organisations, analysts usually focus on different 
ýmetqphors' or implicit images that lead them to see, understand and manage 
them in distinctive yet partial ways (Morgan, 1997). In this sense, when 
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organisations are approached as machines they are regarded as bureaucracies, 
as if they were made up of interlocking parts where each plays a clearly defined 
role in the functioning of the whole. 
Likewise, when organisations are approached as organisms, attention is 
focused on the way organisational needs and enviromnental relations are 
understood and managed; rather as if they belonged to different species. When 
organisations are viewed as brains, analysts draw their attention to the 
importance of information-processing, learning, and intelligence, providing a 
set of principles for creating 'learning organisations'. In approaching 
organisations as cultures, analysts focus on values, ideas, beliefs, forms, rituals 
and other patterns of shared meaning that guide organisational life. 
Finally, when the political metaphor is used, the focus is on the different 
sets of detailed. factors such as interests, conflicts, and power that shape 
organisational activities. The political approach to the study of organisations 
can create powerful insights that also become distortions, so that the "way of 
seeing becomes a way of not seeing" (Morgan, 1977; Allison & Zelikow, 
1999). However, given that the political approach enables us to visualise the 
'underweaving' of social actions, it facilitates the understanding of power and 
influence processes. 




Despite the amount of literature about political perspectives on 
organisations during the last decades, scholars have not yet agreed on the 
definition of the term 'political' (Douglas et al., 2005). While some researchers 
give the concept a negative connotation (e. g. Mintzberg, 1983), perceiving only 
its "dark side" (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992: 113), others (e. g. Pettigrew, 1973, 
1995,1998; Ferris & Judge, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981), characterise it in a neutral to 
positive way, quite similar to the effective exercise of influence (Douglas et al., 
2005). However, in studying organisations from a political perspective, most 
authors agree to refer to the concept of power. Power is usually defined as "the 
extent to which individuals have the capacity to influence the processes and 
outcomes of decision-making in a relative and variable manner" (Kenny & 
Wilson,, 1984: 410; Butler et al., 1979; Hinings et al., 1974). 
Studies of power and politics in organisations have resulted in an 
independent stream of literature in organisation theory that conceptualises 
organisations in a different way: through a political model (Morgan, 1997; 
Pfeffer, 1981). The political model of conceptualising organisations regards 
them as pluralistic and divided into various sub-units which are wedded to their 
own goals,, interests and subcultures (Baldridge, 1971). To Hickson et al. 's 
(1981) perspective, organisations are considered to be coalitions (Cyert & 
March, 1963) in which interests come and go, or are avoided, resulting in 
organisational activities removed from stated purposes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). 
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Moreover, organisations as coalitions are settings in which groups and 
individuals with varying interests and preferences come together and engage in 
exchanges (Hickson et al., 198 1). This approach challenges the conventional 
rational model's unitary view which states that organisations consist of well- 
structured, differentiated subsystems linked through a common goal (Varman & 
Bhatnagar, 1999). While the rational model assumes that decision-makers have 
knowledge of their alternatives and of the consequences of implementing those 
alternatives, the political model declares that real decision-makers often possess 
incomplete and imperfect information about alternatives and consequences 
(Simon, 1957,1959; Hatch, 1997). 
In this sense, the rational model ignores the internal politics of the 
organisational system; it disregards the fact that organisational decision-makers 
often confront conflicting goals and assumes, rather, that there is a consistent 
preference-ordering among key actors, and that decision rules are known and 
accepted by everyone concerned (Simon, 1957,1959; Hatch, 1997). However, 
in attempting to live up to the ideal of the rational model, key parties seem to 
face the problem of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957,1959; Hardy, 1988, 
1992; Hatch, 1997) which implies that rationality is usually constrained by a 
set of limitations such as imperfect and incomplete information; complexity of 
problems; human information-processing capacity; time available for decision- 
making processes; and conflicting preferences for organisational goals (Hatch, 
1997). 
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From an opposite point of view, the political model of organisations 
fundamentally assumes that power and politics are facts of life in organisations, 
and thus, are not issues that can be dispensed with easily or ignored (Bolman & 
Deal, 1991; Ferris & Judge, 1991). It enables us to visualise the diversity of 
interests that arises when people think differently and want to act differently, 
the behind the scenes of every scenario (Miller et al., 200 1); it allows us, too, to 
trace hoiv this diversity gives rise to "wheeling and dealing" (Morgan, 1997: 
160), negotiation, and other processes of coalition-building and mutual 
influence among the actors involved within the organisational activity. 
In fact, the exploration of the detailed processes by which people engage 
in organisational politics reveals that the political model facilitates the 
observation of the day-to-day political dynamics of organisations (Morgan, 
1997). Thus, the political model is acknowledged as a significant tool in 
understanding organisational phenomena (Pfeffer, 1981). It allows 
understanding of how organisational politics arise as a result of the tension 
created by diversity of interests, which has to be resolved through political 
means (Morgan, 1997). 
Organisational politics can be analysed in a practical and systematic 
way by focusing on relations between interests, conflict and power (Morgan, 
1997). The term interests refers to those dispositions embracing goals, values, 
desires, expectations and other orientations and inclinations that lead a person 
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to act in one way rather than another. In everyday life, people tend to consider 
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interests as areas of concern that they wish to preserve or enlarge or as 
positions that they wish to protect or achieve (Morgan, 1997). 
The control of strategic resources endows sub-units with power and 
such power facilitates a degree of influence by some individuals over 
organisational decision-making (Kenny & Wilson, 1984; Hickson et al., 1971) 
according to particular interests. Interests usually vary according either to 
organisational sub-units created as a result of the division of work (Pettigrew, 
1973) or to 'interest groups' (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980) defmed in terms of 
shared values and beliefs (Lucas, 1987). Each sub-unit or interest group 
develops its own differential interests based on specialised functions and 
responsibilities (Pettigrew, 1973) or on values and beliefs, and lays claim to 
scarce organisational resources according to such differential interests, by 
generating demands (Pettigrew, 1977). 
Consequently, disparate interests and demands compete for 
organisational attention and resources (Ammeter et aL, 2002). As previously 
mentioned, the probability that any particular demand will be placed on the 
strategic agenda depends on the condition of three interactive factors at any one 
point in time: firstly, the salience of the demand (its perceived attributes); 
secondly, the sponsorship of the demand (its political formation; who presents 
and/or supports it) and thirdly, the size and variety of dilemmas (Pettigrew, 
1977) already on the agenda (Dutton, 1986). 
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Even though specialisation of tasks makes sub-units in some degree 
independent, competition for limited resources forces them to interdependence. 
When such interdependence drives interests of sub-units to collide, conflict is 
likely to ensue (Pettigrew, 1973; Morgan, 1997). The natural reaction to 
conflict is to view it as a dysfunctional force that can be attributed to some 
regrettable set of circumstances or causes (Morgan, 1997). Whatever the 
reason, and whatever the form it takes, its source rests in the perceived or real 
divergence of interests and demands of various individuals and groups 
(Pettigrew, 1977; Morgan, 1997). Interest groups enter into negotiations which 
attempt to classify and accommodate sub-group interests into a structured 
equilibrium which is characteristic of the organisation as a whole at any one 
time (Lucas, 1987). The success of individual claimants in overcoming conflict 
and furthering their interests will depend on their ability to generate support for 
their demands (Pettigrew, 1973). 
In trying to generate support for their demands and produce outcomes 
consonant with their interests, members of each sub-unit may well join other 
individuals with similar interests into temporary coalitions (Gamson, 1961), or 
perhaps carry out strategies of coercion, bargaining, co-optation and 
manipulation, engaging in political forms of behaviour (Bums, 196 
1; 
Pettigrew, 1973; Morgan, 1997). This behaviour seeks to influence others to 
produce desired, self-serving responses or outcomes (Ferris et al., 
1994). 
Moreover, political behaviour refers to the behaviour by individuals or sub- 
units within an organ'sation that alms to influence the 
different interests that 
result from the division of labour, distribution of scarce resources, 
diversity of 
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values and beliefs, and different perspectives in order to produce intended 
results. 
Strategic decision-making is highly influenced by political behaviour 
inside and outside the focal organisation. This was empirically demonstrated by 
Hickson et al. (1986), in their study of top decision-making processes in 
organisations. According to them, these processes are discontinuous, 
fragmented, kept under wraps by senior managers who -do not inform others 
about them, or simply blocked in their implementation. 
Thus, in trying to visualise the organisation as a 'political arena' 
(Mintzberg, 1983), we need to understand how demands are generated 
according to the different interests that result from diversity of functions and 
responsibilities within the organisation; how people mobilise power to gain 
support for those demands and produce desired outcomes, or to block others' 
demands, and how conflicts of interest are ultimately resolved. In this sense, 
power appears to become a critical concept in carrying out a political analysis 
within organisational settings. In other words, the political perspective in 
studying organisations revolves around the use of power to influence (Hardy, 
1992) in trying to produce desired outcomes. 
Power is one of the most contentious concepts in the social sciences 
today (Hardy & Clegg, 2006). It has received scant empirical attention because 
of the controversy and difficulty over its conceptual elaboration and operational 
definition (Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 2002). Although a multitude of definitions 
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have been proposed for the concept of power, scholars mostly coincide in 
emphasising that power is not an attribute possessed by someone in isolation. 
Rather, it is a "relational phenomenon" (Pettigrew, 1995: 85 1) that appears to 
be generated, maintained and lost in the context of relationship with others. In 
this regard, Kenney and Wilson (1984: 4 10-11) assert that power is a "relative 
phenomenon amongst managers, the balance of which is likely to change given 
variable organisational conditions". This phenomenon has to be exercised to 
have an effect on outcomes (Hardy, 1992). It influences "'who gets what, when 
and how"' (Morgan, 1997: 170). 
Moreover, power is a relative concept (Finkelstein, 1992) that can only 
be explained in a particular context; power is context-specific (Ammeter et al., 
2002): if it is displayed on one occasion, it may not be transferable to other 
settings. Key actors may have power during a particular period of time and in a 
precise situation, but such power may not last, since power distribution varies 
over time. Thus, since power is inherently situational, dynamic and potentially 
unstable, it has to be understood not only in its political context (Hardy, 1992) 
- i. e. power distribution throughout the organisation - nor only in its historical 
context (Pettigrew, 1995) - i. e. the period of time during which the power is 
observed. Other contextual factors, such as key actors and their particular 
ftatures, values and beliefs, and economic context, among others, also facilitate 
the understanding of power. With this in mind, adopting a longitudinal 
approach for the study will enable us to understand how the SLP changes over 
time. 
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To sum up, in analysing the SLP in organisational settings from a 
political perspective, it seems relevant to consider contextual factors 
(environmental conditions determined by the outer context, such as the 
political, social and legal environments; trends in the culture and history of the 
sectors; economic context; and features of the inner context such as people, 
history and culture and the values of the firm; coalitions; policies; systems; 
business performance), structural conditions (power distribution triggered by 
the disparity of roles and functions of the different parties in the organisation, 
such as the Board, the CEO, Committees) and the influence of these on the SLP 
as well as the way they are in turn influenced by the SLP. The contextual 
factors (outer and inner contexts) and the structural conditions of the 
organisation decree the circumstances under which each key actor attains his or 
her own influence, which is constrained and limited by others' influence 
(content of influence). Key actors' power sources are generated and restricted 
by the setting but their power mobilisation depends on the will and skill of the 
various key actors in transforming potential power into power in action. 
Thus, a political analysis within organisational settings entails the 
identification of different roles for the key actors (structural conditions) in a 
particular context (outer and inner contexts), an assessment of the nature 
(power sources) and extent of their power (content of influence), and the 
analysis of the strategies employed by these groups as they translate power 
into 
action (power uses) in the form of political behaviour (Pettigrew, 
1995,1998; 
Hardy, 1992). Figure 2 represents a diagram of the political analysis ofpower 
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in Organisational settings. It includes contextual factors, structural conditions, 




0 PON P-4 0 
E0 










CZ (n 0-0 0 c: 
(D 0 1-. IL ý- w 
((D) 
x CQ-) = 
03 



















00 C: (1) , ) I j >, 2 
0 , 'Fz 
a) Ea ) CD C 
ý 'i- 
E 
'o E cz 
::. z 





CZ C/) C: Cý5 2 a) x U) Lij a) (n - 0 
00 
- -C - Q . > 
CU 
-2 -g cu (Z cz 
zE " cz 
cz cn c 




70 >1 (D 
0 (n cr 0) - L- uj 0 c 
1- _ (D Q) c a) 73 4-- 





3: 0) ý6 > 0 ) 
1 
2: ( / ) -(I) ý (1) 01-c 
3) oo (2 
(D 











:3 OR 4-1 
0 
Cf) 
(D M E 
0 EC 9) 0 
(3- 
g 0 
U- ýs a) 
00 (7ý 
In summary, the political perspective within a specific organisational 
context entails the identification of interests and demands that result from 
different functions and responsibilities, values and perspectives and scarce 
resources; how demands are generated and presented; how power is mobilised 
around demands to generate their support overcome conflict, and produce 
desired outcomes. The following section discusses the various ways of 
conducting a political analysis in organisations. 
3.3. Alternative ways of conducting a political analysis in 
organisations 
The study of power in organisations offers a multitude of theories and 
approaches (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). Although consideration of the subtle 
complexities leads to a more comprehensive overview of the phenomenon of 
power, the proliferation of conceptual subtleties has resulted in the 
fragmentation of empirical research (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984) into two 
streams of literature: micro- and macro-level views. 
On the one hand, organisational psychologists take a micro-level view, 
and focus on the behaviour of individuals and on their ability to use power, 
suggesting that power is only present in its use. They investigate bargaining 
techniques and political tactics (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). An example of this 
approach is Thompson's & Luthans' (1983: 75) comment that "power is 
manifested through behavioural actions". On the other hand, organisational 
sociologists take a macro-level view, and focus on the larger organisational 
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context, the structure (both formal and informal) of the organisation, suggesting 
that power rests in the potential. They centre their attention on the nature of 
power, the sources and bases of poiver such as position (formal power) and 
network (informal power) (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). An example of an author 
representing this approach is Pfeffer, (1981; 2002), who refers to polver as 
authority or legitimate power, i. e. that of supervisors over their employees, 
although he recognises the relational aspect of power, which emphasises that 
power is "first of all a structural phenomenon" (Pfeffer, 2002: 305) created by 
the division of labour in each organisation. 
However, even though some authors (e. g. Bacharach & Lawler, 1980) 
have emphasised the distinction between potential and enactment, others have 
argued that the two components cannot be separated. Structural bases of 
potential to power do not translate directly into actual power. Rather, behaviour 
transforms structure into power (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). For example, 
Emerson (1972: 67) states: "... to have a power advantage is to use it"; Dahl 
(1957) equates power with influence and suggests that unused potential is not 
power; Mintzberg (1983) emphasises both will and skill and argues that the 
separation of potential from use is unrealistic. 
In trying to maintain an analytical balance between the structural and 
behavioural forms of power, some scholars (e. g. Brass & Burkhardt, 1993) 
adopt a social network perspective (Krackhardt, 1990) and apply this structural 
focus at the interpersonal level of analysis. This perspective, often associated 
with Resource Dependency Theory (Emerson, 1962), views power as the 
inverse of dependence - that is, people in central network positions have greater 
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access to and potential control over relevant resources such as information, 
persons and instrumentalities in the organisation (Pettigrew, 1995,1998; Brass 
& Burkhardt, 1993). 
However, while personal behaviours and strategies (assertiveness, 
ingratiation, rationality, coalition formation, co-optation, and exchange, among 
others) may have an important effect on power acquisition, structure (position, 
network, reward) and personal sources, based on personal attributes of power 
(expertise, prestige, referent, among others), impose the ultimate constraints on 
the individual (Brass, 1984). Thus, in enacting power to attain different 
interests, individuals' behaviours are restricted by structure. This implies that 
people who are able to control relevant resources and thereby increase others' 
dependence on them are in a position to acquire power (Brass & Burkhardt, 
1993). 
Figure 3 synthesises the altemative ways in which scholars have 
approached the study of power in organisations. The macro-approach suggests 
that power is grounded in the potential; it refers to the structural or contextual 
and to the personal attributes of power within the organisation. In studying 
power, macro-level researches focus on power sources such as position, 
network, information and reward (structural aspects); and to the prestige, 
expertise, referent and consistent behaviour provided by personal values 
(personal aspects) (French & Raven, 1959; Finkelstein, 1992; Pfeffer, 1992). 
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The micro-approach considers the behavioural or relational aspect of 
power and refers to its enactment. Thus, in studying power, micro-level 
researchers focus on uses of power such as behavioural tactics: assertiveness, 
rationality, exchange, coalition fonnation, cooptation, bargaining and 
gatekeeping, among others. 
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Following Pettigrew (1973; 1998), Brass & Burkhardt (1993), Pettigrew 
& McNulty (1995) and Hardy (1992), this study approaches the analysis of 
power from a combined (macro/micro) perspective where structural and 
behavioural aspects of power are "intertwined" (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993: 
466). This approach enables us to observe and understand how the interaction 
between structure (power sources) and behaviour (power uses) determines the 
power distribution throughout the organisation (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993) 
given that a "complete understanding of power in organisations requires an 
integration of both perspectives" (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993: 443). Figure 4 
shows both macro- and micro-approaches to the study of power in organisations 
and how both treatments of power are regarded as simultaneous and 
complementary by a combined approach to the study of power in organisations. 
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Figure 5 shows both sources and uses of power in organisations. 
'Sources of power' refers to potential power (structural and personal); 'uses of 
power', to power in action or what Mintzberg (1983) has defined as ivill and 
skill. This study considers position, network, prestige, referent, expertise, and 
reward, among other aspects, as power sources. Behavioural tactics such as 
assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality, coalition formation, co-optation, 
bargaining, information control and exchange, among others, are considered as 
power uses. 
Figure 5: Sources & Uses of Power in Organisations 
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To sum up, this research on SLP in Business Schools from a political 
perspective approaches the phenomenon by observing how people display 
power from different sources (structural and personal) and use power, in 
promoting and supporting their interests and demands, and how these compete 
with each other to be included in the strategic agenda and transformed into 
decisions which will eventually be implemented. 
3.4. A political analysis of the SLP in Business Schools 
As we have noted, this study intends to fill the gap in the literature 
caused by the dearth of empirical studies on strategic leadership as a process in 
a specific organisational setting - Business Schools, over time. Why choose a 
political perspective in carrying out such a study of the SLP in Business 
Schools? A political analysis of SLP seems to facilitate the observation of this 
phenomenon as a social influence process that takes place among parties in 
organisations. The political approach acts as a lens that focuses on the 
generation of diverse interests and demands that result from the division of 
work, scarce organisational resources, and disparity of perspectives. 
Moreover, this lens centres attention on human action; in essence, how 
conflicts are overcome through the use of power. In observing strategic 
leadership from a processual perspective in an organisational setting where 
power tends to be shared and collegiality penneates the way in which 
academics tend to relate to each other, the political analysis brings into sharp 
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focus issues of power mobilisation (of sources and uses) in building and 
executing the strategic agenda over time. 
Even though leadership studies in the past decades have developed 
different perspectives on antecedents, processes and outcomes, it looks as if 
they may have neglected potentially important variables that could shed light on 
leadership dynamics (Ammeter et al., 2002). For this reason, scholars are 
calling for theoretical and empirical investigation of leadership from a political 
perspective. They draw attention to the way in which perceived deficiencies 
regarding important variables like context, leader style, and alternative 
leadership constituencies indicate that "a new conceptual framework may be 
needed" (Ammeter et al., 2002: 753). In addition, given that power and 
influence processes in organisations have been studied by social psychologists, 
some authors find it extraordinary that there is no theory of political leadership 
in complex organisations (House & Aditya 1997). 
in operationalising the study of the SLP in Business Schools from a 
political perspective, it seems relevant to identify the 'aspects' to be considered 
and analysed: key actors, main generic interests, characterisation of key actors 
and features of both inner and outer contexts. Figure 6 shows how the SLP 
(strategic agenda-building and -executing) operates ftom a political viewpoint - 
i. e. key actors exert influence through power mobilisation in order to prioritise 
and legitimate some issues, or to de-legitimate others. Thus, the study aims 
to 
identify how different key actors build and use power to influence strategic 
agenda-building and -executing, over time; and, in addition, 
how both inner and 
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outer contexts (their key features) both shape and are shaped by the SLP, over 
time. 
Figure 6: A Political perspective on Strategic Leadership in 









Few studies of organisations from the political perspective intend to 
identify the key actors that mobilise power to solve conflicts raised, due to 
diversity of interests. Rather, scholars mostly focus on interests, conflict and 
power (Morgan, 1997). Among those that suggest a focus on key actors, 
Krackhardt (1990) proposes that to assess a political landscape in an 
organisation, researchers should identify the key political actors: who plays? 
That is, whose interests and actions have an important effect (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999) on the strategic agenda-building and -executing? The key actors 
or (players' in this case are 'influencers' with varying personal needs who 
attempt to control the Business School's decisions and actions. 
Moreover, in studying strategic leadership, it seems relevant to identify 
the key actors who play a major role in building and executing the strategic 
a, genda, over time. Whether acting autonomously or as members of a coalition, 
they latch onto issues (Dutton, 1986) and mobilise power to place their interests 
on the School's strategic agenda. Thus, in recognising that a number of 
individuals in the organisation may be involved in the SLP (Davies & Davies, 
2004) rather than just one, this study views the SLP as a collective phenomenon 
to which different individuals can contribute in different ways (Denis et aL, 
2001). 
It is true that certain scholars have previously stressed the need to 
examine leadership as a 'team' phenomenon rather than as the attribute of one 
person (Pettigrew, 1992; Hosking, 1998), stating that in non-hierarchical 
organisations, leadership is a necessary collective phenomenon 
(Denis et 
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al., 2001). In this regard, Eisenhardt (1989) and Finkelstein & Hambrick (1996) 
focused on top management teams, and Denis et al. (2001,1996) focused on 
settings (professional service firms, hospitals in particular) in which the 
structural demands for collective strategic leadership were strong. 
In reviewing the literature on higher education institutions and Business 
Schools, other researchers (Lorange, 2002; Bargh et al., 2000; Ramsden, 1998; 
Middlehurst, 1993; Hardy, 1992) have referred to various key actors: the Dean, 
the central administration, the Senate, the Board, the Faculty and the staff, 
among others. However, in essaying a political analysis of the SLP in Business 
Schools over time, this study refers only to those key actors who have the 
greatest influence on strategic agenda-building and -executing, over time. 
Accordingly, three key actors have been identified: the Dean, the Board 
and the Faculty. The Dean and the Board stand at the strategic apex of the 
School and therefore, their role consists in being in charge of making decisions 
that impact the whole organisation, since they constitute its formal authority. 
The Faculty contributes to the shaping of the School's strategic agenda- 
building and -executing because of the particular idiosyncrasies of the setting. 
Key actors exert influence on the strategic agenda-building and -executing of 
the Business School in the same way that professionals enjoy substantive 
influence in any professional service firm (e. g. the previously mentioned 
consulting firms, hospitals, and so on). 
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Thus, the study will focus on the Dean, the Board and the Faculty. 
However, political analysis of the SLP enacted by these three actors implies a 
focus not only on them, but also on those interests that propel them to mobilise 
power in building and executing the strategic agenda, over time. 
b) Key actors' main generic interests 
Individuals think differently and want to act differently. Alone or in 
groups, they struggle to define and to accomplish their interests, which result 
Erom the division of labour and - in the case of universities and therefore 
Business Schools - from the loosely coupled nature of such organisations 
(Hardy, 1992). As they compete for their interests, they come into conflict with 
other individuals and groups (Lucas, 1987). Accordingly, the choice between 
alternative paths of action usually hinges on the power relations among the 
actors involved. 
The political analysis focuses on how divergent interests give rise to 
conflicts, visible and invisible, that are resolved or perpetuated by various kinds 
of power play (Morgan, 1997). Thus, individuals within the leadership 
constellation act in a manner which they perceive to be likely to further their 
interests. 
Yet this study is not concerned with identifying every interest of every 
key actor, but only those interests specific to his/her role, no matter who the key 
actor is or under what contextual circumstances he/she acts; these are generic 
interests, that is, they are applicable to an entire class or group that is 
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differentiated from other groups. And among key actors' generic interests, the 
study focuses on the main ones - i. e. those that are most important because they 
affect the School's strategic agenda-building and -executing, over time. Table 6 
describes each of the key actors' main generic interests and what each interest 
refers to: 
Table 6: Key actors' main generic interests 
_Key 
actors Main generic interests 
Board Governance: responsibilities regarding the management of the School 
Performance: School's revenues and profits 
Reputation: School's status in the management education market 
Dean Strategic agenda-building and -executing: a long-term perspective of the SLP 
Faculty and Board support: approval to legitimate own decisions 
Performance: School's revenues and profits 
Faculty Collegial participation in key decisions: shared power 
Career: long-term perspective of their profession 
Fair work and compensation systems: transparency in workload and fair reward 
These interests prevail over time and their content and their 
prioritisation vary according to the key actors' characteristics and the influence 
of contextual features. 
c) Key actors' prioritisation of main generic interests 
Even though generic interests are always present in each of the key 
actors' agendas, the prioritisation. of some of them over others is usually 
affected by the enviromnental conditions under which key actors interplay. So, 
in times of economic crisis, it seems reasonable for the Dean to prioritise the 
School's perfonnance over strategic agenda-building and -executing. Or, for 
example, in situations where the Dean is emphasising strategic 
decision- 
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making, it is quite logical that the Faculty should prioritise its need to 
participate in the School's strategic agenda-building and -executing. 
Thus, the different contextual features influence the preferences of each 
key actor. However, prioritisation of main generic interests does not solely 
depend on the situation. There are personal characteristics -such as 
background, leadership style, skills and values- that affect key actors' 
prioritisation of some interests over others. 
In an attempt to understand how the managing of implementation may 
influence eventual success, Hickson et al.. (2003) draw 55 cases from the 
Bradford Studies (a large-scale UK study of decision-making). They conclude: 
44 priority emphasises an unimpeded trajectory for implementation. If other 
priorities should divert managerial attention then, equally, success is much less 
likely" (2003: 1812). Results suggest that "priority is associated with 
achievement, which may influence success" (2003: 1814). 
d) Characterisation of key actors 
Just as key actors have generic interests that depend on their role, they 
also have specific interests according to their personal characteristics and the 
contextual circumstances in which they interplay. In addressing the 
characterisation of key actors, the study focuses on different features that to 
some extent constrain each of the key actors' interests and eventually mould the 
School's strategic agenda-building and -executing, over time. 
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In this study, each key actor's main generic interests vary according to 
the role he/she plays. Accordingly, the Dean is characterised by his 
background, leadership style, skills and values. The Board is characterised by 
its background and the role of the Chairman. Finally, the Faculty is 
characterised by its background andftagmentation. 
Background describes the set of initial circumstances that affects each of 
the key actors' personal characteristics, and that, over time, conditions their 
action. For example, their career (managerial, academic or entrepreneurial), 
degrees attained, universities attended, their year of arrival at IMD, etc. 
Leadership style refers to the way in which the leader secures the 
compliance of others (Mehta et al., 2003); how the leader's consistent patterns 
of exhibited behaviour are perceived by others when he/she is attempting to 
influence people's activities (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982). The literature 
includes different classifications of leadership styles. This study observes the 
leadership styles of the various Deans from the perspective of the classification 
suggested by Bass (1990) since it fits the setting (see Table 7). However, it 
seems relevant to declare that the study does not intend to stick to any of the 
two typologies suggested by Bass's (1990) classification. Rather, it describes 
each leadership style according to its inclination towards any of the typologies. 
Thus, leadership style typologies are taken simply as a starting point in this 
analysis. In addition, the classification is limited to the period under study (and 
does not imply that the style is maintained over time). 
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Directive Leader plays the active role in problem-solving and decision-making. 
Leader expects group members to be guided by his/her decisions. 
Leader can try to use persuasion, reason and logic. 
Leader can assert an expectation or need and offer reivards or exert pressure to 
gain acceptance. 
Leader can generate charismatic identification to motivate and build 
commitment. 
Leader can try partial disengagement by backing away from time-consuming 
issues with a lower priority and by concentrating colleagues' attention on more 
important issues. 
Participative Is cooperative & democratic. 
Involves others in decision-making process. 
Draws people out, listening actively and carefully, and gaining acceptance. 
Source: Bass, 1990. 
Besides observing the leadership style of the Dean, the study also 
focuses on his/her skills and values. Skills and competences refer to the abilities 
of the actor, his key set of competencies for effective leadership (Douglas et al., 
2005; Ahearn et al., 2004), and values play a primary role in determining 
behaviours. 
As for the characterisation of the Board, the study focuses firstly on its 
background. It intends thereby to identify the professional/executive career 
development of its members - whether they be businessmen, CEOs, or 
something else, and their nationality. In addition, the study also observes the 
role of the Chairman - whether he plays a more comprehensive role, 
in order to 
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achieve higher involvement of the Board in the Business School, or ensures 
only that it fulfils its tasks. 
Similarly, in characterising the Faculty, the study also identifies its 
background. Accordingly, it focuses on the careers (professional as well as 
academic) pursued by its members, the degrees they have attained, universities 
attended, their year of arrival at the School, values and orientation (teaching- or 
research-oriented, etc. ). In addition, the study also observes the Faculty's 
ftagmentation - i. e. divisions among members that occur because of particular 
circumstances related to the history of the Business School. Table 8 depicts the 
SLP (strategic agenda-building and -executing, over time) operated by three 
key actors (Board, Dean and Faculty), the main generic interests of these three 
and their characterisation: 
Table 8: Characterisation of each key actor 






Role of the Chairman 
Faculty Background 
Fragmentation 












e) Features of the inner and outer contexts 
Key actors' prioritisation of main generic interests is influenced not only 
by their personal characteristics, but is also affected by the environmental 
conditions in which they participate and interplay. Moreover, the environmental 
conditions themselves are also influenced by key actors as they try to pursue 
their own interests. 
Environmental conditions refer to the inner context of the School within 
which the SLP occurs - the School's formal and informal structure, its culture, 
organisational climate, systems and performance; and the outer context - the 
School's location, its competition, the economic environment, its corporate 
customers, alumni, donors and benefactors. Thus, in observing the SLP in 
Business Schools from a political perspective, over time, the study hopes to 
identify those features of both inner and outer contexts that act as enabling or 
constraining forces, influencing the key actors' prioritisation of their main 
generic interests and shaping the School's strategic agenda-building and - 
executing, over time. Figure 8 shows the SLP (strategic agenda-building and - 
executmg, over time) enacted by three key actors (Board, Dean and Faculty), 
their main generic interests and characterisation, and the features of both inner 
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To sum up, the study intends to describe and analyse the SLP (strategic 
agenda-building and -executing) over time, in Business Schools from a political 
perspective - i. e. by examining how key actors prioritise issues, legitimate them, and 
mobilise power according to their main generic interest prioritisation, both in each 
Business School and across the three Schools, over time (see Figure 9). The following 
three research questions will guide us: 
1. Who are the key actors? How do they interplay in exerting influence to shape 
and execute the strategic agenda while raising their own interests? 
2. What are the main features of the inner and outer contexts that influence the 
School's strategic agenda-building and -executing over time? What kind of influence 
do 
they have, and upon what? 
3. How do the key actors mobilise (build and use) power in order to influence 
strategic agenda-building and -executing over time, according to their prioritisation of 
interests? 
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Figure 9: Analytical Framework for the political study of the SLP over time 
I 
SLP Strategic Agenda %I 
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5. Features of the inner & outer context characterisation 
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Chapter III: RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to clarify the epistemological underpinnings of this study on 
the strategic leadership process (SLP) in Business Schools from a political 
perspective, over time. Given the breadth of the research questions presented at the 
end of the foregoing chapter, the analysis demands different perspectives to achieve a 
deeper understanding. Accordingly, both holistic and contextualist approaches are set 
up to visualise the interaction of social actors in context and as theory of method. 
Finally, as this study is focused on Business Schools, different theories of 
organisations in relation to leadership will be tackled, so as to identify and understand 
the patterns of behaviour of the institutions under study. 
2. Epistem9logical Underpinnings 
Of the many models that have attempted to defme paradigms in social and 
organisational theory, the one developed by Burrell & Morgan (2001) has attracted 
the most attention (Hassard, 1991; Morgan, 1990). Taking together as standpoints two 
distinct dimensions (i. e. assumptions about the nature of social science and 
assumptions about the nature of society), these authors defme four paradigms for 
organisational analysis by intersecting subject-object debates in the theory of social 
science with consensus-conflict debates in the theory of society. 
The four paradigms produced are the functionalist (objectiveý regulation), 
interpretive (subjective, regulation), radical humanist (subjective, radical change) and 
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radical structuralist (objective, radical change). To be located within a particular 
paradigm is to view the world in a particular way (Burrell & Morgan, 2001,1979; 
Gioia & Pitre, 1990; Willmott, 1993). These paradigms or general perspectives are 
ways of thinking that reflect fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the nature of 
organisations (Kuhn, 1970). 
Unlike other authors (e. g. Giddens, 1979; Gioia & Pitre, 1990), Burrell & 
Morgan (1979) stress that the four paradigms (functionalist, interpretive, radical 
humanist and radical structuralist) are alternative (in the sense that one can operate in 
different paradigms sequentially over time) but mutually exclusive (in the sense that 
one cannot operate in more than one paradigm at any given point in time) since if one 
accepts the assumptions of one, the assumptions of all the others are rejected. 
2.1. Multiparadigm perspective 
Traditional approaches to theory-building in organisational study have enabled 
scholars and others to formulate propositions about organisations and how to 
understand them within a given paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). In this regard, even though 
these different paradigms make important contributions to theory-building, these 
contributions are nonetheless incomplete (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). The problem rests on 
the fact that the use of any single research paradigm produces too narrow a view to 
reflect the multifaceted nature of organisational reality (Buffell & Morgan, 
1979; 
Gioia & Pitre, 1990). 
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As a result, scholars in organisation theory are involved in a debate over the 
distinctive contributions of knowledge and to knowledge that arise from different 
philosophical views and conceptual paradigms (Gioia & Pitre, 1990; Astley & Van de 
Ven, 1983; Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Some of them argue that paradigms present 
boundaries that are permeable; they tend to be ill-defined and blurred so that it may 
appear difficult to establish exactly where one paradigm leaves off and another 
begins. For example, Gioia & Pitre, (1990: 595) assert: "paradigms are not 
completely incommensurable". Boundaries between paradigms are more usefully 
conceived as transition zones. 
In order to amend any attempt to force-fit one theory-building technique as a 
'universal approach', Gioia & Pitre (1990) suggest a multiparadigm perspective, thus 
constructing an organisational science that is not only eclectic, but also original. This 
perspective allows a more comprehensive consideration of organisational phenomena 
and generates more complete knowledge (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). Moreover, it offers 
the possibility of creating fresh insights because these start from diverse assumptions. 
Therefore, it taps into a number of facets of organisational phenomena and produces 
markedly different and uniquely informative theoretical views of the events under 
study (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). 
The multiparadigm approach can generate more complete knowledge than can 
any single paradigmatic perspective. It offers the potential contribution of theory 
when applied to theory-building within any given paradigm; and a contribution to 
theory because it fosters an awareness of multiple approaches to the theory-building 
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process, with the consequent potential of constructing alternative theories about the 
nature of organisational phenomena (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). 
Figure 10 represents the multiparadigm perspective - i. e. the epistemological 
underpinnings of this study. Boundaries can-not be identified within transition zones, 
where they are blurred. The shadows at the borderline between paradigms correspond 
to their permeability. 
Figure 10: Multiparadigm perspectives on theory-building 
The sociology of radical change 
Subjective 
The sociology of regulation 
Source: Burrell & Morgan (2001; 1979), Gioia & Pittre, (1990) 
Obj e tiv 
The above figure exemplifies the opinion of certain scholars that paradigms 
are not completely incommensurable: there are ways of understanding important 
facets of one paradigm in terms of another by focusing on the transition zones. 
It 
seems relevant to state that despite the possibilities for bridging across 
blurred 
boundaries, the permeability of paradigms is confined essentially to the transition 
zones themselves (Gioia & Pittre, 1990). 
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This political analysis of the strategic leadership process in Business Schools, 
over time, adopts a multiparadigm perspective with the purpose of achieving a more 
comprehensive consideration of the phenomena and generating more complete 
knowledge. Since this kind of analysis aims to overlap both functionalist and 
interpretive paradigms, bridging the transition zone across these paradigms is 
facilitated by employing 'second-order concepts' (Van Maanen, 1979), i. e. 
explanatory constructs used to describe dimensions of scientific understanding (Gioia 
& Pitre, 1990). The bridge between these two paradigms - which share a concern 
with the maintenance of social order - falls under the rubric of Structurationism 
(Giddens, 1979; Gioia & Pitre, 1990). 
Structuration theorists focus on connections between human action and 
established organisational structures. Proponents of this theory do not treat structuring 
as separate from structures. They consider social construction processes together with 
I objective characteristics of the social world. Moreover, they recognise that although 
an organisation's members use generative rules to produce organisational structures, 
these serve to influence and constrain the structuring activities themselves. Thus, 
structuring and structures are placed on an equal footing by showing how social 
structures emerge from structuring activities and become external and influential on 
subsequent structuring processes. Since structure is conceived simultaneously as "a 
flow of ongoing action and as a set of institutionalised traditions of forms that reflect 
and constrain that action" (Barley, 1986: 80), it is both the medium and the outcome 
of interactions (Giddens, 1979). 
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Structuration serves as a means to bridge a gap between subjectivist and 
objectivist views of related notions covering the interpretive-functionalist transition 
zones. Consequently, structuring and structure are not seen as exclusive concepts 
simply because they reside in different paradigms. Structuration resolves an apparent 
paradox between action and structure (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989), two combined 
concepts. 
2.2. Implications of Structurationsim in this Study 
Making use of structurationism implies that elements of both interpretive and 
functionalist paradigms are used together in carrying out the research. Aligning 
oneself with a mixed epistemological stance such as structurationism raises important 
issues regarding suitable methodology and consequently research design choice 
(Hatum, 2002). For example, this research strategy is iterative (Bryman, 2001) since 
it involves a weaving back and forth between data and theory and thus, it is both 
inductive (subjective dimension and thus, interpretive) and deductive (objective 
dimension and thus, functionalist). Deduction is caffied out in operationalising the 
SLP through its two main elements that result ftom the literature review - i. e. 
strategic agenda-building and strategic agenda-executing. Induction enables us to 
reach conclusions from different findings in analysing not only the sequence of 
events, but their interconnections and interrelations, over time. 
Both quantitative and qualitative research methods are used in collecting data. 
Within quantitative research methods, the study carries out content analysis of semi- 
structured interviews and coding of the transcripts of these. This technique 
facilitates 
the building of matrices to evaluate data. Qualitative research methods such as case 
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studies provide us with a thorough examination of the strategic leadership process in 
each Business School, over time. However, the combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods enables the analyst to carry out a more accurate analysis, 
since validity is guaranteed. 
Thus, given the broad research questions that have already been outlined in the 
previous chapter, it seems impossible that just one single method will satisfy all 
requirements. A holistic approach is necessary also to show the interaction of social 
actors in their context as another element derived from the epistemological standpoint 
of this research (Giddens, 1979,1984). Moreover, the theory of method informing 
this research is contextualism (Pepper, 1942; Pettigrew, 1985,1987,1990,2001). 
This is tackled next. 
2.3. Contextualism 
Formal knowledge may be obtained through four 'world hypotheses': 
formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism (Pepper, 1942). Each of these is 
associated with a different 'root metaphor' (Pepper, 1942; Tsoukas, 1994), a device 
for embellishing discourse, a way of thinking and a way of seeing that pervade how 
we understand our world generally (Morgan, 1997). 
According to these hypotheses, human knowledge is an endless process of 
cognitive refinement: the criticism and improvement of common-sense claims 
(Tsoukas, 1994). Contextualism is both a synthetic and a dispersive theory. It is 
synthetic since it takes a pattern as the object of study, rather than a set of 
discrete 
facts. it is dispersive in so far as the multitudes of facts it seeks to re*gister are 
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assumed to be loosely structured, not systematically connected by virtue of a lawful 
relationship (Tsoukas, 1994). 
The root metaphor of this theory is the idea of the historic event continuously 
changing over time. Moreover, contextualists believe that change is endemic in social 
systems. Thus, every moment is qualitatively different and should be treated as such. 
Contextualists categorically accept change as an inherent feature of the world, and 
seek to accommodate the ontological claim that the social world is incessantly on the 
move (Tsoukas, 1994). 
Regarding this particular research on the strategic leadership process in 
Business Schools, a contextualist analysis draws on phenomena at vertical and 
horizontal levels of analysis and the interconnections that exist between those levels 
through time (Pettigrew, 1985,1987,1990,2001). The vertical level refers to 
interdependences between higher or lower levels of analysis such as each of the 
Business Schools under study (firm level of analysis), the management education 
industry (sector level of analysis) and the European business environment (national 
level of analysis). The horizontal level refers to the sequential interconnectedness 
among phenomena over time, which is provided by the longitudinal analysis both of 
each of the Business Schools individually and across the three, over time. The 
following chart (Figure 11) describes the contextualist Perspective of the present 
research explained in the previous paragraph. 
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Figure 11: Contextualist approach of the study 
Vertical level 
European business environment I Academic, socioeconomic and political environment in Europe during 1 99o - 2004 
Management education industry I Main strategic challenges in the industry during 1990 - 2004 
IMID - INSEAD - LBS Influence of both inner & outer contexts in building and executing I 
each business school's strategic agenda during 1990 - 2004 
Time 
Horizontal level 
We have now laid out the epistemological underpinnings of this study; these 
groundings determine the perspective from which organisations are studied. In this 
regard, the fact that a contextualist approach has been chosen to carry out the political 
analysis of the strategic leadership process in Business Schools, over time, leads us to 
consider also the influence of the inner and outer contexts on organisations and how 
both contexts are also affected by the SLP, over time. The next section addresses the 
research methodology of the study of the SLP in Business Schools over time, from a 
political perspective. 
3. The study of the SLP in Business Schools over time: Research Method 
The methodology selected to tap into the political processes that occur around 
the SLP (strategic agenda-building and -executing) over time, is primarily qu4litative, 
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since it tends to describe the unfolding of social processes (Van Maanen, 1979). This 
methodology covers an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, 
decode, translate, and come to terms with the meaning of certain more or less 
naturally occurring phenomena in the social world (Van Maanen, 1979). 
Accordingly, when we are embarking on a political analysis of the SLP in 
Business Schools, over time, qualitative methodology would seem to facilitate the 
observation of the unfolding of events over time and the interconnections between the 
actions of key people (the Board, Dean and Faculty of each Business School) and 
contextual circumstances both inside and outside the Business School. When we are 
making observations, a multiple paradigm perspective, employing triangulation 
across theories and paradigms, enables us to have greater confidence in the reliability 
of our fmdings (Bryman, 200 1). Similarly here, we are using qualitative methods and 
strategies (case studies, semi-structured interviews) triangulated with quantitative 
material (statistical analysis of the evolution of key features of each Business School, 
such as revenues over time, characterisation of key actors, content analysis of semi- 
structured interviews, coding analysis of the transcripts of each interview and archival 
material, in order to build matrices for a better data display). 
Longitudinal and comparative case studies (Yin, 1984; Pettigrew, 1990) of 
three top European Business Schools were conducted over the period 1990-2004. 
Longitudinal design permits the study of long-term processes in context. Insights 
into 
the time order of variables eventually facilitates causal inferences (Bryman, 
2001). As 
a result, causation and connectivity can be determined and patterns identified and 
explained (Pettigrew, 1990). 
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In addition, since this study intends to describe and explain the temporal 
sequence of events (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990) involved in the SLP over time, it 
seems appropriate to employ the case study method, which implies tracing processes 
in their natural contexts (Pettigrew, 1992; Van de Ven, 1992; Yin, 1984). The case 
study method is a "research strategy, which focuses on understanding the dynamics 
present within single settings" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). It is thus suitable for the in- 
depth exploration of the strategic leadership process in Business Schools and, 
moreover!, it facilitates the identification of interconnections, causality and patterns of 
behaviour which will in time contribute to theory-building (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Finally, given that the case study method essentially generates theories about 
specific phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989) the multiple case study method augments 
external validity and helps guard against observer bias (Yin, 1984). Thus, each case 
study serves to confirm or disconfirm the inferences drawn from previous ones 
(Bourgois & Eisenhardt, 1988). Moreover, in carrying out multiple case design, there 
is scope to examine causal processes directly, to look at them in context (Pettigrew, 
1990; 1992; 1997). Comparing three cases (SLP in three different Business Schools) 
puts us a better position to establish the circumstances in which a theory will or will 
not hold (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bryman, 2001). Comparative design acts as a 
springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings (Bryman, 200 1). 
It seems relevant to declare that n line with the practice of other scholars doing 
process research (such as Pettigrew, 1979; Barley, 1986; Doz, 1996; Denis et al., 
1999,2001), a temporal bracketing strategy is employed here. This study breaks 
down the chronological data identified in each Business School, into successive 
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discrete time periods, or phases that become comparative units of analysis. Phases are 
defined so that there is continuity in the context and actions being pursued within 
them; and boundaries are delineated by turning points or 'social dramas' (Pettigrew, 
1979). 
This study has defined the boundaries within the period under study (1990- 
2004) according to changes in the Deanship and within each Business School over 
time, in relation to different initiatives launched in response to a particular strategic 
issue: becoming a top international Business School. Thus, the study observes how 
the SLP is operationalised through strategic agenda-building and -executing in the 
chosen strategic issue that acts as a vehicle for this operationalisation. Comparison 
among the different set of initiatives undertaken in relation to the strategic issue 
within each Deanship, and within and across the three Business Schools, over time, 
facilitates the identification of patterns. 
In sum, an "eclectic approach" (Pettigrew, 1973: 64) that consists of both a 
longitudinal and a comparative case study method - political analysis of the SLP in 
three Business Schools chosen among the top Business Schools in Europe according 
to international rankings - facilitates the depiction of reality and of the course of 
events, their chronology, how events evolve over time, in order to establish patterns 
and permit examination of temporal interconnectedness, for it focuses on past, present 
and future (Pettigrew, 1997). 
Data was gathered from multiple sources: semi-structured interviews, lasting 
around 90 to 120 minutes, and recorded with members of key constituencies - 
Board, 
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Dean, Faculty and staff; documentary and archival data from Business Schools (i. e.: 
books on the School's history, brochures, speeches, presentations, annual reports, 
minutes, rankings in Business Week and the Financial Times, material put out by 
AACSB and EQUIS, etc. ); statistical material that reflects the evolution of key 
features of both inner and outer contexts (e. g. the Faculty profile over time, students' 
profile over time, members of the Board and other key actors). Triangulation (Denzin, 
1997) of these different sources enables the researcher to counteract the bias 
potentially resulting from relying upon a single data source (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
4. The study of the SLP in Business Schools over time: Research Questions 
In attempting to understand and analyse the SLP in context from a political 
perspective this study intends to answer the following research questions, which have 
already been posed in the previous chapter: 
1. Who are the key actors? How do they interplay in exerting influence to shape 
and execute the strategic agenda while raising their own interests? 
2. "at are the main features of the inner and outer contexts that influence the 
School's strategic agenda-building and -executing over ti . me; and what 
is their 
influence? 
Ifl 3. How do the key actors mobilise (build and use) power in order to 
in uence 
strategic agenda-building and -executing over time, according 
to their prioritisation of 
interests? 
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Figure 12 shows the scope of the study - the SLP, and its operationalisation 
through two main elements, strategic agenda-building and -executing during the 
period 1990-2004. The outer context refers to the trends in the environment of 
management education during the period under study, rankings, economic context 
and corporate support; while the inner context involves the leadership style, the 
concentration and dispersion of dominant values, Faculty profile, formal and informal 
coalitions, economic and activity indicators, and customised activities. Both 
contextual factors shape and mould the SLP over time. 
Figure 12: Analytical Framework 
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The following section deals with the way in which this research delves into the 
data in order to fmd the answers corresponding to each of the research questions. 
4.1. How was this study conducted? 
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In trying to answer each of these analytical questions this study first identified 
the key constituencies within each Business School and their main generic interests, 
over time. In this the focus was not only on the person of the Dean but also on other 
people who influenced the Business School's strategic agenda-building and - 
executing - i. e. the Board and the Faculty were also observed. Moreover, this study 
also identified the key actors within those constituencies with the aim of recognising 
the people who had the most influence, and establishing how they prioritised their 
main generic interests over time (1990-2004). 
Second, the study identified the critical features of both outer and inner 
contexts that influenced strategic agenda-building and -executing over the period 
1990-2004. Here, the focus was on the features that constituted each of the contexts, 
and how these features triggered the prioritisation of some interests over others and 
facilitated the legitimisation of this type of prioritisation over time. 
In addition, in trying to understand how key people mobilised (built and used) 
power, and raised or blocked, legitimated or delegitimated strategic issues in order to 
influence the School's strategic agenda-building and -executing over time, the study 
explored the basis and uses of key actors' power that facilitated their prioritisation of 
main generic interests over time. For this purpose, longitudinal data about the SLP 
(strategic agenda-building and -executing) in each Business School, 
during the period 
1990-2004, was collected. Pettigrew (1990) claims the importance of clarifying the 
beginning and end of the process under analysis. A retrospective analysis of each 
School was also carried out so that the study could grasp the succession of events 
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relevant to the understanding of developments in each School over the period 1990- 
2004. 
Access to each of the three Business Schools was not a problem. All three 
institutions were happy to collaborate and generous with time and information. As has 
already been said, the case study method was chosen. This technique demanded three 
main sources of data from each Business School: semi-structured interviews, 
documentary data and archival material, and quantitative and statistical material. This 
triangulated methodology was useful since it made it possible "to draw on the 
particular and different strengths of various data collection methods" (Pettigrew, 
1990: 277). Moreover, different kinds of data were used as cross-checks. 
Given that interviews are one of the most common methods used in fieldwork 
to further the understanding of a situation (Fontana & Frey, 1994), around 30 semi- 
structured interviews with members of the key constituencies were conducted per 
Business School. The number of interviews per Business School varied because once 
theoretical saturation was achieved (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the interview process 
was curtailed. Interviews lasted between 90 and 120 minutes, and all were audio- 
taped and transcribed. Interviewees were asked about both retrospective and current 
strategic decisions related to the School's strategic agenda-building and -executing 
over the period 1990-2004. 
4.2. Data analysis 
The research design and data collection methods have now been explained. 
The purpose of this section is to tackle the question of how the data was then 
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analysed. Huberman & Miles (1994) indicate that analysing data is an interactive 
operation that starts from the moment of data collection and includes also data 
reduction, data display, and the drawing and verifying of conclusions. Table 9 shows 
the framework for analysing the data: 
Table 9: Data analysis. An interactive process. 
Main aspects Main activities Operationalisation of the Aims 
activity through... 
Data reduction -Coding and storage of -Storage of data in broad -Try to avoid "death 
data categories of analysis through data asphyxiation 
-Data storage on own (Pettigrew, 1990: 281) 
database 
Data display -Writing up analytical -Analytical chronologies -Understand the evolution 
chronologies using suitable categories for of the SLP over time 
the different companies -Shaping the key features of 
(Pettigrew, 1990). These both inner & outer contexts 
chronologies bear the seeds of that influence the SLP over 
the analysis. time 
Cross- case -Comparison between -Comparative analysis among -Understanding how the 
analysis the three Business elements of the SLP, features two elements of the SLP are 
Schools over time of both inner and outer enacted over time 
contexts and key actors and -To find common patterns 
their main generic priorities within each Business 
within the three Business School over time and across 
Schools over time and across the three Business Schools 
the three Business Schools over time 
over time 
Source: Haturn (2002) 
A process of reduction and storage of information helped to avoid "death 
through data asphyxiation" (Pettigrew, 1990: 281). N-VIVO software enabled 
data 
reduction under different categories such as strategic agenda-building, strategic 
agenda-executing, and by the different features of both inner and outer contexts 
that 
emerged as the fieldwork was carried out (economic environment, competitors, 
donors and benefactors, systems, structures, culture, etc. ). 
Interviews were content-analysed in order to identify key actors, and 
their 
power sources and uses. Reliability coding (Huberman 
& Miles, 1994) provided an 
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estimate of the validity of the findings. In addition, in order to enhance, triangulate 
(Stake, 1994), and validate (Yin, 1994) information from the interviews, and also 
documentary and archival material, were used. Documentary and archival material are 
important in longitudinal research because they provide the study with facts. They 
are, it is true, "subject to dangers of selective deposit and survival" (Pettigrew 1990: 
277). But, if treated with appropriate caution, documentary data can complement the 
information obtained from interviews and provide insight (Hatum, 2002) into the 
context in which strategic decisions are taken. 
Matrices were built to facilitate data display. In order to enhance, triangulate 
(Stake, 1994), and validate (Yin, 1984), information from the interviews, 
documentary and archival material, quantitative and statistical material were used. 
This data provided the project with the necessary background information about the 
evolution of certain features of each Business School over time. 
After identifying the key actors and the set of initiatives they promoted with 
the purpose of responding to the chosen strategic issue (becoming a top international 
Business School) within the different stages in which the period was divided, features 
of both inner and outer contexts that influenced each School's strategic agenda- 
building and -executing were identified. Moreover, the study observed 
how these 
shaped and moulded the SLP over time, facilitating the legitimisation of the main 
generic interests that were prioritised. 
Finally, the study observed how key actors built and used power in influencing 
strategic agenda-building and -executing over time. It identified the 
different power 
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sources, and uses of power, that were employed by key actors in raising, prioritising 
and legitimating their main generic interests within their School's strategic agenda- 
building and -executing, over time. 
To sum up, in carrying out a political analysis of the SLP (strategic agenda- 
building and -executing) in Business Schools over time, with regard to a particular 
strategic issue - that of becoming a top international Business School - the study 




Firstly, it identified the type of initiative carried out - breakthrough or 
Secondly, it analysed issue legitimisation according to issue 
sponsorship, issue-selling, alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation, agenda 
structure and characterisation of features of both outer and inner contexts. 
3- Thirdly, it studied the mobilisation of power according to sponsors' 
leadership style, the Dean's skills and competences, power sources and power uses. 
Findings were compared within each Business School over time, and then 
across the three Schools. Thus, similarities and differences, over time, could be 
identified, and patterns could be established regarding the SLP as a social influence 
process in Business Schools; this depended on whether such patterns were 
conditionants or enablers of strategic agenda-building and -executing. 
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Chapter IV: BUSINESS SCHOOL INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the Business School sector, with its 
driving forces and trends, and key drivers for competition, in order better to 
understand the external environment in which the three Schools included in this study 
(IMD, INSEAD and London Business School) are embedded. Moreover it also aims, 
in particular, to unveil how the external context affects the SLP in each of the three 
Schools. over the period 1990-2004. 
This chapter will firstly provide an overview of the Business School 
background, the central role played by Business Schools and criticisms of them. 
Secondly, it will describe the history of US and European Business Schools. Thirdly, 
the study will examine Business Schools' response to the main trends towards 
globalisation and increasing competition. Fourthly, the study will refer to the specific 
influence of rankings and accreditation agencies in this sector. Fifthly, it will review 
the challenges facing Business Schools and the forces driving them. And finally, the 
study will present some implications for SLP in Business Schools. 
2. Background 
Business School and management research has a potentially fundamental role 
to play in the context of a knowledge-based society where education, training and 
research are core processes of social and economic change (Starkey et al., 
2004). 
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Their overarching mission is to be responsible both for the continuous dissemination 
of the new and evolving bodies of knowledge available to practitioners, and for the 
institutionalised development of new Faculties to continue the process of discovering 
and developing knowledge (Harvey et al., 2006). 
Business Schools have a central role, existing as they do at the interface of 
business and academic worlds (Prince, 1999). This unique position forces them to 
deal with a twofold challenge: firstly, to cope with the changing external environment 
and its conflicting economic, social and cultural forces, and to foresee the different 
strategies that will be needed in response; and secondly, to reinforce their role as 
research institutions concerned with knowledge creation and dissemination. 
Although Business Schools have had a relatively short history, they have been 
recognised as "the major success story in the university in the last quarter of a 
. century, if we measure this in terms of the growth in demands for its services" 
(Starkey, Hatchuel & Tempest, 2004: 152 1). However, maintaining high quality 
standards and being recognised in both the business and academic worlds has become 
a strong challenge which they must face. In dealing with the double hurdle of 
delivering 'business relevance' and 'academic rigour', Business Schools have been at 
the centre of some criticisms. 
Starkey & Tempest (2005) surnmarise these in the form of five factors: firstly, 
at its origin, the Business School was little more than a trade school; secondly, as the 
Business School has transformed itself from a trade school, its research has become 
divorced from the real concerns of business, and has produced self-referential and 
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irrelevant knowledge; thirdly, Business School education and training does not have 
positive effects on the careers of its graduates; fourthly, in aiming to respond to 
customer needs and become a market-driven organisation, it has sometimes neglected 
knowledge; and finally, the Business School has not only failed to deliver knowledge 
that enhances competitiveness at a firm and national level, but has also been a major 
source of the wrong sort of knowledge for management, fostering a short-term, risk- 
averse orientation and even new management thinking and practices that have led to 
contemporary business and social crises. 
In response to the foregoing criticisms regarding the double hurdle faced by 
Business Schools, Thomas (2007) asserts that Business Schools should engage in 
cutting-edge, rigorous academic research on management which is informed by 
context and by practical insights about management gained from engagement with 
management issues and challenges. 
I US and European Business Schools: an overview. 
Although the impetus for the evaluation and development of business and 
management knowledge within higher education originally started in Europe 
(Antunes & Thomas, 2007), the Business School as we know it was invented in the 
US. Its origin can be traced to the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, 
which was founded in 1881 (Crainer & Dearlove, 1999). Other Schools soon 
followed: Chicago, Harvard, Columbia and Dartmouth. The spread of this type of 
institution all over the US was rapid, with the development of both independent and 
university-based Business Schools (Antunes & Thomas, 2007). 
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These institutions grew out of a desire to train and educate future generations 
in management techniques and practices. Although they were born as trade schools. 
towards the end of the 1950s, reports from the Ford and Camegie Foundations 
influenced their development, driving them towards a more research- and discipline- 
led approach, with emphasis on scientific method, research and knowledge creation, 
and a strong focus on graduate education in business (Antunes & Thomas, 2007). 
While in the US these new institutions were welcomed, in Europe there was a 
tepid response to them. Even though there are some exceptions (e. g. the Ecole 
Superieure de Commerce, founded by the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
in 1819, which introduced a management course in 193 1), Europeans took little 
interest in Business Schools in the first half of the twentieth century (Antunes 
Thomas, 2007). However, after World War 11, the Marshall Plan and other US-led 
initiatives to rebuild Europe's industrial base brought American ideas to Europe. 
Among these ideas there was the recognition that the business leaders of the future 
required special training (Crainer & Dearlove, 1999). 
Thus, during the 1950s, Business Schools began to spring up on the European 
mainland; they developed more slowly and on a national, rather than regional basis. 
As for the UK, there was little development after the foundation of Schools of 
Commerce at the Universities of Birmingham and Manchester at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Business Schools developed late in Britain, but grew rapidly in the 
latter part of the twentieth century. There were no Business Schools 
in British 
universities until the mid- I 960s, when the London Business School (founded 
in 1964 
as the London Institute of Business Management and as a graduate college of the 
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University of London), and Manchester Business School, were created by the UK 
government to provide Europe with the leaders needed to enhance British industry 
and financial sectors, and permit them to compete worldwide. By the beginning of the 
21't century the number of UK Business Schools had reached approximately 120 
(AIM Research, 2006). 
Within continental Europe, IMD, although born in 1990, resulted from the 
merger of two Swiss Business Schools which had been previously founded by two 
private companies: IMI (International Management Institute), and IMEDE (Institut 
pour I'Etude des M6thodes de Direction de I'Entreprise). IMI was founded in 1946 by 
Alcan Aluminium Ltd,, in Geneva, whereas IMEDE was founded by Nestle with the 
academic support of HBS, in Lausanne. While IMI pursued the goal of developing a 
better understanding of the world's geopolitics, IMEDE was founded by private 
companies with the initiative of developing the skills of their managers. 1 
INSEAD was created as a privately funded, independent institution in 
Fontainebleau, France, in 1957. Its founder, Georges Doriot, was a French-bom 
Harvard professor who wanted to provide cross-cultural business education and help 
rebuild the war-torn economies of Europe. INSEAD was not the result of a 
university's strategic initiative, but of a group of business entrepreneurs who wanted 
to found an international Business School in continental Europe. 
2 
Business Schools have expanded worldwide since the early 20th century; 
currently, there are around 4000 Business Schools in the world (Thomas & Li, 2007). 
' Please refer to Chapter V for further details on the IMD case-study 
2 Please refer to Chapter VI for further details on the INSEAD case-study. 
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In this regard, the Business School industry has been among the fastest-growing 
segments in higher education over the last two decades (Thomas & Li, 2007), as a 
result of the globalisation springboard that became a factor in the 1990s. 
In the US, Business Schools have become the largest single field within higher 
education. The number of bachelor's and master's degrees awarded in business has 
reached records for decades and has increased by 215% since the early 1970s. For 
example: In 1955-56, graduate business education was virtually nonexistent, with 
only 3,200 MBA degrees awarded in the US. By 1997-98, this number had grown to 
over 102,000 (Zimmerman, 2001). Currently, in the US, there are over 1.8 million 
MBAs. By the year 2020, it is predicted that there will be over 3 million (Starkey & 
Madan, 2001). 
Along the same lines, a McKinsey-Harvard report from 1995 estimated that 
non-degree executive education in the US generated around $3.3 billion, and was 
growing at a rate of 10% to 12% annually (Crainer & Dearlove, 1999). Business 
education has also spread throughout Asia and Europe; particularly in Britain, where 
the number of Business Schools rose from 20 in the early 1980s to 120 by the end of 
the 1990s. Moreover, Business Schools are among the UK's top fifty exporters, 
attracting over $640 million a year from other countries (Crainer & Dearlove, 1999). 
According to the Digest of Education Statistics 2005, edited by the National 
Centre for Education Statistics (NCES), in the academic year 2003-2004, 
approximately 22% of all bachelor's degrees, 25% of all master's degrees, and 3% of 
all doctoral degrees were business degrees, whereas the numbers had been 14%, 11% 
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and 2% in the academic year 1970-1971. In Europe, between 1996 and 2004, the 
number of full-time undergraduate students grew by 26%, while the total of full-time 
graduate students, grew by 157%. 
4. Business Schools' response to globalisation trends and increasing 
competition during the period 1990-2004 
With the development of globalisation, Business Schools have been forced to 
become international, and indeed, significant progress has been made in the 
internationalisation of Business Schools throughout the world. The capacity to 
provide education in the international dimensions of business has a strong influence 
on the perfonnance and reputation of the Schools. 
In addressing the issue that Business Schools are becoming more global, De 
Meyer, Harker & Hawawini (2004) classify Business Schools according to their 
degree of intemationalisation with regard to three variables: international Faculty, 
mternational students, and international Board. It is interesting to note that the three 
Schools under study present the highest standards worldwide (i. e. including the top 
US Schools) regarding the degree of their internationalisation in all three dimensions: 
Faculty (MM: 98%, INSEAD: 85%, and LBS: 71%), Students (IMD: 96%, INSEAD: 
92%, and LBS: 83%), and Board composition (IMID: 70%, INSEAD: 71%, and 
LBS: 
57%). Table 10, below, compares the three top European Schools under study with 
other top Schools from the US. 
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Table 10 Globalisation of top Business Schools 








arton USA 29 42 49 






































Tuck USA 27 29 15 
Yale USA 29 34 6 
EWD Switzerland 98 96 70 
Darden USA 13 26 18 
Fuqua USA 40 32 12 
Source: Pinancial limes, 2003 
In adapting to the enviromnental trends that the springboard to globalisation 
triggered around the 1990s, some people considered that Business Schools would 
follow a single, globalised, US-oriented business model. However, in their race 
towards internationalisation, these institutions have shown distinct differences. 
Reality has refuted the idea of a single, globalised model of management education, 
as the evidence suggests that a distinctive set of national Business School role models 
has emerged over time (Antunes & Thomas, 2007). 
Rather than supporting the idea of a standardised model of Business School, 
the result of globalisation forces, evidence shows different reaction. In this regard, it 
seems relevant to address De Meyer et al. 's (2004) four models for globalisation: the 
import model refers to those Schools that have attempted to bring the world to the 
campus, attracting Faculty, participants and knowledge from all over the world (e. g. 
Harvard Business School, IN4D). The export model overarches those Schools that see 
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their campus as the sole producer of their proprietary ideas, and have moved into 
exporting these ideas overseas by having travelling teaching staff (e. g. Chicago GSB). 
The partnership model of Business Schools refers to those which start as alliances, 
offering participants the possibility of spending some time in the foreign institution 
(e. g. London Business School and Columbia University Alliance; and the alliance 
between INSEAD and the Wharton School). Finally, the nehvork model: Schools that 
have gone one step beyond and have followed the example of international companies 
or professional service firms in the creation of overseas subsidiaries or offices, 
building up a network and deciding to station a Faculty abroad on a permanent basis 
(e. g. INSEAD; and the French School ESCP-EAP). De Meyer et al. (2004) assert that 
questions of how Business Schools need to change their structures and programmes to 
accelerate the process of building global insights among students and Faculty, in 
order to achieve knowledge and understanding of international business, have led 
Business Schools to develop a variety of different models to support international 
education. 
In ftaming differences among Business Schools, Antunes & Thomas (2007) 
explain the evolution of Business Schools on both sides of the Atlantic. Using 
evidence from rankings published annually by the Financial Times, they address the 
key features of European Business Schools and map the competitive characteristics 
and relative strengths and advantages of European Schools over the US Schools. 
These authors assert that even though the US Business School model has come to 
dominate the Business School landscape, European Schools have developed their own 
identities, styles and approaches to management education; they focus on reflective, 
integrative, and action-based learning, public sector management and public policy 
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issues, and offer a greater sensitivity to international relations. 
But there is no such thing as a single, widely-accepted European model for a 
Business School. "Rather, 'national' champions or elites have emerged in Europe, 
and these tend to be defined by national and cultural characteristics ivith some US 
flavour" (Antunes & Thomas, 2007: 396). In this regard, the characteristics of 
European schools have been shaped by national and regional considerations, albeit 
with a degree of influence from the US model as a result of its dominance through 
textbooks, cases and teaching materials and journals. Given that US Business Schools 
have always possessed the competitive advantage of being the first movers in the 
field, historically, they have always led the Business Schools market. 
There are some common characteristics between European and US Business 
Schools models, but also, clear differences and niche strategies. In this regard, 
Antunes & Thomas (2007) differentiate both models according to institutional 
differences, 3 such as language, culture, regulation, standardisation, and size; 
competitive differences, 4 such as govemance, values, funding and endowment, 
international mindset, innovation, knowledge transmission, and corporate links; 
finally, social capital differences, 5 such as rankings and reputation. 
Among the main differences, European models show multiculturalism; a 
strong adaptation to the many different languages and regulations that exist across 
3 These are associated with the different viewpoints and interpretations of 
business debated and shared in 
a national context. 
4 Markets are a dominant US recipe form, strong competition develops and 
the key drivers or 
differentiators between the US and Europe in management education become evident. 
5 These reflect the processes of maturity and growth of business schools, where national and 
international 
the comparison that brands and school images are formed. 
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Europe; a slower acceptance and institutionalisation of Business Schools; smaller 
size; predominantly public funding; smaller endowments; a weaker resource base; a 
more international mindset; and greater reliance on executive education. US models, 
on the other hand, show a more homogeneous culture; a single language; lower levels 
of regulation; fast acceptance and institutionalisation of Business Schools; larger size; 
predominantly private funding; large endowments; stronger resource base; a less 
international, more insular mindset; and fewer Schools promote executive education. 
According to Antunes & Thomas (2007), some of the key competitive 
strengths of the European Schools are their relatively small size, their strong customer 
relationship management capabilities, the fact that they have embraced public 
management and policy, their innovatory capabilities and learning styles, and their 
international mindset. On the other hand, "the strengths of the leading US Business 
Schools derive from the competitive advantages associated with their gains as fast 
first-movers in management education, i. e. product standardisation, Business School 
legitimisation, strong and well-established brands and reputations, and significant 
fmancial. strength and very large private endowments fuelling their position in the 
market" (Antunes & Thomas, 2007: 396). 
In classifying IMD, INSEAD and LBS according to Antunes & Thomas' 
(2007) lens, this study has noted that INSEAD and LBS are more US-oriented due to 
their size, governance, Faculty profile and background, knowledge transmission 
(research), and reputation. They are also differentiated from US Schools in terms of 
their multiculturalism, international mindset, weak endowment, and corporate 
links 
(both show a strong reliance on executive education). As for IMD, 
it represents a 
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unique case (a niche strategy), displaying the particularities of the US model and also 
of the European one. For example, it combines a single language and 
multiculturalism, a low level of regulation, small size, no endowment, international 
mindset, practical problem-based learning, critical reflective thinking, a one-year 
MBA, action-oriented learning, a predominant reliance on executive education closer 
to business, amongst others. 
The increasing demand for management education has strongly impacted on 
the growth of the Business School sector. As a result, Business Schools have found 
themselves needing to define a clear position and strategy in order to differentiate 
themselves. Some have joined together and created informal groups. Deans meet to 
discuss common issues, share experiences, and evaluate trends to better position their 
Schools amidst increasing global competition. Examples of this are the 'Seven 
Sisters', top-tier US Schools (HBS, Wharton, Columbia, Stanford, Kellogg, MIT, and 
Chicago); and the 'Big Three' top-tier European Schools (IMD, INSEAD, and LBS). 
They join to discuss critical issues with regard to the Business School industry. 
5. The influence of rankings in the Business School industry 
Given the strong impact that rankings have in the Business School industry, it 
seems relevant to understand how, and to what extent they have influence. Media 
rankings affect the Business School industry and have a profound impact on both 
students and Business Schools. They provide customers with information on eir 
decision-making process. In this regard, 95% of graduating MBAs said that School 
rankings had more influence than any other media source (Peters, 2007). 
Moreover, 
during the period in which the Wharton School was ranked number one 
in Business 
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Week's biannual ranking (1994-2000), the applicant pool nearly doubled (from 4,300 
in 1993, to 8,400 in 1999). A quick investigation of the extent to which Business 
Schools promote themselves through media rankings asserts that of the 100 Schools 
listed in the Financial Times annual ranking of the top global MBA programmes, 
published in January 2006,96 refer to their position in rankings on their websites, 
through press releases, or in brochures (Bradshaw, 2007). 
Much has been written on the value of rankings. While the media feel they 
have added positive value, academia feels the opposite (Policano, 2007). Despite 
criticisms, rankings have had some positive effects on the Business School industry; 
they have brought transparency and information to a complex market (Bickerstaffe & 
Ridgers, 2007). They have a double impact: in one respect, they tend to increase and 
set a minimum baseline for academic standards; and in another, they identify 
differences among Schools within the same level of standards, according to different 
criteria. 
However, some scholars agree that nowadays, the proliferation of rankings 
over the last decade provides the market with so much data that there is little new left 
to be uncovered, since every School is assessed on so many different dimensions that 
there is always some measure and some ranking that makes the School shine 
(Policano, 2007). Criticisms refer to the fact that different rankings evaluate different 
dimensions according to the weights chosen. In analysing the rankings given to 
various Schools by various publications, Policano (2007) asserts that it is the arbitrary 
weighting assigned bY the media to the variables of the ranking, rather than the 
quality of the School, that accounts for differences across similar programmes, so 
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changing the weights can exert a significant impact. In order to avoid this, he suggests 
rating Schools in groups of programmes of similar quality. 
Towards the 1990s, rankings have consolidated their influence and impact 
both on participants and, in consequence, on Business Schools' Deans and 
administrators. Even though the ranking of Business Schools first appeared in 1977 
with the Carter Report and the Ladd & Lipset Survey, it was not until 1988 that 
Bitsiness Week constructed a survey that moved beyond industry insiders. In a paper 
where he sets out to examine the effect of rankings on Business Schools, Peters 
(2007) affirms that the Business Week survey was the first one to receive wide 
circulation; it focused on salaries as the key component of Business School success, 
and measured student (45%), recruiter (45%), and intellectual capital (10%) scores. In 
1990, the US News & World Report launched a US-based MBA ranking which 
measur . ed reputation (40%), placement success (35%), and student selectivity (25%). 
However, these rankings raised much criticism throughout the European 
Business Schools industry, since both Business Week and US News were too US- 
biased (Peters, 2007). As a response to this, the Financial Times launched an 
mternational ranking of MBA programmes. In this regard, Della Bradshaw 
(2007: 58) 
remembers: "One of the main driving forces behind the publication of the 
first 
Financial Times ranking in 1999 was a group of the top European Business 
Schools, 
which felt that the US-only focus of the two leading rankings, Business 
Week and US 




At that moment the Financial Times was approached by the Deans of the 'Big 
Three', IMD, INSEAD and LBS. They wanted to promote the emergence of a ranking 
that would include European Schools. Thus, in 1999 the Financial Times produced 
the first publication of an integrated global ranking for both North American and 
European full-time MBA programmes (January 1999), and subsequently for 
executive education programmes and executive MBAs. Della Bradshaw 6 emphasises 
the role of INSEAD in encouraging the appearance of a ranking that would include 
global indicators. 
The aim of the Financial Times ranking was to produce a listing of the 
Business Schools that were producing global managers for the twenty-first century. 
This has determined the three planks on which the rankings are based: firstly, the 
career progress of alumni; secondly, the international focus of the programme; and 
thirdly, the ideas generation (research capabilities) of the school (Bradshaw, 2007). 
Moreover, in addressing the Financial Times' international ranking and how it is 
really differentiated from other rankings, Della Bradshaw underlines that the FT 
is the 
only organisation which independently audits the data supplied for Schools. 
She 
explains how KPMG reports on the results of obtaining evidence and applying 
specified audit procedures related to selected data provided 
for the surveys. To 
differentiate, FT awarded 20% for international diversity and 25% 
for research 
performance in addition to 40% based on salary progression and 
15% based on 
student selectivity and quality. (See table at the end of this section. 
) 
In 2001, the situation was complicated by the Wall Street 
Journal survey, 
Interview with Della Bradshaw, FT 
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which was based 100% on recruiter opinions (Peters, 2007). Since then, more surveys 
have been created by other medias: Forbes Magazine, i, America Economia, and Asia 
Inc., among others. In response to this proliferation of rankings, Peters (2007) 
identifies two streams: the first one attacks the veracity of the results-i. e. the 
statistical validity, the weightings given, the methodologies employed, and the factors 
used; whereas the second one attacks the Business Schools' reactions to the game- 
i. e. ranked schools took more action to address underlying issues that the rankings 
brought up and paid more attention to the rankings process than did unranked 
Schools, who evidently felt that getting into the rankings was next to impossible and 
thus, futile. 
The following Table II shows the different publications, the criteria each of 
them assesses and the weight of each of the variables. It illustrates how publications 
assess different criteria and confer different weights to the variables used. This 
. reaffirms the importance of letting people know what is being assessed, the criteria 
being considered and the weight variables given: 
Table II Different weights to different variables used by Medias 
Business Week US News Financial Times Wall Street Journal 
Student 45% 25% 15% - 
Recruiter 45% - 100% 
Intellectual capital 10% 25% 
Reputation 40% 




I Salary progressio 
400/o 
To sum up, "rankings are here to stay and they will continue to affect 
the 
fortunes of Schools" (Peters, 2007: 53); "they are not going to go away" 
(Bickerstaffe 
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& Ridgers, 2007). Their contribution enables an explicit and transparent reflection of 
each Business School to be shown; they have become a key element for prospective 
students and participants in their decision-making process. However, there are aspects 
that must be considered, such as the criteria assessed and the different weight each of 
the variables is granted. Some authors (Peters, 2007; Policano, 2007) refer to the 
importance of methodologies used: their statistical validity, robustness and accurate 
measures of quality. Perhaps a more accurate description of quality would be obtained 
by rating Schools in groups of programmes of similar quality (Policano, 2007). 
5.1. Accreditation agencies 
Today, AACSB, AMBA, and EQUIS are the three most highly regarded 
schemes for international accreditation in the business field in higher education 
(Urgel, 2007). International accreditations represent high standards for Business 
Schools; they stand as an externally validated hallmark of excellence in management. 
Accreditation agencies confirm their commitment to quality and continuous 
improvement through rigorous self-evaluation and comprehensive peer review 
processes. 
AACSB was founded in 1916 by a group of leading US Business Schools with 
the goal of enhancing the quality of management education at the collegiate 
level. It 
provided a significant building block for institutional development, as accreditation 
could improve the market recognition that various Business Schools needed. 
This led 
to a drive towards standardisation-i. e. similarity and mass production 
in business 
education (Antunes & Thomas, 2007). As a result of such convergence, the 
MBA title 
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was successfully accepted in the US market. 
Following the AACSB example, in 1992, AMBA (Association of MBAs) 
created an accreditation scheme in the UK focusing specifically on the growing range 
of UK MEBA-awarding Business Schools. However, this did not have the same effect 
in terms of the pace of standardisation. 
Five years later, the European Foundation for Management Development's 
(EFMD) international system of quality assessment, improvement, and accreditation 
of higher education institutions in management and business administration created 
EQUIS (European Quality Improvement System) by a mandate of the EFMD's 
member Business Schools with the active support of a number of the top Schools in 
Europe, such as IESE, IMD, INSEAD, LBS, HEC Paris, Bocconi, Instituto de 
Empresa, Helsinki School of Economics, and Rotterdam School of Management. Its 
creation was prompted by the need to develop an accreditation system targeted at 
those Business Schools around the world that were trying to make an impact beyond 
their domestic frontiers. It aimed at meeting some of the needs faced by international 
Business Schools that AACSB and AMEBA were not satisfying. Thus, since its origin, 
EQUIS has never attempted to adopt the role of those national accreditation systems 
that are aimed at detecting quality at the purely domestic level (Urgel, 2007). Rather, 
EQUIS wanted to target top-quality international Business Schools. For EQUIS, 
internationalisation has always been its key dimension. 
Given its European origin, the EQUIS model was firstly tested on top 
European Schools. This is the rationale that underlies the conviction that corporate 
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connections were important. They have always been a key ingredient of the quality of 
European Business Schools, characterised by having strong corporate connections 
that facilitated students' development and allowed them to deal with the realities of 
their profession (Urgel, 2007). 
It seems relevant to note that even though value is added to those Business 
Schools qualifying for each of the three accreditations their impact is not as strong as 
that of media rankings. In this regard, although IMID, INSEAD and LBS hold all three 
accreditations (AACSB, AMBA, and EQUIS), the field study showed that none of the 
three Business Schools views them as being particularly relevant. They are 
considered as standpoints in their decision to become global Business Schools. 
6. Challenges 
Business Schools play a central role in the context of the new economy and 
knowledge society (Starkey et al., 2004). They face multiple challenges and driving 
forces, and at the same time, they try to balance the twin hurdles of academic rigour 
and business relevance (Pettigrew, 1997). 
In the particular context in which Business Schools have been immersed 
during the last decades, the study identified those global trends that most critically 
affected the Business Schools during the period 1990-2004: 
1. Dealing with globalisation; 
2. Setting a clear strategic direction and positioning; 
3. Achieving the right balance between business relevance and academic rigour; 
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Consolidating the economic model; 
5. Differentiation and customisation of the value proposition due to increasing 
competition and selectivity in corporate demands; 
6. Distance learning, propelled by the revolution in information technology and 
globalisation. 
1) Dealing with globalisation 
Among the challenges and opportunities that create opportunities for Business 
Schools to differentiate themselves from the crowd of business education providers, 
Hawawini (2005) emphasises the effects of globalisation on business education. 
Globalisation trends have encouraged the development of a market for internationally 
oriented and qualified graduates who are able to understand different cultures and 
work in a multi-cultural globalised society (Elkin et al., 2005). To succeed in this 
endeavour, businesses depend on market selection and understanding of the business 
environment in these markets. This requires skills in managing functional areas, as 
well as an awareness of international differences in the way business is managed and 
how people interact (Shetty & Rudell, 2002). 
As business has become increasingly international, it depends on Business 
Schools to meet its need for managers with global business skills. Managers in every 
part of an organisation need more knowledge and greater understanding of 
international business. Therefore, the role of Business Schools in supplying graduates 
with international expertise and the ability to deal with the complexity of 
the 
changing business environment has become ever more important. 
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Clearly, the internationalisation of business education is an obligation that 
Business Schools cannot afford to ignore (Shetty & Rudell, 2002). It is a strategic 
change for the future well-being of Business Schools, and has implications for their 
competitive advantage. In this connection, De Meyer et al. (2004) affirm: "Business 
Schools have no choice but to be international in a world in which business is global, " 
(De Meyer et al., 2004: 126). 
Moreover, most accreditation agencies have required their member Business 
Schools to increase international business content and to address global issues in their 
curricula. Over the years, too, numerous authors have emphasised the importance of 
internationalising business education at all levels for all students (Shetty & Rudell, 
2002). 
Internationalisation has been viewed as a process of integrating international 
and/or intercultural dimensions into teaching, learning, research and service to the 
community (Orphanides, 2002). It has been characterised by an international direction 
in issues pertaining to scholarship, research, Faculty, students, and curricula, issues 
that have been much broader than just the export of education services (Orphanides, 
2002). 
In breaking down the concept of 'internationalising' into a series of 
dimensions, Greensted (2004) suggests the following: a clear international culture; 
internationalisation. of the student body; internationalisation of the 
Faculty; 
internationalisation of the research; internationalisation of educational programmes; 
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and internationalisation of support services, physical resources, and stakeholder 
relations. 
Facts show that Business Schools have used a variety of strategies to raise the 
bar on internationalisation. Current demands in the field of preparing business leaders 
for success in a global enviromnent have forced Business Schools to re-examine their 
programmes and structure, establish programmes and campuses around the world, 
bring in international students and Faculty, establish an international curriculum, and 
reshape their organisations through alliances and joint ventures (De Meyer et al., 
2004). 
In all probability, the internationalisation of a Business School is unlikely to 
be a completely smooth process; certainly, it must be supported by adequate 
resources. Various factors may hinder the development of programmes and policies; 
for example, a lack of adequate financial resources for major international initiatives. 
In an era in which overall governmental funding is in relative decline, there is not 
much chance that governments will invest specifically in internationalisation (Van 
Damme, 2004). 
Besides the lack of funding, internationalisation is also confronted by a lack of 
explicit and coherent strategies, both at the national and the institutional level. At the 
level of national policy-making, huge differences exist between countries 
in the 
elaboration of international policies. At the institutional level, there are also important 
variations in the level of institutional commitment towards internationalisation, 
measured, for example, by the presence and internal institutional authority of the 
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internationalisation office. In this regard, Van Darnme (2005) asserts that the role of 
academic authorities as an integral part of their strategic leadership seems to be a 
decisive factor. 
2) Setting a clear strategic direction and positioning 
In defining their strategic positioning, Business Schools must seek to increase 
their competitiveness in the global market; to leverage their competences and 
distinctiveness in local and regional markets as a platform for positioning in the 
global market; to maintain "strong niche brands, yet provide high-quality 
management education" (Antunes & Thomas, 2007: 399). They need to adopt more 
effective governance structures and to make the appropriate strategic choices that will 
allow the School to cope better with competitive pressures (Hawawini, 2005). 
As Lorange (2002) asserts, "academic direction setting is never clear-cut. " In 
fact, over the period 1990-80, a number of respected management thinkers have 
asserted that Business Schools cannot be managed. For example, Cohen & March 
(1973) assert that in the university, each individual is seen as making autonomous 
decisions; a laissez-faire approach is the best way to manage strategic academic 
institutions. According to these authors, these organisations should be allowed to 
evolve incrementally, largely with the impetus coming from the bottom. In this 
regard, Lorange (2002) calls for a balance between top-down and bottom-up forces. 
Other authors, such as Weick (1976), assert that these institutions can be 
managed, but only loosely. To them, managing a Business School strategically is an 
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impossible task. Too often, academic institutions view management ideas and 
practices with scepticism. 
The process of setting strategic direction to a Business School is not an easy 
task. It requires a clear sense of priorities and a clear focus; "strategy means choice" 
(Lorange, 2002: 1). But setting a strategic direction in the current Business School 
context is markedly different from setting a strategy in corporations, because its 
ý-product% value creation, is intangible. In fact, the role of the Dean, though vital, is 
inherently different from that of the CEO. Just as in professional service firms, their 
top managers do not have the same power as do top managers in other organisations. 
For the leadership of today's Business Schools, setting strategy means 
juggling many concerns, managing many forces, and making many difficult choices 
for value creation. This difficulty in setting direction and aligning systems, structures 
and processes, is more complex in Business Schools who depend on universities and 
the public sector. This is not the case with IMD, INSEAD and LBS (even though LBS 
is part of a university, it is autonomous). 
3) Achieving the right balance between business relevance and academic rigour 
On the one hand, Business Schools have been viewed with some suspicion by 
academics from the longer-established disciplines, who question the status of business 
and management as a proper academic discipline given that it is based on the 
fragmented borrowing of constructs, theory and methods from other, longer 
established, academic disciplines (Harrison & Leitch, 1996). 
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It was this criticism of their lack of strong scientific foundations that set 
Business Schools on a more mainstream academic trajectory. But the search for 
academic legitimacy created a distance between the concerns of the Business School 
academic and the field of business practice (Starkey & Tempest, 2005). Focus on 
research has led to an academic enclave that is increasingly hermetically and 
hermeneutically divorced from the concems of the 'real' world (Starkey & Tempest, 
2005). As Pfeffer & Fong (2002: 79) suggest, "Adopting the ways of other academic 
social science departments has produced a new set of problems including concerns 
about the relevance and centrality of Business Schools and business education to the 
world of management. " 
Scholars such as Bennis & O'Toole (2005) question whether Business 
Schools, and especially MBA programmes, are on the wrong track because business 
professors have focused on the scientific model when they should have focused on 
other critical requirements of the profession. They assert that today's Business 
Schools are packed with an intelligent, highly skilled Faculty but with little or no 
managerial experience. As a result, they cannot identify the most important problems 
facing executives and do not know how to analyse the indirect, or indeed long-term 
implications of complex business decisions. These authors conclude: "Things won't 
improve until professors see that they have as much responsibility for educating 
professionals to make practical decisions as they do for advancing the state of 
scientific knowledge" (Bennis & O'Toole, 2005: 103). 
Pfeffer & Fong (2004) argue that Business Schools, in their quest for 
resources and status, have lost their way and their professional mission. 
Mintzberg 
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(2004), meanwhile, tackles Business Schools' overemphasis on scientific methods to 
teach management (Mintzberg, 2004), and thus, being increasingly 'irrelevant' to the 
needs of practitioners and failing in their basic mission - i. e. to prepare students for 
the profession of management. 
In addition, scholars agree that Business Schools have a special responsibility 
to link fields of research with fields of action - that is, with the context within which 
managers do their work. Most commonly, Business Schools' research follows 
axiomatic, discipline-driven traditions (Lorange, 2002). Research usually focuses on a 
particular discipline that can often be too narrow to meet the needs of practitioners. 
Moreover, in their obsession with scientific rigour, Business Schools have forsaken 
other forms of knowledge that might be more relevant to the demands faced by 
executives (Bennis & O'Toole, 2005). Lorange (2005) asserts that in order to respond 
to current market demands, research should be more closely linked to real-life 
business, be more cross-functional in nature, and produce insights that have an impact 
when organisations apply them. 
Consequently, their key function - i. e. "the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge" (Prince, 1999: 464), seems likely to be achieved through purposeful 
research about management and the role of business in the economy and society. In 
this regard, Starkey et aL (2004: 1529) affirm: "The Business School must pursue a 
four-fold knowledge strategy - knowledge for management, 
knowledge for society, 
knowledge about management and knowledge about society. " 
169 
In the same vein, Trieschmann et al. (2000) suggest that today's Business 
Schools should strive towards two goals: knowledge exploration through research, 
and knowledge exploitation through teaching. Both exploration and exploitation are 
critical for the Business Schools' reputation. While the explorers (i. e. like-minded 
academics) create deep knowledge about organisations, the exploiters (i. e. students 
and practitioners) disseminate and apply that knowledge in the pursuit of improved 
organisationa practice. 
4) Consolidating the economic model 
Most public Business Schools around the world are used to receiving some 
form of direct and/or indirect goven-iment support to complement their income from 
tuition fees, while private Business Schools rely primarily on revenues from 
programme fees to fund their activities (Hawawini, 2005). 
However, governments around the world are seeking to reduce their support to 
Business Schools and are encouraging them to look for alternative sources of funding. 
Simultaneously, as competition intensifies, the higher margins that most Business 
Schools are currently receiving from their executive education programmes will come 
under increasing pressure, not only on the price side but also on the cost side. 
Likewise, the cost of designing and delivering executive education programmes will 
rise as corporate clients request courses that address firm-specific issues for which 
customised solutions are sought (Hawawini, 2005). 
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Moreover, financing investment in intellectual capital is expensive and it is 
likely to rise faster than the ability of Schools to raise tuition fees, increase the size of 
their student intake or launch new programmes (Hawawini, 2005). However, without 
a? top Faculty, Schools will find it increasingly difficult to attract top students and 
charge top prices. Thus, Business Schools that have the ambition to rank in the top 
tier face a major challenge, which rests on the need to develop strategies that will 
shape their economic model, adapting it to current trends. 
Many Business Schools, particularly in the US, are seeking to build an 
endowment fund to provide a complementary income, besides the revenues of the 
School, to support academic research and development and investment in 
infrastructure. Accordingly, they concentrate their fundraising on strategic centres of 
excellence that take the form of academic institutes, centres and programmes. 
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However, this is not the case with most Business Schools outside the US, where 
there is no strong culture of fundraising, particularly those within countries in which 
education has usually been financed by governments. Thus, many Business Schools 
will face the need to undertake fundraising initiatives within a scenario that may lack 
a "culture of giving" (Hawawini, 2005: 12). Consequently, they will have to acquire 
the required fundraising skills and commit significant management and Faculty time 
to developing relationships that will generate sponsorship from alumni, and 
encourage corporate giving (Hawawini, 2005). 
Other Business Schools will be run more like businesses. They will focus on 
balancing incomes and outcomes, and generate their own resources without expecting 
to receive government aid (Lorange, 2005). This involves a dramatic shift in the 
culture of a School, whose Faculty will need to focus on the way to generate 
resources. 
It is noteworthy that most Business Schools are part of a larger university 
structure. This will typically have resource implications, with net resources flowing to 
or coming from the Business School (Lorange, 2002). In this regard, Lorange asserts: 
"For the Business Schools that manage to respond to the market and create relevant 
academic value, it may be particularly hard to be part of larger university structures" 
(2004: 200). 
5) Custornisation due to increasing competition and corporate demand 
172 
The ability to connect the needs of today's business schools' major learning 
partners/clients and, at the same time to 'catalyse' them to look forward is a critical 
challenge (Lorange, 2002). "Actual strategic direction emerges from balancing the 
bottom-up and top-down forces" (Lorange, 2002: 22). 
As worldwide demand for business education has increased and new 
programmes have emerged in response, the range of options available to degree- 
seekers has broadened. The industry is no longer monolithic. Business education is 
delivered in a fragmented marketplace and in multiple formats. Today, increasing 
differentiation among providers of business education is a worldwide phenomenon. 
Generally, there are three broad categories of provider: traditional university-based 
Business Schools; for-profit institutions; and a large group of other providers that 
includes executive development centres, consulting firms, independent consultants 
(supplemented by Business School Faculty working privately), and company-based 
training centres and corporate universities. 7 
As for business education consumers, they are also increasingly heterogeneous 
in their needs and preferences. Business Schools have responded to the broad range of 
consumer wants and needs by developing a wide variety of programme formats along 
side their traditional two-year, full-time MBA programmes. 
8 
In this regard, Van Baalen & Moratis (2001) affirm that a 1993 market survey 
conducted by Ashridge Management College on trends in 
leaming preferences in 
executive education clearly shows a shift from structured expert courses 
delivered by 
7 Report of the Management Education Task Force to the AACSB - International 
Board of Directors. 
8 Report of the Management Education Task Force to the AACSB - 
international Board of Directors. 
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experts or gurus in management towards courses that are tailored to specific 
individual and organisational teaming needs. 
In a world of fragmenting markets and ever-increasing competition, 'world- 
class' organisations put the customer at the centre of all their activities - i. e. all 
systems and staff are organised to service both external and internal customers. 
Moreover., customer-oriented Business Schools base their direction on their 
assessment of the market's needs. The customer-based focus provides the foundation 
for the organisation's vision, strategy and structure (Prince, 1999). This demand- 
driven focus stands in sharp contrast to the classic supply-driven focus, where 
Business School professors offer their courses as individual Faculty members with a 
typically narrow, discipline- specific focus (Lorange, 2002). 
Thus, in striving to meet current market needs, most Business Schools have 
adapted their structure and offerings to satisfy customers' requirements. During the 
last few years, the range and ambition of customised programmes have grown 
rapidly. Business Schools have gone through a period of increasing demand to 
provide customers with global learning solutions that have a faster delivery time. 
Custom-made programmes have mushroomed because companies want 
programmes that directly support their business goals. Corporate clients increasingly 
require courses with a proven successful application of learning back at the job. They 
also want their managers to own their learning throughout their career. 
Companies do 
not want their executives labouring through peripheral subject areas; they want them 
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to be working at subjects and learning skills that will make a difference when they 
come back to work (Crainer & Dearlove, 1999). 
Companies want to invest, together with their employees, in improving those 
employees' performance and the firm's results (Hawawini, 2005). This requires 
Business Schools to extend their links with clients out of the classroom and into their 
workplace and offer programmes that combine on-campus sessions with learning in 
the workplace (Van Damme, 2004). 
6) Distance learning propelled by the revolution in information technology and 
globalisation. 
From the 1980s onwards, as a result of the technological revolution in 
information technology and globalisation trends, management education was driven 
to incorporate distance learning. Thus, advances in information and communication 
technology have enabled many Business Schools to improve their pedagogical and 
delivery capabilities by using information technology as a pivotal learning vehicle, 
which has shaped and enhanced their strategy. Among the commoner applications are 
multimedia formats for research delivery and teaching tools; Web technology, 
including virtual classrooms and the setting-up and leveraging of Web-based leaming 
and sharing of networks (Lorange, 2002). 
Technologies are viewed as a highly efficient platfonn for international 
education without the significant financial and personal costs of moving students of 
Faculty to different parts of the world. Moreover, they can also make business 
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research faster and more effective, with large databases and sophisticated tools that 
can significantly increase productivity and help to tailor empirical results to specific 
countries or regions (De Meyer et al., 2004). 
Distance-learning technologies, initially seen as offering the potential to 
overcome the limits of geographical location, bring the best teachers and experts in 
the world to students anywhere in the world (De Meyer et al., 2004). They offer 
greater opportunities to supplement classroom education or in-person meetings and 
closely link people and activities around the world. This implies an advantage both 
for Business Schools and corporations. For the Business Schools, technologies enable 
them to reach a significantly larger number of students around the world and satisfy 
the surging demand for business education. They also provide the opportunity for 
Business Schools to respond to the new needs of companies for tailor-made 
management development programmes (Hawawini, 2005). As for corporate clients, 
technologies facilitate employees' development at lower costs. 
Moreover, companies also want to invest, together with their employees, in 
improving employees' performance and their firm's results. "This requires Business 
Schools to extend their links with the clients out of the classroom and into their 
workplace and offer so-called blended programs that combine on-campus sessions 
with leaming in the workplace" (Hawawini, 2005: 10-11). 
7. Some implications for the SLP in Business Schools 
This chapter has enabled a description to be provided of the external 
environment of the Business School industry. From the 1990s, the globalisation 
of the 
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economy., promoted by technology, has introduced a dynamic of major competitive 
pressure that is pushing/is compelling Business Schools to adopt a clear definition of 
strategic direction, in terms of three main issues (Thomas, 2007): 
1) Academic model (Faculty profile, type of research orientation - i. e. 
academic vs. practical orientation, portfolio programmes both in 
executive education and graduate education); 
2) Economic model (Financial sources for sustainability - i. e. operating 
incomes, fundraising, endowment); 
3) Market positioning (niche strategies at national or regional levels, or 
global positioning). 
Within this context, strategic leadership is gaining momentum. By defining, setting, and 
implementing a clear strategic direction, it will be able to create a differentiated value 
proposition. 
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1. The study of the Strategic Leadership Process (SLP) at INM over 
time from a political perspective 
The Institute for Management Development (IMD) was founded in 1990 in 
Lausanne through the merger of two Swiss Business Schools (IMI -International 
Management Institute- in Geneva, and IMEDE -Institut pour I'Etude des M6thodes de 
Direction de I'Entreprise- in Lausanne). It does not belong to any university. It 
belongs to a foundation, the Board of which is made up of 50 executives elected from 
leading client firms from different countries across the world. 
IMD is a major international player in the international management education 
market. ' Despite its short history IMD has built a strong reputation for its widely 
mternational executive education and full-time MBA. Given the difficulties that the 
School had to overcome through the merger process, the fact that EAD is the result of 
the merger of two educational institutions with different cultures (IMI, with its focus 
on the geopolitical and macro environment and IMEDE, case-teaching oriented and 
bent on the provision of management skills to worldwide executives) has enriched 
IMD's background story. This makes the study of strategic leadership as a social 
influence process at IMD, particularly attractive. 
IMD regards three issues as key to shape the international environment for 
executive development: (1) it finds itself immersed in a highly competitive and 
fragmented market that involves a large number of Business Schools, consulting 
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firms and other actors; (2) the demand for high quality executive development is 
growing rapidly as people are increasingly recognising it as the critical 'strategic 
resource, in business; (3) there is a significant awareness that successftil companies 
need to coordinate their learning activities in order to achieve more effective and 
holistic outcomes. ' 
With relation to its key market, INM's activities are aimed at middle and 
senior executives from worldwide companies. Its internationality is reflected in the 
widely diverse geographic origins of its participants. Approximately 50% come from 
Europe, 27% from Asia, 3% from Australia and Africa and the remaining 20% from 
the Americas (50% from Latin America and 50% from North America). " 
Moreover, its internationality is also evident in the School's research that is 
focused on general management, rooted in international business. Just as professional 
schools (AIM/EBK, 2006) do, IMD's activity has as its primary focus the 
improvement of management practice. Its principle stakeholders are business people 
who regard IMD's high organisational impact as a key enabler of economic growth. 
Thus, its research is customer oriented, and aims at outweighing business relevance 
directed towards the solution of current business dilemmas. 
Research intensity at IMD has grown over the last years and it aims at making 
the School lead the market and be led by the market. Accordingly, it emphasises the 
importance of business relevance in addition to academic quality. All EMD programs 
are strengthened by research and material development, complemented by the 
9 EQUIS H 2002 DAD Self-Assessment Report - Archival Material. 
10 Peter Lorange, 11\4D President. 
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International Leaming Network made up by IMD's key corporate clients (around 152 
companies between corporate partners and business associates). " 
However, it seems relevant to note that IMD's emphasis on business 
relevance, underestimating the importance of academic rigour, is disapproved by the 
academic community. In this regard, some people agree INM's academic model is not 
comparable with top US and European Schools' with high academic research 
standards. An example of this is the fact that INSEAD and LBS do not consider IMD 
as a competitor. They concur their model is more US-influenced whereas WD's is 
more applied research. Thus, INSEAD and LBS people believe this significant 
difference with regards to research orientation highly impacts how they are both 
positioned and compete in the global arena. 
Its core resource, about 55 full-time Faculty, has two relevant features: (a) it 
has neither tenure, nor titles, all Professors having the same status, nor (b) academic 
departments in an intent to avoid barriers and to promote teamwork. This has been 
part of the strategy of the School since Peter Lorange's arrival as IMD President in 
order to keep a 'minimalist organisational approach'. 12 
Further, many international companies hold IMD in high esteem as can be 
seen by its Alumni network of about 55,000 individual executives from 143 countries 
worldwide" who have participated in a program at B4D during some period of their 
lives. " There are also 42 Alumni Clubs in 31 countries. " Another indicator of the way 
" EQUIS Id 2002 B4D Self-Assessment Report - Archival Material. 
12 Peter Lorange, EAD President. 
13 
www. imd. ch 
14 Annie Tobias, Director of IN4D Learning Network. 
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in which international companies highly respect IMD is the longevity and success of 
INM's Corporate Partners and Business Associate Network, which entails close 
relationships between IMD and the 170 multinational, regional and national 
companies from more than 20 different countries that integrate the network. 
Although it is a new School, B4D has achieved outstanding prestige. Since 
1998, leading journals (Financial Times, Business Week, Forbes, Economist 
Intelligence Unit and the Wall Street Journal), have considered it among the top 
Business Schools worldwide and the top three in Europe according to the rankings of 
the top management education providers. 
Thus, due to its present positioning among European Business Schools and the 
major raison d'etre of the merger that gave birth to its creation -to strengthen its 
competitive position in the international market place, it could be said that IMD has 
always aimed at fulfilling its vision: 'to Provide the best global experience in 
I management development . 
This study does not pretend to qualify EAD's case as a successful and a 
concluded story. It is just focusing on the analysis of the SLP as a social influence 
process, throughout its first 14 years of life. This period of time is interesting because 
it overarches every event since the School's foundation and thus, enables to 
understand the SLP in observing the construction and execution of the School's 
strategic agenda, over time. 
15 
www. imd. ch 
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Moreover, 1990-2004 is a period of time characterised by geopolitical and 
economic changes. IMD had to overcome a number of problems arising from 
operating in a highly competitive market, the consequences of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall for Europe, an economic crisis triggered by the Gulf War, the coming of the 
European Union that resulted in monetary union, and the globalization trends that 
affected the management scenario. It seems particularly interesting to observe 
environmental facts unfolding over time and how they impact on the School shaping 
and moulding the construction and execution of the School's strategic agenda, over 
time. 
2. Overview of the History of ITVM16 
The case study will divide it in three different periods (social dramas"') 
using turning points that have propelled important changes in the direction of the 
School (See Appendix 1): 1) merger between 1990 and 1992; 2) transition between 
1992 and 1993; 3) consolidation and success between 1993 and 2004. The 'social 
dramas' at IMD were the points of leadership succession as the School changed from 
Dean to Dean. 
The study will visualise how the SLP seeks to operate along the chosen 
strategic issue that will act as vehicle for its operationalisation-becoming a top 
international Business School. Accordingly, such strategic issue will be examined 
through the set of initiatives or episode that triggered decisions and actions aimed at 
achieving it (See Table 12). For example, the first episode is related to a number of 
See Appendix 2 for ftuther history of M& IMEDE 
Pettigrew (1979) 
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initiatives undertaken by Dean Juan Rada with the purpose of making the IMI & 
INMDE merge successful. The second episode describes those initiatives carried out 
by Xavier Gilbert as IMD's Interim Dean, in order to restore the School's financial 
situation. Finally, the third episode refers to those initiatives during Peter Lorange's 
tenure, undertaken with the purpose of taking the merge and creation of the new 
School to a stage of consolidation and success. 
Table 12: Strategic issue observed through three episodes in each 
Deanship 
Business School IMD 
Strategic issue Becomin a top international Business School 
Period 1990-1991 1992-1993 1993-2004 
Set of decisions & Making the EVH & Restoring the School's EVM's consolidation & 
actions to promote IMEDE merge financial situation success in the top 
successful league of management 
education 
3. An internationalised and changing environment 
During the end of the '80s and the beginning of the '90s, the world and 
particularly continental Europe, faced tumultuous changes. These were times of great 
importance for the development and consolidation of the European Community, 
which during the '90s, became the European Union through the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992), in November, 1993. This standpoint provided the 
member states for economic and political integration. Thus, common policies were 
developed in a very wide range of fields: a single market, a single European currency, 
common citizenship, common foreign and security policy, a more effective European 
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Parliament, and a common labour policy. Each of these goals presented important 
challenges, such as setting up a new monetary policy. 18 
Furthermore, other regional markets also appeared in North America, South 
America and Asia. This escalation of world commerce was intensified by the 
development of technology with the appearance of the Internet, which triggered a 
revolution in communications. Technology created the possibility and even the 
likelihood of a global culture. The Internet, fax machines, satellites, and cable TV 
swept away cultural boundaries. " The world started to be considered a 'small village', 
where country boundaries appear to be more permeable particularly with regard to the 
exploitation of global brands such as Microsoft, Disney, etc. In addition, enormous 
number of potential opportunities for new business and investments appeared. This 
led the business industry to find itself facing the need of adaptation to these profound 
changes, which were transforming the regional market into a global one. 
These events were reinforced by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, together 
with the Gulf War in 1991 and various financial crises in different countries. 
Consequently, these were times characterized by geopolitical changes and 
technological transformations. Barriers fell and new markets emerged. These events 
were accelerated by the emergence of the Internet. This new era, 'globalisation', 
affected business in such a way that new opportunities emerged. 
However, processes of economic globalisation over the last few decades have 
not only dramatically altered the way business is done around the world, but have also 
18 www. euroDa. eu. int The EU at a glance - The History of the European Union. 
19 Globalization and Culture. 
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greatly impacted political, social and cultural landscapes . 
20 The business world was 
forced to adjust to this new scenario. The creation of global brands, a truly global 
market, and the ability to move money around the world in nanoseconds required 
educating managers to navigate this tumultuous environment succeSSfUlly. 
21 
Managers needed to be able to think internationally, taking into consideration the 
state of the world at large in the implementation of strategic decisions. They needed 
management education, which would provide them with the tools needed to face new 
trends. 
At the same time, the marketplace for Business Schools became characterised 
by relentless change. As the worldwide demand for business education increased new 
programs emerged in response, and the range of options available to those who 
looked for answers on the management education industry broadened. Accordingly, 
Business Schools were urged to re-shift their focus to respond to emerging priorities 
and challenges. 
22 
The foregoing description is the context in which IMD started up its activities. 
context characterised by internationalisation, change and a highly competitive 
market made an impact on the business industry and triggered its need to develop new 
skills that enabled companies to adapt to the current issues. It was this that prompted 
the business industry to look for the increasing support and advice of Business 
Schools. In time, these circumstances affected M and IMEDE to such an extent that 
20 Reed (2004). 
21 Wankel & DeFillippi (2004). 
22 Report of the Management Education Task Force to the AACSB-Intemational Board of Directors 
(2002). 
Van Baalen & Moratis (2004). 
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their Foundation Boards decided on the merger with the purpose of becoming a top 
international Business School. 
4. Merger (1990 - 1991) 
4.1. The decision to merge 
Since 1957, there had been various, unsuccessful attempts to merge both IMI 
and ITVIEDE. However,, it was not until December 1988 that members of both M and 
R\4EDE Foundation Boards met to discuss their concern for these two Schools. Most 
of them belonged to the Swiss business industry and since they were influenced by 
the current changes within the business scenario (globalisation trends, geopolitical 
and economic changes), they decided that it would be beneficial to create a big 
international Business School large enough to be not only financially and 
academically sustainable, but also relevant at a world class level-a top international 
Business School. Although both IMI and IMIEDE had considerable success and 
reputation, they lacked adequate critical size and financial sustainability needed to 
adjust to the demands of the market and to be able to have access to a competitive 
position within the business education market in the new international setting. 
Amongst those attending the December 1988 meeting, were: Helmut Maucher 
(Chairman of the Board of Nestle SA during the period 1982-2001), Louis Von Planta 
(President of the Board of Directors of Ciba-Geigy during the period 1972-1987), 
Alex Krauer (Von Planta's successor), Stephan Schmidheiny (Chairman of Anova 
AG), and Paul Jolles (Chairman of Nestle at the IMEDE Foundation Board). They all 
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had the purpose of finding a solution to their current dilemma. "What were the 
reasons for the merger? Critical size -both [Schools] did not have critical size for a 
Business School- and long term financial liability -we had to create something 
which [ ... ] had less dependency on one company. "" 
Considering that to have two medium sized Schools in Switzerland, only 
60km. away from each other (one in Geneva and the other in Lausanne) did not make 
any sense, they decided that the best solution would be to merge both of them into a 
new one. They would create a new Swiss Business School that would be larger and 
that would have no subsidies from any company for its operative budget. Thus, IMI 
and INMDE were merged into IMD, the major rationale of the merger being to 
strengthen the School's competitive position in the international arena. Immediately, 
the people at the December 1988 meeting created a Transitional Board. Table 13 
presents its members. 
Table 13: INM transition period 
Member Position at the Board 
Kaspar Cassani Chairman 
(former Head of 113M-Europe) 
Louis Von Planta Vice-Chairman 
(Ciba-Geigy) 
Helmut Maucher Member 
(Nestl6) 
Stephan Schmidheiny Member 
(Alcan) 
Cassani had been member of the Foundation Board of IMEDE representing 
IBM so he knew WEDE well. However, he also knew IMI because he had once 
attended a top executive seminar at that institution and therefore an alumnus. 
2' Kaspar Cassani, former Chairman of the IN41D Foundation Board. 
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So the merging process was put in place. It was largely driven by the Boards 
of both Schools. Neither the Deans nor the Faculty participated in the decision to 
merge. Some of the former IMEDE Faculty members recall a meeting in Nestle 
where they proposed alternatives to the merger but their opinions were not 
considered. 
The Foundation Board not only took the decision to merge but also chose 
Lausanne (where INMDE campus was located) as the place where the new School 
would be located. In order to compensate the IMI people for their decision to 
establish the new School in Lausanne rather than in Geneva, they chose the IMI 
Director General, Juan Rada, to become the new IMD Director General. "As usual in 
merger situations, the whole thing ends with a kind of compromise: the chosen 
location was Lausanne, but then, of course, IMEDE had to give Geneva something 
and therefore the chosen Dean would come from IMI. "" 
Figure 13 illustrates IMD Chronology (1989-2004). It illustrates the different 
social dramas characterised by the merger challenges (Juan Rada's Deanship), the 
period where restoring the School's financial situation and setting order were the key 
priorities (Xavier Gilbert's interim Deanship), and finally, the period in which the 
School's identity was shaped and the School began to grow (Peter Lorange's 
Deanship). In addition, Figure 15 also depicts the evolution of the IMD Foundation 
Board and other structures of the govemance of WD: such as its Executive 
Committee, the Business Advisory Council, the Academic and Research Advisory 
Council and the MD Director General Search Committee. 
24 Heini Lippuner, former Chairman of the IN4D Foundation Board. 
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4.2. Merger: 1990 - 1991 
As soon as IMD was founded in 1990, the IMD Foundation Board was 
established. Several members of the Boards of both IN41 and IMEDE became 
members of the RAID Foundation Board. The Board was quickly expanded 
various CEOs from national and international companies were invited to join it 
(98 international companies from 26 countries). Moreover, the Business 
Associate Network, an IMI legacy (created by Bodhan Hawrylyshyn in 1975- 
1976), was also expanded (74 Business Associates and 24 Sponsors). 
Table 14 shows the executives who formed the Executive Committee of 
the IMD Foundation Board. This committee reviewed the overall business 
situation. IMD's strategic direction was carried out by the Management 
Committee (Table 12). 
Table 14: Executive committee of the INM Foundation Board 
Member Position at the Executive Committee 
Kaspar Cassani Chairman of the Eý4D Foundation Board 
Helmut Maucher Chairman of the Board and CEO of Nestld SA 
Richard H Murray Chairman and CEO of Nfinet International Professional 
Indemnity Ltd 
George S Van Houten Board of Management of NV Philips' 
Glowilampenfabrieken 
Louis Von Planta President of the Board of Directors of Ciba-Geigy and 
Vice-Chairman of the ITAD Foundation Board 
Juan Rada MID Director General 
Robert G Toletti Secretary of the Executive Committee 
Max Murbach Advisor 
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Table 15: IMD Management committee 
Position at IMD Member Former School 
Director General Juan Rada 1141 
MBA Program Director Francis Bidualt M 
Director, Program Coordination Robert S Collins ITMEDE 
Chairman of the Program Development 
Committee and NMA Program Director 
James Ellert IMEDE 
Academic Support Arie de Koning 
Director of Research and Development Nlichael D Oliff M 
PED Program Director Christofer Parker 
Executive Director Robert Toletti 
Director In-Company Programs Andrd Vandermerwe ITVH 
A Business Advisory Council was constituted under the Chairmanship 
of Pier-Carlo Falotti (President and CEO, DEC International Europe). Its 
ob ective was to assess IMD's strategy in terms of direction, scope and j 
completeness; and it would give recommendations on Faculty, image, content 
and packaging of programmes. This Council would assist UVID in preparing 
people to respond to and drive continuous change in a competitive 
envirom-nent, without sacrificing quality. 
Finally, there was an Academic and Research Advisory Council whose 
Chairman was John McArthur, Dean of Harvard Business School at that time. It 
assessed EMD Faculty on issues referring to teaching and research. 
As soon as he was appointed Director General of WD, Juan Rada 
presented his strategy to the Executive Committee of the IMD 
Foundation 
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Board. He called it "evolutionary, but not revolutionary"25 . Its main thrust was 
to increase the partnership with industry through a number of changes in the 
nature of the educational offerings, such as a portfolio approach to offerings, 
participants and change of design of offerings. There was a strongly-felt need to 
protect the core business of the School and its international orientation. 
Rada's IMD strategy consisted of five aspects: firstly, to emphasise the 
primary importance of open-enrolment programmes; secondly, to introduce 
partnership educational development programmes with industry; thirdly, to 
introduce a second division of the MBA in 1993; fourthly, to demand greater 
selectivity in IMD's private programme offerings (i. e. limited in-company or 
consortium to sponsors); and finally, to demand more selective and better 
targeted research projects (i. e. more selective and oriented to EMD's corporate 
clients' needs). 
26 
In this regard, the IMD strategy between 1991 and 1995 looked forward 
to meeting two requirements: "resPond to client demands and achieve 
excellence. , 27 In order to do this, there were two key elements: "strengthen the 
partnership with industry; add organisational learning to management 
development. " 28 
However, Rada believed that in order to face a fast-changing era of 
international business, managers needed to combine functional skills with a 
25 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the 12ý41) Foundation Board Meeting on March 27 Ih 
1990 - Archival Material. 26 ITVM Strategy 1991-1995 - Archival Material. 
27 INM Strategy 1991-1995 - Archival Material. 
28 n4l) Executive Summary, October ls' 1990 - Archival Material. 
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broad general vision to appreciate trends both within a company and outside. 
Thus, INM would provide managers with a genuine international style, 
practical implementation, integrative research, and a strong partnership with 
industry. 29 
As for executive education, 30 Rada structured the educational portfolio 
around four complementary groups of programmes focusing on the different 
elements required in the education of an executive at different stages of his/her 
career: firstly, managing the corporation; secondly, developing managerial 
competence; thirdly, implementing change; and finally, broadening functional 
expertise. 
In relation to research and development, 31 the focus was on the 
customer's needs (e. g. the 'Manufacturing 2000 Project' with II companies 
joining 'The World Competitiveness Report'). International industry partners, 
IMD Educational Programmes and ITWD Institutional R&D Projects were all 
considered as being interconnected and interrelated to each other. Two 
premises guided the R&D focus: on the one hand, the convergence of 
functional disciplines; and on the other hand, the collaboration of industry 
partners. 
For the implementation of this strategy, about 15 additional Faculty 
would be hired over the next three to five years. This need, combined with 
29 IN/ID 1990 Annual Report - Archival Material. 
'0 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the IMD Foundation Board Meeting on March 27 th 
1990 - Archival Material. 
" Minutes of the Executive Commi ee of the JMD Foundation Board Meeting on March 27 th 
1990 - Archival Material. 
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research, required that IMD add about SFr 10- 14 million. to the current level of 
revenues over the next three to five years. 32 
Thus, both the Board and the Dean focused on the success of the new 
School. They set up a govemance structure, policies, rules and strategies for 
this purpose. However, the fact that the Faculty had not participated in the 
merger decision brought great discontent to the School. Even though they 
understood the reasons for the decision to merge, they did not agree with it. 
They wanted to participate in the School's key decisions and were annoyed that 
the merger had been negotiated at Board level. "So the negative reaction was 
more to the process of decision making not to whether or not it was a good 
decision. , 33 
Besides, trustees may have underestimated the impact of the reality that 
. both faculties had been rivals for many years. 34 "They were two radically 
different cultures. [ ... ]I realised this during the merger process. IMI had been 
founded by Alcan, a business that has long term return on investment and 
therefore, is interested in geopolitics, in social stability. [ ... ] IMEDE was 
founded by Nestle, which is a business of short-tenn cash flow, with a radically 
different perspective, and which is interested in the management functions and 
marketmg in particular. 
, 35 
th 32 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the IMD Foundation Board Meeting on Marc 27 
1990 - Archival Material. 
33 Kamran Kashani, former EýIEDE Faculty, IN4D Faculty. 
34 Jim Ellert, Xavier Gilbert, Derek Abell, Kamran Kashani, Jan Kubes, Juan Rada, Fred 
Neubauer. 
31 Juan Rada, former M Faculty, former EVID Faculty. 
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These differences were evidenced in each School's Faculty 
composition, in their teaching methods, and in the types of programme offered. 
Moreover, IMI Faculty had to move to Lausanne, while the IMEDE Faculty 
had to accept a new Dean coming from IMI. So everybody felt uncomfortable 
and annoyed. 
Given this situation, the challenge for Juan Rada was enormous. He 
realised he was the Dean of a School which had a Faculty characterised by 
disparity of interests, different backgrounds and perspectives on what the 
Business School should be, and which was extremely dissatisfied with the way 
in which decisions had been handled. 
Moreover, he realised that he needed to motivate this new Faculty to set 
aside their negative feelings towards the present situation and to build the 
identity of the new School, its vision and strategy within this internal context'Of 
discontent and mistrust. He was aware that joining the two different Faculty 
groups into an IMD Faculty required a sense of belonging to the new School. 
He actively intended to involve the Faculty in the design of strategy and 
policies related to research activities, portfolio programmes, and Faculty work 
systems, among others. In this sense, different committees were created with a 
broad participation of the Faculty. 
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Rada presented a list of 13 internal policy rules and procedures which 
were developed together with Faculty Task Forces. 36 Their basic concepts 
overarched the following five issues: 
1. Transparency in substance and processes; 
2. Up to 20% of time available for consulting; 
3. Annual measurement of Faculty performance through plans and 
objectives; 
4. Three professional ranks (Assistant/ Associate/ Full Professor) 
and no tenure; 
5. Director General to be responsible for applying the policies. 
Rada made himself accessible to everyone at WD. All professors could 
easily reach him. People agree Juan Rada was capable of listening to everyone 
and considering different perspectives within the heterogeneous Faculty. 
In general, most of the Faculty recognised that Dean Rada was a clever 
person with strong analytic and strategic thinking capability. But at the same 
time, the turbulent circumstances that he had to go through with a Faculty 
which was divided and had no interest in the merger, dragged him into a 
situation in which decisions were rather difficult to make and execute. 
Unfortunately, some people interpreted this as a personal flaw related to a lack 
of decision-making ability; a feeling that contributed to the climate of 
discontent and discomfort. 
36 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the EWD Foundation Board Meeting on March 27ffi 
1990 - Archival Material. 
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,, 37 Thus, it "was a painful process. The different styles and perspectives 
of the former IMI and IMEDE Faculty made the merger very turbulent. What 
was more, there was a lack of clarity as regards the direction of the School and 
the decisions which would be undertaken. There was much confusion and 
uncertainty. 
38 
In this sense, some IMD Faculty members recall the growing tendency 
towards individual agreements. This trend contrasted with the values IMD 
intended to instil, and thus created a climate of lack of transparency, lack of 
trust, and lack of understanding of what was really going on. IMD was an 
mterestmg international place to be in, with an interesting international 
background. But nobody knew if it would survive. 
Fred Neubauer - former IMI and INM Faculty - remembers, "The early 
stages were very rough. And if you want, I'll take off my shirt to show you the 
scars on my back. It was very difficult. And I personally must say I never felt as 
insecure in a job as at that point in time year. You never knew what would 
happen next. , 
39 
In addition, the Board was strongly focused on the School's 
performance while Rada's aim was to carry out the merger successfully, 
unifying the culture of the Faculty and developing his vision of the new 
School's profile. On the other hand, the main purpose and chief anxiety of 
Cassani, the Chairman of the Board, was to maintain the budget at break-even. 
" Jim Ellert, former MEDE Faculty, EVID Associate Dean. 
38 Fred Neubauer, Xavier Gilbert, Jim Ellert, Jan Kubes, Kamran Kashani, Juan Rada 
39 Fred Neubauer, former M Faculty, IN4D Faculty. 
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The Board felt a sense of ownership towards IMD, so Cassani wanted the 
Business School to succeed. In this regard, Juan Rada asserts, "Cassani cared 
for the numbers. He wanted them to remain black. " 
As for IMD's financial performance, though the first year - 1990 - was 
excellent, the second year was disappointing with an operating loss of SFr 
880.000. The economic dislocations originating in the Gulf War impacted 
negatively on the School. Consequently, results in 1991 were not as good as 
budgeted. Most customised programmes were cancelled. 
As a result, there was a shortfall of SFr 1.2 million in programme 
revenues. This was partially compensated for by better non-programme 
revenues, but overambitious plans, particularly in R&D, support services and 
external relations led to an unhealthy increase of manpower and total operating 
expenses. 
40 
Thus, the Chairman of the Board provided solutions for the weakened 
situation and stated: "Efforts will be sustained to streamline the portfolio and 
reduce overheads. [ ... ] The 1992 budget 
directions call for 'conservative 
revenues and tight expenses'. The budget will be monitored quarterly with 
monthly tracking reports. 
, 41 
Thus, strong measures such as a hiring freeze and reduction of the 
headcount; cutbacks in operational expenses; reduction of the support structure; 
" Minutes of the Executive Committee of the IN4D Foundation Board Meeting on October 15 th 
1992 - Archival Material. 
41 Fourth meeting of the IMD Foundation Board, November 7th 1991 - Archival Material. 
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re-assessment of R&D organisation; stimulation of revenue sources were taken 
to avoid a loss, and a modest surplus was thought to be possible. 
Annoyance and discontent kept growing. The continuous debate and the 
lack of clear direction triggered the Faculty's decision to create a Conu-nittee 
called the 'Faculty College', "A 'think tank', which -while not being a decision 
instrument- [could] influence in a positive manner the orientations and 
decisions. , 42 
Rada was never consulted regarding the creation of the Faculty College. 
Moreover, he was 'invited' to participate of the Committee's meetings, not to 
Chair it but as a member of the Faculty. This College met once a month and it 
discussed IMD's evolution. It was not a Faculty meeting. Rather, it was a form 
of assembly of the Faculty to discuss issues of the School; a steering group of 
governance that created pressure on the Board through its Faculty 
representative, Pierre Goetschin (Chairman of the College). Its mission was not 
to make any decisions but to identify issues and also to control the Director. 43 
The Faculty College persistently infortned the Board of its dissatisfaction. 
Juan Rada found himself in a difficult situation. His position as Director 
General was not strong enough since he could not impose any decision without 
being stopped by the Chainnan of the Board. He knew that gaining Board and 
Faculty support was critical. However, the fact that they all had different 
interests hindered him from making any decisions and implementing them. On 
42 Fourth meeting of the EVM Foundation Board, November 7 th 1991 - Archival Material. 
43 Fourth meeting of the EWD Foundation Board, November 7th 1991 - Archival Material. 
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several occasions he asked the Board to grant him more attributions that would 
enable him to manage this particular situation of the School, including the 
competence to ask those people who interfered in the execution of his decisions 
to leave. 
The difference between the priorities of the Chairman, who focused 
primarily on the School's operating budget, and those of the Dean, who 
prioritised the develoPment of the new School strategy, triggered major 
confusion and dissent. Rada made decisions which he could not execute since 
they were usually thwarted by the Chairman's actions. This brought much 
dissent and misunderstanding among the entire Faculty. Moreover, the Swiss 
enterprises could see that this confusion was leading the School towards a low 
performance level, so they assigned an administrator who would act as a 
mediatof44 advocating for the Board's interests. Thus, the first three years were 
very painful. 
Even though Rada made an enormous effort to try to manage BM 
successfully, he could not do so. He "tried to go much more through formal 
processes. So he was very contentious in forming committees. We had 
transitional committees for the merger period, the management committee. We 
had committees that were working on policies. So the intent really was to be 
careful to ensure that in the formation of those committees there was balance 
between the two Schools. To get that balance, it meant that the committees 
were typically large rather than small. And a lot of consensus-building he tried 
44juan Rada, former IN/H Director General, former EAD Director General. 
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,, 45 to do through the Faculty meetings and the Faculty retreats. 
Despite his persistent efforts to achieve consensus, the processes of 
decision-making and execution became slow and difficult. Moreover, results of 
the School's performance during the year 1991 confirmed that the increasing 
costs were not matched by increasing profits in the same proportion. 
Some people remember that Rada had positive traits such as strategic 
analysis, participation with the Faculty in the School's strategy and policies, 
and consensus-building. However, his position required the capacity to execute 
decisions. The combination of the merger and the external position required a 
firm leadership style and clear authority. His leadership style and the 
organisational difficulties complicated the situation. As a result of this situation, 
Rada's credibility and authority were weakened and his relationship with the 
. Board was unsustainable. This situation led him to resign. 
Towards the end of his Deanship, Rada outlined several suggestions for 
change in the governance structure of IMD. Among these suggestions, he 
highlighted the need for a division of authority between the Director General 
and the Chairman. "The function of the Chairman should be clearly that of a 
non-executive Chairman. 
46 
Xavier Gilbert (former IMEDE Faculty, MD Professor) was asked to 
become the Interim Director for a period until the Search Committee appointed 
45 Jim Ellert, former ENAEDE Faculty, IN4D Associate Dean. 
46 Suggestions for Change in the Governance Structure of IMD by Juan F. Rada, March 1992 - 
Archival Material. 
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a new Dean for INM. "It had to be somebody who would be accepted and 
recognised by the majority of the Faculty. -)47 
Meanwhile, a Search Committee was appointed with the purpose of 
finding a new Dean for IMD. Its Chairman was John McArthur, Dean of HBS 
and Chairman of the Academic and Research Advisory Council. Table 16 
shows the members of the Search Committee. 
Table 16: Search committee 
Member Precedence 
John Mc Arthur Dean of ]FIBS 
(Chairman) Chairman of Academic and Research Advisory Council 
Pier Carlo Falotti Chairman of Business Advisory Council 
Rolando Rasi Member of Executive Committee 
Jim Ellert ITVM Faculty 
Former MIEDE Faculty 
Xavier Gilbert EVID Acting Director General 
Former IMEDE Faculty 
Paul Strebel D4D Faculty 
Former IMEDE Faculty 
Louis von Planta President of Board of Directors of Ciba-Geigy 
Vice-Chairman of MD Foundation Board 
Executive Committee of EWD Foundation Board 
Max Murbach Advisor of Executive Committee of MD Foundation Board 
But when Gilbert realised that all the professors who joined the Search 
Committee had been IMIEDE Faculty, he decided to step down to make sure 
that there would be no conflict of interests for the fonner EVH Faculty. So, Fred 
Neubauer (former IMI Faculty) was invited to replace him. 
As regards the new Dean, the Search Committee looked for someone 
who had not been involved in the merger because they believed an 'outsider' 
47 Kaspar Cassani, former Chairman of the MM Foundation Board. 
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would benefit the merger process. So the criteria that they followed included 
four issues: firstly, the new Dean had to have an international background. 
Secondly, he or she had to be somebody who had experience in running a 
Business School. Thirdly, he or she had to be a researcher, someone publishing 
influential work in the literature so that he would have credibility. Finally, he or 
she had to be a good teacher. Not many people met these criteria. 
4.3. Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during the merger episode 
Thus far, this part of the study has referred to the number of initiatives 
set by Dean Juan Rada during the merger episode, between 1990 and 1991. The 
underpinning driver of these initiatives relies on his intention to shape the 
School's academic model and portfolio programmes. This purpose was clearly 
aligned with Deans' MGI related to building and executing the School's 
strategic agenda. In this regard, the Dean prioritised the medium- and long-term 
strategic agenda over short-term MGI such as performance and Faculty and 
Board support, both clearly prioritised by the other two key actors (Board and 
Faculty) (See Table of MGI in Appendix). 
In trying to move a step forward in the understanding of the SLP 
(strategic agenda-building and -executing) over this episode from a political 
perspective, the study focused on different strategic initiatives raised to the 
strategic agenda by Dean Juan Rada with the purpose of making the merger 
successful. 
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4.3.1. Critical elements in Juan Rada's failure to impose his vision 
Several strategic initiatives attracted attention subsequent to the decision 
to merge IN41 and IMEDE to create the new School, WD. On behalf of the 
Board, economic performance in the short term was clearly prioritised because 
of the critical economic and financial situation of the new School. This, in fact 
was such a substantive problem for IMEDE and IMI, that not only did it trigger 
the merger process, but also it became a key part of the School's agenda (see 
the Appendix Tables that show reliability coding). 
On the other hand, the Faculty, with its different cultures (IMI and 
MffiDE) which had been competitors for so long, was bogged down in an 
unsettled situation, characterised by discomfort, anxiety and annoyance, given 
its lack of participation in the merger process. Juan Rada's failure to make clear 
decisions clarifying the direction of the School, and his overlapping functions 
with the Chainnan of the Board neutralised his effort to get the Faculty to 
participate in the definition of IMD's strategy and policies. Rada's power, 
mainly based on his strategic and analytical capabilities, was not enough for 
him to succeed in this episode, which required the implementation of 
breakthrough initiatives. How and why did this set of initiatives finally fail? An 
analysis of both issue legitimisation and power mobilisation sheds light here. 
4.3.2. Issue Legitimisation and Power Mobi sation 
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In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed Issue Sponsorship, 
Issue Selling, Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation, Agenda Structure 
and Characterisation offeatures of both outer and inner context legitimating 
initiatives. 
The weak economic and financial Performance that triggered the merger 
and creation of the new School worsened over 1991 within the context of an 
economic recession because of the Gulf War (performance and economic 
environment). At the same time, Faculty discomfort (climate) with the 
prevailing lack of direction led to the creation of the Faculty College as an 
informal but powerful group that communicated with the Board through the 
Faculty Board representative, Pierre Goetschin. Moreover, Rada's dinability to 
solve problems related to short-term economic performance was critical in 
weakening his own credibility before the Board and Faculty. His lack of 
answers related to Faculty and Board demands and the School's strategic 
direction led him to isolation and failure. 
In summary, Rada's inability to solve IMD's short-term economic 
performance (clearly prioritised by the Board) together with Faculty discomfort 
because of the lack of leadership and clear direction (misalignment among key 
actors' prioritisation of MGI) turned out to be a critical obstacle for Rada's 
credibility in legitimating his own vision and leadership for the School. This 
proved in the end to be a strong determinant factor in making him unable to 
sponsor and sell his own vision to influence INIID's strategic agenda structure. 
Under these circumstances, his resignation was inevitable. 
Forfurther information see IMD Appendix IV 
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5. Transition (1992-1993) 
5.1. Restoring INW's situation 
Kaspar Cassani informed the IMD Faculty, "Juan Rada has resigned 
and Xavier [Gilbert] has agreed to be the Acting Director General. Please, 
give him all the support you can. , 48 Then there was a meeting of the Faculty 
College, which decided to accept Gilbert to run the School. So Gilbert 
became INID's Acting Director General as from January 1992. The Board 
assigned to him the task of restoring the School's financial situation. 
Born in France, Xavier Gilbert was an IMD Professor who had 
belonged to the MEDE Faculty. In the opinion of the IMD Faculty, he is a 
man of strong personality, very upfront, very determined and committed to 
the School. He has always been respected by his peers; a referent leader to 
the Faculty. 
By 1992, EMD's situation was difficult. There was much confusion 
because of the lack of leadership and strong management. The financial 
situation of the School was in pretty bad shape and deteriorating all the time. 
The economics of IMD reflected the need for a significant turning point in 
IMD's modus operandi. Specifically, the revenue/cost evolution in 1990-91 
was marked by a revenue increase of Sfr 2 million while costs increased by 
SFr 4 million. 
49 
48 Xavier Gilbert, fortner IMEDE Faculty, former ITWD Acting Director General, IMD Faculty. 
49 EVD's Implementation Priorities, Xavier Gilbert, March 16th 1992 - Archival Material. 
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As regards the Faculty, it was divided, restless and hesitant. There was 
tension concerning what EMD ought to be and ought to do. "There was a 
concern on both sides in terms of what would be the culture that would 
,, 50 emerge from the process. There were the farmers', i. e. those professors 
that had insisted on being around, doing the work, not competing with the 
School; and the 'hunters'. i. e. those professors who were outside working 
with companies, teaching and organising their own programmes. 
This difference hindered the building of the new School's identity. 
However, these two groups did not fall meekly within institutional 
boundaries. "It was not the ex-IMI versus the ex-IMEDE. It was not like that. 
[] They were the farmers and the hunters again. But they were the hunters 
of IMEDE and IMI that got together and the farmers of IWDE and IMI that 
got together. 
Moreover, EAD's state of disorder, its lack of integration and sense of 
direction forced Cassani to define Gilbert's main responsibilities, as follows: 
1. To exercise leadership and direct IMD to ensure achievement 
of the highest standards of excellence in all activities and its 
continuous success as a leading institution in the field of 
international management education; 
2. To make recommendations to the Executive Committee of the 
IMD Foundation Board for the mission and strategy of IMD; 
50 Jim Ellert, former IMEDE Faculty, MM Associate Dean. 
51 Xavier Gilbert, former IMEDE Faculty, former MD Acting Director General, IMD Faculty. 
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3. To ensure the financial health and viability of IMD; 
4. To implement management processes that adequately 
encompass the influence of the Faculty, other senior 
professionals and all other stakeholders; 
5. To implement adequate personnel policies that attract and 
retain Faculty and Staff of excellent quality; 
6. To work individually with each member of the Faculty at least 
once a year on his/her workload, professional development and 
performance evaluation; 
7. To report on the activities and performance of IMD on a 
regular basis; 
8. To represent INM to the outside in coordination with the 
chairman and to actively solicit financial contributions; 
9. To act as the Secretary of the Foundation Board. 52 
Thus, it seems clear that the Board's focus was set on IMD's 
governance, its finances, and in aligning the School in the short term. Among 
the most urgent duties, Cassani53 highlighted the need to keep BID running 
successfully during the interim period, requiring Gilbert in the first place to 
keep the Faculty together and to straighten out such issues as he may 
encounter which were not handled in accordance with established policies 
and procedures. 
52 Letter firom Cassani to Gilbert appointing him as EýM Acting Director Gral., April 7 
th 1992- 
Archival Material. 
53 Report on Tenure of Prof Xavier Gilbert as Acting Director General of EVID 
from 1992-1993 - 
Archival Material. 
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Gilbert was determined to bring IMD to the fore, as had been intended 
since the School's foundation. He knew it was not an easy task given the lack 
of identity of its members and the painful process they had been going 
through. Although he was a referent among his colleagues (IMD Faculty), it 
was quite a fragile situation. At the same time, he knew 'his' School needed 
complicated 'surgery'. He had to restore the School's finances in the short 
term, to focus on its activities, to produce and sell in order to raise IMD's 
reputation. 
But he was extraordinarily dependent on the Board and Faculty, since 
he was just an Interim Dean and would be in command for only a short 
period. On the one hand, he was determined to restore IMD's financial 
situation and fulfil the Board's main interest; but on the other hand, he was 
part of the Faculty and wanted his colleagues to feel BM was their School 
and to support him. He found himself caught in the cross-fire between the 
Board and the Faculty. This strengthened his position since both the Board 
and the Faculty knew they could not afford to lose another Dean. 
Thus, as soon as he was appointed Interim Dean (January, 1992), 
Gilbert presented his priorities to the Faculty and Staff. "We have a job to do 
in the very short term, on which we must concentrate first: we must deliver 
what we have promised to our customers, and even better. [ ... ] We must run 
excellent programmesi, fill them up, and develop new programmes.,, 
54 In thiS 
regard, Gilbert knew that corporate customers felt critical of IMD. Moreover, 
54 Xavier Gilbert's priorities as presented to the Faculty and Staff of DAD in January, 1992 - 
Archival Material. 
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some former IMD Faculty recall there were competitors who did not believe 
IMD would survive. 
Although he was aware of the financial weakness of IMD, he did not 
really know what the precise economic state was. "At this time, the exact 
financial situation is a complete unknown to me. The books for 1991 are not 
yet closed and the budget for 1992 is not finalised. I would like one or two 
Faculty to get involved in this matter so that they could inform the College of 
Professors and me by the end of February on what the exact 1992 situation 
will look like. , 
55 
He made a great effort to share the real critical situation of the School 
with the ITAD Faculty and Staff, so that they would all navigate the same 
boat. "The institution needs the support of everyone; it is our collective 
responsibility to make sure that this support is not undermined internally or 
externally. , 56 With their support he would be able to strengthen his authority 
and thus, exert influence to shape the School's strategic agenda-building and 
-executing. 
From the very beginning, he decided to constantly share with the 
Faculty and key administrative Staff the most critical issues to solve. Thus, 
he had meetings every week with each of them. In order to keep everybody 
informed Gilbert spent every Monday afternoon in Faculty meetings showing 
51 Xavier Gilbert's priorities as presented to the Faculty and Staff of WD in January, 1992 - 
Archival Material. 
56 Xavier Gilbert's priorities as presented to the Faculty and Staff of IMD in January, 1992 
Archival Material. 
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the revenues, looking at the program-me enrolment, informing people about 
downsizing. "I was looking at the most pressing issues so that nobody could 
say that they have not heard [ ... ]I was using every single opportunity to 
repeat the same messages. , 57 So he developed a mechanism whereby he 
could keep the Faculty informed of developments and projects. "Team work 
can only take place if there is maximum transparency. 9,58 He also held 
meetings with the Staff members twice a month. 
So his first main concern was to restore INM's financial situation 
because the Board had told him, "Either you put it back financially or we 
close. 9559 In addressing the Faculty and Staff, he affinned, "This is our 
mission and this is where our money comes from. , 60 This would be achieved 
through revenue level (adequate revenues for IMD's size, measured for 
example, in revenue per Faculty), product mix (more commodity-like public 
programmes to be reviewed so as to decrease the overall number on offer), 
and programme quality (assessment of quality improvement in terms of 
innovativeness, relevance to real managerial issues, and impact on learning 
approach). 
To restore the School's financial situation he made sure of the quality 
of revenues and reduced the costs structure. In line with this, he carried out a 
head count reduction within the administrative Staff. However, even though 
57 Xavier Gilbert, former HVIEDE Faculty, former EýM Acting Director General, 11ý4D Faculty. 
58 Xavier Gilbert's priorities as presented to the Faculty and Staff of RVID in January, 1992 - 
Archival Material. 
59 Xavier Gilbert, former UvIEDE Faculty, former EVID Acting Director General, B4D Faculty. 
60 Xavier Gilbert's priorities as presented to the Faculty and Staff of IMD in January, 1992 - 
Archival Material. 
211 
some Faculty decided to leave, he did not take any measures to lay off 
Faculty because he wanted the programmes to be delivered as agreed with 
customers. "Otherwise we were dead. "61 He knew IMD needed to change its 
image within the management education industry and that Faculty 
participation was critical for this. 
His second priority was to change the balance of the cost structure. 
"INM's cost structure must be substantially re-balanced. The 1991 cost 
increase was due primarily to a SFr 3 million increase in payroll. ). )62 
Accordingly, Gilbert was absolutely drastic with all expenses. He cancelled 
the recruiting of some new Faculty; he reduced the administration Staff by 
25%. "That worked much better. People were able to work without being 
injured by incompetent losses. [ ... ] In 1992, we were 
break-even. , 63 
Figure 14 illustrates the head count reduction that took place during 
Gilbert's Interim Deanship. It shows that seven people left from Faculty and 
Research, nine from support Faculty and Programmes, seven from Learning 
support, six from Marketing and External Relations and seven from 
Administrative Support. 
61 Xavier Gilbert, former HVIEDE Faculty, fonner EVID Acting Director General, B4D Faculty. 
62 IMD's Implementation Priorities, Xavier Gilbert, March 16 th 1992 - Archival Material. 
63 Xavier Gilbert, former IMEDE Faculty, former BID Acting Director General, IMD Faculty. 
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Figure 14: Head Count Reduction during the Transition 
perio 
Head Count Reduction 
Faculty & Research 
Support to faculty and programs 
I Learning support: library, computers 
0 Marketing & external relations 
I Administrative Support 
Gilbert's final priority was to mobilise the Faculty. The Faculty had 
been drifting away from IMD for two reasons: firstly, insufficient 
involvement in the affairs of INM, which led to an 'us vs them' attitude, a 
lower commitment to the institution and lack of identity. Secondly, the 
market for Faculty services valued BM's Faculty more than IMD itself did. 
This situation was corrected by a highly motivating formula: constant 
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Total: 181 Total: 145 
FEBRUARY 1992 AUGUST 1992 
information and involvement in the decision-making process and a 
compensation and benefits package were reviewed in the light of what the 
market was willing to pay for the Faculty's private consulting time. 64 
Since he wanted to propel research focused on the development of 
Faculty capabilities and an increasing diversity of programmes to be 
delivered. ) Gilbert created the figure of IMD Research Director. He asked 
Derek Abell, the former Dean of IMEDE, who at the time was on leave of 
n 11. absence after the merger, to take charge of IMD's research. 
Actions and documents showed effective results. His involvement in 
activities such as the assessment of the participation level in the public 
programme, the keeping of a close eye on private programme portfolio 
evolution, the development of relations with companies, as well as the 
rigorous control that he implemented over all major expenses, led to a better 
perception of the probable fmancial evolution of IMD. This, in turn, 
translated into a faster submission of IMD audited financial statements. 
In relation to the Faculty, Gilbert set out a list enumerating each of the 
15 internal policies. This is shown as Figure 15. 
64 12\413's Implementation Priorities, Xavier Gilbert, March 16'h 1992 - Archival Material. 
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Figure 15: Faculty policies implemented during the Transition period 
List of Faculty Policies: 
1. Faculty profiles and recruitment. 
2. Guidelines for employment contracts with Faculty members. 
3. Titles, rankings and promotions of Faculty members. 
4. Workload planning guidelines. 
5. Compensation. 
6. Annual performance evaluation. 
7. Professional development and sabbatical leave. 
8. Private consulting. 
9. Grievance procedure. 
10. Faculty review guidelines and process. 
11. Faculty personnel committee. 
12. Process for the selection and contract review of the Director General. 
13. Procedure for the election of a Faculty candidate to the Foundation Board. 
14. Procedure for the selection of Faculty to endowed Chairs and Fellowships. 
15. Policy on revision of current policies and introduction of new ones. 
In addition,, Gilbert was passionate about reversing attitudes and ethics. 
He was detennined to give the Faculty an identity, a sense of ownership of the 
School. He wanted them to feel there was concern for their interests and that 
their support was not only essential for the School's success but also that it was 
appreciated. 
Gilbert was detennined to succeed and he had the courage, will and clear 
ideas to bring about this resolution and execute decisions. "He [ ... ] has always 
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kept decisions up, very constructive. , 65 He would not allow anything to 
interfere with this determination, and imposed sanctions on those who would 
not act as expected. "There are stories of Faculty coming in to see Xavier 
Gilbert saying, 'You can't do this to me. You can't tell me how many days I 
can consult. ' And Xavier saying, 'I can tell you whatever I want. I'm the Dean. 
There's the door. See YOU.,, ý66 
Towards the end of Gilbert's Deanship, IMID was able to reverse the 
negative trend in financial performance, which had threatened the viability of 
the institution at least in the short term. Having cut costs and installed proper 
administrative management systems, IMD shifted towards revenue creation. 
Figure 16 shows the evolution of both income and expenses at MM 
during the first years (1990-1993). It depicts an increase of approximately SFr 
1.8 million in total income in 1991, and of about SFr 1.3 million in 1992. It 
then shows a decrease of around SFr 2.4 million in 1993. As for the expenses, 
Figure 16 shows that they increased by some SFr 4.3 million in 1991 but that 
they decreased by some SFr 1.4 million in 1992. By 1993, the expenses had 
decreased by approximately SFr 1.8 million. 
65 Kaspar Cassani, former Chairman of the EýM Foundation Board. 
66 Gordon Adler, Assistant to Peter Lorange (IMD President). 
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Figure 16: IMD Financial Results 1990 - 1993 
INCOMIE 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Program Revenues 27,366 26,899 28,657 25,824 
Partners & BAs 4,505 5,434 5,490 5,975 
R&D Contributions 1,412 2,248 2,248 2,362 
Endowment Income 918 1,061 871 673 
Other Income 313 689 379 378 
Total non-prograrn revenues 7,148 9,432 8,988 9,388 
TOTAL INCONDE 34,5144how36,331, %. op37,645%. ww35,212 
EXPENSES 
Program Expenses 4ý876 3,833 4,510 3,690 
R&D Expenses 809 2,042 1,728 1,696 
Administrative& support expenses 8,470 9,829 9,237 9,067 
Salaries and related expenses 18,004 20,753 19,602 18,759 
Total Expenses 32,15%q.. d 36,457, %.. vw35,07' 61.. or 33,212 OPERATING PROFIT 2,355 1 -126 2,568 1 (a) 2,000 
Depreciation 1,505 754 1,196 1,521 
Provisions and interest ý4,3 mill ions -1,4 nuffl hons -1-8 millions 428 
OPERATING RESULT 850 -880 1,372 51 
One-time restructuring costs 0 0 441 0 
One-time extraordinary items 0 0 916 
NET OPERATING RESULT 850 -880 15 51 
(a) Net of SFr 1,155,000 for various provisions accounted for under operation expenses.. 
In order to accomplish the purpose of restoring INM's financial situation, 
Gilbert hired competent marketing and public relations specialists to support 
his endeavours. 67 As soon as he took charge, he faced a difficult and 
deteriorating situation. However, he was able to establish himself as the boss. 
This was very much needed at that time. 68 In this regard, Jim Ellert (former 
EMEDE Faculty, INID Associate Dean) recalls, "Xavier set his role really as 
getting the ship firm and in good shape for whatever would fall on him in that 
position. And [ ... ] we 
drilled the comer financially during that period. [ ... ] He 
67 Report on tenure of Prof. Xavier Gilbert as Acting Director General of IMD from January 
27, 
1992, to June 30,1993 - Archival Material. 
68Report on tenure of Prof. Xavier Gilbert as Acting Director General of ITAD 
from January 27, 
1992, to June 30,1993 - Archival Material. 
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did a good job. " 
Gilbert focused on IMD's financial side. Both cash flow and operating 
results showed a remarkable improvement over 1991. His success was a 
consequence of his will and ability in making and executing decisions. "Gilbert 
took over a difficult and deteriorating situation, [ ... ] with excellence. He took 
charge clearly, forcibly and unambiguously, establishing himself as the boss. 
He approached the job with his usual high energy, enthusiasm, and total 
commitment. [ ... ] In this Period, he listened carefully, debated actively, 
expressed his own points of view forcibly, and made decisions. Not everybody 
liked them all the time, which is the price of true leadership. ýý 
69 
However, there remained much to be done to further increase revenues. 
On November 10"' 1992, the IMD Foundation Board held a meeting in which 
several important decisions were made: first, Kaspar Cassani became the Vice- 
Chairman of the EWD Foundation Board and Fritz Leutwiller was assigned 
Chairman in Cassani's place. Second, Cassani announced that a new Dean had 
been appointed and he introduced Dr. Peter Lorange, President of the 
Norwegian School of Management in Oslo, formerly of the Faculty of Wharton 
and MIT. "He was elected unanimously by the members of the Board in their 
circular vote of September 4th 1992. ýý70 Third, he thanked Xavier Gilbert for his 
job. 
69 Confidential letter from Derek Abell to Max Murbach, October I I'h 1993 - Archival Material. 
70 Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Foundation Board of IMD, November 10 
th 1992 - Archival 
Material. 
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Gilbert suggested three priorities for 1993, which emphasised the 
continuation and consolidation of the initial improvements achieved during 
1992: firstly, IMD's positioning as a partner in executive development with 
corporations; secondly, the financial viability of IMD, which remained 
precarious and which required a focus on marketing and developing fund- 
raising; and thirdly, internal partnership, which required a strong coherent 
Faculty team and a committed Staff. 
Finally, Cassani made several further remarks, "IN4D, now solidly 
established, has a world-class Faculty, a highly qualified President and physical 
facilities that create the optimum environment for the students. [ ... ] The solid 
fmancial model of EWD, whose only debt is the mortgage of SFr 19 million 
[] remain a concern and if we cannot raise the funds to pay them back, we 
shall have to find the amount of the annual interest payments through increased 
sponsor and Business Associate fees. , 
71 
It is in this way that the transition period came to an end. However, Peter 
Lorange's official joining date would be July 1" 1993 "due to existing 
,, 72 commitments. Meanwhile, the responsibility to manage WD lay with the 
Acting Director General, Prof Xavier Gilbert, who would "take decisions in 
close contact with the President-elect. 
, 73 
7 ' Kaspar Cassani in the minutes of the fifth meeting of the IMD Foundation Board, November 
1& 1992 -Archival Material. 
72 Minutes of the fifth meeting of the MM Foundation Board, November 10ffi 1992 - Archival 
Material. 
73 Minutes of the fifth meeting of the IMD Foundation Board, November 10 
th 1992 - Archival 
Material. 
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5.2. Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during the transition 
episode 
The transition episode is characterised by a radical change of focus 
towards restoring IMD's financial situation during the period 1992-1993. The 
foregoing merger episode that ended in a critical financial crisis for the School 
enabled the different key actors (Board, Dean and Faculty) to share a common 
concern: ensuring INM's survival in the short term. 
5.2.1. Critical elements for Gilbert's success 
Gilbert had a clear mandate related to solving the School's financial 
problems. Thus, he mainly concentrated on prioritising the turning of red 
figures into black. This same concem permeated the Faculty, who was fostered 
by Gilbert's determination and effective communication to make everybody 
aware of the critical situation, asking them for their contributions. Moreover, to 
some extent, Gilbert augmented his credibility and power base through firm and 
assertive decisions and actions aimed at reducing costs to balance the School's 
figures. 
5.2.2. Issue Legitimisation and Power Mobilisation 
In analysmg issue legitimisation, the study observed Issue Sponsorship, 
Issue Selling, Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation, Agenda Structure 
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and Characterisation offtatures of both outer and inner context legitimating 
initiatives. 
Several circumstances concurred in Xavier Gilbert's Interim Deanship 
legitimisation. Firstly, the fundamental alignment between Dean, Board and 
Faculty's MGI prioritisation focused on short-term performance for survival. At 
the same time, Gilbert represented the role of the captain who prevented the 
ý-ship' from sinking. His profile, characterised by a directive leadership style 
and clear communication and assertive skills, enabled him to gain credibility, 
legitimate his own role and thus, strengthen his power base, rather limited since 
it resulted from his appointment just as interim Dean. 
Forfurther analysis see IMD Appendix V 
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6. Consolidation and Success (1993-2004) 
6.1. Taking Charge 
In looking for a new Dean for IMD, the Search Committee evaluated 
about 85 candidates . 
74 Finally, it appointed Peter Lorange - bom in Norway - 
who had extensive academic and managerial experience. After obtaining his 
degree at Harvard, in 1971, Lorange went to ITVMDE, Lausanne. In 1972, he 
obtained his doctorate and in 1973!, he joined the Sloan School at the NUT for 
nine years. Then, he went to Wharton where he became a Full-Time Professor. 
In 1979, he went back to EMEDE for a year. He recalls, "I had been here twice 
for a total of two years, and I felt sentimentally closer to the place. , 75 
In 1989, he became Dean of the Norwegian School of Management and 
-remained there until 1993 when he was appointed President of IIMD in 
Switzerland. In evoking these days Lorange asserts, "I really missed to be in an 
international place. So when the President of IMEDE's alumni club in Norway 
nominated me for this, [ ... ]I was really tempted with the 
international side. , 76 
However, things were not as good as he had expected them to be at 
INM- "I was not aware of how bad it was. 
9977 Lorange adds, "When I arrived, I 
felt that the School was much more uneven than I've thought. iM There was still 
uncertainty for the future. EWD had had its image damaged in the 
business and 
74 Xavier Gilbert, former IMEDE Faculty, former IN4D Acting Director General, BAD Faculty. 
75 Peter Lorange, EýM President. 
76 Peter Lorange, EýM President. 
77 Peter Lorange, EVID President. 
78 Peter Lorange, EVID President. 
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management education environment. Those were times of much anxiety and 
anguish. In addition, there was a financial problem. Revenues were not coming 
in as planned, and the costs were too high. Even though Gilbert had repaired a 
dramatic situation, he did not have enough time to address the question of the 
revenues. 
79 
As for the IMD Foundation Board, there were ambiguous feelings. 
Trustees hoped that IMD would begin to grow, that there was a new 
opportunity ahead. "We had some cash flow, but we came out of a very 
difficult situation, so the future, everything was uncertain. , 980 
The Faculty was restless and also expectant. They wanted to overcome 
the merger process so, "they needed a strong outsider who could come in and 
put the place in order. "81 However, that was not the perspective of the entire 
Faculty. Some of them were still eager for a more collegial participation 'in 
managing the School. The Director of the Faculty College drew the attention of 
the IMD Foundation Board to "the need to involve the Faculty closely in the 
management of the School. -42 He stressed the Director General's role as one of 
ýprimus inter pares'. 
On the other hand, Kaspar Cassani clarified that the Board was clearly 
assigning the total responsibility for managing IMD to the Acting 
Director 
79 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
80 Vito H. Baumgartner, former Chairman of the MM Foundation Board. 
81 Philip Rosenzweig, IMD Faculty. 
82 Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Foundation Board of IMD, November 
10 th 1992 - Archival 
Material. 
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83 General and subsequently to the President . Because of his management 
experience in academic institutions and considering Juan Rada's advice, 
Lorange had guaranteed the Board's support for himself He wanted to be 
completely responsible for the School's management. 
In a brief introductory address to the WD Foundation Board, Lorange 
stressed the following four central points that needed his attention: firstly, the 
financial position of IMD had to be kept sound (keeping an eye on revenues 
and expenses); secondly, there was a need for a clear vision of where IMD 
wanted to go; thirdly, there was the critical issue of a mutually beneficial 
partnership with business; and fourthly, he saw a need for close attention to the 
School's critical resources 'Faculty' and 'administration'. 
As soon as Lorange entered ITNM (January, 1993), in looking for the 
Faculty's commitment, he wrote a personal letter to each Faculty. "If you were 
in my shoes, which are the three positive things you would do, if you had my 
job, and which other three things would you advise me not to do. Please, help 
me. Send me a little note. I want each of you to respond in writing. So what I 
got was very interesting. 44 Based on the Faculty's comments, Lorange picked 
up what he thought was most important. "I received all the letters and here I 
think I have a mandate from you to do a few things. I think it's critical that we 
look towards the environment, and that we become more customers oriented. 
reading that from YOU.,, 
85 He already had the Board's support so his 
" Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Foundation Board of EWD, November 
10 th 1992 - Archival 
Materil. 
84 Peter Lorange, DAD President. 
85 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
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purpose now was to achieve the Faculty's support and to set priorities. 
Lorange summarised the Faculty's requests into three main issues: to 
strengthen the Faculty; to clarify the portfolio of programmes; to reinforce 
marketing. Besides his robust position and status as President of INM, he tried 
to reinforce the Faculty support. "He said quite clearly, 'I cannot do the job 
alone, I cannot, I mean, I need the Faculty. ý 9. )86 He said to everybody that he 
would do his best in terms of making decisions which were to the benefit of the 
School. "If you don't want me here, you have to understand that my power is 
only indirect. It's because you want me to have power. So I will receive the 
power from you, the Faculty, to do my job. ý-)87 
In the same way, Lorange was determined to bring together different 
perspectives and experience, so he joined together key Faculty from IMI and 
IMEDE into the Coordinating Committee (currently called the 'Management 
Committee'). He realised that he needed the collaboration of people who had 
been at EAD since the very beginning; people who were respected and whose 
advice was followed by Faculty. Among the Faculty who joined the 
Coordinating Committee, there were "[Xavier] Gilbert [from IMEDE], Fred 
Neubauer [from M], Jim Ellert [from IMIEDE], Jan Kubes [from WIEDE and 
Pierre Goetschin from IMEDE as well]. They were all supporting players. , 
88 
6.2. Shaping INW's own culture and identity 
86 Fred Neubauer, former M Faculty, MM Faculty. 
87 Peter Lorange, MM President. 
88 Peter Lorange, INED President. 
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a) An unsettled organisation 
When Peter Lorange arrived at IMD, he found much discontent and 
discomfort among the IMD Faculty. "I could see that the organisation was not 
thinking of team work, and it was not really a collegium, and it was low, a lot 
of comments around, denigrating things, barely ambition. "89 There were still 
two different cultures within the new School: IMI's and IMEDE's rather than 
IMD's. IMI's culture was less represented because professors from IVMDE 
mainly made up the Faculty. "About six or seven [against], near forty. "90 They 
had differences regarding the School's model: "What is the role of a Business 
School? What is the role of the Faculty? Which are the things allowed and 
those forbidden? "91 
Moreover, the Faculty was still divided into 'farmers and hunters'. 
Many professors just focused on their self-interest instead of thinking of IMD's 
benefit. "The Faculty was very mixed. Some Professors were more normal in 
the sense that they did really good research and teaching. Others were more 
interested in doing their own private consulting work. And I felt that the ethical 
standard of the Faculty was not up to speed. [ ... ] They were quarrelling and 
fighting, and they were not thinking about the customer. [ ... ] It was a very 
inward looking thing. There was a lot of fighting and distraction. The Faculty 
members acted as if they owned the programmes. 'This is my programme. ' And 
they acted as if they owned a certain client relationship 'This is my company. ' 
89 Peter Lorange, INED President. 
90 Carlos Cordon, MM Faculty. 
9' Carlos Cord6n, IMD Faculty. 
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[] But we had to break all that. , 92 Thus, Lorange found himself in the 
situation of needing to promote new values and behaviours based on 
institutional ownership, teamwork, transparency, responsiveness to the market, 
high standards of teaching and programme delivery and meritocracy, among 
others. 
b) Building a new culture for DM 
Once he got the Faculty's mandate through the letters he requested, 
Lorange began to implement changes that would facilitate the development of 
INID. This consisted in rewarding those behaviours that represented IMD's 
beliefs and values and punishing those that were against. His main driver was 
'what's good for IMD is good for all of us. ' In this sense, people remember he 
was very consistent with some of the basics like 'you don't compete with the 
School'. 
Some Faculty agree, Lorange "started [ ... ] thinking about what 
kind of 
agenda he would lay out for this place to stop being two Schools, get out of the 
merger, get on to its own identity, and start moving to grow. , 93 So he started 
"to work and sell. He does a very good job going out there tirelessly, talking to 
people, responding to their mails [ ... ]. He 
is really a person 'par excellence' on 
the selling front. , 94 He was persistent in meeting clients' needs to bring a 
customer perspective into IMD's inward-centred mindset and thus, in making 
the School focus on customer orientation and market. "As the Dean you can 
easily be busy all time internally. The key is to spend time visiting the market. 
92 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
93 Don Marchand, IMD Faculty. 
94 Jan Kubes, MID Faculty. 
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[]I spend about 50% of my time travelling and visiting the market. ý195 
In this regard, Annie Tobias, Director of the IMD Learning Network, 
asserts "He's listening to what the issues are, rather than to their agendas. And 
then, he tries to make the translation back to what we need to do. " Moreover, 
Lorange "brought credibility to this new School for his own reputation activity. 
And that was needed in this School because it had none. IMD had no 
identity. "96 
Thus, Peter Lorange worked hard promoting certain core behaviours: 
outstanding standards at teaching and programme delivery, hard work, 
responsiveness in order to keep clients loyal to INM, being a supportive team 
player and developing research with business relevance and strong impact in 
teaching to fulfil corporate clients' needs. One of Lorange's goals was to 
remove those behaviours that did not align with the institutional ethical 
standards. "[The Dean and the Associate Dean] are known to discuss what is 
considered ethical conduct of a Faculty. I think that's the one thing that is 
punished quite seriously. iý97 In this sense, IMD punishes those members who 
use the IMD network as a channel for personal purposes or are not good team 
players, "because everyone relies on everyone else to teach on their 
programmes and lead programmes that others are teaching on. So being a good 
team player is pretty impo a. 908 
" Peter Lorange, EVID President. 
96 Don Marchand, IMD Faculty. 
97 Bala Chakravarthy, IMD Faculty. 
98 Mike Stanford, IMD Faculty. 
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Although it was not a simple task, slowly but firmly, IMD was oriented 
towards responsiveness, transparency, and teamwork. "It was a matter of trying 
to ask new Faculty members who had the energy and the drive to do it; to 
people who expressed more team-oriented values. " 99 In this Process of setting 
clear rules and systems, the President's determination to accomplish them 
played a very important role. "That involved hiring some new Faculty, 
[] creating clear Faculty guidelines for consulting, [... ] and having 
transparency regarding the workload. "loo 
In this sense, to encourage Faculty teamwork ("Teamwork is the focus 
of EVED's culture"101) Lorange carried out two critical and innovative decisions 
that involved breaking up with most academic traditions: first, the 
establishment of a non-departmental academic structure, and second, 
implementing an academic career structure with neither tenure nor titles, in 
order to avoid hierarchies within the Faculty ("everyone is a 'professor' [] 
with a perhaps largely self-imposed 'pressure' to deliver"' 02 ). 
Accordingly, some of the Faculty agree: "It's been very surprisingly 
helpful keeping politics out, and keeping people from being developed. []I 
mean no levels of Faculty, no levels of tenure, no department heads. It's been 
very good in terms of not having levels. , 103 However, not all Faculty were open 
to adapt to MD's new system. Thus, "It was a matter of asking a number of 
Professors to leave. People who did not live up to the guidelines were asked to 
99 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
"' Peter Lorange, IEMD President. 
101 Lorange (2002: 360). 
102 Lorange (2002). 
103 Tom MaInight, IMD Faculty. 
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leave. People who were not performing were asked to leave. [ ... ] Several 
Faculty left by themselves. "' 04 
Thus, Lorange worked to create a new culture for IT%M, adopting 
organisational values such as being a market oriented, eclectic rather than 
axiomatic, pioneering-oriented, value-creating organisation; being more based 
on teams; becoming more of a learning partner to organisations; and 
proactively shaping the agenda of the future. 105 
c) Strengthening the Faculty 
Among the Faculty inputs that Lorange received as a mandate when he 
arrived at IMD, the first referred to strengthen the Faculty. "That involved 
hiring some new Faculty, creating clear Faculty guidelines for consulting, 
clarifying the workload for all and having transparency. , 106 Moreover, Lorange 
realised that to strengthen the quality of the Faculty, the School must be able to 
attract and retain the best Faculty possible - i. e. outstandingly successful people 
who had the ability to deliver business relevant research in the classroom. 
From Lorange's perspective, "above all, it is the Faculty's individual 
interests and motivation for academic work that matter: commitment to the 
discovery process, transformation of research into terms that can be shared with 
others, dissemination of the results through writing and teaching, discussions 
104 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
105 Lorange (2002). 
106 Peter Lorange, MD President. 
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with colleagues and supervision of students. 95107 However, he recognised that to 
attract and retain the best Faculty, an academic institution has to be an 
eminently attractive and interesting place. The Faculty needs to feel 
comfortable in the institution. Thus, Lorange adapted the workload system in 
order to develop more transparency among the Faculty. 
The Faculty workload is allocated among the following three broad 
categories: teaching, research and citizenship. Transparency was a key feature, 
"Everybody knew what the other was teaching. That immediately meant that 
we got a lot more capacity built. "' 08 In this regard, most Faculty members agree 
"The workload system has made a good thing: it gave a sense of recognition. 
When I arrived here, if someone worked a lot for the institution, there was no 
recognition. [ ... ] The workload system is telling me that they have recognised 
that I'm working. And as it is going to be public, I feel much more satisfied. I 
am fulfilling my job and I am doing it just fine. ý-)109 
Accordingly, in the following years, compensation systems were 
adapted in order to stimulate partnership between the Faculty and the School. 
"When I came and I thought 'missions can only have fixed pay' but then, we 
had a Chairman of the Board who came from Caterpillar - Vito Baumgartner - 
he insisted that we should have bonus pay like in business. So today we have 
very big bonus pay, partly a group bonus so that everybody shares as a team 
and we don't have any free loaders and partly, individual bonus based on 
research output, teaching excellence and citizenship. [ ... ]. But on top of that 
107 Lorange (2002: 208). 
108 Peter Lorange, MD President. 
119 Carlos Cordon, IMID Faculty. 
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also we have a generous system of buy-back. If you teach more, you get paid 
more. " 110 
Thus, a 'buy-back' arrangement was designed and implemented. Buy- 
back of Faculty time takes place after a threshold of programme delivery 
workload has been reached. This threshold is set at 90 days of Faculty workload 
for programme delivery activities. Accordingly, each Faculty has a base load of 
90 days, above which the School buys the time back. -It will normally be 
counted as part of the maximum of 45 days of private consulting allowed for 
individual Faculty. The rationale for the buy-back provision was to create a 
way to expand Faculty capacity to meet institutional demand in good years, 
optimise utilisation of physical space, leverage secretarial support and contain 
fixed costs generally, while also to protect IMD's break-even point in years of 
economic downturn. "' 
"This is a competitive environment, it's a competitive world [ ... ] and 
you have to be able to attract the best talent. And in order for you to attract the 
best talent, you have to be able to pay them well. And if you allow them to 
participate in the fmancial success of this undertaking, through incentive base, 
you really round the circle. You get their energy, their attention, and we also 
wanted to make sure that the Faculty was focused on the School and not so 
much on outside things. "' 
12 
Thus, EMD devoted itself to encouraging professors to become involved 
110 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
111 Buy-back provision for capacity adjustments - Archival Material. 
112 Vito H. Baumgartner, former Chairman of the MD Foundation Board. 
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with the School and to make them understand that they would benefit 
themselves if the School achieved increasing economic revenue. This would 
discourage Faculty's interest in external consulting. In this regard, Vito H. 
Baumgartner (former Chairman of the IMD Foundation Board) affirms, "We 
went from straight pay to straight pay plus incentive pay. We also made 
significant steps to increase the potential for key people to make more money in 
the School, recognising that you can attract best talent only if you are not only 
providing an environment that is exciting, but also if you compensate people 
fairly and fairly also means in line with the results that these people achieve. "113 
Further, within INM's compensation system, good professors have a 
better chance of being proposed for a sponsored chair. There is also a bonus 
system according to the financial position of EAD. Bonuses are budgeted for as 
part of the cost structure. This means that if IMD meets its surplus objectives, it 
may distribute these back to the Faculty. But if the budget shows a deficit, there 
may be a reduction made to the bonuses at the end of the year. ' 14 
The bonus is allocated taking into consideration two different 
perspectives: there is a group bonus which applies equally to all professors and 
which is a percentage of each Faculty's base salary. Thus, everybody gets the 
same percentage compared to the salary base. Then, there is a second pool, 
which is the individual bonus that has three components: performance on 
research development; superior performance in terms of classroom teaching, 
programme management, programme innovation; and dimensions that relate to 
113 Vito H. Baumgartner, former Chairman of the IMI) Foundation Board. 
114 Buy-back provision for capacity adjustments - Archival Material. 
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citizenship activities! 15 The result of the bonus round is determined after a 
discussion between the Faculty, the Dean (Peter Lorange) and the Associate 
Dean (Jim Ellert), about how the professor has performed during the year, the 
response from the classes and research. 
Over time (2001,2002) it became clearer to Lorange that customer 
orientation was not enough for a Business School. His 'entrepreneurial 
thinking' led him consider students as clients. As such, they demanded IMD to 
lead them "through the research and being behind to adapt it to the practice. "' 16 
So he built up a Faculty whose cutting-edge research has strong impact on 
programme delivery, and leads to 'real life, real leaming' teaching. "We had to 
change many of our professors to be much more able to do the research leading 
to this. "' 
17 
Thus, at IMD, new research is brought into the programmes 
systematically. "The research is brought to the agenda vis a vis each Faculty 
member in our one to one discussion, once per year. [ ... ] Every 6 months we 
started to do that till this very day. [ ... ] The Faculty review encourages research 
and publications. "' 18 Peter Lorange himself assesses Faculty research outputs 
and makes further recommendations regarding business relevance and 
academic rigour. "So Jim Ellert evaluates everybody on teaching and 
115 Jim Ellert, fonner IMEDE Faculty, EAD Associate Dean. 
1" Peter Lorange, ]AM President. 
... Peter Lorange, EVID President. 
118 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
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citizenship and I evaluate everybody on the research. So I read everything. The 
month of February I read everything. "' 19 
As a result of the implementation of rules, policies and systems, INID 
grew to be aligned with the goal which was set during its foundation: to 
develop a world-class institution, financially sustainable and in the top league. 
6.3. Shaping IMID's vision 
a) Setting strategic direction at IMD 
From Lorange's perspective, the modem Business School will be more 
effective if it has a clear vision which will help it to focus on a specific 
direction. The Business School must translate its vision into a more detailed 
mission that mirrors a sharp strategic focus. Without a vision statement, the 
Business School will likely lose focus, since it has no basis on which to make 
the key strategic choices on which its success will depend. 120 "Lack of focus 
leads to the scattering of activities, [ ... ]a misallocation of the most 
important 
strategic resources. " 
121 
Business Schools can easily lack focus because as organisations with 
highly talented staff, they are permanently sprouting initiatives. A number of 
centrifugal forces pull Business Schools in every direction of the strategic 
compass. The best antidote to this 'pull' is a strategic focus, a clear direction 
"' Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
120 Lorange, (2002). 
121 Lorange, (2002: 179). 
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that serves as a 'centripetal force' and keeps players in equilibrium. 122 Thus, 
Business Schools must focus on a particular vision that 'pushes' them in a 
specific direction. 
Lorange understands that setting direction in today's Business Schools 
is "markedly different" (Lorange, 2002: 9) from doing so in any other 
organisation, because its "product, value creation, is intangible. " (Lorange, 
2002: 9). Accordingly, in setting strategic direction, Business Schools must 
make the strategic choices necessary to respond to the market, making sure they 
achieve an internal balance and create the kind of value the customer expects 
(Lorange, 2002). 
Moreover, Lorange asserts that to be able to adapt to the signals that 
come from the marketplace and thus, create value, Business Schools must be 
demand-oriented and externally focused, rather than supply-oriented and 
internally focused. It is by carrying out environmental scanning that they can 
understand the growth segments. In this regard, Lorange declares "the external 
enviromnent is critical. It is a 'raison d'6tre' for the whole organisation. " 
When setting direction, Business Schools need to combine a proactive 
vision, sensing where to go and getting there ahead of others, not only by 
adapting to clients' needs, but also leading them. To do so, Faculty members 
tap into their entrepreneurial spirit, and pursue insights that lead to the concrete 
understanding of critical issues. It is the Dean (vision and leadership) who 
122 Lorange, (2002). 
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finally decides which of these insights fit and which do not fit, orchestrating the 
understanding of the reasons. "The Dean's job is to facilitate the process of 
selection. The task is to manage it through top-down vision, not to be merely a 
glorified adding machine of bottom-up initiatives. , 
123 
Thus, in talking about his perspective on the modem Business School, 
Lorange understands there are key issues such as setting a clear strategic 
direction that result from the combination of various forces. The value creation 
in a Business School requires a balance of all four forces, shown in Figure 17. 
"The overall richness of the value creation can be better captured by the term 
'dynamic Business School 9. 
Figure 17: Forces with impact on the Strategic Direction of the School 125 
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Accordingly, the direcA8jjhTrMffiAgion sets out the strategy of the 
Business School's research and teaching activities. It is a function of both the 
need to adapt to the various customers and of the proactive vision of the Faculty 
members. On the other axis, the actor dimensions: the important entrepreneurial 
123 Lorange (2002: 22) 
124 Lorange (2000: 406) 
125 source: Lorange (2000) 
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inputs by the Faculty members, working both alone and in teams, creating a 
'bottom-up input', complemented by a top-down vision and leadership 
dimension, driven by what choices the Dean/President feels the Business 
School should make in setting its strategic direction to develop an overall 
portfolio. 1 26 " Strategic direction emerges from balancing the bottom-up and 
top-down forces. This balance is what will determine the ultimate focus or 
direction of the School. 1,127 
To sum up, according to Lorange, "To set strategic direction effectively, 
academic leaders must worry about creating value in each of the four ways so 
far described; to do well in only one, or two is inadequate. , 128 
In describing the way in which RAID has shaped its strategy, Lorange 
asserts it has been built around four elements. The first element is "real life, 
real learning" 129 and it implies a practical focus for learning, based on thought 
leadership; clear business trends ("be in front of the cart and behind the 
cart', 130); quick transformation from research to programme delivery ("leading 
through research and being behind to adapt it to the practice"131); pedagogical 
focus on 'action-leaming'; and quality -world-class Faculty. 
In this regard, IMD is very much concerned with carrying out cutting- 
edge research with emphasis on business relevance, so that the latest trends can 
126 Lorange (2000: 405) 
127 Lorange (2002: 22) 
128 Lorange (2002: 24). 
129 Peter Lorange, WD President. 
130 Peter Lorange, IN41D President. 
131 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
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be shared with customers through good teaching programmes. Thus, research 
must have high impact, not just in the academic world but also among the 
business audience. 
The second element is "the global meeting place. " 132 Over the last 
decades, the management education industry has been affected by globalisation 
trends and Business Schools have responded to these trends in different ways. 
While some of them have opened campuses abroad, others have undertaken 
strategic alliances or developed distance learning. MD's answer to 
globalisation trends has been to 'stand alone', bringing the world to its campus 
in Lausanne; being a global meeting place: one place, one Faculty - i. e. a 
unique place where clients will find international Faculty, an international 
student body, and international Programmes. 
Thus far, it has been successful. Executives from all over the world 
leam side-by-side at IMD: 50% from Europe, 27% from Asia, 10% from North 
America, 10% from Latin America, and 3% from Australia and Africa. The 
School's home country, Switzerland, did not play a dominant role in any way, 
with Swiss participants numbering less than 10%. MD's Faculty of 50 
members similarly comes from 19 nations. 
Having cross-cultural sensitivity facilitates to deal with dilemmas, 
recognising there are no real answers but just various viewpoints. Since 
"learning is very much about dealing with 'dilemmas' 133 , there are no 
132 Latest Strategic Development at IMD - Archival Material; Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
133 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
239 
4right/wrong' answers, rather, cross-cultural insights. 
This second element can also be observed in IMD's clear business trend 
(e. g. the growth of Asia), its new research centres (e. g. the Evian group), and 
the growing Learning Network of around 170 companies. 
The third element is "all learning is lifelong learning. " 134 This 
element was raised in importance as a result of the need of the alumni to remain 
in contact with IMD after completing their programmes. "People were very 
excited while they were here but then, they were asking 'what what more is 
there in terms of leaming ? i, ýý135 The Wednesday web casts at 4pm (Lausanne 
time) has been installed so that all people in the 170 companies within the 
Learning Network, plus all alumni, can have a weekly input. This web cast 
implies 25.000 people logging in every week, for 30 minutes. 
Finally, the fourth and last element, "a minimalistic organisational 
approach" 136 entails no academic departments, no titles (every Faculty is a 
Professor), no tenure, market-driven internal processes and remaining a clear 
trend-focused School. 137 According to Lorange, "simplicity is absolutely 
critical". When he arrived at 11\4D in 1993, the School was in deep crisis. This 
enabled him to do "certain things, a deep cut fairly immediately. [ ... ] It was 
perhaps an unclear process, but it became very clear. The Board was very much 
134 Latest Strategic Development at B4D - Archival Material; Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
"' Peter Lorange, 34D President. 
136 Latest Strategic Development at IMD - Archival Material; Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
137 Latest Strategic Development at B4D - Archival Material; Peter Lorange, EVID President. 
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with me, that we could not have tenure. ý438 There are also no titles, no 
academic departments, and no fixed pay. 
Some Faculty question whether or not these elements are just slogans 
rather than a strategy. They argue that IMD has no strategy at all. Moreover, 
they show a special concern regarding the fact that the school's strategy is not 
clear. Others argue that given the idiosyncrasy of this kind of academic 
organisation. (Business Schools), these elements play the role of clear, wide 
4 guidelines' for everybody that is part an evolutionary strategy process, more 
suited to this type of knowledge-based organisation. 
b) Dean's leadership style 
. In observing Peter Lorange's leadership style, some elements seem 
clear. Firstly, he feels his authority has been delegated by the Board and the 
Faculty. "My power is only indirect. It's because you want me to have power. 
So I will receive the power from you, the Faculty, to do my job. 9439 
Secondly, Lorange feels the Board and Faculty expect him to set a clear 
direction, to lead, to make strategic decisions. "They want me to lead so, so it's 
an administrative thing. They don't want me to do nothing, they want, they're 
happy that there is direction here, decisions are being made. 
, 140 
Thirdly, some people (mostly Faculty) are asking for more participation 
Peter Lorange, IMID President. 
Peter Lorange, MD President. 
140 Peter Lorange, MD President. 
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in the debate related to IMD's strategy. Some believe Lorange's is a too 
directive leadership style; that there really is no collegiality. They suggest a 
more consultative leadership style would be better. Others understand that Peter 
Lorange participates with them during the meetings that take place every last 
Friday per month, with the Faculty and with each of IMD's committees (see 
Appendix 1141) as well. "The power is shared through these four committees- 
the Operating Committee, the Faculty Recruiting Committee, the Management 
Committee and the Faculty Meeting. And, it's shared but it's a structured 
agenda. And then, the shared power provides inputs for me to add energy so we 
move forward. [ ... ] But the 
legitimacy comes from these four committees. , 142 
Fourthly, Lorange dislikes wasting time in endless meetings. He triggers 
debates and propels them so that they can come to an end soon. "In all of these 
committees, there is a tendency to slow down. And here is where my drive and 
energy comes in. But if you don't, it's like the second law of thermo p ysics, 
you have to add energy all the time or the process can come to a slow halt. , 
143 
He also has an aversion to politics. He acknowledges this and feels people 
value this aspect of his leadership style. "They understand that I am not 
political. I think they appreciate that, that I try to do what I feel is best for the 
School. )-)144 In this regard, BM's systems and policies are implemented when 
needed, mirroring transparency and consistent behaviour. 
141 IMD's structure. 
142 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
143 Peter Lorange, IMID President. 
144 Peter Lorange, MD President. 
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Finally, Lorange is permanently carrying out environmental scanning. 
Inwardly, he listens to the Faculty and Staff through the different Committees; 
outwardly, he listens to the market and visualises its demands. He dedicates 
50% of his time to making contacts with the business world, bringing the 
market's main needs to IMD. This is what really makes the Business School 
externally-focused and customer-oriented. "I spend about 50% of my time 
travelling and visiting these people. [ ... ]A lot of time really. , 
145 
Accordingly, as Annie Tobias acknowledges, Peter Lorange focuses on 
the customer's needs and demands so that IMD can provide them with the latest 
knowledge. "He's much more listening to what the issues are than to their 
agendas. And then he tries to make the translation back to what we need to 
do. 5146 
In describing leadership at EAD, Bala Chakravarthy highlights four 
components: "One is the broad direction as to what the School [ ... ] is broadly 
attempting to do. " In this regard, the Faculty brings suggestions to the BM 
Board, the School's governing body: "to continue to remain small and not be a 
huge School, to continue to, up wide creating department, and continue the 
focus on executive education with an elite MBA. We'll do research but we may 
not have a backing programme. 
, 147 
The second component refers to the way in which the School decides 
"to allocate resources on strategy. Should we focus on in companies? Should 
145 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
146 Annie Tobias, Director of MM Learning Network. 
147 Bala Chakravarthy, IMD Faculty. 
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we focus on the public? Should we focus on what kind of public programmes? 
etc., etc. , 148 BAD's President has an advisory committee of Faculty members 
called, the Management Committee, where issues are debated. "So topics are 
introduced in the Faculty meeting, every month. [ ... ] And the sub groups of 
Faculty will all debate more deeply, and then we offer a further suggestion. So 
that goes back to the committee and the President and he may say, 'I thought 
everything here is what I liked to propose. Any further objection let me know. 
Otherwise, this is it. ý"149 
As far as execution - the third component - is concerned, it is based on 
the fact that a Faculty member is in charge of a programme. So "you have a lot 
of Ereedom. You are given the broad goals; you are given the broad resource 
constraints. Then after, you do your thing. "150 
Thus, Lorange delegates implementation. The fact that about 70 people 
report directly to him shows that he is capable of delegating operational issues, 
"Does he control? Yes. Does he micromanage? No 1115 1 He runs everything, and 
people work hard with great autonomy. "He has a group that he relies on 
heavily. , 152 
The last leadership component that Chakravarthy mentions is 
bureaucracy. "We have none. I mean, it was quite stunning when I got here. 
You know, if you are on the phone, personal or institutional, the same thing the 
148 Bala Chakravarthy, EWD Faculty. 
149Bala Chakravarthy, IN4D Faculty. 
150 Bala Chakravarthy, DJD Faculty. 
151 Annie Tobias, Director of IN4D Learning Network. 
152 Annie Tobias, Director of EWD Learning Network. 
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fax machines are open, the photocopiers are open. It's an honest system where 
you say, are you doing this for your personal self or consulting, are you doing it 
for the good of the institution? [ ... ] It's just very straightforward, very 
straightforward. "153 
In pointing out what he thinks people value most in his own leadership 
style, Lorange declares four strengths: "The fact that I'm doing quite a lot of 
research, and I'm also a good teacher. [ ... ] As second thing I think they 
understand that I am not political. [ ... ]A third thing is that I'm very good at 
marketing and sales so I can recruit the clients and I can also bring in money. 
r]A fourth thing is that I make a lot of efforts, it's very complicated. They 
respect that. " 
When asked if he feels he has changed anything over time, Lorange 
replies, "I became clearer, more able to say, 'Let us reach a decision and move 
forward'. And maybe I spent much more time hesitating before. I am more 
assertive now. , 
154 
Some Faculty observe the fact that INM's identity, positioning, growth 
and success has been built mostly on the strong leadership of a single person. 
This could be considered a weakness. On the other hand, some suggest that 
INM's identity has been institutionalised and its own values, skills and systems 
aligned with the Business School's model. This is what reinforces the School's 
endurance. 
153 Bala ChakravarthY, MD Faculty. 
154 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
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6.4. IMD's Growth and Success 
INM's unique history of growth and success has met with important 
challenges. During its first years after its foundation in 1990, EVID had to deal 
with pretty tough times both internally (as has already been described), and also 
externally. Regarding the external environment, besides the Gulf War in 1991, 
the financial crisis in emerging markets (Mexico 1995, Russia 1998, and South 
East Asia, 1995/1997), the terrorist attacks of September 11 th 2001, and SARS 
in 2003, had costly effects for the countries directly affected - both those where 
the crises began and those that might have escaped them but for spillover and 
contagion effects. Its consequences have taken the form of a substantial 
shrinkage of investment and consumption. 155 
However, two years after Peter Lorange was appointed, revenues 
increased, maintaining a permanent trend till they were almost tripled in 2004 
(Erom SFr 35 million to SFr 97 million). Likewise, IAM's reputation had 
enjoyed an unprecedented shift within the international management education 
industry. "IMD is a leader in executive education, with a very strong leadership 
and management focus and deep connections into the European business 
communi y. ý456 
Moreover, the School's financial health was restored: it has ten 
endowed chairs, each worth about SFr 3 million; it recently completed a new 
Executive Leaming Center; it is debt-free, and is expanding its buildings, self- 
155 Fvff's World Economic Outlook, May 1998. 
156 Donald Lessard, Deputy Dean of NUT Sloan. 
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financed. 157 
Figure 18 shows BM's revenue growth and the different crises that 
took place in its external environment since IMD's foundation until 2004 
(1990-2004 being the period under study). It enables one to visualise ITAD's 
constant growth since Peter Lorange was appointed President in 1993. During 
this period (BM's Consolidation and Success 1993-2004), revenues have 
increased by around 280%. 
157 EQUIS Il 2002 IMD Self-Assessment Report - Archival Material. 
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Figure 18: IMD's Revenue Growth 1990 - 2004 
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IMD's success and recognition as a leading Business School has been 
reflected in international rankings of management education. Over the past 
years, this pattern of excellence has raised the School's profile and strengthened 
its brand, as evidenced by leading journals such as the Financial Times and 
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Business Week. While ratings of Business Schools in print media may be 
unscientific and subjective, taken together they indicate that IMD has adjusted 
well to its changing context. 158 
Figure 19 shows the evolution of IMD in the European rankings during 
the last years as regards executive education, which overarches all custom 
programmes and open enrolment programmes. 
Figure 19: IMID's place among Business Schools world-wide: Executive 
Education 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EVM 4/3 513 11/2 6 4 
Financial Times 159 INSEAD 15/11 1115 15/8 9 11 
LBS 11115 4/13 14/11 7 7 
EVM 8 8 
Business Week INSEAD 2 5 
LBS 7 10 
Sources: www. ft. com; www. businessweek. com 
Figure 20 shows the evolution of IMD in the European rankings during 
the last few years in relation to Full-Time MBA programmes. 
158 EQUIS Id 2002 E\4D Self-Assessment Report - Archival Material. 
159 a/b where 'a' corresponds to open-enrolment programmes and 
W, to custom programmes. The 
Financial Times delivers combined rankings as from 2003. 
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Figure 20: IMID's place among European Business Schools: MIBA 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2-003 20-04 
EvM 3 3 3 3 3 
Financial Times INSEAD 2 2 1 1 1 
LBS 1 1 2 2 2 
PVM 4 4 3 3 2 
Business Week INSEAD 1 1 1 1 3 
LBS 2 2 4 4 5 
, jources:, "r%A,, lAr. rt. com; vvNvw. businessweek. com 
Figure 21: INM's place among Business Schools world-wide: MEBA 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
IMD 11 11 14 13 12 
Financial Times INSEAD 9 7 6 6 4 
LBS 8 8 9 7 4 
MD 4 - 3 - 2 
Business Week 160 INSEAD 1 1 3 
LBS 2 4 5 
Sources: www. ft. com; www. businessweek. com 
In addition, top Business Schools in the US and Europe consider MD 
as an innovative key player within the management education industry which 
has acquired a high reputation in the top tier. 
The School has a highly productive Faculty, whose work appears to 
160 Non-US Business Schools. 
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interest the outside world keenly. The 52 full-time-equivalent Faculty provides 
more visibility, more publicity and generates more interest than their small 
number would suggest. Originality, not size, is the source of IMD's relatively 
strong brand. 
161 
INM's growth in overall revenue and bottom-line profits has been 
impressive over the last five years. This growth indicates increasing approval in 
'the market'. And although the number of professors has increased only slightly 
since 1998, the value of what they create has increased dramatically. 
In addition, IMD's Learning Partnership Network, with around 170 
leading global corporations from around the world, is stronger than ever and 
continues to bolster the IMD brand, differentiating it from the competition. The 
Network ensures that IMD's research agenda keeps its focus on critical 
management issues. Moreover, it guarantees that professors receive regular 
feedback on the quality of their knowledge-creation activities, with a turnover 
of about 15%. 
6.5. Future Challenges 
Vito H. Baumgartner defmes EAD's overall future challenge: 
"Maintaining those relationships that they have with the partner companies, and 
the business associates, and making sure that the system provides value to both 
and that these partnerships can be perpetuated. I think that's absolutely critical. 
161 EQUIS 1[[ 2002 IIMD Self-Assessment RePOrt - Archival Material. 
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A continued recognition that it is the people of IMD that makes the difference. 
And you have to work on your ability to continue to be able to attract the base 
talent, to achieve those goals and successes, to perpetuate the successes of the 
past. , 
162 
According to the overall perspective of the interviewees, three main 
challenges clearly emerge in relation to WD's future: Faculty recruitment, 
IMD's business model and Peter Lorange's succession. 
We are living in a very dynamic, rapidly changing world. If you want to 
teach something, you have to be ahead of the game. You have to be a visionary, 
you have to anticipate and you have to spread knowledge. "So I think research 
again plays a key role. I think making sure that the partner companies in 
particular, and the associates that pay a lot of money for that privilege, get the 
value and continue to get what they are expecting from the School, and the 
recognition that all this can be done with the best brains.,, 163 
a) Faculty recruitment 
Attracting Faculty who are capable and committed both for excellence in 
teaching and top-quality research relevant for business has been a major 
challenge for MD. However, nowadays, given the extraordinary reputation it 
has achieved within the management education industry during the last years, 
162 Vito H. Baumgartner, former Chairman of the MM Foundation Board. 
163 Vito H. Baumgartner, former Chairman of the IMD Foundation Board. 
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INM has around "250 to 300 names per year to quickly look at. We decide to 
invite 25 and then, we give 10 offers. Last year we got 7 out of the 10.55164 
Recruitment is one of the School's major challenges, and therefore a 
major strategic priority. Some Faculty state that "to find the next generation of 
people to be in the School"165 is EMD's main challenge. 
There are two key aspects to Faculty recruitment: -one includes finding 
and attracting experienced individuals who increase the average quality of the 
Faculty, who are very good in teaching and who focus on business relevant 
research. 
A second aspect consists in recruiting people capable of having a sense of 
belonging to the School, and cohesiveness towards its Faculty, in order to lead 
IMD in the future, given its particular model which is uniquely different (no 
tenure, no titles and no academic departments, among other things). In this 
regard, the fact that IMD does not provide them with tenure, affects new 
candidates' careers. Since they are driven out of the traditional system, they 
must consider IMD not as a transitional Business School. Rather, they must 
have real interest in remaining there. 
b) Business model 
In visualising INM's future challenges, there are two critical issues: 
firstly, what are the growth boundaries for a Business School with its particular 
164 Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
165 Jan Kubes, IMD Faculty. 
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characteristics (i. e. one global meeting place with full-time Faculty, no 
departments, market-oriented, focused on executive education, etc. )? Secondly, 
will IMD's unique different business model (based on tuition and on the 
Learning Network's annuity that represents 10% of the revenues), be 
financially sustainable in the future? 
According to Lorange, BM should remain relatively small -a top 
quality 'boutique- style' institution, with top quality Faculty (not more than 65), 
heavy on research but practitioner-oriented, with no departments, emphasising 
teamwork and entrepreneurship, and in one place - 'the global meeting place'. 
"To remain entrepreneurial, dynamic [ ... ]. Not become a common place. Be 
custom-oriented. Output focused. Team oriented. [ ... ]I think this is one of the 
reasons why we cannot be bigger. , 
166 
However.. since he acknowledges that there might be other alternatives, 
Lorange suggests it is vital to keep re-examining EMD's 'business model'; to 
continue pushing for cutting-edge learning value creation in order to find new 
ideas (e. g. open another campus, set strategic alliances with other Business 
Schools, etc. ); the particular business model that will facilitate IIAD's enduring 
success. 
In this regard, Bala Chakravarthy questions the boundaries to this model 
of a stand-alone global meeting place. He affirms "The challenge always is 
going to be the institution is growing explosively. It is growing the 10-15%, 
166 Peter Lorange, IN4D President. 
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which basically means if you take ten years ago since now, it has changed 
dramatically. , 167 
c) Peter Lorange's Succession 
IMD has had an extraordinary development as a result of a team of 
Faculty and Staff led by an individual with a strong leadership style and an 
amazing ability to understand the business world. His clear entrepreneurial 
spirit, his consistent behaviour and his outstanding results have enabled him to 
build MD's reputation within the management education industry. 
Moreover, Peter Lorange's focused vision, clearly developed and 
strengthened over time, was supported by academic structures and systems of 
compensation, recruitment and workload. The careful alignment of IMD's 
culture, its structures and systems to its strategic direction, and the Dean's 
leadership style, made the School's success possible. 
In facing the prospect of Lorange's succession, the challenge that arises 
does not only rest on what Business School model EAD should have but also on 
what leadership model the School should adopt. In this regard, Bala 
Chakravarthy suggests, "Either modify our leadership model or get a leader. , 168 
In talking about his successor Peter Lorange asserts, "We have very 
clear guidelines here. We have a Faculty search committee, a search committee, 
which is three Faculty and three members of the Board, and they will fmd my 
167 Bala Chakravarthy, DvID Faculty. 
168 Bala Chakravarthy, IMD Faculty. 
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successor. I don't think I should be very active there. They will be given my 
inputs but I think that ifs a strong thing, that it's an institutional process, not 
me. 
6.6. Analytical tracing of different 'aspects' during INED's 
Consolidation and Success 
The study has described the significant change in EAD through the 
eleven years (1993-2004) of Peter Lorange's Deanship. A number of 
substantial breakthrough initiatives were set up and implemented, shaping the 
School's culture and strategy and creating a new identity that has positioned 
IMD among the top Business Schools in the world. 
Lorange combined actions and decisions that strongly impacted both the 
short- and the long-term policy of the School, and directed moves to restore 
MD's financial situation and consolidate the economic sustainability needed 
for it to become an independent institution. Moreover, Peter Lorange's activity 
in turning MD's inward culture into a customer- and marketdriven one, was 
crucial to reshape the School's academic model and identity, to position EAD 
as a top worldwide Business School. 
Over time, as the IMD's performance and reputation were 
strengthened, Peter Lorange shaped the School's agenda and transfonned it into 
"' Peter Lorange, IMD President. 
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a simple and highly focalised strategy so that it became a leading Business 
School, recognised as the "global meeting place for real world, real learning. " 
In terms of main generic interests prioritisation by each of the key 
actors (see the Appendix for Tables and Figures that show reliability coding), 
Peter Lorange developed an inclusive agenda where the legitimate interests and 
priorities of the other key actors were comprehended. Even though the Board's 
and the Dean's interests (the School's financial and economic performance) hit 
the top of the School's agenda, Lorange's broad academic and business 
approach fostered Faculty participation and involvement, which was a priority 
for them (collegial participation in key decisions). 
LT- 
Jluw and why did Peter Lorange gain support to set and execute his 
strategic initiatives? 
In understanding the SLP (strategic agenda-building and -executing) 
from a political perspective, the study intended to analyse the unfolding of 
events that fostered pribritisation of main generic interests by key actors (key 
actors' interpretation of issues and issue characteristics) and legitimisation 
(issue sponsorship, issue salience and agenda structure) - 
The following elements explained how and why Peter Lorange gained 
legitimisation for his leadership and prioritisation for his strategy: 
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In tenns of key actors, Peter Lorange was recognised as the top 
executive at IMD through his nomination as President of the School. Moreoverý 
a new Chairman of the Board was nominated with a non-executive role, thus 
the relationship between Board and School was managed by President Lorange. 
His pragmatic approach and ability to carry out continuous 
envirom-nental scanning enabled him to attain a clear understanding of the 
needs and priorities over time of the different stakeholders: market, corporate 
world, Faculty and Board. He combined this with a business perspective where 
economic sustainability has always been a key standpoint and driver for all 
strategic decisions. Moreover, simple, clear and focused characterised his 
preferences in terms of decisions. He also legitimated and consolidated his 
power base by asking the Faculty to make explicit their mandate and support, 
and thus the Faculty delegated power to him as WD President with a clear 
mandate. Within this new scenario the Faculty College lost its influence and 
disappeared from the scene, since it had become useless. 
On the other hand, Lorange gained power by legitimating his actions, 
taking advantage of the crisis scenario, his assertive style and his capacity in 
delivering early results. As a consequence his reputation, both internal and 
external, was consolidating because of his ability to lead an increasing and 
ongoing process of growth, profits and positioning of the School. 
Moreover, Peter Lorange's entrepreneurial character, his competence to 
understand corporate customer needs for management education and his 
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capacity to communicate them to the academic world, jointly with remarkable 
communication ability, shown in his dealings with Board, Faculty, Staff and 
corporate world, were critical in legitimating his leadership. 
Finally, his ability to involve different senior Faculty in the 
Management and Operating Committee at the beginning, and then rotating 
them periodically with new ones clearly contributed to the legitimisation of his 
decisions. 
In terms of features of the inner context Peter Lorange's leadership 
gained legitimisation over the period by: a) Minimising and simplifying 
academic structures and systems (no academic departments, no hierarchies, no 
titles, and no tenure); b) Setting a fair and flexible compensation system (buy- 
back, workload, bonus) and a highly competitive level, combined with clear 
and consistent guidelines for consulting and workload, that facilitated both a 
sense of partnership, and teamwork c) Faculty recruitment consistent with 
academic strategy; d) Increasing revenues and profits; e) Funding for research 
and infrastructure over time; f) Climate with high morale, satisfaction, 
optimism, openness because of favourable results; g) Culture built on 
teamwork, transparency, partnership, high academic standards, business 
relevance in teaching and research; h) Outstanding rankings position in the top 
tier of the premier league; i) Growth and consolidation of Learning Network 
model with the corporate world. 
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In terms of features of the outer context, changing economic conditions 
over the period of eleven years have demonstrated IMD's economic model to 
be solid and flexible. Finally, although the singularity of the model of this 
particular Business School awakens hesitations with regard to its academic 
profile and continuity beyond Peter Lorange, its main competitors have an 
increasing respect for IMD as a top world-class provider in executive 
education. 
Forfurther information see IMD Appendix VI 
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Chapter VI: INSEAD 
1. The study of the SLP at INSEAD over time (1990-2004) from a political 
perspective 
INSEAD is a major player in the international management education 
industry; one of the world's largest top-tier graduate Business Schools, with 
two comprehensive and fully-connected campuses in Europe (France) and Asia 
(Singapore). 
INSEAD was founded as a privately funded independent institution in 
Fontainebleau, France, in 1957. The Asia campus was created in Singapore in 
October 2000, to better serve INSEAD's regional and global partners. Both 
campuses are regional hubs in the School's emerging Global Learning 
Network. 170 
INSEAD was one of the first Business Schools to offer a one-year MBA 
programme. In addition to a large portfolio of Executive Development 
Programmes, both INSEAD campuses also offer the Executive MBA and PhD 
Programmes, together with an ambitious research agenda stimulated by 15 
research centres. 171 In this regard, it seems relevant to note that research at 
INSEAD follows the US academic model, and thus, it emphasises both 
business relevance and academic rigour. INSEAD is a professional school 
(AIM/EBK, 2006) characterised by high academic research standards and 
170 INSEAD Executive Education Brochure 2005, Archival material; www. insead. edu 
171 INSEAD Executive Education Brochure 2005, Archival material; www. insead. edu 
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scholarly impact. These qualities position INSEAD among the top global 
Business Schools. 
INSEAD's presence in Asia dates from 1975 and the creation of the 
Euro--Asia Centre, making it a pioneer in teaching and research related to 
management on that continent. Its long-term commitment to business education 
in the Asia-Pacific region, reinforced by the Singapore campus since 2000, 
enables the School to provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics of Asian 
business to western companies while exploring potential for expanding Asian 
companies. 
172 
Since May 2001, the INSEAD-Wharton Alliance has combined 
INSEAD's resources with those of the Wharton School, whose campuses in 
Philadelphia and San Francisco enable the Alliance to deliver business 
education and research across its Global Learning Network. 
173 
INSEAD has grown and developed major strengths in business 
disciplines, focusing on innovative teaching and learning methods. In giving the 
greatest possible relevance to its research and teaching, INSEAD emphasises 
the development of close partnerships with leading firms around the world. 
INSEAD provides a unique international leaming experience. 
Participants interact with Faculty and fellow students in an unparalleled 
multicultural environment, gaining essential insights into international business 
172 INSEAD Executive Education Brochure 2005, Archival material; www. insead. edu 
173 INSEAD Executive Education Brochure 2005, Archival material; www. insead. edu 
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practice. Currently, there are 144 Faculty representing 31 nationalities to teach 
900 MBA participants, 7,000 executives and 71 PhD candidates. 174 None of the 
90 nationalities represented in these programmes exceeds 10% of the total 
student/executive body. 
The School's ever-growing community of over 32.000 alumni 
I *ý worldwide 6-creates lifelong opportunities for professional development and 
networking. This global and multi-cultural perspective sets INSEAD apart in 
the field of international management education and research. 
As an educational institution, INSEAD's mission is to promote a non- 
dogmatic learning environment that brings together people, cultures and ideas 
from around the world to: develop responsible, thoughtful business leaders and 
entrepreneurs whose actions create value for their organisation and their 
communities; and to create and disseminate management knowledge that 
expands the frontiers of academic thought and informs business practice. 175 
INSEAD's espoused values make a claim for diversity as a source of 
learning and enrichment; independence as a governance principle; rigour and 
relevance in teaching and research; closeness to the international business 
community; and entrepreneurial spirit. 
In sum, three aspects distinguish INSEAD from other top-tier Business 
Schools: firstly, it is widely recognised as the world's most global Business 
174 INSEAD Executive Education Brochure 2005, Archival material; www. insead. edu 175 Executive Education Brochure (INSEAD company-specific programmes), Archival material 
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School. In this regard, INSEAD is the only top-tier School with totally 
integrated twin campuses in Asia and Europe (Singapore and Fontainebleau, 
France). Its alliance with the Wharton School creates additional opportunities in 
the US. Secondly, INSEAD is the only top-tier Business School to offer an 
intensive one-year MBA in international business administration, which is 
highly valued in the marketplace. Finally, INSEAD's multicultural diversity 
ensures that no one nationality, style or dogma dominates, either within Faculty 
or among students, resulting in a unique global management learning 
enviromnent. 
All this not only differentiates INSEAD from other top-tier Business 
Schools, but has also enabled the School to become a world-class institution. 
Thus, it seems particularly interesting to observe and understand how strategic 
leadership as a social influence process has shaped the strategic agenda- 
building and -executing, affecting the unfolding of events throughout 
INSEAD's growth, over time. Moreover, the particular scenario in which 
INSEAD has developed over time makes it of great interest to understand how 
key actors prioritise and legitimate their interests. 
Next, the study addresses the INSEAD case: the overview of its history, 
and the main events that enable us to visualise the strategic leadership process 
through the strategic agenda-building and -executing over the period 1990- 
2004. Accordingly, it will visualise how the SLP operates along the chosen 
strategic issue that will act as a vehicle for its operationalisation - Becoming a 
top international Business School. This strategic issue will be observed through 
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a set of initiatives or episode that has triggered decisions and actions aimed at 
achieving it. 
For this purpose, the period 1990-2004 was divided into three different 
periods (social dramas 176 ) according to turning points that have propelled 
important changes in the direction of the School (see Appendix): Period 1, Co- 
Deanship (Claude Rameau and Ludo Van der Heyden between 1990 and 1993, 
and Ludo Van der Heyden and Antonio Borges between 1993 and 1995); 
Period 2, Dean Antonio Borges between 1995 and 1999; and Period 3, Dean 
Gabriel Hawawini. The 'social dramas' at INSEAD were the points of 
leadership succession as the School changed from Dean to Dean. 
However, in observing the strategic issue - Becoming a top 
international Business School - that this study has chosen as a vehicle for the 
operationalisation of the SLP over time, four sets of initiatives have been 
highlighted. These emerged as redefinitions of directions previously set by 
Philippe Naert and Claude Rameau. during their co-Deanship between 1986 and 
1990. 
176 Pettigrew (1979) 
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Strategic Becoming a top international Business School 
issue 
Period 1990-1995 1995-1999 1999-2003 2004 
Set of Deepening the Launching a second Making Singapore Launching a third decisions and School's research campus work campus 
actions to strategy and profile 
promote I I I 
2. Overview of the history of INSEAD 
INSEAD was founded in 1957as a privately funded, independent 
European Business School, three months after the Treaty of Rome. Its founder, 
Georges Doriot, was a French-bom Harvard professor who wanted to provide 
cross-cultural business education and help rebuild the war-torn economies of 
Europe. He was a pioneer in management and teaching research who at the 
beginning of 1930 introduced into France the CPA case study method. 
The inspiration to build a global Business School in Europe first came to 
him during the war years. The reality of Doriot's world was the consequences of 
a cataclysmically destructive war that had little respect for borders, and where 
the tremendous challenge of reconstruction would require leaders of vision, 
infused with a spirit of entrepreneurship and able to navigate seamlessly across 
the boundaries of language and culture. He envisioned an institution that was as 
grand in its scope and as malleable in its programme as the changing world 
itself 
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Accordingly, Doriot wanted INSEAD to be a global institution rather 
than an American one, a Business School based in Europe but not exclusively 
for Europeans; although it would be based in France, it would intend to reach 
different cultures: a Business School for the world. Thus, from the very 
beginning, intemationalisation became INSEAD's essence, installed at the core 
of its existence. People agree that INSEAD's history is based on its 
international dimension. "It is what INSEAD is all about. [ ... ] This is our fate. 
,, 177 We have to be that. It's in our genes. In agreement with the Paris Chamber 
of Commerce, Doriot created INSEAD to be both international and 
independent. 
By 1957, the political drivers in favour of a European Business School 
were reinforced by economic forces. The national economies that had been 
badly shaken by the Second World War started to recover and demanded 
people trained in management and with an understanding of countries and 
languages. 
So the School became a success through its ability to attract excellent 
students. It was an exciting time. People believed in Europe's renaissance; 
Europe was just beginning to happen. There was a moment of strong economic 
growth so the context was very favourable and the School began attracting 
people who immediately obtained good jobs. In this sense, Antonio Borges, 
former INSEAD Dean remembers: "It became quite clear that the INSEAD 
programme attracted good students and those students had great opportunities, 
job opportunities. " 
177 Gabriel Hawawini, former INSEAD Dean 
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Very soon, INSEAD became the School to which everybody wanted to 
go. The INSEAD MBA turned out to be a magnet to attract high-quality views. 
Thusý INSEAD managed to innovate on the teaching side - e. g. bringing in 
people who had done PhDs in the US with the purpose of creating high-quality 
programmes with the latest ideas, developments and pedagogical models. For 
many years, the fundamental goal "was to attract great teachers and have great 
programmes. 9078 
During the 1970s the School introduced executive education and 
fostered Faculty relationships with companies. In this way, INSEAD 
established itself as a dominant product in the European management education 
industry. 
Thus, in 1975, under the leadership of Henry Claude de Bettignies, 
INSEAD started -to offer executive programmes in Asia, mainly Japan and 
South-Eastern countries. This was the beginning of a key strategic movement 
towards the region, including the creation of the Euro-Asian Centre in 1980, 
the seed for the INSEAD's campus in Singapore that would eventually be 
launched in the year 2000. 
By the mid-1980s, the scope and scale of INSEAD's activities had 
grown tremendously. The School had prospered as an international top 
teaching-oriented Business School - the leading institution of its kind in 
Europe, "179 characterised by an innovative and entrepreneurial spirit. 
178 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
179Letter from Claude Janssen to Board members, 26/5/86 (Barsoux, 2000: 175) 
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Two particular episodes marked this new-found respect for INSEAD. 
Firstly, in early 1984, INSEAD's main amphitheatre hosted the press 
conference about the European summit that took place at the Palace of 
Fontainebleau. The purpose of the summit was to agree on the calendar for 
creating a Single European Market 180 . During that occasion, Frangois 
Mitterrand presented the first European passport to the audience. Secondly, in 
May 1988, Fortune International magazine provided dramatic confirmation of 
these perceptions featuring Antonio Borges, head of the MBA programme, on 
its cover,, and hailing INSEAD as the top-ranked Business School in Europe. 181 
Both events (the summit and the cover of the magazine) marked a 
sweeping renewal of interest in INSEAD for anyone with a concern for Europe. 
INSEAD started to be recognised as "the School that virtually invented the 
concept of international business education [ ... ] the Rolls-Royce of European 
Business Schools". 182 Thus far, INSEAD was perceived to be the number one 
Business School in Europe both within the School and by the management 
education industry. 
However, as Europe swept away economic barriers on its march 
towards 1992, companies turned increasingly to managers unfazed by linguistic 
and cultural boundaries. 183 Thus, they demanded that Business Schools 
transform themselves into centres of scholarship that would attract the best and 
brightest professors and programme participants. 
180 It was during this summit that the date of 1992 was established; the official announcement of 
the accord was made in the School (Barsoux, 2000) 
181 Barsoux (2000) 
182 Fortune International, 'Europes's best Business Schools', 23/5/88 (Barsoux, 2000: 175) 
183 Fortune international, 'Europe's best Business Schools', 23/5/88 (Barsoux, 2000: 175) 
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In this vein, by the end of the decade, INSEAD was emphasising the 
recruitment of Faculty that had excellent evaluation in terms of research 
performance. This shift enabled the School to bring "a new wave of more 
, 5184 academic oriented people that provided a lot of renewal . 
During the 1990s, the development of technology, with the appearance 
of the Internet triggering a revolution in communications, fostered INSEAD's 
adjustment to environmental trends. Thus, towards the end of the decade, with 
the intention of remaining loyal towards its international destiny, the world 
witnessed INSEAD's decision to stay on as a top international and multi- 
cultural Business School. "This is one of the main reasons why we also went to 
Asia. "185 In 2000, the second campus, in Singapore, was launched. 
To sum up, in four decades, INSEAD has been able to reach the world- 
class top tier group of Business Schools; shifting "from an entrepreneurial 
venture to an internationally regarded institution. 086 
3. Strategic Leadership Process at INSEAD: Period 1990-1995. 
Co-Deanships: Claude Rameau - Ludo Van der Heyden 
Antonio Borges - Ludo Van der Heyden 
1. Background 
Towards the 1980s, the School began to shift from being a successful 
educational institution to a more powerful academic research-oriented 
184Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
185 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
186 Barsoux, 2000: 3 
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organisation. It was during this decade that the idea of not only requiring very 
good teachers and credibility with companies, but also the ability to generate 
research and to compete on the research front with the American Schools, 
became a priority. 
During the end of the decade, Claude Rameau and Philippe Naert were 
INSEAD's co-Deans (1986-1990). It was Rameau's second period. He was an 
entrepreneurial businessman who reinforced the School's executive orientation 
and got INSEAD "to establish a very strong and effective economic model. , 187 
Rameau understood the particular phase INSEAD was undergoing: 
unless its Faculty got serious about research, it would find itself obsolete. 
Consequently, transforming INSEAD so that it would be recognised as one of 
the world's top five Business Schools implied having critical mass: in terms of 
. Faculty size, in terms of research, and in terms of the volume of the service 
proposed. 
As for Naert, he was an academic with considerable experience, 
especially in research. In this regard, he argued for INSEAD's responsibility to 
innovate and to assert leadership in the creation of new concepts and ideas that 
contributed forcefully to thinking and knowledge in the particular European 
environment in which it operated. 188 As the School matured, it became more 
and more important to produce knowledge as well as to disseminate it. Thus, 
187 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
188 Minutes of the Board Meeting, 18/3/88 (Barsoux, 2000: 179 - 180) 
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Naert's main thrust was to secure a better balance between "the transfer of 
knowledge (teaching) and the production of knowledge (research)". 189 
Naert had an uncluttered view of what needed to be done to hoist the 
School into the very top tier. In his presentation to the Board in March 1986, he 
exposed what he saw as INSEAD's lingering weaknesses: the inadequacy of 
research per capita and the weak image in the 'academic community'. 
Accordingly, he proposed to increase the size of the pennanent Faculty body by 
about 50% and to create a doctoral programme. 190 
In this regard, some people assert, "If we wanted to be the top Business 
School in the world, we needed a PhD. "191 Moreover, after having hired so 
many PhDs from foreign universities, there was a feeling that the School should 
r4reciprocate" that and create PhDs that would teach all over the world. Thus, 
INSEAD launched the PhD programme "to become better as an Academic 
Institution. 
Accordingly, Henri-Claude de Bettignies, one of the earliest Faculty 
members of INSEAD who devoted himself to creating a position in Asia and 
later on founded the Euro--Asia Centre, agrees that launching the PhD 
programme had a strong impact on the Business School because "it was an 
attractive dimension for Faculty recruitment; it had a great impact on the 
research outputs; and it would enhance the visibility. " 
"' Financial Times, 9/11/87 (Barsoux, 2000: 179) 
190 Minutes of the Board Meeting, 10/3/86 (Barsoux, 2000) 
191 Claude Janssen, former Chairman of the INSEAD Board 
192 Claude Janssen, former Chairman of the INSEAD Board 
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Towards the end of 1980s and after several obstacles had been 
overcome, INSEAD had launched its doctoral programme, the Euro-Asia 
centre, numerous new executive programmes, a mass of cases and working 
papers, and 34 new PhD professors had been recruited, to bring the total up to 
79 in September 1990.193 These facts were the result of Naert's main legacy to 
the INSEAD community: the importance of developing research capacities and 
abilities and "how to recruit in a very, very systematic manner. "' 94 
It seems relevant to highlight Claude Janssen's key role as Chairman of 
the INSEAD Board, in facilitating every strategic decision during these years. 
Janssen, had been very involved with INSEAD since its foundation thus, he 
knew the School very well and considered his role as a 'bridge' between the 
Dean and the Board. Accordingly, if he was comfortable with the strategy, then, 
he took it upon himself, to sell the idea to the Board. 
In talking about the role of the Chairman of the INSEAD Board, Ludo 
Van der Heyden agrees Claude Janssen "was excellent Chairman because he 
was always looking at us but he was never making decisions. He would sort of 
say, 'Look, this is not very good. You have to pay attention to this. ' But he was 
quite, the Governance relationship was a very healthy one, at a close attention, 
'You come and see me every month, you tell me, we discuss and I'll back you 
up. But you have to tell me everything new. I don't want to discover it. "' 
'9' Minutes of the Board Meeting, 9/3/90 (Barsoux, 2000: 187) 
194 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
273 
12. Co-Deanship: Claude Rameau - Ludo Van der Heyden (1990 - 
1993) 
In 1990, Ludo Van der Heyden, former head of R&D, took over from 
Philippe Naert as the new co-Dean, alongside Claude Rameau. 
The co-Deans had to handle INSEAD's three dimensions: an academic 
dimension, a managerial and business dimension, and a multi culture 
dimension. Two complementary people, sufficiently different from each other, 
were thought to be able to reinforce INSEAD's development, since one 
individual could not cover all the qualities that were required. One would play 
the Director General's role and the other, the Faculty Dean's. 
Thus, both Rameau and Van der Heyden constituted INSEAD's co- 
Deanship during the period 1990-1993. Claude Rameau was the business man 
who had been part of thefounders of INSEAD. He was a former academic with 
an INSEAD NMA, and also a consultant. He loved the School but he was not 
really an academic. In addressing their different styles, Van der Heyden recalls, 
"the Faculty looked at me as their representative in the management, and the 
business people looked at Claude Rameau. He managed the external side. , 195 
While Rameau. was in charge of the executive business affairs, Van der 
Heyden was really an academic who had very little business experience. He had 
the task of making sure that the PhD programme and the new professors 
195 Ludo Van der Heyden, former INSEAD co-Dean 
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became successful. He aimed at generating a "model of synergy"' 96 ;a good 
mixture of relevance, rigour and revelation. 197 
However, as soon as he was appointed, INSEAD had to face both 
internal and external challenges. As for the internal, the arrival of new 
professors created two different groups within the Faculty. This triggered a 
situation "a bit difficult to manage. "' 98 
With regard to the external enviromnent, the Gulf War crisis broke out, 
and produced a worldwide recession which affected INSEAD through its 
impact on the business industry: tailor-made programmes were cancelled or 
postponed; several on-going pledges were cut back; executive programmes 
suffered too; and there was a significant drop in applications and admissions for 
the MBA programme. As a result, revenues were reduced to the extent that they 
produced the first. deficit in accounting results for over a decade. 199 
Accordingly, Ludo Van der Heyden recalls, "The first Irak War which 
was 911,1 think, all the Americans started to stop travelling, and we immediately 
lost revenues, so we were in the red. But in addition [Rameau] was managing 
executive education and our executive education Dean had mismanaged the 
budget or his Staff mismanaged the budget by close to a million euros. So, you 
know,, the two together, created two million euros of deficit and we had to go to 
the Board with a deficit for our first time. And we knew that the Board would 
196 Ludo Van der Heyden, former INSEAD co-Dean 
197 Barsoux, 2000 
198 Minutes of the Board Meeting, 9/3/90, (Barsoux, 2000: 187) 
199 Minutes of the Board Meeting, 6/3/92 (Barsoux, 2000) 
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let us run the School as long as there was no deficit so we were in trouble. And 
then, out of that point I said, 'Look, I'm willing to assume mistakes that I'd 
checked. It's very hard to assume mistakes that you are not responsible for. ' So 
then we started to co-manage. I said, 'Claude, we need to make decisions 
together; you can't just do your take on your own. [ ... I So we started to behave 
more collegially, and I think we had a good time. " 
The situation worsened over the following years. The drop in market 
demand was accentuated by heightened competition in the management 
education sector, forcing the market to become tighter. Such critical scenario 
affected INSEAD's research budgets and teaching loads. In addition, Faculty 
compensation fell once again, and hindered INSEAD from being a particular 
attractive proposition for "top-flight , 200 academics. 
Accordingly, the recession provided a forceful reminder of the School's 
lingering financial vulnerability. INSEAD had gone through a period of strong 
growth and its on-going development called for the need for raising funds. In 
this regard, Claude Rameau recalls, "We wanted to have more, more Faculty 
because we were stretched in terms of Faculty. So we agreed [ ... ] that a fast 
growth of Faculty would be impossible without new type of financing. " 
However, many members of the School's Faculty and Board showed 
hesitation about getting drawn into fundraising activities. Rameau remembers 
"I convinced the Board that a capital campaign was the only possibility for 
200 Barsoux, 2000: 193 
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really having a push for Faculty recruitment. But we could not do that only 
through more executive education. It was too small and too low. " 
In March 1992, the Board agreed to launch a feasibility study, which 
one year later proved optimistic initial findings. Supporters of the School 
interviewed by the consultants confirmed that they would back a very 
ambitious campaign provided that INSEAD could present a clear and 
201 
convincing development project . In this regard, Rameau recalls, "the 
feasibility study was very positive for launching the capital campaign. " 
In September 1993, the Wall Street Journal rankings rated INSEAD's 
Advanced Management Programme, first in its survey of executive education 
worldwide. In addition, research centres were developed, and their outputs were 
immediately transferred to the classrooms. 
3.3. Co-Deanship: Antonio Borges - Ludo Van der Heyden (1993 - 
1995) 
By 1993, Rameau's tenure had come to an end and Antonio Borges, 
fonner Associate Dean of the MBA, was appointed co-Dean in his place, 
alongside Van der Heyden. Even though the two men respected each other and 
agreed on where the School should be heading, their styles were not 
complementary. Borges had spent three years away from academia, as deputy 
governor of the Bank of Portugal. He was forceful and determined, while Van 
20'Barsoux, 2000 
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der Heyden who had always been an academic, was more questioning and 
,, 202 consensual, and always positioned himself as a "primus inter pares. 
Borges arrived at INSEAD in a climate of financial crisis not entirely 
attributable to the recession but to the bad habits that the School had developed 
and to its overrun expenditure budgets. However, such a critical scenario 
enabled him to generate a sense of urgency which facilitated the necessary 
changes. In this regard, there were freezes on Staff salaries, a slowdown on 
investments, tightened cost control and a block on recruitment. Job 
restructuring drove a head-count reduction of 18 positions within the Staff203 
Single or dual Deanship structure? 
Borges was expected to do the external work and Van der Heyden, the 
:h "204 intemal. However, it mostly "turned out to be the reverse. While the 
previous co-Deanship had combined a business man and an academic, the 
current one didn't. 
Thus, the lack of complementary roles between Borges and Van der 
Heyden fuelled their difficulties in making the co-Deanship work. In this 
regard, Van der Heyden recalls, "There was something very clever about the 
co-Deanships, which was the checks and balances-we kept talking to each 
other. [Claude Rameau] was a business man, I was an academic. And Antonio 
202 Barsoux, 2000: 201 
203 Nfinutes of the Board Meeting, 2/12/94 (Barsoux, 2000) 
204 Barsoux, 2000: 200 
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Borges was an academic and I was an academic. [ ... ] And somehow we didn't 
produce a good team. " 
The main virtue of the co-Deanship structure was held to be that the two 
members had more time and energy to devote to a very demanding task. "The 
dual structure was bringing some common sense at the top, because you have 2 
different view points. ), 
205 
Some people saw it as integral part of the School's delicate balance of 
interests and constituencies; the embodiment of a collegial style of decision- 
making. "What's very good about this system is you see, because it was a 
collegial structure, no decision could be made until both agreed. , 
206 
Others thought it was inefficient, ineffective and a contributor to the 
current financial difficulties; a luxury that the School had only been able to 
afford in more prosperous time. "The benefit of the single Dean structure was 
rapid decisions making, speaking of a single voice. , 
207 
In this regard, some Faculty felt "a bit tired of the double Deanship. We 
all found that the disadvantages now, over took the advantages of having two 
people that are co responsible and can share the tasks. The disadvantages of the 
potential quarrels, the potential conflicts, I mean, we saw them growing and I 
205 Ludo Van der Heyden, former INSEAD co-Dean 
206 Ludo Van der Heyden, former INSEAD co-Dean 
207 Ludo Van der Heyden, former INSEAD co-Dean 
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think that quite a few people at the Faculty said, "It's time to go to go to a more 
traditional structure with one person in charge. ýý208 
However, even though there was a sense of mistrust towards such model 
due to delays in decision-making, ambiguous responsibilities and lines of 
authority, 209 there was also a lot of concern that a single Dean would have too 
much power. 
Thus, when Van der Heyden's co-Deanship term came to an end, he 
made it very clear that he would not be re-elected for a second time, whereas at 
the same time, Borges stated, "If you want me to continue I want to be single 
Dean. " It was at this point when some Faculty members said, "It's time to go to 
a more traditional structure with one person in charge. " 
In this regard, facts started to push the School in favour of a single 
Dean. Among these, there was a sense of declining Faculty morale that needed 
to be addressed urgently by installing a Dean of Faculty that devoted full 
attention to issues of Faculty management such as recruitment, promotion, and 
compensation systems, among others. 
Given that the INSEAD Faculty strongly supported the decision to 
change structure, Antonio Borges was appointed Dean in 1995. 
208 Arnould de Meyer, former Dean of the INSEAD Asian campus 
209 Barsoux, 2000 
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1 4. Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during the period 1990 - 
1995: "deepening the School's research strategy and profile to compete with 
top Business Schools". 
Driven by the interest to compete with top US Business Schools, several 
initiatives were raised to the strategic agenda over this five-year period (1990 - 
1995). The study focused on the following three: firstly, making the PhD 
Programme successful; secondly, recruiting and integrating new Faculty with 
strong research background and developing INSEAD's research activities; and 
finally, facing the School's financial crisis (1991 - 1994) and improving 
INSEAD's economic model to enhance its sustainability by launching a Capital 
Campaign. 
In summary, co-Deans recognised that for INSEAD to become a top 
Business School in the international market, it needed to reach an academic 
standard comparable with top US Business Schools, not only in teaching, but 
also in research. To achieve this, the School got involved in an aggressive 
strategy of hiring faculty with strong research skills, as well as the PhD 
programme initiative which had been launched in 1990. 
However, INSEAD's economic model remained dependant on revenues 
from teaching activities. Moreover, due to the Gulf War in 1991, the difficult 
economic context impacted dramatically on the management industry, reducing 
the demand for INSEAD's executive education. Consequently, INSEAD's 
operating budget showed deficit. Thus, key actors agreed about the need to look 
281 
for new income sources to strengthen the School's economic model. In this 
regard, a development campaign was launched to raise funds for INSEAD's 
academic purposes. 
3.4.1. Critical elements for the new vision to succeed. 
In observing the episode related to the purpose of deepening INSEAD's 
research profile and strategy during the period 1990 - 1995, the study suggests 
it consisted of a successful breakthrough initiative since it implied a tuming 
point in terms of the School's strategic direction, resource allocation and 
organisational capabilities, culture, systems and structure. 
The two co-Deans, Ludo Van der Heyden and Antonio Borges, 
sponsored this breakthrough set of initiatives. The succession of Philippe Naert 
by Ludo Van der Heyden aimed at continuing to strengthen INSEAD's research 
strategy, competences and capabilities. During his co-Deanship with Claude 
Rameau, Van der Heyden was oriented towards the consolidation of the PhD 
Programme and promoting Faculty with a research profile. 
3.4.2. Legitimisation and Power mobilisation 
Legitimisation of the initiative to improve INSEAD's research 
capabilities (launching and consolidating the PhD programme, hiring Faculty 
with stronger research background, etc. ) was based mainly on the vision of the 
co-Deans (P. Naert, Claude Rameau, Ludo Van der Heyden and Antonio 
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Borges) rather than on the demands of corporate management education 
market. Thus, issue-sponsorship was the key driver in encouraging and 
legitimating this strategic issue that critically influenced INSEAD's nature. 
Both Co-Deans and particularly, Antonio Borges, carried out a smart 
"issue selling" process to make the Faculty understand and share these 
initiatives, underlying their relevance in reaching INSEAD's international 
strategy and success in order to be consolidate as a world top Business School. 
Borges displayed an effective communication and coalition-building 
activity to get support for the initiatives. He appealed to both Faculty and 
Board's interests in order to make them understand that those initiatives he 
promoted were strongly related to INSEAD's entrepreneurial and international 
culture. 
To do so, he appealed to the INSEAD community's background- 
strongly entrepreneurial- and focused on the need to launch a capital campaign 
aimed at achieving the economic resources that would finance the School's 
research activities. He counted on Claude Janssen's (Chairman of the Board) 
support, an entrepreneurial and risk-taking business man who facilitated Borges 
to attain the Board's approval. 
Borges introduced such initiatives as sequential steps towards the 
evolution of INSEAD's vision according to the School's strategic agenda 
previously set by Rameau and Naert. The study observed that those features of 
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the outer context that legitimated this first episode were corporate customers' 
demands, donors and benefactors, and competition; whereas performance was 
a legitimating feature of the inner context. As for those features delegitimating 
the study found climate, culture, and systems (inner context). 
In mobilising power to legitimate the initiatives, Borges listens to other 
people, builds coalitions to overcome opposition and articulates the initiatives 
with the School's vision and strategy. He builds coalitions with other people, 
uses rational and assertive arguments, and is decisive in carrying out strategic 
directions. 
Forfurther analysis see INSEAD Appendix IV 
4. Period 1995-2000: Antonio Borges 
When Antonio Borges became Dean, his immediate concern was to 
restore the School's financial and economic situation. "We had lost a lot of 
money in the previous years. There was a big recession in Europe, and in the 
US. We were very sensitive to market fluctuations and we had lost a lot of 
money. So my immediate concern was to recover balance and not be worried 
about the budget. Second, was to reemphasise the research, dimension the 
academic seriousness. And I started with evaluation process (and that was very 
tough) of Faculty. And third, was more an opportunity that we had, which was 
Asia. Asia was doing very well. 'Let's see how much we, now that we're facing 
a big recession in Europe and in the US, maybe Asia is our opportunity. ' And 
we focused very, very much on Asia. And then, the fmal element of this vision 
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was the fundraising-the creation of an endowment and raising funds 
essentially for academic purposes. [... ] The model of School that we had at that 
time was 'We have to have US standards, but we have to be very different from 
the US Schools. The standards, the quality of the Faculty, of the research, of the 
publication, have to be as high as in the US, but if we just become another US 
School, we loose our differentiation. So we want to be a lot more international, 
a lot more diverse, a lot more multi-country and so forth all the American 
Schools, which is one of the main reasons why we also went to Asia. , 
210 
Thus, as soon as he had become INSEAD's single Dean, Antonio 
Borges was clear about his strategic vision and priorities: firstly, to reinforce 
the School's economic sustainability so that the School's financial situation 
would be restored; secondly, to launch the development campaign so that funds 
would be raised for academic purposes and high research standards would be 
achieved; and finally, to reach INSEAD's differentiation. 
As former head of the M[BA programme, Borges was familiar with the 
inner workings of the School thus, he clearly understood how it worked and 
which levers to pull: setting such strong academic course at INSEAD required 
the full support of both the Board and the Faculty. 
Changing the orientation of the School was a difficult task. "Borges 
took a textbook approach: renewing the people, aligning the systems and 
processes; using the full gamut of rewards and penalties at his disposal to 
210 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
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support the strategy.,, 211 Thus, he appointed a strong team capable of 
implementing the policies that he had in mind. 
Two new associate Deanships were created to unburden the single Dean 
of excessive responsibilitieS212 : the Dean of Faculty (Hubert Gatignon) and the 
Dean of External Development (Gabriel Hawawini). In evoking this, Borges 
recalls, "The concern of the Faculty was that with one Dean, the one Dean 
would have too much power. So the governance model was very, very seriously 
discussed, and the final decision was 'Ok, we accept one Dean but we want to 
reduce his powers so we are going to create a Faculty Dean, an Associate Dean 
of Faculty with enormous importance. "' Thus, Hubert Gatignon became 
INSEAD's first Dean of Faculty. He was proposed by the Faculty and then 
confirmed by the Dean. Very quickly, he became Borges' best ally since "he 
,, 213 wanted to do exactly the same things that I wanted to do. 
Borges started out by addressing the academic level of activity. He 
advised the Board that "if each professor were to teach only the contractual 
number of sessions, [INSEAD] would need up to 50 % more Faculty 
members. , 
214 Moreover, INSEAD's current level of activity was undermining 
the School's ability to invest in academic renewal. In this regard, even though 
the School had attracted 35 new professors between 1990 and 1995,28 had 
departed. 215 
21 1 Barsoux (2000: 205) 
212 Barsoux, 2000 
213 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
214 Minutes of the Board Meeting, 8/12/95 (Barsoux, 2000) 
215 Board meeting, 22/3/96 (Barsoux, 2000) 
286 
Thus, Borges focused on recruiting, fostering the Faculty growth at a 
steady rate of 13% per year during his tenure. To help attract and retain a 
research-oriented Faculty, a number of systems and incentives were introduced 
or changed. In this regard, Martin Gargiulo, current INSEAD Faculty, asserts, 
"INSEAD Faculty perceived that it was only through research that tenure could 
be achieved. This was driven to the extent that Antonio said to the Faculty, 'Do 
not over invest in teaching, "' 
Accordingly, those 12 new professors who joined the INSEAD Faculty 
by June 1996, were given reduced teaching loads, two bonuses known as 'fifth 
day buyback' and 'summer support', jointly representing a 40% increase in 
base pay for those willing to use their discretionary time to do research rather 
than outside consulting. In addition, they were helped with relocation costs, and 
their spouses were assisted to fmd suitable jobs. 
Existing Faculty also received incentives: chairs, professorships, 
research support for programme directors and a strong programme of 
sabbaticals. Hence, not only additional teaching was compensated but also 
research. In this regard, Borges remembers "There was for the first time, 
significant differentiation in salaries depending on how people were doing on 
the research side. " The Associate Dean of Faculty assessed the research 
performance of each Faculty member in terms of "Not only the research output 
but also the research input, the whole effort. In terms of papers, which ones had 
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more impact and more reputation. People that got involved in conferences, 
seminars, people that got prices, academic prices. , 216 
As a result, as new people came in, the process was reinforced since 
those new recruits had the same tendency. The PhD programme had a very big 
grow and the School devoted a lot of resources. "For example, a very important 
point was the peer pressure. If you are in Buenos Aires and Pilar, you are 
working on your own and thousands of km away from Harvard or Stanford or 
LBS; but if you are permanently visiting them, if you are constantly interacting 
,, 217 with them, you feel the pressure all the time. So INSEAD allocated 
resources into funding Sabbaticals, conferences and seminars, "Telling people, 
'if you, if you are working on a paper with somebody in Chicago, here is the 
money to spend six months in Chicago; and here's the money to invite people 
to come from the best universities to come and stay at INSEAD' because that 
created the peer pressure. , 
218 
Thus, it was Hubert Gatignon who facilitated setting INSEAD's 
direction in place, reinforcing the processes behind Faculty recruitment, 
evaluation, and compensation. "It was Antonio that drove us really into the 
research direction. He really made it clear it was important that we became 
research-oriented. )921 9 He introduced a significant change in the direction 
towards more serious academic standards. Borges recalls, "Instead of 
216 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
217 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
218 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
219 Arnould de Meyer, former Dean of the INSEAD Singapore campus 
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compensating only for additional teaching, we gave pretty substantial bonuses 
to the good researchers, to people who had a strong record in research. " 
But there was part of the Faculty who did not agree with the School's 
new strategic direction and with the new systems and processes that were being 
aligned with it. In this regard, Arnould de Meyer remembers that in arguing 
about these new systems, 'teaching-oriented Faculty' charged those 'research- 
oriented', "You are researching and you are paid all the money that I earn as a 
teacher. " 
However, Borges felt that thus far, the system had been absolutely 
unfair towards those research oriented Faculty. He recalls, "I had to prove very 
carefully (this is a very important point) that the system was absolutely fair and 
that I was correcting an unfairness because those who taught more got more 
money. Those who did not teach more but did more research, did not get 
anything so we had to, those who did more research had to get more money 
because that compensates for those who get more because they teach more. So 
this was perceived as matter of faimess and it was also perceived as, I 
communicated, insisted very much that this was also a matter of freedom. You 
know, some people choose to do teaching, fine. They do teach, they get more 
money if they teach more than their load. Others choose to do research; they get 
more money for doing research. This is a matter of freedom. " 
Given the complexity of the economic situation during the years 1992 
and 1993, Borges decided to deepen INSEAD's research orientation. However, 
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in order to carry out the needed changes in the systems of Faculty 
compensation and promotion, it seemed crucial to launch a development 
campaign to raise funds for academic purposes. 
1. Launching the capital campaign 
Borges felt INSEAD should achieve significant higher quality and 
quantity of academic research output by recruiting more Faculty members with 
solid research agendas and putting more emphasis on the PhD programme 
launched in 1989. Given that the School would need financial assistance to 
fulfil this purpose, he made the fandraising campaign a top priority. 220 
Thus, INSEAD's capital campaign (which had been started in 1993) 
was officially launched in September, 1995. A grand affair took place in the 
courtyard of the palace before 350 guests. Several early benefactors spoke to 
the audience to affirm their faith in the School. Borges revealed the target 
figure of 700 million francs, and explained that INSEAD's future depended on 
its capacity to contribute to the production of new ideas in management, not 
just to disseminate existing knowledge. "This campaign is not only about 
resources and about capital. In many ways, it is also the ultimate market test for 
INSEAD ... Nobody will support something they 
don't believe in. nobody will 
continue funding INSEAD unless we are doing the right things. , 
221 
220Garg (2003) 
221 The INSEAD Campaign Launch, INSEAD video, 30/9/95 (Barsoux, 2000: 203) 
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Assembling the nucleus fund prior to officially launching it took longer 
than expected. The prevailing attitude in Europe towards donating money to 
Business Schools remained highly ambivalent. Thus, the campaign had been 
carefully prepared in order to prevent the School from making any mistake. "It 
was a whole apprenticeship for INSEAD. ýý222 
However, the delay proved helpful in some respects. For example, it 
facilitated Van der Heyden spending much time in interviewing each Faculty 
member individually in order to establish a list of the research projects they had 
in mind. This helped to bring them round to the idea and neutralise their 
opposition towards the campaign. 
By 1998, two years before the campaign ended, INSEAD had raised 
60% of the amount (i. e. E 60 million). Thus, Antonio Borges appointed Gabriel 
Hawawini, who was in charge of the Finance Department, Dean for 
DeveloPment. "[1 was] asked to come in to help. Two more years left to the 
campaign, and we had raised only 60% of the amount. And Antonio said, 
"We're never going to make this. Two more years left to raise 40 million. , 223 
Hawawini accepted and was appointed Dean of Development. He recalls, "I 
started in '98,6 months to get everybody to work together because there was a 
mess internally, and then the stock market went to the roof All we had to do is 
go and ask for money. And we raised in 2 years, because we did more that 100, 
we did 120. We raised 60 million in 20 months. " 
222 Barsoux (2000: 202) 
223 Gabriel Hawawini, former INSEAD Dean 
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The process engaged quickly and had a rapid impact on the School. It 
encouraged closer and more regular interaction between the Dean and the 
Board (particularly, with its Chairman), the Board and the Faculty and between 
the Dean and the alumni. The Dean's job became much more externally 
oriented. 
Moreover, the campaign also had a significant impact on the 
composition of the Board. In 1994, six of the 24 members were alumni. By 
1998, the number had climbed to ten. This progressive renewal of the Board 
driven by the campaign also changed its fimctioning. The fact that most Board 
members had made a financial and educational investment in the School made 
them feel more involved. Thus, they expected to receive detailed information 
before Board meetings and to participate fully in the decisions regarding the 
School's development. As a result, the Claude Janssen (Chairman of the Board 
at that moment) and the Antonio Borges had to invest more time in explaining 
and influencing Board members about the advantage of each particular 
initiative. 
As for the Chairman of INSEAD's Board, Claude Janssen played a key 
role during the campaign, always on hand to advice and support Borges. He 
refused to meddle with the internal running of the School. Rather, he took an 
active involvement in the external affairs devoting time and energy in 
persuading the business industry about the convenience of financially 
supporting the School. 
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To sum up, INSEAD's first development campaign (1993 - 2000) 
achieved E120 million in corporate and private sponsorship. The success of 
such an ambitious campaign substantiated the School's credibility with the 
business community, generating not only funds and visibility, but also 
commitment. Those who made financial contributions became keen supporters 
of the School's vision. 
4.2. Reinforcing the Faculty Evaluation Committee 
Thus, Borges was committed to reinforce the shift that INSEAD had 
undertaken during the foregoing period when the School aimed at becoming a 
top-league Business School, becoming an academic research-oriented place. In 
this regard, he recalls, "The point that I made was that the reputation of 
INSEAD is crucial for the success of the teaching. And the reputation is given 
by those who produce the best research. That was the point of view. " 
Hence, Borges understood that not only high level teachers and 
outstanding credibility with companies were required but also the ability to 
generate research and to compete on the research front with the American 
Schools. "That of course was a challenge-number 1 because the competition 
was very tough but also because there was always a concern and a serious 
concern that by focusing on academic objectives and particular on research 
specially theoretical research, INSEAD would loose its ability to work close to 
the companies; that the academics that were the best researchers very often 
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were people that companies did not want to talk to. And this concern existed all 
the time. -, 224 
Moreover, there was also to certain extent, another concern that great 
researchers might not necessarily be great teachers, and therefore the model of 
the School which was based on high-quality teaching, would be jeopardised. 
However, the School had already proven on the '80s and '90s that this was not 
incompatible; that INSEAD could have extremely high-quality researchers who 
were credible with corporations, who could also develop strong links with 
companies that supported the School's direction, and at the same time, were 
excellent teachers. 
However, even though some members of the Faculty agreed with 
INSEAD's shift towards a more academic inclination, others wanted a more 
business oriented kind of profile. In this regard, Borges reinforced the Faculty 
Evaluation Committee. He asserts this process "was extremely interesting, 
influential and credible because it was driven by the Faculty. The evaluation 
committee was elective, at least half of it was elective the other half was 
nominated by the Dean. The Faculty determined some guidelines, some criteria 
for evaluation and then the committee deliberated very seriously investing a lot 
of time in the process, got outside input, and made the recommendation to the 
Dean. And the Dean then decided. Of course the Dean could reverse the 
recommendation of the committee but every time they reversed it, it was 
painful in particular for the people concerned because or that meant that they 
224 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
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were all going to be promoted or kept the Faculty by the favour of the Dean not 
by the respect of their colleagues and that was always a sting in their CV. So 
this process became a very powerful instrument. " 
During Borges' tenure, this process which had been installed during the 
foregoing periods was very seriously toughened: the Dean would nominate very 
serious and credible academics for the committee. The Faculty would elect 
three and the Dean would nominate another three. There was a very strong 
reliance on external referees. To get recruited or promoted or to be kept in, the 
Faculty had to get a lot of support from the outside and from the peers 
throughout the world, and according to Borges, "there was no hesitation in 
removing people or not promoting people, even though they were old timers, 
even though they were very good teachers, even though the School needed 
them badly but simply because they were not good enough on the research 
front. " 
Thus, the reinforcement of the process of evaluation became a lot 
tougher but at the same time, extremely legitimate-nobody could argue 
against it because it was the judgement of the profession. It was not some 
arbitrary judgement for any Dean or any Director General; "it was the 
profession exercising its judgment on the candidates. " 
4.3. Launching the Asian campus 
Background 
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Driven by the vision of Professor Henri-Claude de Bettignies, 
INSEAU's relationship with Asia began in the 1970s. He believed in the 
emerging importance of Asia, the critical value of developing a better 
understanding between the European and Asian businesses, and in the 
opportunity represented by Asia's unexploited markets. 225 Thus, he convinced 
INSEAD's Board to create a special structure called the Euro-Asian Centre, 
which was formed as a non-profit club of corporations with its own budget, 
reporting procedures, Board of Directors, and a Director General who was an 
INSEAD Faculty member. 
In this regard, de Bettignies recalls, "I saw that Europe was very 
ignorant about Asia and I tried to convince the institution to hold, organise and 
develop an agenda, a research agenda; and to try to promote a bit of 
understanding of what was happening in Japan and Asia. And eventually, to 
make the story short, develop into something which was called the Euro-Asia 
activities starting in 1974 and then, through some pressure of my part, I was 
given the possibility to develop the Euro-Asian Centre, which was opened in, or 
created in, 1980. And then, in 1985 1 put up a new building called the Euro- 
Asian Centre building which is where we are today. " 
The Euro-Asian Centre was designed to build a base of knowledge to 
enhance the ability of European and Asian businesses to work together through 
research, public and company- specific executive programmes, publications and 
annual forums. Faculty trips fmanced by INSEAD were also organised to 
225 Garg (2003) 
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enlighten the Faculty on activities in the region and further develop their 
interest. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, an Asian economic crisis impacted the 
centre. "It was very small. And they were going to shut it down. , 226 Thus, 
Gabriel Hawawini was appointed Director of the Euro-Asian Centre in 1988, 
and remained in that position until 1995. He remembers,, "The demand was 
very weak. I came in, I turned it around and the demand picked up. " Under his 
direction, the Euro-Asian Centre gained momentum. Executive programmes 
which were already being conducted in Asia increased significantly, and, by 
1994, INSEAD had become the biggest provider of executive education in 
South-East Asia. 227 
In recalling the time in which he was in charge of the Eurasian centre, 
Hawawini asserts, "When I was at the Euro-Asian centre, I went to INSEAD 
and said, 'Euro-Asian centre has to go to Asia. ' But I could not do an MBA 
there so I was already discussing with three locations where we would have to 
take the Euro-Asian centre in Asia, physically, to deliver executive education 
and to pose Faculty. Antonio Borges and Amould De Meyer said, 'Good idea. 
Good idea to take the Euro-Asian centre abroad. But if you only do executive 
education you're going to have a hard time getting Faculty to stay there. [] 
Do you know how to make the Faculty stayT And I said, 'Yes, you have to 
have a degree program. You have to have an MBA there. ' And then, Antonio 
and Arnould said, "Let's make this happen. But let's not do it for the Euro- 
226 Gabriel Hawawini, former INSEAD Dean 
227 Barsoux (2000) 
297 
Asian centre. Let's take all of INSEAD because the only way we are going to 
get Faculty abroad is because the MBA's abroad. So they picked out the 
project. I had already a contact in Malaysia, in Hong Kong, in Singapore and 
then, they said, 'We are going to take INSEAD out there. ' And that's how it 
started. " 
Thus, the beginning of INSEAD's presence in Asia started with the 
Euro-Asian Centre, which brought Asia to INSEAD, made the School credible 
and got its Faculty to fly there. By 1995, after taking over as Dean, Borges felt 
that INSEAD needed to clearly differentiate itself from other top Business 
Schools in the world. In this regard, Anil Gaba, INSEAD's Dean of Faculty 
during Hawawini's Deanship, recalls "There was also a greater desire to expand 
beyond Europe and not be known just as a European Business School. " Being 
highly international was no longer adequate since more and more Business 
Schools considered themselves international. 
Borges had no experience of Asia but stimulated by the Asian miracle, 
the tiger economies of South-East Asia, the importance of the Japanese 
economy and the emergence of China, he became increasingly interested in the 
region. Thus, in 1996, under the direction of Amould de Meyer, the East-Asian 
Centre opened a representative office in Singapore. 
However, when de Meyer examined the market potential of Asia more 
closely, he realised that the East-Asian Centre did not have enough capabilities 
to seize the opportunities; the East-Asia Centre operated on a marginal basis 
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and had remained below its potential. In this regard, he recalls, "We needed to 
have a bigger ambition. I saw a big opportunity for INSEAD in Asia. " 
It was at this time that Borges realised that it could be through the East- 
Asia Centre that INSEAD would be able to differentiate itself, giving a real 
meaning to the concept of international business education. In explaining his 
viewpoint, Borges states: "We have to be as good as the Americans but we 
have to remain different and we already have this enormous hard stuck in Asia 
so let's go after that and have a two-campus School which would enhance the 
diversity which INSEAD has always had and create more opportunities for 
differentiation. " 
Moreover, he saw Asia was an opportunity to build up rapid growth 
which would fit with INSEAD's strategy of cultural diversity. He remembers: 
"Some companies were telling us, 'Come to Asia, we will build a campus for 
you, we will spend u$s 200 million to create a Business School. You just come 
and take it over. "' 
However, Borges feared the East-Asia Centre would follow the path of 
CEDEP (European Centre for Continuing Education): become successful and in 
time,, hive itself off as an independent institution from INSEAD, one which 
might sometimes compete with INSEAD. Thus, he agreed that INSEAD should 
lead the campus in Asia. 
First steps 
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During the 1990s, globalisation trends fostered Business Schools to talk 
about catching up with the current scenario. In this regard, US Schools such as 
Harvard, Wharton, Chicago and Kellogg established alliances or opened 
research centres in distant countries. 
It was in these circumstances that during a Faculty meeting, Borges 
introduced the idea of opening a second facility so that INSEAD would follow 
market demands by having real presence in any other part of the world. "If we 
don't do it now, another School will do it before US.,, 
228 Some Faculty members 
recall that it was Borges who led the issue and that he had de Meyer's support. 
This issue fragmented the Faculty into three different groups: there was a group 
of enthusiastic Faculty (around 15%) that had expertise in Asia and promoted 
Borges' idea. They joined into a committee, and guided by Amould de Meyer, 
were put in charge of analysing whether it made sense to go to Asia and what 
guiding principles to follow should that happen. 
There was a second group (around 60%) who were concerned only 
about the risk that the decision could imply. This group was joined by all 
Faculty members who got easily excited about all the innovative projects that 
the School was presenting. Finally, the rest of the people represented the most 
conservative Faculty members who wondered whether such a decision 
accorded with the School's strategic vision or not. However, they knew that "If 
one had asked so many questions, INSEAD would have never existed. 
11229 
228 Antonio Fattds, former Dean of the INSEAD M[BA 
229 Antonio Fattds, former Dean of the INSEAD, M[BA 
300 
De Meyer's group began examining why other top Business Schools 
were not taking advantage of the opportunity and going to Asia. They 
concluded that the bureaucracy involved on the university side prevented most 
of the Business Schools Erom carrying out this strategic decision. Particularly, 
two initiatives undertaken by top Business Schools were analysed: firstly, 
Harvard's executive education centre in Switzerland in the 1970s; secondly, the 
Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago's executive MEBA 
education centre in Barcelona. However, neither of these two models was 
considered to be similar to that which INSEAD was heading towards. 
In relation to the decision on the Singapore campus, Ludo Van der 
Heyden remembers: "One day there was a Faculty meeting and Antonio sort of 
asked topic Singapore and we just discussed it. He said, 'Well, what do you 
have against AT And people said, 'Well, we're not sure, let's think about it. ' 
And then, at some point, the decision was to open a campus. So some Faculty 
members went to Antonio and said, 'When did we make the decisionT Antonio 
answered, 'Well, we talked about it. Nobody seemed against it. I assumed we 
were all in favour. ' So there was no formal point about 'Let's have a vote. Let's 
make sure nobody can say we didn't discuss this. "' 
In the same vein, Arnould de Meyer recalls: "Antonio took a decision 
and said, 'I put my reputation on the line. After having listened to everybody, 
being convinced by me, I as a Dean take a decision. ' I know that in making that 
decision he had taken care of convincing Claude Janssen. So he knew that the 
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Chairman of the Board was behind him. The two of them together felt 
comfortable enough to go ahead with the project. " 
Thus, even though Borges knew that if he had taken a vote, probably the 
Asian campus project would not have received a clear majority vote among the 
Faculty, de Meyer recalls, "Antonio basically said, 'We have now decided to do 
it, now we have to get it through the Board. " 
It took six months to convince the Board to clear the decision. But 
Claude Janssen was determined to go ahead with it. There were some key 
Board members who felt that Asia was the future, and thus, INSEAD should try 
it. But there was also a lot of resistance that had to be overcome. 
Accordingly, Borges states that given that opening the Asian campus 
"was a market-driven process it was relatively easy to prove that this was a 
relatively safe pad; that we had grown so much that this was more a method of 
continuity and that we were taking advantage of a position of market leadership 
compared to our competitors -nobody was in Asia then. We were very visible 
and so we should take advantage. So we defined that advantage relative to our 
competitors before they decided to do it. And so then, although people were 
sceptical, it was very easy to go ahead. [ ... ] The Board of 
Directors also pushed 
by saying, 'You have to be bold, you have to do this. "' 
By 1997, a feasibility study explored the possibility of expanding into 
Asia. Peter Jadersten, Marketing Director of the Euro-Asian Centre, was 
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appointed to devote much of his time to research the Asia project. He first 
began by estimating the Faculty's level of interest and observed that even 
though much time had been devoted to talk about the Asian campus, "no 
studies of how the strategic plans could be made successful had been 
developed. 95230 
Moreover, Jadersten. also spent time researching the business education 
market in Asia. He carried out a survey from which he understood that the main 
criterion for MBA students choosing a Business School was the reputation of 
the School, not its location. This implied that besides delivering executive 
education programmes, INSEAD could attract MBA participants to the Asia 
campus as well. 
Challenges and difficulties of the Asian project: one institution, two 
campuses 
INSEAD's top management team recognised that even though a 
feasibility study was undertaken and different analyses concluded that the 
Asian project would be successful, getting the Faculty to buy in to the proposal 
would be the key challenge. 
In addressing the different challenges and difficulties that were faced 
regarding the strategic decision to launch the Asian campus, de Meyer 
highlights that "First, convincing the Faculty to go there. Two, insuring that the 
230 Garg (2003: 8) 
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Staff here was fully behind the project and people here that actually took 
ownership of the project there. The third one was to ensure that the quality of 
what we did there was the same as here. Fourthly, most of the management 
systems at INSEAD at that moment were very informal and you can't work if 
10 thousand krn away everything is informal. So we did put a lot of procedures 
and processes in place. And fifthly, we needed to ensure that, I mean, we had 
this slogan 'one institution, two campuses', that we remained one institution. In 
other words, that we remained very integrated. " 
Thus!, after speaking to government agencies, local business 
communities, INSEAD's corporate partners and other relevant organisations, de 
Meyer shortlisted three out of eleven major cities in East Asia as potential sites 
for executive education and MBA programmes: Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Then, he undertook a visit to the three possible settings with 
Borges and Janssen. During this trip, Kuala Lumpur emerged as the favourite 
due to its excellent infrastructure and an attractive partnership offer by Sime 
Darby -a large Malaysian corporation. 
Furthermore, two get-to-know Asian trips were organised for the Faculty 
to join the visits to the three favourite sites, to convince them to approve the 
opening of the campus. During these visits leisure tours were organised to show 
what life in those cities was like. Meetings were held with potential partners, 
local business community leaders, government authorities, INSEAD corporate 




According to Borges and de Meyer, the presentations delivered at the 
Faculty meetings about the progress of the Asia project in 1996 and 1997, were 
positively received. The concerns raised could be categorised in six groups : 231 
1. The Asian Business Area Faculty felt that by not tapping into 
their expertise, INSEAD had missed opportunities to better negotiate in Asia 
(the Faculty had not been especially called upon during the feasibility study and 
the decision-making process). 
2. Some Faculty maintained the view that INSEAD should not 
expand but seek to become as prosperous and renowned as BM in Switzerland. 
They argued that "a multi-campus institution was not necessarily the best or the 
only model of internationalisation; it could be equally well achieved from a 
single site. , 
232 
3. European lobbyists said that INSEAD should focus Purely on 
Europe. Not being in the USA was bad enough; being in Asia was a total waste 
of resources. 
Others raised concerns about operational issues such as Faculty 
management and challenges in managing global organisations. For example, 
getting the Faculty to relocate to Asia was a big challenge. 
5. Some Faculty were unhappy with what they perceived to be a 
Machiavellian approach on the part of INSEAD's top-management team. 
Relevant questions were not given due attention or adequate discussion time. 
23 1 Garg, (2003) 
232 Garg, (2003: 13) 
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6. Finally, there was a group within the Faculty that thought it was 
a good idea to have a campus in Asia. However, the project should be 
accomplished via several small milestones to manage the risk since in the event 
of failure, such a project could damage INSEAD's reputation and financial 
health. The following table depicts the benefits and risks perceived: 
Table 18: Benefits and risks perceived regarding INSEAD's Asian campus 
Perceived benefitS233 Perceived risiisý 
Booming market demand for INSEAD's Enormous financial risk and stram 
executive programmes in Asia due to the massive investment 
needed; such investment would 
restrict INSEAD from taking up 
other new opportunities for 
several years 
Opportunity to assert an image of a "one-and- The two campuses could lose 
YY23 only truly global Business School by offering cohesion over time 
unique opportunities to MIBA participants and 
executives 
Increased opportunities for the recruitment of INSEAD was actively engaged in 
more Faculty, including some of Asian origin a Development Campaign, Faculty 
recruitment and research; thus, it 
did not have large financial 
resources 
Opportunitie's for increasing research output on Fear of not being able to attract 
Asia and retain enough Faculty on the 
campus in Asia; concerns about 
quality of programmes and brand 
dilution 
Going ahead 
During the Faculty meeting towards the end of 1997, before the Board 
was to take a yes/no decision, the INSEAD Faculty expressed its perspective 
about the project. In this regard, one professor recalls, "We were asked how 
many people were excited about the- project. About 75% or so raised their 
233 Garg (2003) 
234 Garg (2003) 
235 Garg (2003: 14) 
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hands. However, like for most proposals, we did not conduct a formal vote. ý1236 
It was during this meeting that Singapore emerged as the site of choice. About 
en professors expressed their interest in moving to Asia. 
Singapore had shared with INSEAD its plans to become an educational 
hub for the region. A senior government official of the Economic Development 
Board of Singapore had visited Paris and the INSEAD campus in Fontainebleau 
to meet with Antonio Borges and Claude Janssen. Soon after, Singapore came 
forward with a concrete and attractive proposal and showed its commitment by 
helping to arrange meetings with a number of ministers, senior government 
officials, local universities and the business community. 
New risks 
In July 1997, the Thai baht crashed, marking the start of currency crises, 
a collapse of banking systems and a series of corporate bankruptcies in several 
Asian economies over the following months. Major executive education 
customers of INSEAD were particularly badly hit due to the structural 
deficiencies of the Asian tiger economies. 
Even though the INSEAD Board still supported the Asian project, the 
top management team was instructed to adjust the business plan to the new 
reality. However, economic conditions in Asia worsened more and more and 
investing in Asia suddenly became a critical decision. Borges felt the crisis 
236 Garg (2003: 14) 
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would end shortly, and companies would need INSEAD executive programmes 
to recover, "I thought it would be short-lived. Asian, in the long term, would 
see good growth so I felt it was the moment to invest and it would be 
,, 237 appreciated by the Asians. 
So by the end of Borges' mandate, the decision was already taken. It 
would be Gabriel Hawawini's mission, as Antonio Borges' successor and new 
Dean of INSEAD, to deliver it. In referring to the strategic decision of 
launching the Asian campus, Borges acknowledges that to run the project, 
study, do the analyses, do the calculations and negotiate the support, begin 
investing, "all of that was relatively simple ... what was really tough was to get 
the various constituencies to support the project. And that's because of the 
governance model of the School, it's quite particular. There is the Board, which 
ultimately makes the decisions. There is the Dean who is the CEO, important to 
the Board. But there is also a very powerful Faculty, very, very powerful, and 
powerful because they elect the Dean. So the Dean, to a certain extent, is also 
accountable to the Faculty having been elected by them. And there are some 
intermediate structures of management, which also reemphasise the role of the 
Faculty. , 238 
Thus, Borges suggests that in strategic decision-making processes "You 
have to first build the consensus and get support, make sure that everybody is 
going to follow you and then, once you do that internally, you also have to do 
237Garg (2003: 16) 
238 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
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that with the Board, and with the alumni, and with all the supporters, all the 
donors that provide the capital support for the School. " 
In talking about the decision to launch the Asian campus, Borges 
concludes, "The basic reason was that people thought that this was a very high 
risk project that was most likely to fail; that in fact, no other School advent this, 
which is true; and that we should focus, concentrate discussion with 
Fontainebleau to develop maximum, critical mass to compete with the 
Americans. That was the main opposition to the project. In the end, I think that, 
that judging by today's success, this was a good decision in the sense that not 
only this is a very viable project, one that is doing extremely well, but one 
that's really helping change INSEAD and keeping INSEAD different from the 
other Business Schools which is the whole reason for the success of INSEAD 
since its creation. In the sense it is not exactly like Harvard or Stanford, it is a 
. different model. And the Asian campus emphasises that difference within a 
completely new perspective, which is this global perspective. But we will have 
to see, it's too early to tell whether in ten or twenty years' time this is too a 
very, very important, an innovating concept and whether the two campuses 
remain together. " 
In sum, Antonio Borges showed commitment and perseverance to 
achieve his purposes. He believed INSEAD could find its differentiation and 
thus, he worked to overcome every obstacle in accomplishing this. He was a 
visionary and as such, he could foresee the direction INSEAD had to follow. 
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In talking about Borges' leadership style, Amould de Meyer asserts, 
"Most meetings we had were mostly more meetings where Antonio announced 
his decisions rather than discussions about 'what should we doT among 
Associate Deans. That doesn't mean that he didn't listen, but he listened in 
individual meetings. He would talk to you, would talk to me, would talk to 
other people in individual meetings about the different programmes, about what 
we needed to do and he acted as a CEO. He was very clear in setting the 
strategy, giving guidelines to me in 'this is what you have to do' and we were 
operational managers, we were executing. I loved working with him. You felt 
comfortable. Because he was a businessman who set strategy and then said to 
me, 'You do this. ' But then, he left me completely ftee about how to do it. He 
delegated all the operational issues. " 
4.4. Analytical tracing of the critical 'issues' during Antonio 
Borges's Deanship (1995-1999) 
Although a number of initiatives were on the strategic agenda of 
INSEAD over the four-year period between 1995 and 1999, the study focused 
on the following: firstly, the Capital Campaign already in progress, to raise 
funds for academic purposes (enhancing research capacities and activities) and 
thus, strengthening INSEAD's economic model; secondly, deepening research 
profile of the School by setting and implementing academic systems and 
polities, to become a top-tier Business School, not only in teaching but also in 
research; and finally, opening the Singapore campus to enhance INSEAD's 
differentiation as a leading School in the field of internationalisation. 
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As a result, during this period systems were shaped and aligned to 
INSEAD's strategic direction. In this regard, Borges states: "It's very important 
to keep in mind that INSEAD was always market driven because of the fact that 
it was always very independent, with no, the source of support of insignificant 
size, and with no endowment so it always had to follow the market. So many of 
the initiatives that we took over the years and which detennined the shape of 
the School were actually imposed by the market. And so, the main difficulty of 
INSEAD was not to expand, grow, large new programmes. That was always 
relatively easy to do because the market pushed this in that direction. What was 
more difficult was to promote the academic and research side because the 
market did not demand that. " In this regard, the opening a second campus in 
Singapore is a reflection of INSEAD's essence; "Asia is a very good 
example. , 
239 
Thus, the second campus in Asia became a milestone in INSEAD's 
history and shape. The vision was to become "one School in two campuses", 
with a single Faculty body. The new project, with the pressure to overcome the 
obstacles to open the new campus, could have threatened INSEAD's purpose of 
becoming a more research-oriented School because of the problems associated 
with dispersion. 
4.4.1. Critical elements in going forward with the project of a 
second campus in Singapore. 
239 Antonio Borges, former INSEAD Dean 
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Dean Borges was looking to differentiate INSEAD's international 
background in an ever more global and multicultural market. Thus, opening a 
campus in Singapore, with the School's experience, expertise and positioning in 
the Asian management education industry, became an advantage as an answer 
to the current market trends. 
As for the initiative of INSEAD's development campaign, it was 
relatively easy to sell the issue to the Board and Faculty because of the needed 
urgency (issue salience). The challenge relied on raising the funds. Deepening 
research capacity and activities and opening the Singapore campus were bold 
initiatives, neither market-driven nor demanded by a significant number of 
Faculty. It was the Dean's personal commitment (issue sponsorship) that 
enabled critical actions for legitimisation. "He made very clear he wanted 
INSEAD to become a top School in the world, not only in Europe. , 240 
4.4.2. Legitimisation and Power mobilisation 
In this regard, the Dean showed sheer ability in building critical 
coalitions to support both initiatives among the Chairman of the Board, the 
management team of the School, as well as Faculty identified with the research 
and/or the Asia initiative. He looked for the support of those enthusiastic and 
entrepreneurial people who wanted INSEAD to have new projectS241. 
Accordingly, Arnould de Meyer asserts, "The management of the School was 
very much behind him. He convinced us very much of the fact that that was the 
240 Arnould de Meyer, former Dean of the Singapore campus 
241 Antonio Fauds, former Dean of the INSEAD MEBA 
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right thing to do. [ ... ] however, there was always a group of Faculty willing to 
emphasise the European roots of INSEAD. They wanted to remain as a 
European institution, very international but European. [ ... ] Among them were 
some of the Senior Faculty. , 
242 
Each of the two initiatives generated both support and resistance within 
the Faculty and the Board. However, Borges' ability to communicate 
individually with people to build a consensus "hiding what he didn't want to 
say in publiC,, 
243 became a critical tactic in getting results. Borges based his 
demands on those values embedded in the School's culture since its foundation: 
being the most international, multicultural School in the world. It was 
INSEAD's entrepreneurial spirit that emphasised the need to turn it into a 
global School according to environmental trends, and differentiating it from its 
competitors. Thus, according to Borges, INSEAD needed to think beyond 
Europe. Given that INSEAD had invested resources (30% of its revenues) in 
South-East Asia since the 1970s, it was through its own expertise that Asia now 
represented an opportunity. 
Antonio Borges was able to obtain enough support from the other key 
actors by building consensus through different means. "All methods: formal 
and informal; in meetings, formal meetings, and in conversations; or meetings 
that were spontaneously organised for the purpose, when people had a concern. 
And that's the point. At INSEAD, the Faculty are very close to the Dean. If a 
group of Faculty come to the Dean and say, 'Listen, we heard about this 
242 Arnould de Meyer, former Dean of the Singapore campus 
243 Arnould de Meyer, former Dean of the INSEAD Singapore campus 
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concern, we are worried about this, let's discuss it. ' The Dean says, 'Sure, let's 
discuss it. ' Because you need to develop credibility, you need to invest in your 
reputation, you need to establish these lines of communication and then, they 
will support you. [ ... ] Basically by building a coalition of people who were so 
interested and so committed. [ ... ] In a place like INSEAD this is very, very 
important. In any professional service organisation, you have to have the troops 
with you. You cannot manage one of these organisations as if you were in the 
army-you just give orders and everybody follows. It's not how it works. [] 
You have to have a Faculty in a supportive mode. But they are not the only 
ones. You then have the Board. " 
Forfurther analysis refer to 17VSEAD Appendix V. 
5. Period 2000-2004: Gabriel Hawawini 
Gabriel Hawawini joined INSEAD in 1980. In 1988, he was appointed 
Director of the Euro-Asia Centre until 1995, when he returned to the Faculty as 
Head of the Finance Department. In 1998, he was appointed Dean of the PhD 
programme which he directed for one year, and Dean of Development, in 
charge of the fundraising campaign until 2000. 
Thus, by September 2000, Gabriel Hawawini was an insider who had 
belonged to INSEAD delivering expected results for over two decades. After he 
-bad 
been elected by a majority of Faculty members (it seems relevant to note 
that he received 90 votes out of 96), the Board appointed him Dean of 
INSEAD. 
314 
I. Singapore campus 
Borges' bold agenda of shaping the School's profile to a more research- 
oriented institution and opening a second campus in Singapore stretched the 
organisation, producing both support and opposition. Thus, the choice of 
Gabriel Hawawini as the new Dean can be interpreted as a desire on the part of 
Faculty to look for a more consensus-oriented and participative leadership 
style. 
"The style of Gabriel is much one of collegial management with Deputy 
Deans and with Associate Deans. He puts all kinds of committees and systems 
to manage the School in a collegial way. He runs the meetings to gather 
information and discuss the issues. Although he was not at all involved in the 
concept of the Singapore campus, he did an excellent job as Dean to ensure that 
everything was put in place to make the Singapore campus a big success. [] 
After two years in place, Gabriel wanted to re-organise his governance structure 
because he felt that the more large and complex School required more 
delegation. So he appointed two Deputy Deans: Landis Gabel in charge of 
Faculty Research and Arnould de Meyer in Administration and Operations. 
And that's his way of saying, 'I run the School but I have two deputy Deans 
that actually run it for me. 
ý "244 
244 Amould de Meyer, former Dean of the INSEAD Asian campus 
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Moreover, Hawawini's appointment could also stem from his strong 
reputation as a very effective task- and result-oriented person from his previous 
experience with the Euro-Asian Centre and the Development campaign. 
As Dean of INSEAD, Gabriel Hawawini's main thrust was to ensure the 
success of the Singapore campus. In this regard, Anil Gaba, current INSEAD 
Dean of Faculty, remembers "Gabriel's main focus was on making sure that the 
Singapore Campus works well. That was really the main thing. , 245 
However, many Faculty members (the older ones, those who had been 
at INSEAD at the beginning) wanted someone different who would stop the 
Singapore project. Even though the decision had been undertaken, the Faculty 
believed that the fact that a new Dean had been appointed would enable them to 
reopen the topic and thus, hinder the School from making a big mistake. 
I Hawawini recalls, "When I was appointed Dean, and the project had been 
approved, there was still this question mark of can we actually stop it? Yes, it's 
too risky. Let's think again. You know, "Yes, we pushed it, it went through but 
ok, new Dean can we... " 
But although some people put pressure on him, when Hawawini had 
been appointed Dean, the Chairman of the Board had told him, "You can do 
anything you want but you cannot go back on Singapore. " So Hawawini knew 
he had to deliver the Asian campus. Moreover, he truly believed that stopping 
the project would be very bad for the future of the School; it could change 
245 Anil Gaba, INSEAD Dean of Faculty 
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completely and become less ambitious, more intemally- oriented and less 
entrepreneurial. And this was no good. Hawawini reckons, "So I had no choice 
between my own conviction and the Chairman's instructions. I had to deliver 
,, 246 this, I had to deliver this. 
So Hawawini's next step was to mobilise the entire organisation around 
his mission. "Once the organisation realised that there was no return, even those 
who had a bit of hesitation, they realised that if they didn't participate in the 
success, they're going to pay a very high cost. So they had no choice. Those 
who were against became neutral, and that was what I wanted. So I knew that 
they would not create a problem for me. But they were right. They would not 
do anything to torpedo all the system. They would simply wait on the 
sidelines. , 
247 
However, in the course of the intended fulfilment of his mission, 
Hawawini had to face multiple challenges. By 2001, the economic crisis in the 
Asian countries was still critical; terrorism spread throughout the world so there 
was no more travelling; SARS appeared in the middle of Singapore. As 
Hawawini recalls, "Everything that could have gone wrong went wrong. " 
But INSEAD kept on pushing and trying to deliver good results, and the 
overall idea of being able to go to Asia was still attractive for the students. The 
School did as much as it could so that people would get an outstanding 
246 Gabriel Hawawini, former Dean of INSEAD 
247 Gabriel Hawawini, former Dean of INSEAD 
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experience. "In spite all the problems there was still this attraction of 'let's go 
and see what's happening there'. " 
Over time, the Faculty who accepted to be sent there to teach for a few 
weeks, wanted to stay two months and then, even a year. "We have not seen 
one single Faculty that was sent there that decided to come back. . )248 Thus, the 
Singapore campus was successfully delivered enabling INSEAD to increase the 
proportion of Asians on its MBA programme from 6% in 1998/1999 Oust 
before the campus was launched), to 25% nowadays, making a major impact on 
the market. 
However, the School's sheer growth, resulting from INSEAD's success 
in Singapore, also had a negative impact. Some Faculty members argue "To 
what extent an academic institution is able to grow so fast and assimilate such 
growth with no problems. , 
249 
5.2. INSEAD - Wharton Alliance 
According to Hawawini's vision, remaining a global Business School 
implies not only to be present in the European and Asian markets, but also in 
the American, especially in the US. In this regard, he states: "The conceptual 
vision is to say that the Business School of the future (not all of them, some of 
them) are no longer going to be a place... [However], if it's not a place, if it is 
not a production model, what is it? Is it a network of multiple locations linked 
248 Gabriel Hawawini, former Dean of INSEAD 
249 Antonio Fattds, former Dean of the INSEAD MIBA 
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together by a technology? The pieces could be different campuses but it could 
be an alliance. It could be a partnership. Partners don't have to be necessarily 
another Business School. A partner can be a company. So you can broaden this, 
and moving away from the concept of the production model, you say it is about 
networking and then the next concept is about life-long learning. " 
After he was appointed Dean, Hawawini was approached by the Dean of 
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, to -establish an alliance 
between INSEAD and Wharton. At that time, Wharton had the problem of not 
being sufficiently international. 
The alliance offered INSEAD the opportunity to have both global reach 
and global activity concerns in association with a partner with whom most of 
the Faculty had frequent contact. 
Even though the Faculty supported the idea of building the alliance with 
Wharton, the Board disagreed. Hawawini recalls saying to them, "Look, the 
opportunity cost is zero. What are you afraid of.? There's no money. Ok. It's 
three years. If it doesn't work, we stop. [ ... ]So, they went along. I 
don't think 
the Wharton alliance was hard. " 
Hubert Gatignon, Dean of Faculty at that time, affirms: "We've MBA 
exchange; we have Faculty exchange which means that our Faculty continues 
to be paid by our institution but can do their teaching at the other School and 
the same thing for Wharton. We have executive education programmes, so we 
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do jointly branded as alliance programmes. [ ... ] And then a research dimension 
as well, in terms of trying to do something together, the two Faculties together, 
[] to have more impact on the designation part of the research. " 
Thus, the INSEAD-Wharton alliance was announced in March, 2001, 
with the purpose of contributing to advancing scholarship and business 
practice. From the start, it focused on education and on developing the 
knowledge to meet the challenges of the changing global business environment. 
But after several years, some people felt the alliance was not satisfactory for 
INSEAD, suggesting that it is an unequal alliance since the INSEAD Faculty is 
providing the Wharton Faculty with much more original thinking than they 
provide to INSEAD. Moreover, as for the contacts that the alliance supposedly 
offers, most of the INSEAD Faculty was educated in the US system and 
therefore, the School is not really in need of any contacts. Accordingly, Claude 
Rameau asserts, "We don't need contacts, we need something else. " 
5.3. The US campus Project 
With regard to Hawawini's vision for INSEAD, "it's not enough to 
bring the world to Fontainebleau; we have to move towards the system of 
having multiple locations which Fontainebleau and Singapore are just the first 
two. [ ... 
] We have to move from the production-base model of Business School 
(site-based or place-based) and say, 'a Business School is not a place, it's a 
network. it is a network of multiple locations linked together. It is about 
networking, linking different institutions linking for learning. So the two main 
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concepts are first, networking model and second, life long learning. , Q50 In 
Gabriel Hawawini's view, that"s the prototypical Business School. 
Hawawini wanted to open a third campus in the US. He counted on 
Janssen's support; thus, he thought he would be able to convince the Board. He 
recalls, "Janssen said to me, 'Yes, good idea. We're going to make this 
happen. ' And I knew this because if I could convince him I could convince the 
rest of the Board members. " 
However, Janssen was soon replaced by a new Chairman, Cees Van 
Lede, who was Dutch, an INSEAD alumnus, international who was not ready 
to face such big decisions. Hawawini remembers that as soon as the Chairman 
was appointed, he presented his idea to him, "I don't believe in the third 
campus 91) , 
Van Lede said, "Too early. " Van Lede had just been appointed and 
did not want to deal with too many problems in the beginning. 
Moreover, the Committee of Deans was not convinced either and 
therefore, they could not present the project to the Faculty. Thus, Hawawini 
found himself in a situation where he did not have all of his lieutenants firmly 
believing in launching a campus in the US. 
Then there was the election to renew Hawawini's mandate as Dean. He 
had already stated that he wanted to take INSEAD to the US by launching a 
250 Gabriel Hawawini, former INSEAD Dean 
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third campus. Even though the Faculty was not convinced yet, he said he would 
only stay for another mandate "if the vote in my favour starts with a 7.1, )251 
Hawawini hoped that because of his record and because of the 
relationship with the Faculty, the Faculty would come back with a very strong 
vote, and he would be able to take this vote and go to the Board and say, 'I have 
the Faculty behind me. We have to do this. ' But instead of being an election for 
electing the Dean, it became an election about whether INSEAD was to go to 
the United States or not. The vote took place and Hawawini got 5 8%. He 
recognises, "So I lost. " 
In talking about what could have gone wrong, Hawawini analyses his 
past situation and says that he could have waited until he was elected. But he 
preferred to have the mandate. He did not want to undertake the US project 
unless he had the support of Faculty, and this could only be through a secret 
vote. 
Most Faculty members agree that ey are really sensitive about the issue 
of the third campus. For example, some Faculty members assert, "When we 
talk about a third Campus, it's almost, the Faculty is allergic to this because the 
Faculty still remembers how the decision of a second Campus was pushed 
through without them. So now the Faculty will make almost everything 
impossible, just to make sure that this doesn't happen again. " 
251 Gabriel Hawawini, former INSEAD Dean 
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In addition, others suggest, "It couldn't have been made at all. From the 
first time he mentioned the idea, which actually came very soon after he was 
appointed as Dean. it could be seen in a very, very long term that it could make 
sense. But it would take a very, very, very long time for this to be feasible to 
happen. " 
In this regard, people explain that INSEAD has not got enough 
economic resources in terms of Faculty recruitment. "The competition in the 
US is extremely well established. ý9252 Moreover, people think that competing 
with US Business Schools in their own market would be detrimental to the 
perceptions of INSEAD as a top academic institution. Finally, some Faculty 
members call for the need to develop first of all a different model of being 
global. 
5.4. Analytical tracing of critical issues during 2000 and 2004 
A number of initiatives were on the strategic agenda of INSEAD over 
the '(episode" we have considered, between 2000 and 2004. However, the study 
focused on two of particular relevance. The first critical issue, as soon as 
Gabriel Hawawini became Dean, was to deliver the Singapore campus. As the 
second one, towards the end of his first term of Deanship, he introduced the 
initiative to open a third INSEAD campus as a precondition to his remaining 
INSEAD's Dean for another tenn. 
252 Hubert Gatignon, former Dean of Faculty 
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As soon as he was appointed, Hawawini's priority was 'to deliver the 
Singapore campus' successfully; otherwise, it would drag INSEAD into failure 
not only in economic terms but also regarding its reputation. Thus, as the Dean., 
he clearly focused on the School's performance and looked for Faculty and 
Board support on which he could easily count. In addition, he showed again his 
abilities to lead critical challenges and tasks (he had already been successful in 
restoring the feasibility of the Euro-Asian centre, as well as reinvigorating the 
Development Capital Campaign). Thus, for the Singapore Campus, he 
delegated to Arnould de Meyer for the start-up and motivated the entire School 
to focus on this mission until it became a success. 
Once the opening of the Asian campus was successfully completed, 
Hawawini focused in making INSEAD "one School, with two campuses". In 
this regard, he restructured the govemance body so that INSEAD had one 
7ý -- raculty and one Administration by appointing two Deputy Deans: one in 
charge of Faculty and Research (Landis Gabel) and the other, in charge of 
Administration and Operations (Arnould de Meyer). 
Finally, towards the end of his first tenn as Dean, he decided to deepen 
the vision, for INSEAD to become "one School in multiple campuses". Thus, 
considering the US market as dominant in management education, Hawawini 
raised the issue with the intention of making it happen during his possible 
second term as Dean. Moreover he made Faculty and Board support for that 
project a condition of his candidature for another period. According to his 
view, INSEAD "should go to US and should establish a campus 
in the US, 
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should give priority to the US market"253 , Hawawini intended to legitimate the 
idea of opening a third campus in the US (strategic agenda-building and - 
executing). He thought he could count on Board and Faculty support for this 
new project. 
However, a new Chairman of the Board was appointed who did not 
share the idea: "I don't believe in the third campus, " said the new Chairman. 
On the other hand, the Faculty felt the need to prioritise an improvement of 
"communication" and work conditions, in terms of sharing the benefits of 
INSEAD's expansion and promoting integration (Fair workload and 
compensation systems), given the increase in complexity in INSEAD's 
functioning with the opening of a second campus in Singapore. 
5.4.1. Critical elements in understanding both the success of the 
start-up of the Singapore campus and the failure in going forward with the 
initiative for a third campus in the US 
Gabriel Hawawini's power depended on his ability to manage conflicts 
and challenges, delivering results successfully - the management of challenge; 
make it happen'. Once again, he showed his capacity to convoke and lead task 
forces to tackle difficult situations. 
In this regard, it was the consequentiality in launching the Singapore 
campus (issue salience) that legitimated Hawawini's thrust. He recalls, "I 
253 Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD's Dean 
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inherited a mess ... it is a pattern. [ ... ] In all the situations I was involved, I 
always came as the saviour. I never had to deal with the Board. The Board was 
saying, 'Please, Gabriel, fix it. ' [ ... ] And the Faculty saying, 'Look at the poor 
guy. He comes in to fix this problem and he didn't create the problem. Good 
guy. ' So you know, the context was very good. If you have some enthusiasm, 
skill to rally some of the key people, and you have the benefit of the doubt 
because you are not the man who created the mess, you're the man that was 
brought in to fix the mess. So people look favourably upon -you. " 
As for the US campus project, circumstances were different. He 
proposed a new challenge, leaving behind his role as saviour and transforming 
it into a change agent that would set and lead a new conquest. However, the 
pattern of undertaking the role of the person who fixes problems changed; it did 
not favour him. Rather, he should have spent time selling the idea and getting 
both Faculty and Board support by building a coalition that would support the 
US campus endeavour. 
From the Faculty perspective, the Singapore campus setting, the one 
School, two campuses project still had some challenges in terms of 
management and organisation. Thus, there was a group of people that thought 
they were not ready to face such challenge once again; it was too early. Others 
thought INSEAD could not be a leading School in the US and thus, that this 
would damage the School's brand. Also, there were some people who believed 
that Hawawini had not spent enough time in selling the issue individually to 
each Faculty member, underestimating them. Finally, others felt that the School 
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had grown too much and that they could not yet see the benefit of such 
additional growth. 
Moreover, in considering the resistance that the US campus project 
raised within the Faculty and the current Board (including the new Chairman), 
making the issue a precondition for him to run for a second term with over 70% 
of the votes did not seem an advisable tactic to legitimate his project. It would 
be interesting to consider what would have happened if he had presented the 
project after being re-elected for a second term, as was pretty well assured. 
5.4.2. Legitimisation and power mobilisation 
In observing the episode related to the purpose of making the Singapore 
campus work between 2000 and 2003, the study suggests it consisted of an 
incremental initiative since it implied the continuity of a strategy which had 
been previously set by former Dean Antonio Borges, in the School's strategic 
, qgenda. Z-: ) 
On the other hand, the idea of launching INSEAD's third campus in US, 
the most competitive market in the world, in 2004, is considered by this study 
as a breakthrough initiative since it implied a turning point in terms of the 
School's strategic direction, resource allocation and organisational capabilities, 
culture, systems and structure. 
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Gabriel Hawawini strongly sponsored this incremental set of initiatives 
since he was appointed to undertake the specific task of making the Singapore 
campus work. He was known as a man who delivered results and had enough 
expertise be able to align people's interest and accomplish such an endeavour. 
Since he had been specifically appointed with the mandate of making the 
Singapore campus work, he had no need to undertake any issue-selling. 
Hawawini's interest was clearly aligned to those of the other key actors. Most 
of them wanted the Singapore campus to succeed and focused on achieving 
good results. 
Although the initiative represented a superb effort for the School's 
Faculty and Staff, as well as for the economic resources committed and risks 
assumed, the Singapore campus was already part of INSEAD's strategic 
agenda. Thus, this study considers this project as incremental. However, from 
the perspective of its execution, opening the Singapore campus represented a 
major challenge and risk. 
The fieldwork shows that the leadership style of Gabriel Hawawini is 
mostly participative. With regard to his skills and competences, the study 
underlined his capacity to deliver results, take risks (entrepreneurship), and 
foster commitment and integration. Hawawini based his power on his expertise, 
reputation in make things happen (execution); resource generation and 
allocation. In mobilising power to execute initiatives already decided, 
Hawawini was strong in, coalition formation, rationality, assertiveness, 
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consensus-building, decisiveness, execution, delegation, listening and scanning 
the environment 
On the other hand, the scheme to launch INSEAD's third campus in the 
US, considered the most competitive market in the world in 2004, is considered 
by this study as a breakthrough initiative since it implied a tuming point in 
terms of the School's strategic direction, resource allocation and organisational 
capabilities, culture, systems and structure. 
From an overall perspective, the study considered the set of initiatives 
included in this fourth episode as blocked because of the following outputs: 
Hawawini had made the Faculty's decision to launch INSEAD's third campus 
in the US a precondition of his reappointment; Claude Janssen was replaced by 
a new Chairman (Cees Van Lede) who was an alumnus and who disagreed with 
Hawawini's decision; the members of the Board were mostly alumni and were 
conservative regarding the INSEAD brand; given that launching the Singapore 
campus had been quite an endeavour, the Faculty was not ready to repeat a 
similar experience in the US. 
Gabriel Hawawini sponsored the set of initiatives intended to launch 
INSEAD's third campus. However, this sponsorship was rather weak since it 
had no support from the other key actors. Moreover, the study did not find any 
evidence of effective issue-selling or coalition-building on behalf of Gabriel 
Hawawini. The initiative of a third campus was clearly misaligned with the 
Main Generic Interest prioritisation of other key actors: the new Chairman of 
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the Board, an alumnus with a different profile from Claude Janssen's 
entrepreneurial style; and Faculty who were more concerned about INSEAD's 
second campus consolidation and integration than for a new scheme. 
To some extent, Hawawini did not identify the issue affay within the 
School's strategic agenda. Making the Singapore campus work had been such a 
major operation that INSEAD's strategic agenda was still 'overloaded' with 
that initiative, and had no further 'space' for any new one. However, in 
pursuing Issue legitimisation for the third campus initiative, Dean Hawawini 
could appeal to ftatures of the outer context such as corporate customers' 
demands, donors and benefactors, competition and economic environment. 
Opposition to the new initiative came from key actors of the inner context 
(Faculty and Board). 
In comparing the two initiatives to open a new campus abroad 
(Singapore and US) there are clear differences in the process by which each of 
the initiatives was raised to the agenda. Both can be considered as 
breakthrough initiatives, requiring effective issue-selling and a thoughtful 
consideration of possible supporters and opponents. 
See 17VSEAD Appendix VIforfurther analysis. 
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Chapter VII: LBS 
1. The study of the SLP at London Business School (LBS) over time (1990-2004) 
from a political perspective 
London Business School was founded in 1964 as the London Institute of 
Business Management and as a graduate college of the University of London. Over 
time, it has functioned and been consolidated as an academic institution offering 
Master's and PhD programmes plus an extensive Executive Education portfolio. Its 
MBA programme has consistently ranked among the top ten programmes in the 
world, and I" or 2d outside the US, according to Business Week or Financial Times 
rankings. 
Even though it is part of the UK higher education system, LBS has, as with all 
of the UK's higher education institutions, no direct relationship with BA4 
Government's Department for Education and Skills. Funding and oversight of the 
universities is organised through a public agency, the Higher Education Funding 
254 Council for England (HEFCE). 
Since 1996, it has been a full college of the University of London, although its 
own Royal Charter, granted in 1986, confers on the School the right to issue its own 
degrees. However, as a full college of the University, it has undertaken not to 
exercise this right and continues to award University of London degrees. 
255 
254 Barnes (1989); LBS 2003 EQUIS Report 
255 Barnes (1989); LBS 2003 EQUIS Report 
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Since its foundation and during much of its first decades, LBS focused on the 
education of British managers. However towards the end of the 1980s a broader and 
more intemational perspective was gradually developed. In this regard, the School's 
demography showed steady increases not only in the number of non-UK students 
but also in its Faculty. Following the trend towards business internationalisation, it 
was during Professor George Bain's Deanship (1989-1997) that a conscious 
reorientation of LBS towards a fully international outlook took place. 256 
Moreover, since 1990, LBS has gone through a process to internationalise the 
School, with a particular focus on the student and Faculty bodies, to raise the 
quality of its research to international standards, and to deliver programmes capable 
of attracting students from around the world. Its high academic research standards 
have enabled the School to be considered among the top global Business Schools. 
In this regard, it seems relevant to highlight that LBS is a professional school 
(AINIUEBK, 2006) with high quality research standards and strong scholarly impact. 
This has been the result of a strategic initiative which encouraged the School to 
follow the US academic model to strengthen its research capabilities. 
LBS's increasing variation in the percentages of both students and Faculty, 
bears witness to the extent to which this international orientation has transformed 
the School. As for the non-UK Faculty, it has greatly increased, from 18% in 1989 
to 74% in 2004. Likewise, the proportion of non-UK students has increased from 
51% to 77% during the same period. 
257 
256 LBS 2003 EQUIS Report 
257 LBS 2003 EQUIS Report 
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Thus, over time, LBS has been seeking to be a world leader within the 
management education industry. Not only is the positioning of the full-time MBA 
highly distinctive; also, LBS has developed a strong, international Executive 
Education portfolio which is seen as central for the successful future development 
of the School, and a significant revenue-raiser. Finally, in seeking to achieve global 
reach and impact LBS has formed a series of strategic alliances in key parts of the 
world: the US, India and the Middle East. 
The importance of internationalisation in the LBS's mindset is emphasised in 
both its current vision and mission statements. In this regard, "It is the vision of 
London Business School to be the pre-eminent global Business School, nurturing 
talent and advancing knowledge in a multi-national, multi-cultural learning 
environment. , 
258As for LBS' mission, it is two-fold: "To provide students with the 
knowledge, skills, values and networks -the global business capabilities - 
required for leadership and success in the global economy; and to foster 
outstanding research that is rigorous, relevant and innovative on the dynamics of 
global business for students, business leaders, and government leaders throughout 
the world. , 
259 
To achieve its vision, LBS declares that it needs to build on its strengths, 
which include world-class Faculty and students; excellent, influential research; a 
broad portfolio of degree programmes; outstanding executive education; global 
learning opportunities; professional management, Staff and services; and a unique 
258 LBS 2003 EQUIS Report, p. 3 
259LBS 2003 EQUIS Report, p. 3 
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location - London, a hub of global business, finance, technology and culture, is a 
unique asset in the realisation of its mission and the achievement of its purpose. 
Notwithstanding this internationalised orientation, since the School continues 
to operate within the UK higher education system, it has to meet the demands 
placed upon it. In this regard, LBS is subject to the HEFCE 260ý s Research 
Assessment Exercise and comes under the auspices of the UK's Quality Assurance 
Agency. Its top ranking in this assessment exercise enables LBS to obtain a block 
grant to fund academic purposes. However, only 5% of the School's total revenues 
(around f4 million per annum) are received as funding from Government. 
Thus, LBS generates most of its income from other sources, mainly 
programme fees and research grants from alumni and corporate supporters. 
Moreover, as it does not have the benefit of an endowment fund, the economic 
model of the School is still under pressure to pursue its purpose of remaining and 
consolidating its position as one of the top Business Schools world-wide. Hence, the 
School operates as a commercial business and obtains most of its annual income 
from student fees. 
In this regard, the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s implied a 
turning point in the School's strategic direction. The different circumstances of the 
environmental scenario triggered a shift from being simply a top UK Business 
School to pursue the ai-m of becoming a top Business School worldwide. This 
substantial endeavour, which dramatically reshaped the School's character, required 
260 Higher Education Funding Council for England 
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tough decisions that affected the LBS status quo with cultural, academic and 
economic consequences. 
These features not only differentiate LBS from other top-tier Business 
Schools, but have also enabled the School to become a world-class institution. 
Thus, it seems particularly interesting to observe and understand how strategic 
leadership as a social influence process has shaped the strategic agenda building and 
executing, affecting the unfolding of events throughout LBS's growth, over time. 
Next, the study addresses the LBS's history and the main events that enable 
one to visualise the strategic leadership process through the strategic agenda- 
building and -executing, over the period 1990-2004. In order to allow for a deeper 
methodological description of LBS's history, the study has divided it into three 
periods (social dramas 261) according to turning points that propelled critical 
changes in the School's direction (see Appendix): 1) Making LBS a top league 
international School (1990-1997); 2) Deepening the strategy of 
internationalisation, Faculty transformation, and enhancing LBSs visibility and 
revenues (1998-2002); 3) Enhancing LBS visibility and jundraising activities 
(2002-2004). It is relevant to note that the 'social dramas' at LBS were the points of 
leadership succession as the School changed from Dean to Dean. 
Thus, the study will visualise how the SLP operates along the chosen strategic 
issue that will act as a vehicle for its operationalisation - becoming a top 
international Business School. Accordingly, this strategic issue will be observed 
261 Pettigrew (1979) 
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through the set of initiatives or episodes that triggered decisions and actions aimed 
at achieving it. For example, the first episode is related to a number of initiatives 
undertaken by Dean George Bain with the purpose of making LBS a top-league 
international School. The second episode describes those initiatives carried out by 
John Quelch, in order to deepen LBS's strategy of internationalisation, Faculty 
transformation, and enhancement of LBS's visibility and revenues. Finally, the third 
episode refers to those initiatives led by Laura Tyson with the purpose of enhancing 
LBS's visibility and fundraising activities. 
Table 19: Strategic issue observed through three episodes according to each 
Deanship 
Business School LBS 
Strategic issue Becomin try, a top international Business School 
Period 1990-1997 1998-2001 2002-2004 
Set of decisions and Making LBS a top- Deepening the strategy of Enhancing LBS 
actions to promote league international internationalisation, visibility and 
School Faculty transformation, fundraising activities 
and enhancing LB S 
visibility and revenues 
2. Overview of the History of LBS 
The origins of the London Business School were rooted in UK public policy 
concerns about industrial performance and the education of managers. It was 
founded in 1965 on the recommendation of the Franks Report of 1963, regarding 
the establishment of two high-quality university Business Schools, one associated 
with the University of London, and the other, with the University of Manchester. 
The Franks report proposed that such Schools should provide both postgraduate and 
post-experience non-degree programmes, and that, while part of major universities, 
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should nevertheless enjoy considerable autonomy as Partnerships between 
university and businesS. 262 
Thus, in 1964, Lord Plowden was appointed First Chairman and William 
Barnes Secretary of the Government Body of what was at first called the London 
Institute of Business Management. The underlying thought about what it was 
expected to achieve was an improvement in Britain's economic performance, an 
increase in productivity. Much closer co-operation between industry and 
universities was emphasised. Through better management, manufacturing industry 
would be transformed and become more competitive and thus, Britain would once 
again become a net exporter of manufactured goods. 263 
From the beginning, LBS set out to become a high-quality standard-setter - 
a centre of excellence, in the pursuit of knowledge to provide a better understanding 
of the problems of management and their solution. Its high scholarly impact 
research was considered as the base for the programme of instruction, both in 
providing materials and in keeping both teachers and students alive to the dynamics 
of the business scene. Thus, Faculty members were encouraged not only to impart 
existing knowledge to others through good teaching but also to undertake their own 
research and to publish results. 
The importance LBS always granted to research has been evident since the 
School's early days. In this regard, a Doctoral programme was created in 1969, with 
the intention to make a substantial contribution to the critical shortage of well- 
262 LBS 2003 EQUIS Report 
263 Barnes (1989) 
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trained teachers that would be needed by 1980, according to the National Economic 
Development Office. Grants made by the Ford Foundation and the Foundation for 
Management Education made this programme possible. 264 
Thus, over its first quarter-century, despite its British roots and shape since 
its origin, LBS provided its students with a postgraduate education based on the best 
American model, with an admixture of post-experience programmes and a strong 
research element to inform its teaching. There was recognition that American 
industry was more powerful than British due to the intellectual training of business 
people in business subjects early in their careers. The School constantly adapted its 
programmes to meet changing circumstances. The demand for its programmes and 
activities has remained strong. 
3. Period 1. George Bain (1990-1997) LBS: From top UIK Business School to top 
ten world-wide 
1. Background 
Towards the mid 1980s, the world, and particularly continental Europe and 
Japan, showed signs of big economic, technological and geopolitical changes. 
Particularly within Europe, barriers fell and new markets emerged. These 
tumultuous changes were magnified by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
Within the UK, in particular, the Tory goverment under Margaret Thatcher 
took the lead in the deregulation and privatisation and the need to reduce state 
264 Bames (1989) 
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expenses. From this sprang the idea that Business Schools could stand on their own 
two feet and thus, funding for British students was gradually removed. "Most 
British students would get their fees paid by the govemment, and they would also 
get a grant for doing an NMA. And this was quite generous funding and the School 
would also have funding which came from the university funding council: The 
Universities Grants Commission. But the government stopped or almost threatened 
to stop aiding the Business Schools. , 
265 
At that point, before the funding was removed, LBS had to take a certain 
number of British students in order to receive the government grants. Thus, 
circumstance drove LBS to take overseas students, who were charged higher fees. 
Concurrently, the internationalisation of business appeared as a robust trend 
world-wide. These were times of Peter Moore's (1984-1989) Deanship at LBS. The 
School was facing the withdrawal of the govemment, which would eventually leave 
it in pretty bad financial shape. People remember there was increasing discontent 
and anxiety. 
On the other hand, in 1988, Fortune Magazine published an article about the 
top Business Schools in Europe, considering London Business School second only 
to INSEAD, the number one within Europe. This acted as a catalyst for the 
emergent crisis the School was facing. "The School had assumed from its inception 
that it was the best Business School in Europe and not short of arrogance in 
265 paUl MarSh, former LB S Faculty Dean 
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academic institutions, of course. And they had worked on this assumption I think 
since they were founded. 9ý266 
This came as a huge shock for the LBS community. George Bain asserts, 
"There has to be some kind of external shock [ ... ]. It's certainly very helpful. The 
wise external shock was the whole self perception of LBS being the best washed 
OUCý 
As a result, the Faculty rose up and rebelled against the renewal of the 
tenure of the current Dean. Thus, the Governing Body understood that there was a 
need to look for a new vision, fresh ideas. It decided to look for a new Dean from 
outside the School. The Governing Body looked for a distinguished and successful 
individual with an entrepreneurial outlook to manage and market the School, 
someone with a background either in business or management education, who 
combined academic qualifications with leadership and general management ability. 
His or her objective would be to ensure that the School was transformed in order to 
be recognised worldwide as one of the most respected centres of management 
education and research. 
267 
In November 1988, George Bain, Dean of the Warwick Business School, 
was appointed Principal of the London Business School. He would take up his 
duties in August 1989. 
266 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
267 Barnes (1989) 
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Bain was born in Canada in 1939. He was educated at the Winnipeg State 
School where, in 1961, he obtained the equivalent of a first-class honours degree in 
economics and political science. In 1964, he took an MA in Economics in the 
University of Manitoba. He also received a Doctorate in Industrial Relations at 
Nuffield College, Oxford, in 1969. 
3.2. Shaping and communicating the new strategy 
Bain was appointed in November 1988, but he did not take over until August 
1989. He declares that this "actually turned out to be a huge advantage" since he 
took that period "to start seeing a few people, [... ] all of the Faculty. " He also spent 
time visiting around a dozen American Business Schools and tried to become as 
well informed as he could about what was going on in the management education 
industry. 
By the time he arrived at LBS and took over as the new Dean, Bain had 
"seen over 200 people. " He recalls, "I've basically seen everybody: I've seen all the 
Faculty, I've seen all the key administrators, I've seen several people outside the 
School, I've seen representative students and I've seen key people on the Governing 
Body. But they were the least important. [ ... ] Although Sainsbury 
268 was my boss, 
my real boss was the Faculty. [ ... ]I was sort of the 'first amongst the equals' so I 
wasn't too worried about the Governing Body. " 
268David Sainsbury was the Chair of the LBS Governing Body during Bain's tenure 
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This enabled him to understand people's different perspectives on LBS's 
situation and their expectations related to the School's direction. "I'm a pretty good 
listener and I took on board everybody's points . "269Thus, by the time he took over, 
Bain already knew what had to be done. He understood there was a need to put LBS 
in the international map, mostly because the School was already the top Business 
School in the UK. "We wanted to be a top 10 in the world. [ ... ] So I didn't 
encourage them to compare themselves with Britain because it was too comfortable. 
How do you compare with Harvard? How do you compare with INSEAM Those 
are the comparisons I thought were relevant. , 
270 
However, to be able to position LBS at a top international level, George 
Bain felt that he would have to tackle different issues. First of all there was an issue 
of "reputation'9271 for playing behind INSEAD in the international business 
education market according to rankings. Second, "Disciplinary imbalance [ ... ] the 
strength of LBS on those days, were two areas: economics and finance. Strategy, 
marketing, operations, what I would call the central business disciplines were very 
weak. [ ... ] The third thing was it was very British. Seventy-five per cent of the 
students were British and the Faculty were I think 90% British. And our major 
competitor was INSEAD who was training as being truly international'. ) 272 in both 
Faculty and student body. 
In this regard, David Sainsbury, a member of the Governing Body who 
became Chairman at that time, was one of the most important benefactors of the 
269 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
270 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
27' George Bain, former LB S Dean 
272 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
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School. He definitely saw the need for change. "The Faculty, everybody (I say 
everybody), almost everybody saw the need for change. ý273 As a general 
presumption, people knew the status quo was no longer viable. 
The fourth issue referred to the economic and financial model which was 
threatened by the government decisions to reduce the funding of higher education. 
"It was not at all clear if the students would pay the fees that we needed to charge 
them to cover up costs. " 
274 
Finally, as Paul Marsh said, "When George came in, there was a financial 
issue on how to put the School on a sound footing. There was the issue of making a 
virtue of necessity and having a strategy [ ... ] And there was also an issue with the 
Faculty that it was very hard to hire Faculty because we were still very constrained 
by the British University system: we could not pay salaries that were internationally 
competitive; the salaries were not merit based in any way, they were seniority based 
- you got a pay rise: you went one point up the scale for every year that you 
stayed. And so, it was a hopeless system. And the general level was far too low to 
attract an internationally renowned Faculty. " 
Thus, as soon as he took over, Bain presented his Agenda for Change 
organised in a document called Bias towards a StratqT, which compiled and 
articulated what LBS people alleged needed to be done, in a coherent, unified and 
focused way. 
27' George Bain, former LBS Dean 
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In writing this kind of document,, Bain intended to provide the basis for a 
strategy -a set of guiding principles - that could be used to develop a series of 
operational objectives. Accordingly, there were four issues that Bain insisted should 
be tackled: firstly, the School had to achieve a disciplinary balance; secondly, it had 
to become international in terms of students, Faculty, Governing Body and 
programme content; thirdly, it had to enlarge its scale; and finally, it had to become 
financially sustainable. 
He concluded, "If the broad outline of what I have written above is 
acceptable to the School, then it must now go on to develop these objectives. In 
particular, it must devise a five-year academic plan, a five-year financial plan, and a 
generally agreed mission statement that links these plans together. Since the School 
exists in a highly turbulent environment, these documents need to be ready no later 
than April, 1990. -)-)275 
The Faculty reacted in a positive manner to Bain's document. People agree 
they felt released. They had been drifting aimlessly over the previous years, but 
now they knew what the School's direction would be. And even more, Bain was 
"being very clear about what we expected, and certainly, probably being very clear 
to meet those objectives. , 276 In this regard, Bain agrees: "I think the Faculty were 
very happy; even if they weren't happy with the detail they were happy that now 
there was a Captain on the ship who was saying, 'This is where we should go. ' If 
they didn't like it at least they could argue. But they knew where they were going. " 
2" Bain (1989: 73) 
276 Lynn Hoffinan, LBS Associate Dean of Executive MBA and Global Executive NIBA 
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As for the Governing Body, Bain affirms: "It was never a problem in my 
time. [ ... ] As long as the Faculty weren't revolting and the School was in a 
financially healthy state, they were happy. " 
3.3. Getting people on Board to make change happen 
Bain recognised that "Coming up with visions and strategies is pretty easy 
actually. The tough thing is implementing. That's our work. I said, 'It's all in place. 
All we have to do now is make it work and that's going to take several years. "' 
Accordingly, even though he could count on the School's Governing Body, he 
would need the Faculty's support. "The Governing Body would always say, 
'George, you are the Chief Executive. Just like the Chief Executive of a company. ' 
And I'd say, 'No, no, no, I'm not. ' I'd said, 'At best think of me as the managing 
partner of a law firm or a consultancy. ' Those who I supposedly am the boss of, 
actually, have the vote, the power to fire me, not legally but you know, if they 
preferred not to have me, you're finished. "277 
In this regard, Bain knew he would not be able to implement changes on his 
own. "You had the Management Board which was the big driver in the School, and 
you had Faculty Board which was more or less the Parliament that it probably could 
stop something. But if all the Faculty rose up and said, 'No', you'd be in big 
trouble. -)ý278 
277 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
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Thus, the time he had spent listening to people, before taking over as Dean, 
enabled him to identify those key Faculty members that supported him. In this 
regard, he built "a team around him. [The Management Board Steering Group 
(MBSG), usually called Management Committee. ] We did not have a management 
committee before George Bain. , 279 
The creation of the Management Committee, which in formal terms reported 
to the Management Board, enabled Bain to identify key Faculty members and build 
sufficient consensus. In this regard, Rob Goffee asserts "George, I think, is a very 
strong and dominant kind of character with lots of very good qualities as an 
academic leader. I think he was quite skilful at ensuring that team around him and 
help him. " 280 
People agree that this group of four or five people was the group that really 
ran the School on a day-to-day basis. Among these, Paul Marsh was the Dean of 
Faculty, Gerry Quincey, with whom he had worked at Warwick Business School, 
Secretary and Treasurer and Paul Geroski, Dean of the MBA. "Paul Marsh was the 
key person. Paul is Professor of Finance; he was my right hand. He's been an ally 
all, all this way. Very smart guy, not just intellectually but also politically. ý281 
'Paul Geroski, Professor of Economicsý fantastic5 a wonderful scholar, 
tremendous teacher. He took over the MBA and went from two streams to three 
streams. He grew the programme. [ ... ] Gerry was very, very important in terms of 
279 Rob Goffee, former Dean of Executive Education during John Quelch's tenure 
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advice, guidance, you know, very, very tight to the School finances. ý5282 Bain 
recognises: "I delegated several things. For example, I'm not strong in finance but 
I'm smart enough to make sure that I would have somebody present who is Gerry 
Quincey. " 
In this regard, Bain did not have good financial sense. "He was more 
concerned with a kind of bigger picture, where the School is going. [ ... ] He was 
much more interested in management, and what kind of programmes, what kind of 
plans, where we were going, was the Faculty becoming involved. 5283 
Paul Marsh agrees Gerry Quincey was a key person during Bain's tenure, 
"Gerry was a strategist, he was a strong support for George and he sort of balanced 
George when he felt George needed moderating. And Gerry was also someone that 
people went to and comparatively, say he was a very important information 
channel. [ ... ] He could listen to grand plans which he had to translate into financial 
plans. " 
3.4. Leading change in LBS 
a) Transforming the Facultyprofile 
For LBS to become a top-tier Business School within the international 
market competing with top Business Schools, several issues emerged as big 
challenges: internationalisation not only in terms of Faculty, but also of students 
282 Michael Hay, LBS Deputy Dean and Secretary 
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and content of programmes and research. This entailed an increase in the size of 
LBS facilities. But every initiative demanded a sound economic and financial 
situation. 
The most critical tasks were related to the transformation of the academic 
model in terms of developing a world-class Faculty with US research standards and 
teaching disciplinary balance in order to enhance executive education. Thus, 
systems and policies were shaped. 
Moreover, Paul Marsh carried out a complete revision of the Faculty Human 
Resources Policy. Michael Hay, LBS Deputy Dean and Secretary during Tyson's 
tenure recalls: "It was the first time in which someone would lay out that explicitly. 
Paul Marsh was the Faculty Dean and basically wrote a lot of what is now called the 
HR. which is the Human Resources Policy. And we have a new comprehensive 
document called a HR-P and that was presented back in the early '90s. " 
Thus, Faculty compensations became a priority. In this regard, Faculty 
salaries were separated from the UK university salary scale, so that the School 
moved towards paying salaries that were competitive with US salaries. This would 
facilitate Faculty recruitment. "It was very well received by the Faculty. It was a 
very long j ourney. The j ourney on paying market rates at a salary level. 9ý284 
However, transforming systems generated substantial opposition since they 
were oriented towards performance-related pay. Thus, "some people would be 
284 Nfichael Hay, LBS Deputy Dean and Secretary during Tyson's tenure 
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making three times their salary. ý-)285 This was "part of the process of increasing 
salaries expecting more from Faculty. There was a significant debate focused 
around that. " 286 The opposition came from people "who feared that performance 
would be judged too narrowly in some way. ýý287 
There was also resistance to the new policies being introduced since they 
contrasted with old ones and set constraints on consulting. "What George did was to 
clarify that but not more than that. And there was some opposition to that. , 288 
In this regard, Bain recalls, "We were going to introduce a system where 
people might get zero or 20% or whatever. And a lot of people, particularly the 
weaker members of the Faculty, people who thought they wouldn't be able to get 
the 20%, it might be closer to zero, they weren't happy, they weren't happy. And 
there was no question that was a big, a big struggle. I mean, everybody thought 'oh, 
boy, it would be great to get higher salaries. ' That was a bigger carrot than you 
might have thought, because a lot of these people make a lot of money by 
consulting. " 
In Bain's perspective, there's a "honeymoon period. You've got six months, 
eight months, a year at most, to bring the big changes in. " Another critical 
consideration was that probably the most significant challenge he faced in this 
transfonnative process was changing the Faculty. 
285 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
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In talking about the major challenge he had to face during his tenure at LBS, 
Bain points to transforming the LBS Faculty from British to international. He 
explains how this implied altering the School's culture and behaviours, turning 
them global. In getting involved with the EFNM and the 'Big Three "289, he realised 
how complex the cultural issue was, since it implied transforming into global 
players not only the students but also the "Staff, governing bodies, the curriculumý 
you know, it really was quite complex. " He affirms "If you changed culture at the 
end or at the beginning, you had to change behaviours. I think probably the biggest 
challenge was to change the Faculty. [ ... ]I knew the culture would change 
eventually if we changed the Faculty. " 
Moreover, Bain believes the function of leadership ils to produce more 
leaders, not more followers. " 290 Moreover, he adds, "It was that I created the 
enviromnent in which Gerry could become a leader, Paul Marsh could become a 
leader, Paul Geroski could become a leader. And they coped with the challenges 
and they became leaders. I mean, I think for an organisation to be successful, there 
has to be leadership at several different levels. It is no such great hero at the top of 
the organisation. It's got to be at several different levels. " 
In fact, Bain "very much worked on a kind of one to one basis. Let's say, I 
would again see him on a fairly regular basis and talked to him about what was 
happening, what we were doing, where we were going. Much delegation. [ ... ] He 
didn't micromanage but he did take a keen interest in every detail. Not 'hands-on', 
289 Meeting among Deans of LBS, IMD and INSEAD 
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just keeping track. He saw his job was putting the right people in place to do the 
job. And when they were there, he gave them freedom to get on with it.,, 
291 
But Bain did not carry out these changes on his own. "Not alone. He is an 
organisational behaviour man, very good at process he devoted a lot of 
time to the operational leadership dimension. ý-)292 In this regard, Saul Estrin asserts 
that in his view, the Dean had four leadership roles: "One is the external visibility 
role; the second is the 'fundraising' role; [ ... ] The third role is 'intellectual 
leadership' [ ... ] and the fourth is the 'operational leadership'. 
). )293 
As for Bain's operational role, his approach was based on a very clear view 
of where the School had to get to. He used to set up "serious steps on tasks, that he 
used to call 'key tasks', every year: his thought of what the next key task were for 
the next twelve months. Then George said, 'Key task 27, how is it getting on? Key 
task 5T If we were going to achieve all the key tasks, if we were going to achieve 
the big goals. , 
294 
In leading this critical change process, Bain asserts: "My role if anything 
was more one of mentoring. I had frequent meetings every week or two, would 
depend on, you know, with Paul mainly, what's happening, where do you need 
help, more political help, etc. I think the role of the Dean and assuming that Geroski 
was doing his job correctly to take him as an example, was not to tell how to do it, 
you know he would keep me apart. It was more to run interference for him (I use an 
291 Michael Hay, Deputy Dean and Secretary during Tyson's tenure 
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American football analogy - it was to support him politically to make sure that he 
had felt that he had the backing). 5ý295 
Thus, Bain just provided his people with political help. For example, he 
declares he would not have been able to carry out any reforms if he had not counted 
on Marsh. "He wrote the Faculty Guidelines which were critical. We brought in 
reforms about the pay, reforms that were instrumental. I can't give him enough 
credit for the role he played. Paul together with Gerry Quincey. [ ... ]I could not 
have done without them. [ ... ] And if you say to me, 'What did you achieve? ' The 
answer is, 'Nothing, ' in the sense that well, it was Paul Geroski who saved the 
MBAý it was Gerry who turned around all the finances, it was Paul Marsh who set 
up the Faculty. You know, almost everything you've achieved has been through 
somebody else. And it's by creating an environment in which Gerry can work, Paul 
Marsh can work, Paul Geroski can work and they know that they are going to get 
your political support. That's your contribution. It's not that you're doing'these 
thiligs. " 296 
Moreover, in describing the way in which he overcame resistance to achieve 
the goals pursued, Bain declares he was proactive in putting "together the coalitions 
that would be necessary to get this through. 59 297 Bain adds: "Leadership is the 
I-I'k ability to get someone else to do what you want done because they want to do it. 
And it breaks down into three: the ability to get someone else - delegation - to do 
what you want done - motivation - because they want to do it, you know, no, sorry, 
making someone else do what you want done - delegation - what you want done - 
295 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
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that means direction - what you want done - direction - because they want to do it 
- motivation. " 
b) Expanding LBS portfolio programmes 
Rob Goffee, former Dean of Executive Education during Quelch's tenure, 
recalls, "I think a significant part of George's strategy, of the School strategy, was 
to grow the volume of our programs and increase profits and that period I think was 
of more radical growth and radical increasing processes. The major way in which 
the School was able to be lifted so far and begin to pay North American salaries was 
through the organic growth of programmes within the School. " 
Recruiting a world-class Faculty would allow LBS to attract overseas 
students. However, this would not be enough. LBS was an MBA School with scarce 
executive education. In this regard, Bain asserts the School had "a dreadful image" 
with potential students and a bad reputation amongst employers "because employers 
don't care too much about the MBA. They care mainly about Executive Education 
and LBS was not taking Executive Education seriously. " 
Given that "having international salaries and performance were the bases" 
298 Bain called attention to the need for a more vocational institution with a 
balanced excellence so that executive education would be developed. He argued, "If 
you were teaching executives you couldn't teach science. Maybe with finance 
directors you could but not with general managers. And of course, in general, they 
298 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
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didn't want finance anyway. They wanted marketing and strategy, operations. 
things that we were weak in. " 
But some Faculty members disagreed, since they believed executive 
education should be kept in its proper place as a minority activity, not as a central 
activity. "Opposition would come again from those Faculty who either couldn't do 
it because again if you don't teach too well, some people are very good at teaching 
young MBAs or undergraduates who have no credibility in front of Senior 
Managers, no credibility at all . "299 Gerry Quincey remembers addressing the 
opposition, "We have Faculty salaries going up in a rapid way and in order to pay 
for this we need this much. If we don't expand executive education will somebody 
tell me where the money is coming from? " 
Within the opposition there was the Finance group. "They have always been 
very powerful and still are. But they fell out with Bain because his priorities were 
different. Bain's priorities were to strengthen groups out of the finance. [] 
Finance did fall out as a group; it fell out with Bain. , 300 Again, Bain explains he 
dealt with opposition, firstly, "by building coalitions and making sure that what was 
coming up would be, would have fairly broadly based support. " Secondly, since he 
truly believes in managing by walking around, he used to walk the halls of the 
School "Trying to see people face to face. Don't send the memos for sure, don't 
even make telephone calls if you can avoid it, I love just to walk and open the 
people's offices. " 
299 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
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Finally, Bain asserts he also focused on building sources of power such as 
success, setting direction, setting guidelines and communicating them, expertise and 
listening to people. These permitted him to obtain enough support to deal with the 
opposition. "I am a great believer that you've got to get some quick wins. 
You've probably got I don't know, six months or something where people have got 
to give you the benefit of the doubt. Then you start needing to deliver things, be 
very successful in fundraising or people can begin to see initially the place changing 
and so on. [ ... ] But I think the main power came because we started off, we set 
some objectives, and we began to deliver. [ ... ] If people knew where they stood, 
they knew where the School was going, it gave them some confidence. [... ] 
Expertise, you know, this guy knows how to handle people. Or another thing, when 
youýre talking, let the others do the questions, you learn a lot more when you 
listen. " 301 
c) Fundraising 
However, in developing Faculty, students and programmes, LBS would also 
have to tackle the issue of space. "Are you a more research School, are you a big 
MBA School, are you an executive education School, they have completely 
different implications for the infrastructure. An LBS basic problem which has been 
true really since Bain's days, we have both, we neither have endowment nor 
space. , 
302 
301 George Bain, fonner LBS Dean 
302 Saul Estrin, fonner LBS Dean of Faculty 
355 
Thus, he also concentrated in developing fundraising in a systematic way. In 
this regard, he set up a development office and hired a Development Director. "We 
went around most of the world, once a year. We had a big team. We didn't do it all 
in one trip. [... ] I met the Alumni, which had hardly ever been involved in the 
School before. I spent a lot of time getting them on Board. [ ... ]I had very good 
Faculty Deans who did a lot of the detail but I had to be around. [ ... ] And by the 
time I left, the department had 13 or 14 people - professional fundraisers, as a force. 
And this sounds all very self-serving but during my time we raised more money I 
think than it had ever been raised previously, which I might add was not saying a 
lot. But we raised about 2.5 million pounds to build the new library. ý13O3 
In characterising Bain's ability to develop the School's fundraising, Saul 
Estrin, fonner LBS Faculty Dean during Quelch's tenure, asserts, "He would 
personally have built close relationship with people like David Sainsbury, and they 
would give him money. [ ... ] He combined slightly unusually, a charisma - we 
never had a Dean as charismatic as Bain. A visionary guy. Very charismatic. " 
In sum, Bain tumed LBS into an international player with international 
ambitions. "He made it a global player by exploiting important contacts, by 
cultivating the academic, and by having a vision. , 304 He managed to restore the 
School's economic situation, although its business model was not transformed. "We 
don't have an endowment. As simple as that. We pay our way. [ ... ] Nice 
little 
School, little niche player, high quality research, not terribly many students, etc. 
The problem is we have no endowment. So what happens is that we build the big 
303 George Bain, former LBS Dean 
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executive education thing and really a lot of programmes, but the Faculty don't 
identify with this and this is a leadership problem and you know, so we have a huge 
executive education, I think the fourth in the world, but almost no Faculty teach in 
it. -)ý305 
However, Bain declares "If I deserve any credit, it was to have probably, the 
mtuition, (oh! I've made some mistakes, of course), to pick some very good people 
,, 306 to be champions of products, of policies... 
Towards the end of Bain's tenure, there were three internal candidates for 
the Deanship (these were Bain's three deputies: David Currie, Tom Robertson and 
Michael Earl, who was the current LBS Faculty Dean and was Acting Dean, since 
Bain left before his successor took over) and an external one, who was in due 
course elected: John Quelch, a Professor of Marketing at Harvard Business School 
(BBS). 
John Quelch was bom in London, England. He was educated at Exeter 
College, Oxford University (BA and NIA), the Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania (MBA), the Harvard School of Public Health (MS) and Harvard 
Business School (DBA). 
At the time he was appointed Dean of London Business School, he was the 
Sebastian S. Kresge Professor of Marketing and Co-Chair of the Marketing Area at 
HBS. 
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15. Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during the period 1990-1997 
Thus far, this "episode") refers to the main events that took place in LBS 
between 1990 and 1997. It has focused on the initiatives put into the strategic 
agenda and implemented by Dean George Bain with the purpose of making LBS a 
top-league international Business School. 
Among the set of decisions and actions included in the School's agenda over 
this period, the study underlined the following: firstly, setting and communicating a 
new and clear strategy for LBS to position itself and compete in the international 
market of management education, in terms of Faculty and student body, research; 
programme content and portfolio and critical size and scale. Secondly, shaping the 
School's academic profile towards a 'balance excellence' in tenns of disciplinary 
balance (between academic disciplines). Finally, enhancing the School's financial 
and economic situation. 
In terms of Main Generic Interests, prioritisation by each of the key actors - 
Dean, Faculty and Board (see Tables that show reliability coding in the Appendix) - 
the Dean prioritised strategic agenda-building and -executing, by setting a clear 
strategic direction for the School through the document Bias towards strategy. As 
for the School's performance, a number of measures were put in place to enhance 
its financial and economic shape given the need to replace government funding and 
compete in the international market in recruiting new Faculty at higher salaries. 
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In setting the School's agenda, the Dean involved the Faculty and most 
constituencies (Faculty and Board support). Thus, an inclusive agenda that 
represented all key actors' Main Generic Interests was developed. It included the 
Board's interest related to the School's governance as well as Faculty's, and 
referred to collegial participation in the School's strategic decisions. 
3.5.1. Critical elements for George Bain to succeed in setting the 
agenda. 
The transfonnation of LBS, which started towards the end of the 1980s, was 
triggered by some external circumstances that produced the sense of frustration 
needed to recognise the School's isolation from business internationalisation. 
Signals from the outside world included the following: the increasing trend towards 
mternationalisation in the business world; an article in Fortune Magazine putting 
INSEAD in top position, above LBS; growing concern within Faculty about LBS's 
reputation, positioning and future capacity to compete in a more internationalised 
business world and management education industry. Moreover, the decision from 
the Government to reduce funding for management education triggered uncertainty 
regarding the future economic sustainability of the School. 
These circumstances facilitated George Bain's task of setting a breakthrough 
agenda for change that constituted a "turning point" in tenns of the School's 
strategic direction, resource allocation and organisational capabilities, culture, 
systems and structure. 
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3.5.2. Legitimisation and Power mobilisation 
Before taking charge, Bain devoted several months to meeting people who 
would provide him with a broader perspective of what LBS needed. He wrote down 
his conclusions in a document which he handed to most of the LBS community - 
Bias Toivards Strategy. This document referred to the strategic direction he would 
give to LBS, and to the way in which he would lead the School, transforming it into 
a top-league institution. 
A number of reasons contributed to legitimate Bain's initiative: a) involving 
key people through the Dean's skilful and effective effort to allow them to express 
their views and worries about the future of LBS; b) effective analysis, synthesis and 
articulation to express people's views and concerns; c) clear and wide-ranging 
communication of priorities and guidelines, in setting the strategic direction of the 
School through the Bias Towards Strategy document; d) political ability to share 
with key Faculty (Paul Marsh, Paul Geroski) and Board members (David 
Sainsbury) the critical tasks and directions in moving forward; e) the Dean's 
untiriing effort and initiative to move forward in each of the critical initiatives: 
removing obstacles, giving the political support his collaborators needed, building 
coalitions to overcome resistance avoiding unnecessary battles, listening to people; 
f) Delivering early results. 
Thus, Bain encouraged every member of the LBS community to carefully 
read the document and 'get on board'. Even though the Faculty and Board 
backgrounds were mostly British and conservative, he knew how to make them 
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combine their goals with his own interests. Bain's leadership style, characterised as 
visionary and directive, contributed to motivate others and build commitment 
jointly with his active role in problem-solving and decision-making. Finally his 
political and entrepreneurial skills combined with his consistent behaviour, enabled 
him to integrate key actors' interests and goals and thus, achieve effective results. 
V- 
r urfurther analysis refer to LBS Appendix V 
4. Period 11. John Quelch (1998-2001) LBS: a resource to the world 
4.1. Strengthening LBS as a top Business School world-wide 
John Quelch's vision was to create the most important and respected 
mternational Business School; his mission, 'transforming the futures'. This entailed 
ensuring that all 1,300 students, 450 Staff and 15,000 alumni were professionally 
and personally transformed by touching the LBS brand, the learning experience. In 
this regard, the principal objective that guided the School's operations was to fund 
growth while improving quality; its core values were those captured in the LBS 
SPEUT: scholarship, professionalism, innovation, relevance, internationalism and 
transformation. 
307 
In talking about his arrival at LBS, Quelch asserts that the most important 
accomplishment was first of all to get the Faculty, the alumni and the students to 
believe that the London Business School was as good as it was. "So job number I 
was really just to raise the confidence level of the institution. And if you have 
307 Quelch, 2001: 1 
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someone who comes from a full professorship at Harvard, you wouldn't do that if 
" 308 you didn't think there was something good about London Business School . 
Quelch wanted everybody to believe that they were part of something special, 
important, that had a lot of potential. And "Number 2 was to build scale. [ ... ] "You 
can't be a global School if we didn't have more scale, more revenues to hire more 
"309 Faculty because we just didn't have enough Faculty to be a global School . 
a) Quelch's own style: 'Just do it! ' 
From the Quelch perspective, he did not adopt any kind of conventional 
leadership style. Especially with regard to academia, he affirms: "I would listen to 
the Faculty but I wasn't really interested in listening that much because I knew what 
I wanted. If I asked too many questions and I had too much discussion-that there 
would be as is always the case in academia a 100 reasons not to do something. So 
my attitude was: just do it. " 
Quelch adds: "From a political management point of view, you launch your 
first initiative and there are some people who are against it. But before they can 
organise, you launch another initiative that splits that group because some people 
who opposed your first initiative are going to be in favour of the second. And so 
you basically keep splitting through initiative after initiative. You fragment the 
opposition. [ ... ] But you can't survive 
for ten years as a leader operating like this. 
So LI knew what I was doing. I knew it was going to be a short deanship, I wasn't 
308 John Quelch, former LBS Dean 
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sure it would be five years or three years but I was not interested in staying more 
than five years. " 
He was concerned about getting everybody to think that they were a team 
with the same set of objectives. To achieve this, he intended to create "real 
milestones and real progress, and real movement and new projects and new Faculty 
hires and every week that there's something new and more news and after you 
thought you had it all, even more news and just a pilot on. , 310 
Thus, Quelch focused on deepening the international visibility and profile of 
LBS. Firstly, he did this by strengthening the economic model, developing the 
Faculty size by transforming LBS systems and policies according to the US model; 
secondly, he expanded executive education dramatically and made it profitable; and 
he intended to develop fundraising. Thirdly, he undertook a serious of actions to 
position the LBS brand: regional advisory Boards, alumni clubs. "He did a lot to 
raise the profile of the School. He worked very hard for the School. He would 
attend every social function he was invited to and sometimes he would attend two 
or three in one evening. , 
311 
To carry out these actions he delegated to three people: Saul Estrin, Dean of 
Faculty; Rob Goffee, Dean of Executive Education; and Jeffrey Deffries, Secretary 
and Treasurer. It was Estrin who modified the recruiting system that would 
facilitate hiring world-class Faculty. Quelch asserts, "I basically delegated you 
know 80% to him. " In this regard, Estrin states, "My period as Faculty Dean is 
310 John Quelch, former LBS Dean 
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important. Quelch let me and Rob [Goffee, Dean of Executive Education] take the 
School in certain strategic directions. [ ... ] My role was essentially to create a 
seamless platform between LBS and US systems. " 
In order to become a top-tier Business School, Quelch pursued a policy to 
expand the size of the Faculty. However, this was not an easy task. "We couldn't 
hire, the salaries were too low, processes were too arcane, the titles were wrong. "312 
Thus, LBS shaped its hiring processes towards individualised salary negotiation. 
Saul Estrin asserts "Basically I introduced a complete US system. We are the only 
UK University with a US system. We have tenure, we have US salaries, we have 
market-based salaries. If you get an offer from London Business School, you would 
not know if you were not getting an offer from Columbia except from the letter. " 
As a result, the School hired 60 people over five years (1997-2002). Even 
though changing salaries was important, introducing tenure and titles had greater 
impact on Faculty recruitment. Estrin recalls, "Under Bain, finance just never hired. 
They couldn't cover their teaching because they just didn't have enough Faculty. 
They made offers and no one accepted. What happened in Quelch's period? They 
started to make offers and people accepted. There really was a change. " Moreover, 
most of the people hired during Bain's Deanship (no tenure system) gradually 
disappeared. 
Thus, the size of LBS Faculty increased by 60% during Quelch's period. 
"Within two and a half years I had the majority of the Faculty who had basically 
312 Saul Estrin, fonner Faculty Dean 
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come in under me. In those three years we hired something like 40 new Faculty; 
they came in, in three years. [ ... ] We were able to increase the compensation and 
become even more competitive in terms of recruiting high quality talent. 5-)313 
b) Increasing LBS visibility 
Quelch believed there was still much to be done with regard to "how to 
market the place. , 314 In this regard, LBS had to take advantage of its London 
location worldwide. "Because London is a highly competitive city like New York 
and you have to be out there everyday doing something, holding an event, getting in 
the face of someone, having publicity in the media. You have to be there everyday 
in order to get people to believe that you're actually doing something. And top of 
mind, awareness, very important. ), 
315 
Thus, Quelch committed himself to raising LBS's visibility. In doing so, 
people agree he "would have lots of ideas and some of those ideas would be really 
quite creative. A marketing man [ ... ] he worked very hard for the School. He would 
attend every social function he was invited to and sometimes he would attend two 
or three in one evening. , 
316 
The first results of the School's new initiative of expanding its brand were 
shown in the Financial Times rankings, where LBS came out at number 8. Quelch 
recalls, "In late 1998, you know,, that was the first six months I was there. We did 
quite a bit to cultivate the Financial Times and help them on a number of issues. 
313 
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And the bottom line was I remember that before the January '99 rankings, 
everybody was speculating on where London Business School is going to be. And 
for me it was a great result because the consensus around the whole ways was that 
you know it was around 20. And then, we come in number 8. " This position was 
sustained over three years. In this regard, Quelch recognised this position had been 
achieved as a result of George Bain's tenure since he had done an outstanding job in 
terms of LBS's inside management. 
In talking about the transfonnation that LBS went through during Quelch's 
tenure, Gay Haskings recalls, "Things changed a lot under John. [ ... ] It was a very 
big change. I think what John did is he really pushed this into technology. He was 
very keen on internationalisation. What George did, I think, was push the rule to 
mternationalise the student body and the Faculty. With John, he wanted you to do a 
lot of things outside the School and he got us established with all that it had to do 
with conferences, link up in Turkey, and link up here and there. He was quite into 
linkages. And he was very involved with your School in that way so he was very, 
very keen on linkages, probably more than the School itself was. The fact that the 
email address is London. edu is John, because he changed it from LBS. EC. UK to 
London. edu, which is very strong. " 
Moreover, Quelch set up Regional Advisory Boards, which also enhanced 
the School's visibility throughout the world. In this regard, Haskings adds, "So John 
set up the Regional Advisory Board around the world and, in my view, even though 
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the School doesn't have a camp, having these people around the world that you can 
show to them public that you've got link, is quite a good strategy. ý5317 
As a result of Quelch's strategy regarding LBS's marketing and brand 
building, there was "so much energy around London Business School that you 
know, people who would never, PhDs who wouldn't have thought of asking for an 
interview at London Business School started asking for interviews. ý-) 
318 In this 
regard, Quelch suggests: "Everybody wants to be part of something that they feel, 
Ws energy, it's on the move, it's successful and my job was really to create the 
energy, the atmosphere and so on. Again, it's something that had to be done as a 
short-term catalyst to, you know, it's like a battery to jump start the car engine, ok? 
You know, you couldn't keep that up with the same person for ten years. " 319 
c) Expanding LBS programmes with special focus on Executive Education 
Quelch took advantage of the prosperous market situation and not only 
pushed price increases but also undertook scale increases for its current 
programmes. Accordingly, a second stream was added to the Masters in Finance, 
and a third stream to the Executive MBA. Moreover, LBS also launched a Global 
Executive M[BA. This was the result of a strategic alliance with Columbia Business 
School not only regarding this degree programme, but also to bid jointly for large- 
scale executive education contracts. 
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In addition, the School also developed an MBA-level distance learning 
courses with Quisic of California, to expand its global reach. As for Executive 
Education, "Quelch was more actually an executive education person than he was a 
degree program person. And probably, the real rise in executive education, I don't 
know if it will show in the numbers but there's a sense in which there was a huge 
change in the School. ý320 
Accordingly, he appointed Rob Goffee Dean of Executive Education. 
Goffee "created a massive formal executive education which we brought into the 
School. Even in the days of Bain, revenues from executive education would have 
been 10%. In Quelch's, 60%. [Executive Education] was integrated into the School. 
So the management committee certainly had a Dean of Executive Education. " 321 
As a result, LBS degree programme revenues increased over 54% to f 18 
million, while executive education revenues expanded 75% to over E19 million. 
Half of LBS revenues came from overseas earnings broken down as follows: 
Westem Europe, 32%; North America, 30%; Asia-Pacific, 12%; Eastern Europe, 
6%; and Latin America, 4%. 
These initiatives impacted on the capacity of the School's site which was 
stretched, to add significantly to the School's cash flow, reduce programme office 
costs and increase the number of alumni graduating each year although close 
attention was given to improving quality as well. 
320 Saul Estrin, former LBS Faculty Dean 
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"The year I arrived in 1998, let's say 520 people graduated. In 2003, which 
would be the first year of graduation after all of these initiatives went in by 200 1, 
820 graduated. So in five years, the number of degree students increased 60% 
which is an enormous increase. , 
322 
However, in increasing the number of streams per degrees Quelch was 
particularly cautious in preventing this initiative from diluting the perceived value 
of the School's brand. 
In addition, expanding the number of streams also impacted the number of 
the School's alumni, whom Quelch invited to join Alumni Clubs and Regional 
Advisory Boards to motivate international research and to facilitate the School's 
presence throughout the world. 
"He had the idea that we should be represented within each region of the 
world, that there would be a Regional Advisory Board that would report the School 
and that would, you know, benefit from its attachment to the School, focusing in 
raising our profile around the world. iý323 
In this regard, by 2001, LBS had 34 overseas alumni clubs in 29 countries 
and seven Regional Advisory Boards with I 10 members from 38 countries, most of 
them chief executives. Each Board had a Chair who worked with a designated 
governor, a senior Faculty member and a student representative to help set the 
School's agenda for each region. 
322 John Quelch, former LBS Dean 
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d) LBS Research 
For its size and resource base, LBS was transformed into an outstanding 
institution of scholarship. The Financial Times survey ranked LBS third in research. 
The School started to apply strong scholarly standards in recruiting and promoting 
practices, especially to the rank of full professor. 
Accordingly, Quelch's main objective was to get the number of A-Journal 
articles published by LBS Faculty upgraded: the average number per professor, per 
year. He recalls, "So, we did that by removing bad people and hiring good people. 
That's number one. Secondly, by freeing up time for very good people to do more 
research and getting the economics of the institution lined up so you can do that. 
Thirdly, by celebrating more often, young people specially, who really do good 
work so I used to send bottles of wine and so on, around the School. " 
During Quelch's tenure, among many international research projects, LBS's 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor research project evaluated the level and 
determinants of entrepreneurship in 30 countries. LBS became a leading innovator 
in entrepreneurship teaching, research and business creation. Twenty start-ups led 
by LBS alumni operate in LBS's new business incubator, supported by seed capital 
funds in which LBS enjoys a percentage of the carried interest. 
Moreover, a DTI-funded joint venture with University College London, the 
Centre for Scientific Enterprise, enabled UCL scientific innovations to be 
commercialised using LBS know-how. Finally, a Silicon Valley Office was 
established and a unique entrepreneurship summer School was launched. 
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In talking about LBS's research initiatives during his tenure, Quelch 
explains, "In an under-financed institution, the Faculty are very entrepreneurial. 
You know, one of the tensions in a place like that is that the best Faculty are usually 
able to raise money for their own centres and then, they're doing fundraising mostly 
to fund their research independently of the centre. And if the centre starts to try and 
control this, you know, it's a problem because obviously they say, 'Well, you know, 
what have you done for me? You haven't helped me so why the hell should I not 
help myselff So, my feeling was that we had to prove at the centre that we could 
do fundraising in a positive way and gain their respect and then they would be a 
little bit more collaborative. Not giving up their independence but being 
collaborative. " 
e) Fundraising 
Quelch also focused on developing fundraising, although he was not able to 
launch the campaign he had planned before taking over as Dean. The Chairman of 
the Board with whom he had agreed as to his fundraising plans stepped down and 
was replaced by a Chairman who did not support the project. 
In this regard, he recalls "I thought we could use to market ourselves in the 
fundraising process. And so I've got need number one, need number two, need 
number four, need number three. So I presented this document to the Board of 
Governors and this is where politically I misjudged because these guys then were 
split. q-)324 Even though some Board members supported Quelch9s project, there were 
324 John Quelch, former LBS Dean 
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some People who were not committed enough. "And the Chairman basically didn't 
agree with the fundraising project. 325 
As for corporate subscriptions, LBS expanded its fundraising from about 
E100,000 to f 1,000,000. In this regard, Quelch acknowledges, "There were 20 
corporate sponsors of the School at L5,000 a year when I arrived and when I left 
there were something like 65 at f 15,000 a year. Forget about fellowships and so on 
but just the corporate subscriptions. [ ... ] So the international positioning, the global 
positioning really kind of captured their imagination and interest so they started 
putting money in. " 
With regard to the individual side, each graduating class was encouraged to 
make a gift to the School. So the first year, the MBAs graduated and they gave the 
School L100,000. "Then it went up to about E300,000. Now, this is not all gift, this 
. is pledges for the first four years up to their fifth year reunion. , 326 
Moreover, Quelch also contacted the older alumni. "'Look, our own 
graduates are giving LBS E300,000. How come you can't give us f 5,000 or 
fI0,000T So the idea was to shame them into giving. -027 
In sum, Quelch focused on very different issues to raise LBS's visibility and 
profile, extending its international reach, promoting the School more 
internationally, increasing the number of high-standard Faculty, establishing the 
Regional Advisory Boards and Alumni Clubs in different Parts of the world. "His 
325 John Quelch, former LBS Dean 
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approach was to do everything. He didn't have a strategy. He sorted out a hundred 
bullets and just wondered which ones would hit home. 5ý328 
In John Quelch's perspective, "It was a big step up for London Business 
School to get Laura Tyson to be Dean. [ ... ] after so much change, it needed 
someone to come and just calm everything down again; consolidate all of these 
programmes and initiatives and so forth. She's changed international to global and 
you know, done a few things like that but my, my impression is that she has not 
been a radical change agent but rather a good consolidator. And obviously, the 
rankings have improved since she's been there. And that's terrific! " 
As Quelch left before he ended his period, Saul Estrin, Faculty Dean during 
Quelch's tenure, became Acting Dean until Laura Tyson, appointed Dean, took over 
in mid-2002. 
4.2. Analytical tracing of the 'critical issues' during the period 1998- 
2001 
The departure of George Bain did not imply a change in LBS's strategic 
direction,, already set in 1990. On the contrary, the process of searching for a new 
Dean was driven by the purpose of deepening the strategy to transfonn LBS into a 
top international Business School. Moreover, John Quelch's background, as Full 
Professor of HBS, with a strong understanding of international businesses, was a 
key issue for him to be appointed for the job. 
328 Saul Estrin, former LBS Dean of Faculty 
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From this perspective, this study has considered most of the strategic 
initiatives raised and executed during this episode as incremental decisions since 
they gave continuity to the strategy previously set. Thus, Erom the very beginning of 
his Deanship, Quelch focused on enhancing LBS's international visibility; Faculty 
internationalisation; strengthening the financial and economic model of the School; 
and improving LBS's Programme portfolio, both to increase revenues and to build a 
closer relationship between LBS and the global corporate world. 
4.2.1. Critical elements for John Quelch to succeed in deepening LBS's 
internationalisation 
In terms of key actors (Dean, Faculty and Board), all of them agreed on the 
need to internationalise the School. However, there was still a long way to go, in 
order to get LBS's culture, organisation, academic and economic model, and 
positioning, to become international. In this regard, some elements were key to this 
process: Quelch's determination to identify and execute clear targets related to the 
priorities he set for the School; his commitment and strong marketing expertise; his 
British roots, US education and HBS background. 
Moreover, John Quelch's initial reputation as an HBS full-time Professor with 
outstanding international expertise, was increased in terms of credibility since he 
managed to deliver early and positive results, in terms of positioning (rankings and 
media) and economic performance. 
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As for his leadership style, directive and assertive, combined with a simple 
and quick way of execution, and delegating Faculty affairs to the Dean of Faculty 
(Saul Estrin), this proved to be effective in making change happen. 
4.2.2. Legitimisation and Power mobilisation 
Legitimisation of Quelch's initiatives was not a critical task since it 
represented a clear continuation of the main strategic direction previously adopted, 
in order to internationalise LBS. However, introducing change in the status quo 
required him to adopt political tactics driven by "being quick to surprise, to 
fragment and split opposition". 
In terms of features of outer context, a remarkable growth of the economy 
over his Deanship, with an outstanding performance and positioning of London, 
together with growing international markets and increasing competition for 
mternationalisation within management education industry (alliances, opening of 
new campuses, etc. ), contributed to legitimate Quelch's strategy for LBS to 
succeed. 
On the other hand, a smart and effective marketing strategy to position LBS 
as a truly international top Business School, combined with a remarkable increase 
in revenues, was attractive to Faculty candidates. Moreover, it also enabled the 
implementation of an effective policy for Faculty hiring, promotion, tenure and 
compensation systems, with the purpose of adapting the academic model according 
to the US system. 
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In mobilising power to legitimate initiatives within the School, internal 
resistance was not strong or generalised, due to the external focus of initiatives. 
However, Quelch showed his political skills in building coalitions with Faculty 
members to whom he delegated execution. 
Forfurther analysis refer to LBS Appendix VI. 
5. Period 111. Laura Tyson (2002-2004) LBS: Consolidating change positioning 
as the "pre-eminent global Business School" 
5.1. Improving the economic model 
Laura Tyson was born in the US. At the moment she was appointed, she was 
the Dean of Haas. She has also been a Faculty member and Director of Research at 
Berkeley. She was educated at Smith College (Economics; BA) and NUT (PhD in 
Economics). 
Tyson is a member of several corporate, academic and editorial Boards. She 
served as an economic adviser during Bill Clinton's Presidency. 
When she arrived at LBS, she had limited knowledge of the School. During 
Quelch's tenure, "I actually came here for a week, and met a number of people: 
John and David Currie, a number of his leadership teams. So I knew something 
about the School. [... ] I knew a few things that were really very important to the 
decision. Number I was that it was basically a US model programme; so the basic 
components of the programme were not that dissimilar to what would have been at 
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Haas. Two, that they were in mid-stream of building a very strong research Faculty 
and research culture. That was a decision that was already been made and John was 
implementing it with Saul Estrin. " 
Moreover, Tyson "knew that the Faculty creation of research climate, the 
kind of people they were looking for and promoting was also consistent with US. " 
329 Tyson had been interested in making programmes more international and in 
building Executive Education at Haas, "but not been able to. They weren't at all 
interested in executive education at Haas, but I knew this School did a lot. So I felt 
'All right, so this is a serious executive education operation, a very global School 
meaning diversity of classrooms but outstanding quality. , 330 
In describing Laura Tyson, Saul Estrin affinns she has "Fantastic visibility. 
The School gained a lot in terms of the brand, very, very good at the handling of 
the, you know, the relations with the governors, the relations with the students. [ I 
She's a non-executive, she's visibility, she's image. But she's not operational. " 
When she arrived at LBS she decided to appointed Michael Hay Deputy 
Dean and Secretary. "When Laura came in, the guy who was secretary and treasurer 
was removed, and Michael Hay took over in a sort of managerial sense, Michael has 
been running the School. So Michael has responsibility for administration and 
finance but in practice, he has done quite a lot more than that. And when Saul stood 
down, Naufel Vilcassim was taking over and he's been in post for a year now, so 
he's part of that team now. And Steven Schaeffer, I think was part of the team for 
329 Laura Tyson, former LBS Dean 
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two years but it may have been a little longer. Steve has sensible comments to make 
on everything, and so he was a good person to have on that committee. 5-631 
Tyson also noticed that LBS had a strong operational team with a different 
viewpoint than the Faculty's. "And that was definitely what I became more 
sensitive to when I got here. , 
332 In this regard, Tyson understood that there was an 
"issue of shared responsibility" in running LBS: the governors, senior management 
and the Faculty. "They are really quite separate these three. You have to work right 
away to bring them together. " 
When she arrived there was an advisory assignment led by Booz-Allen, 
consultants, regarding LBS strategy towards 2010. Michael Hay recalls, "It's the 
first time the School has a comprehensive plan. The School plan is really my 
initiative. It came out of the strategy but I really designed the proper plan. We did 
all the work with Booz-Allen on the strategic positioning of the School from which 
came the School's kind of vision statement and mission. It started in 
November/December 2001, before she arrived. [ ... ] We needed to do it because we 
were having a new Dean coming. She supported that. Then I decided we needed a 
proper plan. " 
Tyson asserts the Booz-Allen report suggested "nothing surprising. [ ... ] We 
want to be a great Business School, a global Business School; we want to be an 
academic research-based global Business School, what we were on our way to do 
anyway. " 
331 Paul Marsh, former LBS Dean 
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LBS differentiation in the world of topnotch Business Schools consists of 
two issues: one is the fact that the School is in London; "That's a real advantage. 
There aren't any other global Business Schools in London and isn't that great? We 
should make the Most Of it;,, 
333 
and second, that LBS should in every way define its 
44global research capability, which is our catch ray, what we're trying to give our 
students, special content skills and attributes. 95334 
She considers of great value the process through which this information was 
generated. "By the end of my first year here, we had agreed on what we were saying 
about the School, and what our major strategic issues were. [... ] We had 
conversations with recruiters, and we had a Faculty force that worked on this. " 335 
Another critical aspect was that given the fragility of the School's fmancial 
structure, Tyson found that LBS was limited to sustaining the excellence it had 
achieved during the past years. In this regard, towards the end of Quelch's tenure, a 
consulting firm on fundraising carried out a report on LBS, which affirmed "the 
School had reached a level of distinction in students it attracts, and Faculty it 
attracts, and research it does. But its fundraising and PR capabilities are set apart, 
not comfortable, and we are playing a low game in that, at low standards in that. " 336 
a) Filling the 'fundraising gap' 
333 Laura Tyson, former LBS Dean 
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But Tyson realised the School's culture was not ready to undertake a 
fundraising campaign. "There was a mismatch between what the School wanted to 
continue to be and what the financial model was. What was said was the financial 
model would only work if you significantly increase the returns from fundraising. " 
However, she realised "We hadn't developed the network, we didn't have a 
good stewardship to the gift we had got, we didn't have a statement of what we 
wanted the money for which was compelling enough, we didn't have a story, we 
didn't have a brochure. " LBS needed to develop a process right before launching a 
,, 337 fundraising campaign. "Otherwise, it won't work . 
Thus, Tyson went out with a very specific agenda: "Hire a high-ranking 
Associate Dean for external relations; put him or her in our management committee; 
recruit several additional fundraisers; and then, convince the Faculty and convince 
the alumni and everybody that this had to be a major issue in the School. " 
During Quelch's tenure, LBS programmes were under market price, thus, 
raising prices seemed a solution. But during Tyson's Deanship, LBS's programmes 
were the most expensive programmes in the world. Thus, she decided "No more 
revenue growth through very rapid increases in numbers, no more through rapid 
increases in prices, the cost structure cannot continue to grow because we recruited 
all this research Faculty and they are demanding compensations that are global. So 
you have created a gap, and the gap is the fundraising gap. " 
337 Laura Tyson, former LBS Dean 
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Thus, developing fundraising has been one of Tyson's priorities, one on 
which LBS's business model is based. "We should do that because, in part, we do 
have a great outreach around the world. We have all these alum-ni in 50 clubs and 
100 countries, so, but I think it's still a lot of our alumni. 55338 
b) Consolidating the research model, hiring new Faculty 
"The other thing is I do spend a period of time with the Faculty team. I 
mean, the process of continuing to do the research model has been ongoing. []I 
was quite intense on making sure we had periods of reviews of the content of the 
programme. You do need to seriously set up a critical process if you want to review 
,, 339 programmes to make changes. 
Tyson focused on developing the School's Faculty, "creeping and 
continuing to improve quality and increase size. " 340 She set up a new committee 
structure, a sort of central hiring committee responsible for the Faculty. "I decided 
not to go through the Faculty Dean any more because I felt that the hiring decisions 
in the School were too decentralised and that Faculty were blocking decisions that 
should be good for the School for their own interests. [ ... ]I took over that. " 
As for the Faculty Dean, the role is "critically important because the Faculty 
Dean is the one that ultimately has to be responsible for keeping, taking the constant 
temperature of the Faculty, knowing what the issues are because the Dean is doing 
all the representational stuff. " Tyson highlights the importance of the Faculty Dean 
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in bringing together Faculty leaders in a committee structure. "You have to have a 
very powerful Faculty Dean. ý, 341 
5.2. Laura Tyson's view on her role as a Dean 
In describing Tyson's agenda, Michael Hay asserts that she organises her 
time based on three different priorities: "To build a Faculty and increase the Faculty 
number which is low at the moment. And fundraising. So Faculty, fundraising and 
the third is international development in terms of what does it mean to be an 
international global Business School. " 
Tyson organises her agenda by spending 1/3 of it on the operational issues 
and 2/3 on the representational. "The operational part is really 25%, maybe 
sometimes 30%, because of our Faculty issues and things like that. But so instead 
its 2/3 or 7ý% of the time is representational. " In this regard, she recognises: "When 
I came back from govemment I knew I had acertain set of skills which maybe 
would mean I could do this job well. You know, I can generate enthusiasm for 
things, I can mediate other hard, complicated critical processes, sort of bring people 
together who can deal with all of that StUff 9ý342 
To her perspective, being Dean entails representing the interests of the 
Faculty to the other key groups and also, the interests of others to the Faculty. "The 
main thing that I think a Dean is trying to do is actually trying to represent the 
institution to the different groups that don't quite see the institution in the same 
way. So you're standing for the collective interests and the future of this institution 
341 Laura Tyson, former LBS Dean 
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which the rest of the university depend upon and the Faculty depends upon, but they 
are feared in terms of what they should do, how they should operate, in terms of 
their own rather narrow agenda. ý, 
343 
The other group is the Governing Body. The members of this have certain 
rights and responsibilities as an audit committee for the finances of the School, 
composed of outsiders. They are also involved in setting the strategy. However, 
they have never been inside an academic institution except as students, so they 
"tend to see it as a business. " 
"I don't think having a shared governance in this way is really a bad thing. 
It's just a complicated thing. I think that the Faculty do need to be listened to and 
be responded to and understand what the governors say. But at the same time, I 
think the governors think that of the Faculty so you are in the middle trying to 
continue to build this bridge. But I actually think it's probably for a Business 
School not a bad model. ý 
344 In this regard, people agree "It's the first time the 
School has a comprehensive plan. [ ... ] She has a much engaging style; engaging 
with everyone. The atmosphere has improved. There's harmony. [ ... ] She has a 
very consensual style. She doesn't like, doesn't like confrontation. She's very much 
more consensual, very much involving people. And from a personal point of view 
in the job I do, just lets you freedom to get on with it. " 
345 
In considering both business and academic perspectives, Tyson believes this 
prevents what some articles say about Business Schools, that they become irrelevant 
34' Laura Tyson, former LB S Dean 
344Laura Tyson, former LBS Dean 
345 Mchael Hay, LBS Deputy Dean and Secretary 
383 
when they are controlled primarily by academics. In this regard, people recognise 
that LBS benefits by "having such a high-profile Dean with high academic 
background. iý 346 
5.3. LBS's Future challenges 
Tyson points out three main challenges. The first one refers to the School's 
economic model. "The question is, how do you finance this kind of knowledge 
generation? That's a very big issue for any Business School. ý, 347 In this connection, 
Tyson acknowledges, "I'm not sure it is the right model. It is the model that I came 
into. What I was asked to do was not to resolve the inconsistency on the 
grounds of changing the model but to try to resolve the inconsistency on the 
grounds of wanting a serious fundraise effort. [ ... ] There was a mismatch between 
what the School wants to continue to be and what the financial model was. What 
was said was the financial model would only work if you significantly increase the 
returns to fundraising. And it was left to the question whether that was a feasible 
thing to do, if that's the challenge. " 
The second challenge refers to how to develop Faculty challenge. While 
older generations of Faculty view the Business School as being heavily involved in 
executive education teaching, in 'academic entrepreneurship', new generations are 
just interested in 'academic reward. ' "So the issue then becomes the next generation 
of leaders in these institutions and who's going to be the great executive education 
teachers or who are going to be the ones that are going to develop a new programme 
346 Lynn Hoffman, LBS Associate Dean of Executive MMA and Global Executive NMA 
347 Laura Tyson, former LBS Dean 
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because [ ... ] they want to be left alone to do their research. They really do not have 
any interest in governance, in capacity-building. On the other hand, if you try to 
bring somebody from the outside to do that, they are very concerned that their 
power might be eclipsed. So they have power, they don't want to exercise it.. ), 
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Finally, the third challenge refers to the devaluation of the MBA programme 
as a result of two main causes: proliferation of programmes and the instrumental 
nature of the motivation people have for going to Business Schools. In this regard, 
Tyson affirms that, given that the "MBA programmes are ranked deliberately on the 
increased salary that a student gets by going onto an MBA programme, the whole 
MBA programme as an academic learning experience is being reduced, it is totally 
instrumental. " 
5.4. Analytical tracing of different 'aspects' during Laura Tyson's 
tenure(2002-2004) 
To better describe and understand the SLP (strategic agenda-building and - 
executing) ftom a contextual and political perspective, the study focused on the set 
of initiatives led by Laura Tyson in enhancing LBS visibility and fundraising 
activities to develop an endowment fund according to LBS strategy to compete in 
the top international league of Business Schools. 
Among the different strategic issues included in the School's agenda (see 
Appendix) over the period between 2002 and 2004, the study described the 
34' Laura Tyson, former LB S Dean 
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following: filling the fundraising gap to develop the endowment; hiring new Faculty 
aligned with the School's new academic profile; external positioning and visibility 
of LBS as a globally pre-eminent institution; development of the LBS strategic plan 
2005-2010. Thus, the study considered the main initiatives over this episode as 
incremental initiatives since they implied the continuation of the strategy previously 
undertaken by both George Bain and John Quelch. 
5.4.1. Critical elements for Laura Tyson's agenda to succeed over this 
period 
Resistance to those initiatives was not a critical issue since they were mainly 
focused on the external environment and were aligned with the strategic direction 
previously set (by George Bain and John Quelch). Moreover, most features from the 
outer context such as corporate customers' demands, alumni, competition, 
governance and location ("The London advantage") favoured and legitimated the 
initiatives. The external economic environment was positive for the initiatives to 
succeed, although some external elements impacted negatively on the economy as a 
consequence of terrorism ("9/11", the Iraq war, etc. ). 
5.4.2. Legitimisation and Power mobilisation 
With regard to the LBS internal context, Laura Tyson's interpersonal, 
communication and political skills, combined with her participative leadership 
style, facilitated the interaction with the faculty. She listened to others actively and 
carefully. She gained people's acceptance by engaging them in both planning and 
decision-making processes. Besides this, her charisma and high profile, together 
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with her international prestige and reputation, played a key role in the School's 
external agenda of positioning and fundraising. Finally, her academic US 
background facilitated the initiative of hiring new faculty with international 
standards. 
V- 
r urfurther analysis refer to LBS Appendix VII. 
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Chapter VIII: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
Case study researchers tend to argue that they aim to generate an 
intensive examination of a single case, in relation to which they then engage in 
theoretical analysis (Bryman, 2001). In a case study analysis, the crucial 
question is not whether the findings can be generalised to a wider universe, but 
how well the researcher generates theory out of thefindings (Yin, 1984). 
However, in order to be in a better position to establish the 
circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold, the researcher usually 
compares two or more cases (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). "The comparison 
may itself suggest concepts that are relevant to an emerging theory" (Bryman, 
2001: 53). 
This study about the strategic leadership process in Business Schools 
during the period 1990-2004 from a political perspective has chosen three top 
European Schools. All of them present the same external context: the 
management education industry in Europe between 1990 and 2004. 
In observing the enactment of the SLP over time, through a comparative 
analysis of these three Business Schools, the study intends to distinguish 
particular characteristics that will act as a springboard for theoretical reflections 
about contrasting findings (Bryman, 2001) related to the SLP in Business 
Schools, over time. 
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In this regard, the political analysis of the SLP aims at identifying 
similarities and differences between the SLP in each Business School and 
across the three, over time, and thus, establishes patterns and variations in the 
enactment of the SLP in these particular organisational settings. Accordingly, it 
will visualise the SLP (strategic agenda-building and -executing) in a particular 
strategic issue that will act as a vehicle to evidence the dynamics, 
interconnections and key characteristics of the SLP (Birkinshaw, 1997; 
Chakravarthy et al, 2003), over the period 1990-2004. 
The following Figure 22 shows the analytical chronologies of the three 
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1. Comparative Cross-case analysis of the SLP at IMD, INSEAD and LBS, 
over time from a political perspective 
In carrying out the comparative cross-case analysis among the three 
Schools, the study observed the SLP through strategic agenda-building and - 
executing in relation to the same strategic issue as a 'vehicle' to study the SLP 
in each School: "Becoming a top international Business School" 
To aid the study's consideration of this strategic issue, it was divided 
into different episodes. These refer to a set of initiatives that trigger decisions 
and actions, over time. For example, at IMD the first episode is related to a 
number of initiatives undertaken by Dean Juan Rada with the purpose of 
making the IMI and IMEDE merge successful. The second episode describes 
those initiatives carried out by Xavier Gilbert as Interim Dean, aiming at 
restoring the School's financial situation while a new Dean was sought and 
nominated. Finally, the third episode, the longest, tackles those decisions and 
actions led by Peter Lorange that take the merger and creation of the new 
School to a stage of consolidation and success. 
Likewise, in the case of INSEAD, the first episode refers to the set of 
initiatives related to deepening the School's research strategy and profile. The 
creation of INSEAD's PhD programme and the recruitment of a US PhD 
Faculty has been an antecedent to this set of initiatives. The succession to 
Philippe Naert by Ludo Van der Heyden aimed at continuing this initiative of 
strengthening INSEAD's research strategy, competences and capabilities. 
During his co-Deanship with Claude Rameau, he was oriented towards the 
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consolidation of the PhD Programme and the promotion of Faculty with a 
research profile. When Antonio Borges was appointed, he reinforced this 
strategy of enhancing the research profile of INSEAD. To do so, he focused on 
the need to launch a capital campaign aimed at achieving the economic 
resources that would finance the School's research activities. 
The second episode observes INSEAD's initiative to open a second 
campus in Asia; the third episode tackles those initiatives led by Gabriel 
Hawawini to make the Singapore campus work. Finally, the fourth episode 
studies Gabriel Hawawini's decision to attach the definition of his nomination 
for a second Deanship, to the decision of opening a third campus in the US. 
Finally, at LBS, the first episode observes the set of initiatives led by 
George Bain to start this turning point in the School's history. The second 
episode analyses the set of initiatives that took place under John Quelch's 
Deanship, in deepening and giving continuity to the internationalisation 
strategy initiated by George Bain. Finally, the study focuses on the number of 
decisions and actions Promoted under Laura Tyson's tenure in order to 
strengthen the School's international visibility and promoting fundraising 
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2. Political analysis of the SLP (strategic agenda-building and -executing) in 
Business Schools, over time 
2.1. Issue legitimisation and power mobilisation 
This political analysis of the SLP in Business Schools, over time, 
focuses on two key activities: 'issue legitimisation' and 'power mobilisation'. 
These enablers consist of a set strategy of initiatives displayed by the School's 
key actors in raising a strategic issue in the School's agenda, legitimating it and 
mobilising power to get it decided and executed. 
2.2. Strategic initiatives: Breakthrough or Incremental 
This set of initiatives undertaken by the School's key actors in the 
intention of fulfilling each strategic issue can fall along a continuum ranging 
firom modest, small-scale change to far more extensive radical and dramatic 
changes (Dutton, 1987). In this regard, the study identifies strategic issues 
producing breakthrough or incremental initiatives. While the former refers to 
those that involve a turning point in the School's strategic agenda; i. e. "a 
significant reshuffling of resources and beliefs, making them significant and 
time-consuming events" (Dutton, 1987: 286), the latter describes those that 
seem to carry on previous strategies without implying a significant and decisive 
change within the School's strategic agenda; strategic issues already included 
in the School's strategic agenda and which thus do not affect its structure. 
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Thus, the comparative analysis will evolve around the following 
framework represented in Figure 23, already used in each case study on the 
SLP, over time from a political perspective in each School. 
SLP 
=I Strategic Agenda 
Building & executing 
BREAKTHROUGH INITIATIVES 
Strategic Issue 




I Issue Legitimisation 
I 
1. Sponsor's Leadership style 1 Issue sponsorship 
2. Dean's skills & competences 2. Agenda structure (strategic priorities) 
3. Power sources 3. Issue selling 
4. Power uses 4. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
5. Features of the inner & outer context characterisation 
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Figure 23: Analytical Framework for a political approach to the study of the 
SLP in Business Schools, over time 
IA Comparative Cross-case analysis of the SLP over time, from a political 
approach, in IMID, INSEAD and LBS 
3.1. Breakthrough - Incremental initiatives 
The earlier description of the cross-case analysis entails the 
classification of the set of initiatives (decisions and actions) displayed in each 
School's intention of going forward with the strategic issue (becoming a top 
international Business School). The following table classifies those initiatives 
into breakthrough or incremental, according to their impact in the strategic 
agenda of each Business School. In caffying out the classification, the study 
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In this regard, at IMD, the first episode that took place between 1990 
and 1991 during Rada's Deanship refers to those decisions and actions related 
to the start-up of EAD, as a result of the merger of IMI and IMEDE. These 
decisions and actions were considered breakthrough because of the significance 
of the fact that the merger initiative implied the creation of IMD, a new 
Business School. On the other hand, the second episode refers to a number of 
initiatives undertaken by Xavier Gilbert (1992-1993) and it is considered 
incremental since they represent the continuance of the merger and IMD's 
creation. As for the third episode, the set of initiatives during Peter Lorange's 
tenure (1993-2004), it is considered breakthrough, for it implied setting and 
implementing a new strategy for IMD to shape its identity, including its culture, 
policies, systems and structure. 
At INSEAD, the first episode implied breakthrough initiatives since 
INSEAD was a teaching-oriented Business School. Thus, the purpose of 
becoming a top-league player in the management education international 
market demanded that they develop their research skills, capabilities and 
activities. With regard to the second episode, "opening a campus in Asia ", 
again it represents a breakthrough set of initiatives. This implied a significant zzn 9 
risk regarding the School's financial situation and reputation. Even though 
INSEAD had vast experience in teaching executive education in Asia, the 
decision of becoming one School with one Faculty and two campuses 
represented a number of challenges and new risks and complexities. 
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Likewise, the possibility of opening a third campus in the US, sponsored 
by Gabriel Hawawini in the 4"' episode, was also considered a breakthrough 
initiative for similar reasons. On the other hand, making the Singapore campus 
work implied the completion of the process of launching an INSEAD campus in 
Asia, rather than a turning-point in the School's strategic agenda, and thus, it is 
considered as incremental. 
Finally, at LBS, George Bain's episode, which focused on reorienting 
LBS's strategy towards the international management education market, 
represented a turning-point for LBS's history, culture (strongly British) 
demography and profile. However, Quelch's and Tyson's episodes were 
considered incremental initiatives in the sense that they represent the continuity 
of deepening and strengthening the academic strategy previously set under 
George Bain's Deanship. 
3.2. Issue legitimisation 
For an issue to be included in the strategic agenda and executed, 
legitimisation among key actors represents a condition. It gives an implicit 
answer to critical questions related to what issue, why and who sponsors or 
promotes the issue. 
a) The following elements are considered in analysing issue 
legitimisation: 
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i. Issue- sponsorship 
The definition of an issue becomes the target for debate and 
manipulation by key actors. Control over an issue's definition is important to 
issue sponsors - i. e. individuals who take a personal stake in making a strategic 
issue an agenda item. Sponsors have a major influence in shaping the 
organisation's strategic agenda, whether acting autonomously or as members of 
a coalition, issue sponsors "latch onto issues and mobilise interest and spread 
awareness about an issue" (Dutton, 1986: 10). 
Finally, there is direct connection between the position issue sponsors 
have within the organisation and their capacity to influence in raising some 
issues to the strategic agenda. 
ii. Issue-selling 
Any particular issue varies in how important, abstract simple and 
immediate it is perceived to be (Dutton, 1986). In this regard, perceptions of 
issue characteristics change as new information and new interests define the 
issue in a different light, making it appear more or less appropriate for inclusion 
in the agenda. 
In helping to intensify interest or gain issue exposure, issue sponsors 
undertake issue-selling - i. e. the action of gaining people's attention to or 
understanding of an issue and how such an issue is related to the organisational 
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strategy (e. g. Antonio Borges, George Bain). Thus, they translate a concern into 
action by making others visualise the issue embedded in the organisational 
context and placing that issue on the organisational agenda. 
Agenda structure 
The organisation's strategic agenda can be described as an array of 
issues containing a limited number and variety of issues at any one point in 
time (Dutton & Duncan, 1987). The entry of an issue onto the strategic agenda 
is facilitated or constrained by the number of issues, their sequencing and 
structure of the organisation's agenda at the time an issue is being raised. 
Thus, entry will vary according to key actors' prioritisation of issues. The study 
was able to observe that the ability to influence agenda structure represents a 
critical source of power. 
iv. Alignment of MGI prioritised by key actors 
In carrying out the fieldwork, the study observed that each key actor has 
a set of main generic interests (MGI) depending on the role of the key actor, 
rather than the individual who may play that role. For example, because of his 
role and position in the School's structure, the Dean has the following MGI: 
a) Strategic agenda-building, 
b) Perfonnance, 
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c) Faculty and Board support, independent of whether the role is played 
by Peter Lorange, Antonio Borges, George Bain, etc. 
However, what varies is the prioritisation of those MGI according to 
who the key actors are and their circumstances, influenced by both features of 
outer and inner contexts. Moreover, the study also identified that the alignment 
of the prioritisation of those MGI positively affects decision success. 
v. Characterisation of features of the inner and outer context 
Given that this study observes the strategic leadership process with a 
contextual perspective, it focuses the influence exerted by the characterisation 
of features Erom both outer and inner contexts on the organisation's strategic 
agenda-building and -executing, over time; how these features shape the SLP 
and are also shaped by the SLP. 
b) Cross-case analysis: Issue legitimisation in breakthrough initiatives 
The following Table shows the initiatives considered by this study as 
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i. Issue sponsorship - Issue-selling 
In each case, the Dean was the key sponsor. However, even though 
he/she is the highest formal authority because of his/her position in the School's 
structure, the particular characteristics of Business Schools as higher education 
institutions (shared power and dual authority), requires that he/she should need 
the support of other key actors. 
This can be seen at IN4D in actions undertaken by Juan Rada towards 
achieving Faculty participation and the Board's agreement with strategic goals. 
Likewise, from the very beginning of his mandate, Peter Lorange set a clear 
message about his own role, in order to clarify that he was governing on the 
Faculty's and Board's behalf At the same time, he affirms his authority as 
President of MD in charge of all strategic decisions. 
As for the case of INSEAD, the first and second episodes (Antonio 
Borges') represent breakthrough initiatives implying critical change in the 
School's strategy, culture and systems. He carries out a strong issue-selling 
process to make both the Board and the Faculty understand and share these 
initiatives, underlining their relevance in reaching INSEAD's international 
strategy and success in order to be a top worldwide Business School. 
In the case of Gabriel Hawawmi s episode, implying a breakthrough 
initiative (launching a third campus), he presents it as a precondition to his 
undertaking a second term as Dean of the Business School. 
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Finally, breakthrough initiatives at LBS related to the strategic issue of 
becoming a top international Business School, implied a turning-point in the 
School's strategic agenda. Even though there was a fair consensus among most 
Faculty about the need to introduce change that would facilitate competition in 
the international arena, Bain spent several months talking to many people, 
listening to everyone who would approach him and finally, writing down the 
new strategic direction in a document - Bias Towards Stratqý. This document 
articulated different viewpoints in a strong and effective vision and thus, it 
favoured the alignment and facilitated the School's change towards the need to 
focus on the international market rather than the UK market. 
ii. Alignment of MGIprioritised by key actors 
In those cases in which initiatives related to the strategic issues were 
finally executed, the study found a clear alignment of those main generic 
interests prioritised by key actors. However, aligmnent was not always 
spontaneous but promoted and displayed by the Dean. 
At INID during Juan Rada's tenure, both the Dean and the Board had a 
different prioritisation: Rada was oriented towards strategic agenda-building 
and executing with impact on the long term, while the Board prioritised 
performance as a short-term demand. To some extent, such misalignment 
contributed to Rada's departure. 
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As for Peter Lorange, from the beginning of his Deanship, an intensive 
activity to align key actors' MGI priorities is perceived. He focused on 
identifying those signals that entailed any misalignments such as Faculty 
compensation systems which he shaped. From the very beginning Lorange 
argued for the importance of integrating in the School's vision the needs of 
both the institution and the key actors. Accordingly, he promoted such 
integration of interests and goals through his consistent behaviour in bringing 
customers' perspectives to the School. Later, he also redesigned policies, 
academic systems and structures, and maintained intensive communication with 
both Faculty and Board. 
As for Antonio Borges, along the two sets of strategic initiatives (Is', 
initiatives with the purpose of deepening the research profile of INSEAD; 2 nd , 
initiatives with the purpose of opening a second campus), they expanded and 
strengthened the issue sponsorship through informal communication with key 
members of Faculty and Board. Borges displayed a clear activity of 
communication in articulating those initiatives he promoted aligned to the 
School's strategic initiative that started under Philippe Naert's Deanship with 
the creation of the PhD programme, and hiring new Faculty with research 
competences. He leveraged on INSEAD's entrepreneurial and international 
culture, centring on the School's experience and reputation as a main executive 
education provider in Asia. Borges introduced such initiatives as sequential 
steps towards the evolution of the School according to its strategic agenda. 
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On the other hand, the study found a lack of issue-selling in episodes 
that did not go forward. This affected the aligmnent of those MGI prioritised by 
key actors. With regard to Juan Rada's decision at INM, he focused on the 
success of the merger based on defining and shaping the new School's strategy, 
probably without a clear message of where the School was headed. Unlike 
Dean Rada, the Board prioritised sustainability as a precondition for any 
strategy. As for the Faculty, it was fragmented, disoriented and discontented. 
In the case of INSEAD, there is a misalignment gap between the Dean's 
priorities and those of the Faculty and Board. Gabriel Hawawini's sense of 
urgency, of going forward on the multi-campus or network model Business 
School strategy was not shared by the other key actors. The Faculty who 
eventually supported his continuity as Dean, did not agree with such decision. 
Rather, the Faculty focused on other priorities: consolidation of the Singapore 
campus and the impact of this campus in the work systems and academic 
career. As for the Board, Claude Janssen was replaced by Cees Van Lede, a 
former INSEAD alumnus with a conservative profile, oriented towards the 
School's perfonnance, sustainability and reputation and who did not support 
Hawawini's 'risky' initiative. 
iii. Characterisation offtatures of the outer and inner context (what 
influenced most in legitimating and de-legitimating) 
With regard to those features of both outer and inner contexts that 
legitimated the foregoing breakthrough decisions, the study found corporate 
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customers' demands, and competition to be the features of the outer context that 
affected issue legitimisation favourably. 
As for those features of both outer and inner contexts that de-legitimate, 
the study has not found any feature that appears de-legitimating in all 
breakthrough initiatives. 
c) Cross-case analysis: Issue Legitimisation in Incremental initiatives 
The following Table shows the initiatives considered by this study as 
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i. Issue sponsorship - Issue-selling 
As has already been asserted, the study considers as incremental, those 
decisions and actions promoted by Xavier Gilbert during his Interim Deanship 
intended to restore IMD's financial situation; those encouraged by Gabriel 
Hawawini to make INSEAD's Singapore campus work; and those carried out 
by both John Quelch and Laura Tyson at LBS, with the intention of deepening 
the School's visibility and fundraising in order to become a top-league 
worldwide Business School. These decisions do not imply change in the 
School's strategic agenda. On the contrary, they represent a continuum in the 
strategic direction previously set. 
In the case of Xavier Gilbert at IMD, with regard to issue sponsorship, 
his authority was rather weak because of his role as interim Dean. However, his 
clear alignment with the Board's MGI priorities of restoring the School's 
financial situation strengthened his own sponsorship. Moreover, Gilbert was 
able to align Faculty priorities with this initiative. 
As for Gabriel Hawawini, his role as Dean of INSEAD had strong 
support from the very beginning since he had been chosen by a vast majority of 
the INSEAD Faculty to make the Singapore campus work, and to restore the 
School's cohesion and integration after a period of tension and edgy climate 
because of controversial decisions carried out by Antonio Borges. Therefore, 
his sponsorship over the decision of developing the Singapore campus was 
strong; it had already been legitimated. 
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Although incremental, it seems relevant to note that both Gilbert and 
Hawawini called for the Faculty's attention to and understanding of the 
strategic issue (issue-selling) by focusing on its urgency and consequentiality. 
They present it as a problem they all share as members of a same community 
and thus, that they have to solve. 
As for John Quelch, the Faculty had chosen him with the clear purpose 
of continuing with Bain's strategy of internationalising LBS. Quelch was 
determined to do so by deepening the international and research Faculty profile 
- i. e. attracting and hiring Faculty from top US Business Schools and 
adequating the academic systems, delegating this initiative, basically to Saul 
Estrin (LBS Faculty Dean). 
On the other hand, Quelch personally involved himself in positioning 
the LBS brand in. the world landscape, working hard with alumni and business 
people, and also strengthened the economic model of the Business School by 
expanding its programme portfolio and thus, raising the School's revenues 
-1 .. dramatically. His prestige as a British native and HBS Full Professor coming to 
LBS reinforced his prestige. 
Finally, Laura Tyson was appointed with the same mandate. Both 
Faculty and Board expected a Dean who would follow the strategy initiated by 
George Bain and John Quelch: transforming LBS into a top-league Business 
School. As with Quelch, her effort was mainly focused on continuing with the 
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Faculty hiring, increasing the School's visibility and developing fundraising 
activities with the purpose of building an endowment. 
ii. Characterisation of ftatures of the outer and inner context (what 
influenced most in legitimating and de-legitimating) 
With regard to the characterisation of features of both inner and outer 
context that legitimated Gilbert's decision, the study identified donors and 
benefactors, corporate customers' demands and economic environment. 
As for Gabriel Hawawini, corporate customers' demands and 
competition acted as features legitimating his decisions, while economic 
environment de-legitimated them. In this regard, facts such as the September 
I lth2001 terrorist attacks, SARS and the end of the Asian financial crisis had 
negative effects during Hawawini's tenure. There were doubts related to the 
possibility that the INSEAD Faculty would not stay at Singapore, thus, location 
strongly de-legitimated as well. 
In relation to John Quelch and Laura Tyson at LBS, the outer context 
presented the following legitimating features: corporate customers' demands, 
alumni, government, competition, location ('the London experience') and 
economic environment. Donors and benefactors de-legitimated because of the 
lack of a fundraising culture in the UK. 
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With regard to the inner context at IMD, climate (fear and uncertainty 
about the future), structure (clear distinction between the Dean's role and that 
of the Chairman of the Board) and performance (Gilbert restored the School's 
financial situation) legitimated Gilbert's activity while culture (Faculty 
fragmentation betweenjarmers and hunters) de-legitimated it. 
At INSEAD, climate favoured Hawawini's actions since he knew how 
to capitalise on his drive to achieve in an organisation. with an entrepreneurial 
culture. However, features from the outer context such as economic 
environment (SARS and terrorist attacks) did not contribute in legitimating. 
Finally, as for John Quelch, his decision was legitimated by the 
School's climate (will to become an intemational School) and performance (the 
School inherited both economic and financial health from Bain's tenure, and 
revenues were increasing). However, culture acted as a de-legitimating feature 
since the LBS Faculty was still mostly based on a British Faculty. Quelch 
altered this by hiring US Faculty. Tyson deepened this trend even though she 
found an LBS Faculty already oriented towards the US Faculty model. 
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Table 24: Cross-ease analysis of Issue Legitimisation at INM, INSEAD and 
London Business School 
IMD INSEAD LBS 
Ist 2nd 3rd I" 
, 
2nd 3rd 4th Ist 2nd 3rd 
Type of decision B 
I 
Issue-selling 





























3.3. Power mobilisation: Cross-case analysis 349 
... It seems relevant to note that this study classifies people's leadership styles, skills and 
competences, power sources and use according to the emerging data of the content analysis of 
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i. Sponsor's leadership style 
Following Bass (1990) this study classifies leadership style as either 
directive or participative. Directive leadership implies that the leader plays the 
active role in problem-solving and decision-making and expects group 
members to be guided by his or her decisions. To gain acceptance of their 
proposals, leaders can try to use persuasion, reason and logic. They can assert 
an expectation or need and offer rewards or exert pressure to gain acceptance. 
They can generate charismatic identification to motivate and build 
commitment. They can try partial disengagement by backing away from time- 
consuming issues with a lower priority and by concentrating colleagues' 
attention to on more important issues. 
On the other hand, participative leadership refers to leaders who draw 
people out, listening actively and carefully, and gaining acceptance through 
engaging colleagues in the planning or decision-making process. 
It seems relevant to note that there is no Dean who is totally directive or 
participative but they all show certain behaviours that mainly tend towards a 
more directive or participative leadership style. 
With regard to the leadership style of the Deans whose breakthrough 
initiatives promoted successful results - i. e. Peter Lorange, at IMD, Antonio 
the semi-structured interviews. Even though reliability is already confirmed, it seems adequate 
to declare that 'personal traits' do not reflect the whole richness of personal behaviour. 
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Borges at INSEAD (with both sets of initiatives) and George Bain at LBS, they 
all showed a more directive leadership style. 
On the contrary, those Deans whose breakthrough initiatives were 
blocked - i. e. Juan Rada's I" merger stage at INM and Gabriel Hawawini's 
intention to launch an INSEAD third campus, showed a more participative 
leadership style. 
Unlike Deans undertaking breakthrough initiatives, those Deans carrying 
out incremental initiatives present either directive (Xavier Gilbert and John 
Quelch) or participative (Gabriel Hawawini and Laura Tyson) leadership 
styles. 
ii. Dean's skills and competences 
Given the significant role the Dean usually has in building and executing 
the strategic agenda, the study observed the skills and competences that each of 
the Deans display in fulfilling their role, since they affect the SLP, over time. 
In observing those Deans who promoted successful breakthrough 
initiatives - i. e. Peter Lorange, Antonio Borges and George Bain - they all 
seem to present the following skills and competences: the three of them are 
visionary, they show consistent behaviour, they are committed, entrepreneurial, 
innovators and risk-takers. Moreover, they show political skills, they tend to 
deliver results and they are identified for carrymg out enviromnental scanning - 
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i. e. they look for information both within and outside the organisation to 
integrate and articulate the external message with the organisation's 
competences, activities and motivation. 
As for those Deans who carried out breakthrough initiatives which were 
finally blocked or unsuccessful - i. e. Juan Rada and Gabriel Hawawini - 
likewise, since the breakthrough initiatives were successful, the study identified 
that both of them are visionary. Hawawini shows he is committed and results- 
oriented (he delivers results). 
With regard to Deans whose initiatives were classified as incremental, 
Xavier Gilbert appears as a committed Dean who shows consistent behaviour, 
promoting integration of both interests and goals and delivers results. As has 
already been stated in the previous paragraph, Gabriel Hawawini, is a visionary 
Dean who seems committed to his role. He is identified as a person who 
delivers results. 
As for LBS Deans whose initiatives were also asserted as incremental, 
John Quelch shows political skills. He is also identified as a result-oriented 
Dean; whereas Laura Tyson shows both interpersonal and communicational 
skills and a high profile. 
iii. Power sources 
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In understanding issue legitimisation, the study has a double perspective 
about how power is accrued and exerted: Power sources and uses. In relation to 
poiver sources, these were classified according to their origin - i. e. structural 
(e. g. position, resource allocation, reward) or personal (resource generation, 
expertise, referent, reputation). 
Even though the Dean's position is a source of power, it seems that it is 
not the most influential power base. Both reward power and resource 
generation and allocation were other structural sources of power found among 
Deans. 
In observing those "successful breakthrough initiatives" the study could 
identify that prestige, expertise and referent power - i. e. personal sources of 
power turned out to be more effective sources of influence. 
With regard to Deans that produced incremental initiatives, all four count 
on position as a structural source of power. As for their personal sources of 
power, Xavier Gilbert presents both referent and reward power; Gabriel 
Hawawini, referent and expertise; John Quelch, prestige as a Full Professor at 
'HBS and expertise in internationalisation; and Laura Tyson, expertise and 
prestige as former Dean of Haas Business School, and because she is a public 
figure. 
iv. Power uses 
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In mobilising power, sources are a standpoint. However, having power is 
not enough. The will and skill to build and use power is also critical (Pettigrew, 
1995,1998). 
As for the uses of power, in observing those Deanships under successful 
breakthrough initiatives, the study identified the following power uses: 
assertiveness, coalition-building, rationality and execution. 
In the case of the Deanships under breakthrough initiatives which were 
either blocked or unsuccessful, Rada showed rationality and consensus- 
building, Hawawini, rationality and execution. 
Finally, regarding those Deanships where decisions and actions resulted 
in incremental initiatives, Gilbert presents coalition-building, delegation, 
execution, assertiveness and rationality; Hawawini, rationality, assertiveness, 
execution; Quelch, coalition formation, execution, celerity, networking, 
splitting of the opposition, delegation (related to Faculty issues); and Tyson, 
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4. Comparative Cross-Case Analysis and Findings 
1. Cross-ease analysis 
So far, the study has considered the political approach to the SLP in Business 
Schools over time, through strategic agenda-building and -executing in a particular 
strategic issue (becoming a top international Business School) that acted as a vehicle 
for the SLP operationalisation. 
Moreover, in doing so, it has observed both issue legitimisation and power 
mobilisation as the two activities required for the SLP to occur. It has visualised each 
of these activities through different elements that describe them: a) issue 
legitimisation through issue sponsorship, agenda structure, issue-selling, alignment of 
key actors' MGI prioritisation and characterisation of features of both outer and inner 
contexts; and b) power mobilisation through the sponsor's leadership style, the Dean's 
skills and competences, power sources and power uses. 
Thus, in the comparative cross-case analysis, focusing on the foregoing 
strategic initiatives has caused differences and similarities in the SLP across the three 
Business Schools to emerge. This has enabled the identification ofpatterns within the 
SLP, related to the "what", "why" and "how" of decisions, actions and outcomes 
(Pettigrew, 1997). 
Next, the study displays those patterns found related to strategic initiatives: 
a) Set of breakthrough initiatives successfully implemente& 
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i. Consolidation and success of 11\4D led by Peter Lorange 
ii. Deepening research strategy at INSEAD led by Antonio Borges 
iii. Launching a second campus, led by Antonio Borges 
iv. Internationalising LBS led by George Bain 
b) Set of breakthrough initiatives blocked or unsuccessfully implemented. 
i. First stage of MD merger led by Juan Rada 
ii. Opening the INSEAD third campus promoted by Gabriel Hawawini 
c) Set of incremental initiatives 
i. Set of incremental initiatives related to Xavier Gilbert's interim Deanship 
at IMI) 
ii. Set of incremental initiatives led by Gabriel Hawawini in making the 
INSEAD Singapore campus work 
iii. Deepening LBS internationalisation led by John Quelch 
iv. Enhancing LBS visibility and fundraising led by Laura Tyson 
1- a) Patterns found in breakthrough initiatives (successful and unsuccessful) 
related to issue legitimisation 
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Table 26: Patterns in Successful and Unsuccessful Breakthrough initiatives in 
relation to Issue Legitimisation 350 
PATTERNS 
Breakthrough initiatives 
(successful - unsuccessful initiatives) 
Issue sponsorship 
Issue-selling 



























* Issue Sponsorship: Dean (although unsuccessful breakthrough initiatives 
present a weak issue sponsorship) 
9 Agenda structure: altered by decisions and actions related to strategic issue 
e Patterns in features legitimating from the outer context: competition, corporate 
customer demands, and donors and benefactors 
350 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
Nyith less relevance. 
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I- b) Patterns in breakthrough initiatives (successful and unsuccessful) related 
to power mobilisation 
Table 27: Patterns in Successful and Unsuccessful Breakthrough initiatives in 
relation to Power Mobilisation 351 
PATTERNS 
Breakthrough initiatives 
(successful unsuccessful initiatives) 
Sponsor's L style Directive 
Participative 








Power sources Position 
Reward 













0 Dean's skills and competences: vision, entrepreneurship and 
commitment 
0 Power sources: position 
"' Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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2. a) Patterns found in successful breakthrough initiatives related to issue 
legitimisation 
Table 28: Patterns in Successful Breakthrough Initiatives in relation to Issue 
Legitimisation 352 
PATTERNS 
Successful breakthrough initiatives 
Issue sponsorship 
Issue-selling 


























Patterns related to successful breakthrough initiatives in relation to issue legitimisation: 
9 Issue sponsorship: Dean as main issue sponsor, who intends to broaden the 
sponsorship through coalition building 
... Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should 
be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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0 Issue-selling: proactive and intense activity with Faculty, Chairman and 
members of the Board and key Staff, to articulate and communicate the School's vision 
with these initiatives. 
0 Alignment: Dean's proactive environmental scanning, in considering demands 
and requirements from the outer context and other key actors MGI prioritisation (e. g. 
Peter Lorange at IMD, Antonio Borges in prioritising research or deepening 
internationalisation by opening INSEAD's Singapore campus, and George Bain 
promoting the internationalisation of LBS). 
0 Agenda Structure: the agenda is shaped and modified by breakthrough initiatives 
that represent the strategic issue. This requires the above-mentioned strong issue 
sponsorship, issue-selling and alignment of Priorities. 
9 Corporate customers' demands, competition, and donors and benefactors, as 
critical features in triggering the legitimisation of the breakthrough initiatives. 
0 The pattern of perfonnance in the inner context responds indistinctively to two 
different phenomena: 1) Weak performance triggers the need for change (e. g. Peter 
Lorange at MM 1993, George Bain at LBS in 1990); 2) High performance in support of 
the risks triggered by the new breakthrough initiatives (e. g. Antonio Borges, I't and 2 nd 
episodes at INSEAD) 
2. b) Patterns related to successful breakthrough initiatives related to power 
mobilisation 
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Table 29: Patterns in Successful Breakthrough Initiatives in relation to Power 
Mobilisation 353 
PATTERNS 
Successful breakthrough initiatives 
Sponsor's L style Directive 
Participative 








Power sources Position 
Reward 













In observing the foregoing table, the study identifies the fact that Deans 
undertaking successful breakthrough initiatives have a directive leadership style; skills 
and competences that enable them to understand the context in which the School is 
embedded, communicate their ideas and influence others through their commitment. 
They accrue power mostly from personal sources and carry out specific actions which 
353 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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aim at articulating their vision, delegating execution and orienting towards achieving 
results. 
3. a) Patterns in unsuccessful breakthrough initiatives in relation to issue 
legitimisation 
Table 30: Patterns in Unsuccessful Breakthrough initiatives in relation to Issue 
Legitimisation 354 
PATTERNS 
Unsuccessful break-through initiatives 
Issue sponsorship 
Issue-selling (. Scarce issue-seflitiz; ý 



























354 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should 
be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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Patterns in unsuccessful breakthrough initiatives related to issue legitimisation: 
Little activity towards broadening the sponsorship base. 
0 InErequent/weak issue-selling 
0 Misalignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation, 
0 Agenda structure: difficulty in competing with other initiatives 
prioritised by other key actors 
Outer context features legitimating: corporate customers' 
demands, donors and benefactors, competition and economic environment 
0 Inner context features de-legitimating: climate, structure and 
systems 
3. b) Patterns in unsuccessful breakthrough decisions related to power 
mobilisation 
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Table 31: Patterns in Unsuccessful Breakthrough initiatives in relation to Power 
Mobilisation 355 
PATTERNS 
Unsuccessful breakthrough initiatives 
Sponsor's L style Directive 
Participative 








Power sources Position 
.a 
Reward 













Patterns in unsuccessftil breakthrough decisions related to power mobilisation: 
* Participative sponsor's leadership style 
* Dean's skills and competences: Likewise successful breakthrough initiatives, 
Deans shown to be visionary, entrepreneurial and committed. 
355 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should 
be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
, kýith less relevance. 
430 
* Power sources: position (this pattern has is rather weak). Unsuccessful initiatives 
seem to be related to weak power sources. 
9 Power use: consensus-building 
4. a) Patterns found in incremental initiatives related to issue legitimisation 















M Inner CL 
















Patterns in Incremental initiatives related to Issue Legitimisation: 
* Issue sponsorship: led by the Dean as a continuity of previous Deanship in the 
case of INSEAD and LBS and as a particular mandate from the Board in the 
case of INM 
356 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should 
be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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* Issue-selling: appears with no relevance, as if it were already present on the 
agenda. In fact, there is no evidence of issue-selling. It is consistent with the 
fact that those strategic issues did not require any breakthrough decision. 
9 Clear alignment of key actors' MGI priorities 
* Patterns in legitimating features of the outer context: competition and 
corporate customer demands 
e Patterns in legitimating features of the inner context: climate, structure, 
systems and performance 
4. b) Patterns in incremental initiatives related to power mobilisation 
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Sponsor's L style Directive 
Participative 








Power sources Position 
.0 
Reward 













Patterns in incremental initiatives related to power mobilisation: 
o Dean's skills and competences: delivers results 
* Power sources: position, resource generation and allocation and referent 
357 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should 
be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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9 Power uses: coalition fonnation, rationality, assertiveness., decisiveness, and 
listening and scanning 
5. a) Patterns in Breakthrough - Incremental Initiatives related to Issue Legitimisation 
Table 34: Patterns in Breakthrough - Incremental initiatives in relation to Issue 
Legitimisation 358 
PATTERNS 
Breakthrough - Incremental initiatives 
Issue sponsorship 
Issue-selling 



























Patterns in Breakthrough - Incremental initiatives related to Issue Legitimisation: 
9 Issue Sponsorship: Dean 
358 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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9 Features Legitimisating in the outer context: Corporate customers' demands and 
competition 
5. b) Patterns in Breakthrough - Incremental Initiatives related to Power Mobilisation 
Table 35: Patterns in Breakthrough - Incremental initiatives related to Power 
Mobilisation 359 
PATTERNS 
Breakthrough - incremental 
initiatives 
Sponsor's L style Directive 
Participative 








Power sources Position 
Reward 













Patterns in Breakthrough - Incremental initiatives related to Power Mobilisation: 
0 Power sources: Position 
359 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should 
be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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6. a) Patterns in successful breakthrough - incremental initiatives related to issue 
legitimisation 
Table 36: Patterns in Successful Breakthrough - Incremental Initiatives in relation 
to Issue Legitimisation 
360 
PATTERNS 

































Patterns between successful breakthrough and incremental initiatives in relation to issue 
legitimisation: 
0 Issue sponsorship: led by the Dean 
0 Clear alignment of key actors' MGI priorities 
360 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should 
be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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0 Patterns in legitimating features of the outer context: competition and 
corporate customers' demands 
0 Patterns in legitimating features of the inner context: structure, systems and 
perfon-nance 
6. b) Patterns in successful breakthrough - incremental initiatives related to power 
mobilsation 
Table 37: Patterns in Successful Breakthrough - Incremental Initiatives in relation 
to Power Mobilisation 
361 
PATTERNS 
Successful breakthrough - incremental initiatives 
Sponsor's L style Directive 
Participative 








Power sources Position 
Reward 











Listen/scanning ... ..... 
Consensus-build 
361 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should 
be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
Nýith less relevance. 
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Patterns in Successful Breakthrough - incremental initiatives related to power 
mobilisation: 
9 Dean" s skills and competences: deliver results 
0 Power sources: position, resource generation and allocation, and referent 
0 Power uses: coalition formation, rationality, assertiveness, decisiveness, and 
listening and scanning 
7. a) Patterns in unsuccessful breakthrough - incremental initiatives related to 
issue legitimisation 
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Table 38: Patterns in Unsuccessful Breakthrough - Incremental Initiatives related 
to Issue Legitimisation 362 to 
PATTERNS 






























0 Issue Sponsorship: led by the Dean (although in unsuccessful 
breakthrough initiatives sponsorship seems rather weak) 
e Legitimating features of the outer context: corporate customers' 
demands and competition 
7. b) Patterns in unsuccessful breakthrough - incremental initiatives 
362 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study found should be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
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Table 39: Patterns in Unsuccessful Breakthrough - Incremental Initiatives in 
relation to Power Mobilisation 363 
PATTERNS 
Unsuccessful breakthrough -incremental 
initiatives 
Sponsor's L style Directive 
Participative 








Power sources Position 
Reward 













Patterns in unsuccessful breakthrough - incremental initiatives related to power 
mobilisation: 
* Power sources: position 
363 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be present, although 
with less relevance. 
440 
4.2. Findings 
In observing and analysing how strategic leadership works as a process in 
Business Schools, the study aimed to understand and describe strategic leadership as 
an organisational process, with its own dynamics, interrelations, and interconnections 
between different Key Actors and features of both inner and outer contexts, with their 
respective c aracterisation. 
Thus, this research does not pursue to understand and describe the strategic 
leadership phenomenon itself, in isolation, but rather as an organisational process in 
Business Schools (leadership of organisations instead of in organisations). This 
particular perspective of strategic leadership as a process in organisational settings 
makes a difference in the literature connecting the leadership and strategy fields, 
giving answers to scholars' claims of Putting people back into strategy formulation 
and implementation (e. g. Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1989). 
In this regard, three research questions were chosen to put focus on the 
observation and analysis of the key actors and features with their own 
characterisation, and also to understand how they influence and interact among each 
other, from a political perspective. 
As it was already mentioned, the political approach unveils how different 
interests of key actors interplay and compete in gaining space in the strategic agenda 
over time. Moreover, competition of interests enables the observation of how power 
works as a 'force' to influence decisions and actions in building and executing the 
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strategic agenda, over time (power mobilisation). Additionally, the political approach 
reveals 'issue legitimisation' and/or 'delegitimisation' according to key actors' 
perceptions and priorities, and characteristics of features of both outer and inner 
contexts. 
Thus, the political approach of strategic leadership as an organisation process 
reveals issue legitimisation and power mobilisation as two main drivers so that issues 
arefurthered or hindered in the strategic agenda. 
As follows, findings are presented in relation to the three research questions: 
1. Who are the key actors? How do they interplay in influencing strategic 
agenda building & executing? t-D 
Evidence based upon the three European Schools included in the study, shows 
the Dean, Faculty, and Board as the most powerful actors in shaping the 
organisational strategic agenda. 
Moreover, the political perspective shed light to the set of interests of each of 
these three key actors. The data collected during the period 1990-2004 suggests that 
each of the three key players in each school and across the three schools, have a same 
set of interests inherent to the role, and independent to the person who exercises the 
role. These have been called main generic interests (MGI). In this regard, the study 
found as the Board's MGI: School's governance, performance, and reputation; 
Deans' MGI: Faculty & Board support, strategic agenda -building & -executing, and 
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performance; finally, Faculty's MGI: Faculty ivork systems & compensation, 
academic career, and collegial participation in key decisions. 
Another finding constitutes the fact that prioritisation of those interests varies 
over time according to key actors' preferences, style and background, and features 
from both contexts: inner (ýerformance, culture, climate, systems, and structure) and 
outer (competition and rankings, corporate customers' demands, economic 
environment, and donors and benefactors). 
Thus far, three findings regarding the three European Schools under study were 
presented: who the key actors are, their MGI over time, their different prioritisation of 
those MGI over time. As follows, regarding the interplay among the three key actors, 
the empirical study demonstrates the importance for the Dean as the 'natural sponsor' 
of the strategic agenda to display an effective environmental scanning over 
prioritisation of interests of the other key actors and signals from critical features of 
both contexts. Accordingly, priorities of different key actors must be considered and 
channelled in order to legitimate the raise of different issue to the agenda. Moreover, 
to enable alignment of key actors' priorities a proactive issue selling must be 
displayed by the Dean or issue sponsor to facilitate the issue legitimisation. 
Finally, for a more successful interplay in influencing strategic agenda-building 
& -executing, the field study shows it is relevant to consider whether initiatives 
represent a breakthrough (they imply a new direction) or incremental (they follow 
other initiatives already set) decision regarding the strategic direction already set for 
the School. In this regard, in the case of breakthrough initiatives, the identification and 
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channel of others' MGI priorities, and an intense and effective issue selling were 
critical in exerting influence to shape agenda-building & -executing. 
2. What are the main features of the inner and outer contexts that 
influence the School's strategic agenda-building & -executing 
over time, and how do they influence? 
In these three European Schools, features of the outer context that influenced 
most are: competition (rankings), corporate customers' demands, and donors and 
benefactors. With regards to the inner context, the features that mostly influenced 
were performance, climate, and culture. It seems relevant to mention that performance 
represents a critical influence in the three Schools. 
As for the external features, competition, with the influence of rankings 
represents a relevant message for the School's key actors to introduce breakthrough 
initiatives to the agenda, when it is needed. 
For the Dean to gain support and exert power, performance and the capacity to 
deliver results, probably represents the most fundamental feature in achieving 
credibility. This was clearly seen at EWD, with the difficulties during Juan Rada's 
tenure, where weak performance resulted determinant for his departure. On the 
contrary, Xavier Gilbert's short interim deanship, in clearly matching Board's 
expectation of performance, resulted in strengthening his own credibility. As for Peter 
Lorange, from the beginning of his deanship, he exerted a priority focus not only on 
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superior performance both in ten-ns of economics and financial situation over his 
deanship, but also in terms of School reputation in the international market place. 
As for INSEAD, Antonio Borges detennination to go forward in shifting the 
School's profile towards a more research oriented according to US standards, and later 
on, to open a second campus in Singapore, was supported by his ability to strengthen 
the financial and economic model of INSEAD through a successful capital campaign. 
In the case of LBS, George Bain's main collaborator Gerry Quincey became 
crucial through his ability to reinforce the School's fmances. As for John Quelch, his 
purpose to deepen LBS's internationalisation and its academic transformation towards 
the US model, expanding the School's Portfolio programmes dramatically increasing 
pricing and revenues, was critical. 
On the contrary, weak perfonnance represented an opportunity to introduce 
dramatically changes. In this study, that was the case of BM creation, as a result of 
the IMI and IMEDE merger, and to some extent, the situation that enabled George 
Bain to introduce breakthrough initiatives in a conservative culture at LBS. 
With regard to culture, the field study shows it represents either an enabler or an 
obstacle, in introducing breakthrough initiatives to the agenda. This was the case of 
Antonio Borges at INSEAD. The School's entrepreneurial spirit enabled him to foster 
the launch of the second campus in Singapore. 
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I How do key actors mobilise (build & use) power in order to 
influence strategic agenda-building & executing over time, and 
how do they influence? 
The political perspective introduces issue legitimisation and polver mobilisation 
as two central activities in determining what issues will prevail and be included in the 
agenda. 
With regard to issue legitimisation, the contextual perspective of this study 
allowed us to observe who promotes or opposes to some issues, why the issue is 
finally accepted, rejected or blocked. In this sense, the study identified as critical 
topics for issue legitimisation, the following: firstly, a proactive and effective 
environmental scanning from both inner and outer contexts and issue selling to the 
other key constituencies. In doing this, with regard to features of the inner context, a 
critical influence represents the awareness of other key actors' priorities of MGI. That 
was a clear failure of Juan Rada, being much focused on the long-term shape of 
WD's profile and strategy while the Board members were clearly prioritising 
balancing the numbers-performance, in the short-term. 
Secondly, issue sponsorship, which underlines the importance of an active 
coalition building in order both, to reinforce the number of relevant sponsors for the 
issue, and to avoid over exposition of the original one. A clear example of this was 
Antonio Borges and the way he managed the Singapore initiative building coalitions 
at Board level with the Chairman, and at Faculty level, with those who were more 
familiar to the Asia market. 
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Thirdly, agenda structure due to the limitation of resources and the need to avoid 
dispersion in going forward with breakthrough initiatives. An example is Gabriel 
Hawawini's unsuccessful intent to raise the US campus to the School's agenda. 
Fourthly, issue selling. Introducing a new initiative and even more, if it 
represents a breakthrough in the School's strategic direction, requires a proactive and 
effective activity of selling issue benefits and possible contribution to the School's 
current situation. A positive example of this activity at INSEAD was Antonio Borges 
in launching the Singapore campus arguing against possible 'dispersion effect' this 
initiative would bring to the School. Moreover, although this was a clear case of 
breakthrough initiative, he was quite effective in communicating this new challenge as 
part of an 'evolving strategy' for INSEAD to remain as a leading Business School in 
intemationalisation. On the contrary, Gabriel Hawawini underestimated the need to 
spend time in building coalitions and selling the idea of a third campus in US. That 
was critical for this initiative to be rejected. At IMD, during Peter Lorange's deanship, 
his active and intense communication and marketing represented an important asset in 
gaining support and credibility. 
Finally, with regard to features of the inner context influencing issue 
legitimisation, performance in terms of delivering results, financial strength, and 
School's positioning, represents a sinequanon condition in the three cases over time, 
for the Dean to be credible and get support from the other constituencies. On the 
contrary, the study revealed that low performance (i. e. lack of results, fragile financial 
shape, or weak positioning) was a determinant for the Dean's failure. 
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As for features of the outer context, firstly, competition including rankings 
information was the most critical. A clear example represents the legitimisation within 
LBS recognition of the need to change due to the evidence showed by Fortune 
magazine of INSEAD's advantage within the European market. Another example was 
LBS's and INSEAD enormous and persistent in shaping their Faculty and profile in 
order to compete with the top league US Schools regarding their research skills and 
capa 1 ities. 
Secondly, corporate customers' demands. Over the last decades, the more 
intensive competition and fragmented market in the Business School industry raised 
the importance of the critical role of matching corporate customers' demands and 
needs. An example is BM through its main strategy represents a unique example. On 
the other hand, INSEAD and LBS, while having excellent reputation in this regard, 
they are constantly searching ways to improve their already excellent standards, and 
show some degree of concern about IMD's unprecedented success in this matter. 
Finally, donors and benefactors, represent not only the external contribution for 
School's development, but also recognition from the market and society of the value 
of the School's initiative. 
With regard to power mobilisation, the study identified a number of critical 




364 Bass (1990) defmes directive leadership style as follows: 
Leader plays the active role in problem-solving and decision-making. 
Leader expects group members to be guided by his/her decisions. 
Leader can try to use persuasion, reason and logic. 
Leader can assert an expectation or need and offer rewards or exert pressure to gain 
acceptance. 
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represents a substantial difference for him/her to succeed in raising breakthrough 
initiatives to the agenda and executing them. Secondly, with regard to Dean's 
competences and skills, the mobilisation of power is more effective when visionary, 
selling, coalition building, communication, delivering results, entrepreneurship, and 
commitment, are present. 
Thirdly, although position (structural source of power) as Dean or President 
represents a first step to influence and shape strategic agenda -building, however, the 
field study shows personal sources of power as conditionants to succeed in both 
introducing breakthrough initiatives to the agenda and executing them. Among these 
personal sources of power, delivering results, expertise, resource generation, 
reputation, and consistency are considered among the most relevant. Finally, uses of 
power demonstrate a critical role in mobilising power. Among these, coalition 
formation, articulation and communication of the vision, rationality, assertiveness, 
decisiveness, listening and scanning, execution, and delegation are the most relevant. 
Examples on the above findings are Antonio Borges at INSEAD regarding his 
successful endeavour to reinforce and deepen the School's research profile and 
activities, as well as the decision to launch a second campus in Singapore. Another 
clear example is Peter Lorange as for his unparallel turnover and positioning of 11\4D. 
Leader can generate charismatic identification to motivate and build commitment. 
Leader can try partial disengagement by backing away from time-consuming issues with a 
lower priority and by concentrating colleagues' attention on more important issues. 
365 Bass (1990) defines participative leadership style as follows: 
Is cooperative & democratic. 
involves others in decision-making process. 
Draws people out, listening actively and carefully, and gaining acceptance 
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And finally, comparable examples can be observed regarding George Bain and John 
Quelch at LBS. 
Finally, from the analysis of differences and similarities throughout the 
comparative cross-case analysis, a number of patterns emerge. To make the fmdings 
more explicit, the study has organised them as conditionants and enablers. With 
regards to conditionants, their importance relies on the fact that the success of the 
initiatives depends on their presence and how they are enacted - i. e. they are a 
necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Likewise, enablers are elements that 
promote orfacilitate the success of an initiative. 
We see next how the study highlights the conditionants and enablers of 
successful breakthrough initiatives by comparing them with breakthrough 
unsuccessful initiatives. It is relevant to note here that only breakthrough successful 
iratiatives were observed in this regard, since no unsuccessful or blocked incremental 
initiatives were found in any of the three Business Schools under study (this is a 
limitation of the study). However, the study has also identified enablers in comparing 
breakthrough successful with incremental initiatives. 
Conditionants for 
legitimisation: 
breakthrough successful initiatives regarding issue 
i. Intensive and proactive issue-selling. 
ii. Critical activity in understanding and aligning priorities of other key 
actors' MGI. 
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Performance. it sometimes appears as a weak feature and thus, 
reinforces any trend towards change or otherwise. It appears as a strong 
feature legitimating the feasibility of initiative (e. g. deepening research 
strategy regarding the capital campaign). 
Conditionants for breakthrough successful initiatives regarding power mobilisation: 
i. Directive leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills and competence based on his or her capacity to scan the 
environment both intemally and externally, listening in order to enrich his 
or her own perspective and understanding of the context; political skills to 
build coalitions, articulating and communicating the vision and its relation 
with the specific initiative he is promoting to the strategic agenda; the 
capacity to integrate short-term with long-term interests and individual 
with institutional interests; the capacity to deliver results mostly through 
delegation; and the capacity to stand and make the case: to present the 
initiative and the analysis on which it was based with decisiveness, 
assertiveness and rationality. 
iii. Power sources, both structural and personal. Position, reward and 
resource generation and allocation with regard to the structural sources of 
power and referent, expertise and reputation regarding the personal sources 
of power. 
iv. Power uses: articulating the vision, building coalitions, rationality, 
assertiveness, decisiveness, execution, delegation and enviromnental 
scanning. 
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Enablers for breakthrough successful initiatives regarding issue legitimisation: 
i. Issue sponsorship - need of a clear sponsor, an organisational key 
actor. In all cases, the Dean. 
ii. Agenda structure regarding two main aspects: firstly, the number of 
issues already in progress within the agenda; secondly, the logic and 
sequencing among those issues in relation to the broad strategic agenda. 
With regard to the characterisation of features of the outer context that legitimate 
suc mi lat ves, the study cannot conclude whether corporate customers' demands, 
donors and benefactors and competition are conditionants or enablers although they 
are present in all successful breakthrough initiatives. 
Enablers for breakthrough successful initiatives regarding power mobilisation: 
i. Dean's skills and competences - entrepreneurship and commitment 
ii. Power sources - position, reputation and rationality 
Enablers for incremental initiatives regarding issue legitimisation: 
i. Issue sponsorship - the Dean in all cases 
ii. Issue-selling 
iii. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
iv. Characterisation of features of the outer context that legitimate 
incremental initiatives - corporate customers' demands and competition 
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v. Characterisation of features of the inner context that legitimate 
incremental initiatives - climate, structure, systems and performance 
Enablers for incremental initiatives regarding power mobilisation: 
i. Dean's skills and competences-delivers results 
ii. Power sources-position, resource generation and allocation, and 
referent 
iii. Power uses-coalition formation, rationality, assertiveness, 
decisiveness, and listening and scanning 
To sum up, besides the relevance of each of the different research findings 
already addressed, perhaps the most valuable contribution of this study refers to the 
interweaving revealed among different people and features that influence the strategic 
leadership with a processual dynamic unveiling their interconnections and 
mteffelations. In this way, the study observed strategic leadership process with a 
political approach, from an organisational perspective: leadership of organisations. 
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Chapter IX: CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of this research has been to contribute to the literature with 
regard to Leadership. While this area of management has been widely studied over the 
last century, the leadership phenomenon, as has already been explained before has 
mostly been approached within the literature in a relatively disconnected manner with 
regard to the organizational setting in which it was enacted. The not inconsiderable 
interest awakened by leadership issues, both within the psychological and sociological 
fields, is probably one of the reasons for this gap. Thus, although a multitude of studies 
on leadership and the evolution of this literature over time have already been described 
in this study, research on Leadership embedded in organizational settings remains 
relatively scarce. 
Moreover, the study of Strategic Leadership as a process in organizational 
settings from a political perspective represents an opportunity to provide answer to 
researchers' claim with regard to the strategy process. In effect, academics assert that 
44strategy process is not an individualistic process, but a collective one. Thus, the 
political interplay of individual and collective interests has to be examined in order to 
better understand strategy (Chakravarthy et al., 2003). 
As a result, in trying to provide answers to these claims, this thesis has studied 
Strategic Leadership as a process (SLP) -strategic agenda-building and -executing- in 
Business Schools, over time, from a political perspective. The study is set within the 
European context from 1990 to 2004, when a combination of geo-political, social, 
economic and technological change triggered huge transformation in the management 
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education industry worldwide, leading to an increase in competition and fragmentation 
in this sector worldwide. 
Three top European and world-class private Business Schools (IMD, INSEAD 
and London Business School) were studied and analyzed with longitudinal data to 
explore how the SLP operates in each Business School and across the three over time, 
from a political perspective. 
In order to observe the dynamics and interrelations among key elements 
influencing the strategic agenda-building and -executing (SLP), this same strategic issue 
was considered as a vehicle to identify patterns in becoming a top international Business 
School. 
This political approach raises a number of important issues regarding the 
influence of context and process in building and executing the strategic agenda over 
time in the three Business Schools. Recognising this gap in the literature leads to the 
following research questions: 
1. Who are the key actors? How do they interplay in influencing the process of 
shaping and executing the strategic agenda, andputtingforward their interests? 
2. What are the main features of the inner and outer contexts that influence the 
School's strategic agenda-building and -executing over time; and what influence do 
they have? 
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3. How do key actors mobilise (build and use) power in order to influence 
strategic agenda-building and -executing over time, according to their prioritisation of 
their interests? 
In this final chapter, the study returns to these research questions and draws 
together the results of the case study analysis. It discusses the contributions this research 
has made to the study of strategic leadership as a process in context, from a political 
perspective. It is also hoped that it will be shown to have made a significant 
contribution to the study of Business Schools and how they can tackle their main 
strategic challenges in the current and future competitive scenario. Finally, it describes 
the limitations the study has faced, and suggests recommendations for further research. 
1. Overview of the thesis 
In Chapters I and 11, this study looked at claims made in the previous literature 
in support of the idea of leadership as embedded in an organisational and environmental 
context. It also addressed scholars' interest in linking leadership and strategy fields, in 
order to understand the impact of the leadership phenomenon in strategy-making and 
executing. Scholars have mostly approached this topic as a means of dealing with 
leadership in organisations, rather than leadership of organisations. 
Moreover, the study has also stressed the limited attention that scholars have 
paid to the processual approach to the study of leadership. Most of the studies on 
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suategic leadership concentrate on the content (what leaders do) or on the types of 
policies and strategies that lead to effective organisational performance. 
The study has also remarked on the critical role of Business Schools within 
management education in knowledge-based society in the later years of the last century. 
Given the challenges of the 2 I't century, there is now an even more significant need for 
Business Schools to set a clear strategic agenda to allocate scarce resources (Faculty, 
research and infrastructure) in an increasingly competitive and fragmented management 
education industry. 
Finally, in Chapter 11, the study recognised the contribution of the political 
approach to the study of strategic leadership in an organisational context, where poiver 
tends to be shared and diffused among multiple stakeholders and dual authority is a 
fact, given both academic and administrative realities. A political approach enables one 
to visualise the different interests and demands that arise and compete for organisational 
attention and resources. 
The advantage of focusing the study on the SLP in Business Schools led the 
author to employ a contextual approach by focusing on multiple levels of analysis which 
required the use of multiple research methods, a topic addressed in Chapter 111. 
However,, it should be pointed out that even though the study has tackled the wider 
issues of the European context and the management education industry at large, the 
focus remains at the firm level of analysis. 
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Chapter IV addressed the Business School industry and its competitive 
landscape, which is affected by various trends: firstly, the need to manage the tension 
between business relevance and academic rigour; secondly, the need for customisation 
because of increasing competition and corporate demand; thirdly, the obligation to cope 
with globalisation; fourthly, the need to adapt the Business School economic model 
both to retrenchment in public funding and to the requirement to increase income, 
through tuition fees, but also by building up endowments to support medium- and long- 
term development of the Business School; and finally, the challenges of distance 
leaming, which is being propelled by the revolution in information technology and by 
ever-increasing globalisation. 
Chapters V, VI and VII presented a case study and analysis for each of the three 
Business Schools. They described the chronological history of the School, as divided 
mto episodes that reflect the different initiatives that emerged over time, as part of the 
aim of becoming a top international Business School in the management education 
industry. 
I 
The analysis has shed light on how the SLP operated over time in terms of who 
the key actors were and their characterisation, how they interplayed, what their main 
generic interests (MGI) were and how and why they prioritised those interests, over 
time. Moreover, it has conveyed what the key features of the inner and outer contexts 
were, and how they influenced the SLP, over time. 
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The research has also analysed, in each case study, hoiv those issues were 
legitimated by features of both outer and inner contexts, the alignment of key actors' 
prioritisation of MGI, and issue-selling. Finally, the analysis focused on how key actors 
mobilised power to add some issues to the strategic agenda, according to their 
prioritisation. 
Chapter VIII refers to critical findings related to each of the three research 
questions. It addresses the comparative cross-case analysis that enabled the 
identification of differences and similarities in each School and across the three over 
time, and thus allowed the establishment ofpatterns. 
2. Gaps and Claims in both theoretical and methodological literature 
This study aims to help fill gaps and provide an answer to claims from both the 
theoretical and methodological literature related to the study of leadership in Business 
Schools. 
A list of these gaps and claims are presented as follows: 
2.1. There is a scarcity of studies on leadership in organisational settings (Hunt 
& Dodge, 2001). Most of the (abundant) literature on this subject approaches leadership 
as 'a phenomenon in itself, without relating it to the specific context in which it is 
enacted - indeed, it views it as if it were acted out in a vacuum. 
2.2. There are only limited studies on leadership as a process (processual 
perspective) in organisational settings. Most studies have considered leadership as 
if it 
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were a static picture, rather than a dynamic interaction among different constituencies, 
over time (House & Aditya, 1997). 
2.3. Scholars claim for studies that link the leadership and strategy fields, in 
order to understand how leadership and strategy interplay within organisations 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1989). 
2.4. There is a lack of studies on strategic leadership using a holistic approach 
(Pettigrew, 1985,1987,1990,2001), not only studies on the person of the leader or 
TMT, but also on the whole set ofpeople who influence strategic agenda-building and - 
executing, over time (Denis et al., 2001,1996; Bryman, 2001,1992; House & Aditya, 
1997; Hunt, 1991). 
2.5. There are not enough studies on leadership from a political perspective 
(Ammeter et al., 2002) where power and influence shape the interplay between multiple 
interests and conflicts drawn from scant resources and constraints imposed by agenda 
size and structure. Moreover, the study of leadership from a political viewpoint 
facilitates the understanding of organisations where power tends to be shared among 
different key actors (Chaffee, 1983). 
2.6. There is a claim for the need for more research on strategic leadership in 
Business Schools, because of their influential role in the current and future landscape of 
business and management development (Lorange, 2002). 
2.7. Researchers are interested in finding an answer to multiple strategic 
challenges that Business Schools face as a result of the increasing competition and 
fragmentation of the management education industry (Thomas, 2007). 
2.8. There is a particular keenness to understand the leadership phenomenon in 
Business Schools as these are institutions at the interface between the academic and 
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business worlds, with their own tension between business relevance and academic 
rigour. 
3. Findings and contributions with particular impact on the Dean's job 
To sum up, the contextual analysis of the SLP from a political perspective, in 
Business Schools, allows the study to arrive at the following conclusions: 
1. The Dean is the main key actor in the SLP, because of his/her critical 
role in building and executing the strategic agenda, as one of his/her 
MGI. 
2. For the Dean to succeed in pursuing the task of building and executing 
the strategic agenda, two other conditions should be factored in: firstly, 
the position of Dean represents a limited source of Power that requires 
reinforcement by real and effective Faculty and Board support. Secondly, 
this sUPPort will only evolve favourably if the Dean is able to deliver 
early and positive results in terms of economics and market positioning. 
3. Strengthening the Dean's power base is a result of gaining personal 
credibility and reputation in dealing not only with performance but also 
with his or her own capacity to integrate short and long-term objectives, 
and articulate and communicate these in a comprehensive and effect way 
to the key constituencies, for instance, the Faculty Board,. 
4. The Dean's capacity to scan and understand the external 'voice'. signals 
and trends (corporate customers, management education industry and 
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donors and benefactors), and bring them to the School's Faculty and key 
staff, is a critical Precondition for effective direction- setting. 
5. In raising strategic issues that represent a breakthrough initiative for the 
School's direction, some activities are critical: an active issue selling 
through coalition-building at both Board and Faculty levels (and other 
key constituencies), and consistent data to support rational 
argumentation. 
6. Finally, it is crucial to articulate and communicate the initiative as a 
logical evolution within the broader picture of the School's strategic 
direction (e. g. Antonio Borges introducing the second campus initiative 
as a natural drive within globalisation trends given INSEAD's 
positioning as a leading international School). 
With regard to the three Business Schools included in this study, their 
remarkable success over time represents a direct consequence of their capacity to 
identify and anticipate market trends, responding to them with adequate academic and 
economic models. In other words, an effective SLP, over time, consists of the ability to 
set strategic priorities aligned with the academic and economic model. 
4. Comments on Leadership 
The relevance of the leadership phenomenon with the management fields is 
widely acknowledged. The study of leadership has, indeed, been approached with a 
range of considerations in mind: the person of the leader, and his/her traits and skills; 
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the leader's behaviour; his/her enactment in a particular situation; the relationship 
between leaders and followers; charismatic leadership; different characters of 
transformational and transactional leadership; shared/joint leadership with a broader and 
more integrative perspective. Strategic leadership as a process in organisational settings 
represents an avenue for further exploration in order to deepen the understanding of 
strategic formulation and implementation. 
Finally, the political perspective facilitates a consideration of the interplay 
among people's interests. The fact that the political approach to the study of leadership 
has sometimes been considered as 'dark' needs to be overcome. In effect, the fact that 
leadership is understood as a social influence process, power and influence represent a 
central issue in studying leadership. 
- The field study enables one to recognise that power essentially accrues on 
personal sources such as the following: the capacity to shape, communicate and 
articulate a vision; the delivery of results; listening to others; the integration of different 
people; the location of common ground among them; the integration of goals for the 
long and short-term; the building of confident relationships; consistency; commitment; 
integrity; political skills in coalition building; resource generation, etc. 
Particularly, in organisational settings where power tends to be shared and 
collegiality and dual authority challenge formal authority, the understanding of 
leadership and power, with their possibilities and limitations, represent a relevant issue 
for further research. 
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5. Limitations of the study 
5.1. The conclusions to this study relate solely to the specific case study 
examples, which involve, in essence, three high status, high quality private Schools 
during the period 1990-2004: INM, INSEAD, and LBS. Although the choice of these 
three Schools with their own similarities was deliberate, in order to set boundaries for 
the study, future research may well include a case study of a high quality European 
public school to establish a meaningful point of contrast. This would enable an 
understanding of the SLP to be gained within a more regulated environment, such as 
that of the public sector, and identify differences between Schools which are more 
dependent on University governance, and embedded within a more bureaucratic 
context. 
5.2. As in every study, the perspective chosen enables both researcher and 
reader to better understand the phenomenon under study. At the same time, by its very 
nature, it represents limitations. Thus, the political analysis of the SLP in Business 
Schools, over time, depends on the particular lens that has been selected: here, one 
with a political focus. Even though choosing this perspective has facilitated the 
observation of power and influence, interests and demands, coalitions, goals and 
objectives, bargaining processes and conflict - among other things - the rational 
aspect of decisions, actions and events could not readily be identified. 
5.3. In looking at the research method chosen for this study, even though the 
multiple case study method augments external validity and helps guard against 
observer bias (Yin, 1984), there must be questions as to the extent to which findings 
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are applicable to other contexts, especially those whose organisational characteristics 
differ from those of Business Schools. 
5.4. As for the operationalisation of the SLP, the selection of categories to 
identify the SLP may have constrained the analysis. In this regard, strategic agenda- 
building and executing have been chosen, since they suit the political perspective 
better. 
If we now consider the particular sets of indicators chosen to analyse issue 
legitimisation and power mobilisation, and outer and inner contexts, these may also 
have limited the research findings. For example, performance issues have been 
avoided, limiting the issues to positioning and economic outcomes. 
5.5. The period in which the SLP was observed, 1990-2004, and the temporal 
bracketing employed (episodes corresponding to the different Deanships in which 
each School was divided) constrained the study to some extent. However, given that 
IMD was founded in 1990, this period was deliberately chosen in order to carry out a 
better comparison across the three Business Schools over time. 
5.6. Quantitative analysis would have enhanced the study. Although this type 
of analysis was also carried out to augment validity, the study acknowledges that the 
use of the questionnaires would have improved the data, since semi-structured 
interviews sometimes present questions which might not fit or that cannot be 
answered with the depth the research needs for further analysis. 
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A qualitative approach was chosen for the study, since where processual 
analysis is carried out,, interconnections, dynamics and interrelations, can be better 
explained. 
6. Future research 
Future research is likely to centre around the following areas: firstly, although this 
study makes a special contribution to its field of interest by linking leadership and 
strategy, there is a clear space for more research, to better understand how these two 
disciplines interact with, and complement each other. Otherwise, strategy appears to be 
disconnected from the human side of strategy-making and executing. 
Moreover, the study of strategic leadership as a process in context will allow a 
deeper and more grounded understanding of the leadership phenomenon, focusing not 
merely on the person of the leader or TMT, but on a whole set ofpeople who influence 
of r 
st. ategic agenda-building and execution. We may sum up by saying that a processual 
and contextual approach enables us to understand people's individual and collective 
actions, the interplay and interconnections between them, and the dynamics between 
them over time: the who, what, why, when and where can thus be observed and 
described. 
Secondly, study of leadership is hitherto lacking in a sense of organisation impact. 
In other words, more studies on strategic leadership are needed to better understand 
how leadership interacts and influences strategy formulation and implementation within 
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specific settings. Although the leadership field is continually evolving and shared 
leadership has become a key contribution for a more holistic and comprehensive 
understanding of the leadership phenomenon in organisations, there is still a long way 
to go in studying leadership embedded in different organisational features. This 
represents an opportunity to observe the leadership phenomenon not only from 
psychological or sociological perspectives, but also from the perspective of 
organisational theory. In this regard, a strategic leadership perspective, with its 
associated processual and contextual approaches, seems to be a valuable path for further 
exp oration. 
Thirdly, there is still a long way to go in the study of leadership from a political 
perspective where power and influence play a central role. Future research opportunities 
include the study of the strategic leadership process from a political perspective, given 
the nature of the leadership phenomenon as a social influence process. Thus, a political 
approach to the study of leadership facilitates the observation, description and analysis 
of the interplay of actors with different interests and degrees of power, the better to 
influence those people who promote specific issues and raise them to the strategic 
agenda, as well as execute any resolutions to such issues. - 
Fourthly, further research would include polar types: not only Schools with similar 
contexts but also studies on strategic leadership as a process in high quality European 
public Business Schools as a meaningful and informative point of contrast. A positive 
step forward in this direction would be to include some other Schools. 
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Finally, the author would like to offer some suggestions for further research on the 
SLP in Business Schools. Given the critical role that these institutions play in 
influencing business practice, more research could be done to improve and 
professionalise their leadership and govemance. As Peter Lorange (2005), Gabriel 
Hawawini (2005) and Howard Thomas (2007) assert in two issues of the Journal of 
Management Development, more than ever before, these critical challenges are 
compelling Business Schools to have a clear strategicfocus, select the most appropriate 
strategy and execute it flawlessly. In the face of such significant demands, improving 
the understanding of the strategic leadership process in Business Schools is a top 
priority in making a positive impact, not only on education for management, but also on 
society as a whole. 
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Appendix H. Analytical Framework: SLP dynamics: Strategic 
Agenda Building and Executing - Legitimisation and Power 
mobilisation. 
SLP = Strategic Agenda Building & executing 
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Strategic Issue I 'ýý\ 
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Power Mobilisation Issue Legitimisat 
1. Sponsor's Leadership style 1 Issue sponsorship 
2. Dean's skills & competences 2. Agenda structure (strategic priorities) 
3. Power sources 3. Issue selling 
4. Power uses 4. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
5. Features of the inner & outer context characterisation 
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IMID Appendix 11. LVED's Governance Structure 
DM presents seven Boards and committees that comprise the review 
and decision-making bodies of BM. ' The following Figure 27 shows IMD's 
governance structure. There are seven committees: the MD Foundation Board, 
the Executive Committee of the MM Foundation Board, the Business Advisory 
Council, the ITWD President, the Management Committee, the Operating 
Committee, the Faculty Recruiters Committee, and the Faculty Personnel 
Committee. 
Figure 27: IMID's Governance Structure 
IMD's Governance Structure Executive 
Committee of the 
IMID Foundation 
Board 





Management Operating Faculty Faculty 
Committee Committee Recruiters Personnel 
Committee Committee 
1 EQUIS H 2002 EýW Self-Assessment Report - Archival Material. 
4 
The IMD Foundation Board of 50 executives elected from leading 
client firms approves the Annual Report and Annual Budget as well as the 
policies and strategies of IMD; it also appoints the Auditors, the Foundation 
Board members, the members of the Executive Committee and the President of 
IMD. The Board meets once a year for a day-and-a-half A Faculty 
representative sits on the Board and the President of INM is also an ex-officio 
member. 
The Executive Committee of the Foundation Board consists of nine 
members elected from the Foundation Board and includes the President ex 
officio. The Executive Committee meets twice per year and is responsible for 
ensuring the financial health of IMD together with the President and the 
Director of Finance. The Chairman has informal and sporadic meetings with the 
Dean. 
Thus, the Executive Committee focuses on strategy, agreement with this 
strategy and then the resources and skills required to implement the strategy; the 
intellectual capital needed to carry out this strategy successfully and 
compensation issues. ' 
"Once the strategic direction has been established and agreed upon, then 
it becomes the executive committee's responsibility to ensure that 
implementation is effective, or in the event that changes are needed, those 
changes are discussed and agreed to and then implemented. " I 
2 Vito H. Baumgartner, former Chairman of the EVM Foundation Board. 
3 Vito H. Baumgartner, former Chairman of the EVM Foundation Board. 
5 
The Business Advisory Council consists of senior strategy/HR 
executives, representing the 170 companies in the IMD Leaming Network. The 
Business Advisory Council assists the School with viewpoints regarding the 
direction of value-creating activities for clients, such as advice on new program 
initiatives, discussions about corporate universities and the role of Business 
Schools, and other key trends. The Business Advisory Council meets semi- 
annually, for a half-day interactive discussion session. This half a day backs on a 
one-day learning event on challenges facing HR executives with strategic 
responsibility. The Business Advisory Council, plus the one-day learning event, 
provides an excellent network of peers for the members themselves. 
The Management Committee consists of the President, four Faculty 
and two senior Staff. Each Faculty has responsibility for one of the following 
strategic issues: Faculty planning and workload, public and partnership program, 
portfolio planning and quality, MBA program management, research and 
development. The senior Staff is responsible for administration, finance and 
human resources management for Staff members. This Management Committee 
serves in many ways as an executive committee for the School and meets 
formally on a monthly basis and more regularly on a one-to-one basis with each 
other or with the President to resolve day-to-day operational issues. 
The Operating Committee is chaired by IMD's President and is 
attended by individuals with lead portfolios and responsibilities throughout the 
organisation. There are approximately 15 to 20 people on the committee. They 
meet once per month to ensure that all areas of the business are integrated and 
6 
that each area of the business is aware of all developments and innovations. The 
meeting agenda often focuses on strategic issues related to IMD's clients, 
marketing and program quality. 
The Management Committee and Operating Committee evolved 
overtime, in line with INM's overall philosophy to maintain a fluid and flexible 
organisation. 
The Faculty Recruiters Committee is chaired by IMD's President and 
consists of seven professors responsible for Faculty recruiting. This committee 
meets regularly to identify new Faculty and to oversee all aspects of the Faculty 
recruiting process. 
The Faculty Personnel Committee consists of three professors who 
deal with Faculty grievance issues and enforcement of the Faculty guidelines. 
7 
IMI) Appendix III: History of INU & IMEDE 
1. History of IMI before the foundation of INM 
In 1946, one year after the end of World War 11, Europe had to deal with 
pretty desperate times. It was devastated and it had to be rebuilt. Foreign trade was 
reduced to an absolute minimum and subject to countless restrictions to save 
foreign exchange. ' 
At that time, Edward K. Davis, President and founder of Alcan Aluminium 
Ltd. ' was able to see that Europe was becoming a place where men would be free 
to seek opportunities, to exchange ideas and products across the globe, and to put 
the special talents of every person to the best possible use. 
Mr. Davis called upon Dr. Haenni, the Head of Laboratories of Alcan 
Aluminiurn Ltd., he was Swiss and his experience had allowed him to acquire a 
broad intemational outlook. Davis suggested Haenni set up an Alcan School of 
post-graduate international management. His vision was that an expanding 
multinational like Alcan would need to develop international managers. This 
School would give managers a broader perspective of the world focusing on the 
macro environment. It would "internationalise people. 
116 
4 EW document, September, 1986 - Archival Material. 
5 Founded in Canada in 1902, the subsidiary of the Pittsburg Reduction Company (later Alcoa) was 
first charactered as Northern Aluminium Company, Ltd.. The company was renamed Aluminium 
Company of Canada, Ltd. (Acoc) in 1925. The years 1930 to 1950 saw a great deal of expansion on 
the part of Acoc as smelting and hydroelectric facilities were built. Fabricating plants were also built 
and sales offices began opening on an international scale. In 1945, Acoc registered the name Alcan. 
Today, Alcan is a multinational, market-driven company and a global leader in aluminium and 
specialty packaging with 2002 revenues of US$ 12,5 billion. Headquartered in Montreal, Canada, 
Alcan employs 53000 people and has operating facilities in 41 countries. 
6 Bodhan Hawrylyshyn, former IN11 Director General. 
8 
Consequently, Alcan founded a School in Geneva, Switzerland in 1946. Dr. 
Haenni chose this location because he thought it was the most international city in 
Europe. At a time when economic nationalism was rife, Dr. Haenni overcame the 
current trends and instead of merely focusing on the national environment, he 
envisioned an international perspective of the macro environment. Accordingly, in 
1946, he ran what may have been the first international management program ever 
conceived. ' IMI's mission was "To contribute to the development and 
improvement of managerial effectiveness, intemationalising their attitudes and 
capacities and professionalizing their approaches and skills. "' 
During its first years, the Business School was called CEI-Centre 
d'Etudes Industriels. Later (in 1982) it changed its name to IMI-International 
Management Institute. 
Since the mission of IMI was essentially to give people an international 
perspective of business, IMI had international Faculty, international teaching 
material, and international participants. The participants "were managers, young 
managers who could grow up to 35 or even 40 from different countries. "' 
IMI did not use a particular teaching method. Rather, it focused on the 
different ways that enabled executives to understand the impact of the world's 
scenario on their own business. "Their strength was in understanding the ocean 
around the ship, which looked like a reasonable, like complementarities. "10 
7 EVII document, September, 1986 - Archival Material. 
8 IMI document, January, 1986 - Archival Material. 
9 Bodhan Hawrylyshyn, former IMI Director General. 
'0 Derek Abell, former DAEDE Dean, former IMD Faculty. 
9 
By 1950 the world was opening up fast. International trade and investments 
grew prodigiously, and so did the demand for managers with an international 
outlook and with a sense of wonder and delight at the sheer diversity of the world 
around them. Consequently, IMI grew: broadening, internationalising and 
professionalising young managers. 
Already in 1973, IMI was a medium sized international School that offered 
professional development at two levels: one was at management levels, from an 
MBA type course, mid management course to top management course. The other 
was at functional levels, like marketing and finance. " 
During the first 20 years, IN41 had financial dependency on Alcan. Dr. 
Bodhan Hawrylyshyn (Director of IMI from 1968 to 1986) affirms that "[Alcan] 
provided 80% of the budget for the first 20 years, and they set up the Board of 
Directors of the School. "" However, around 1975-1976, Hawrylyshyn created a 
network of Business Associates Companies, which became one of IMI's 
strengths. " In time, this network would enable IMI to become less dependent on 
Alcan's subsidies. " Furthermore, this Network was the antecedent that propelled 
IMD to build the Leaming Network. 
The Business Associate Network became a source of information for IMI 
to know what the needs of the executives were and thus, to design the different 
programs and curricula. In late 1984, IMI Faculty joined representatives of the 
" Fred Neubauer, former M Faculty, MM Faculty. 
12 Bodhan Hawrylyshyn, former BE Director General. 
13 IMI document, September, 1986 - Archival Material. 
14 Bodhan Hawrylyshyn, former EVU Director General. 
10 
Business Associate companies and members of the IMI Foundation Board and 
established the 'Commission 2000'. The purpose of this Commission was to re- 
examine all aspects of M41's own operations and approach to management 
education in order for it to be relevant and appropriate in the light of expected 
changes in the business environment of the 1990s. 1' "The Commission 2000 has 
been very important as regards to what would happen. "" 
One of the key actors of the 'Commission 2000' was Prof. Juan Rada, a 
young Chilean professor who joined IMI in 1979 and who was appointed Director 
General of IMI in 1986 at the age of 33. Rada's main purpose was to transform 
IMI in such a way that it would help managers who attended IMI's programs to 
anticipate more accurately relevant developments, to envisage clear options and be 
prepared to deal with an unpredictable future. " 
Thus, three were the issues that, according to the 'Commission 2000', IMI 
would have to deal with in the near future: firstly, the creation of the European 
Union in 1992. "This was going to change the rules of the game with regard to 
how companies would operate their concern about management. "" 
The second issue was to develop a research capacity in order to understand 
the management world in its diversity and complexity. IMI and all European 
Business Schools had always been oriented towards executive education. "They 
15 IMI document, September, 1986 - Archival Material. 
16 Juan Rada, former IMI Director General, former IMD Director General. 
17 EVU document, September, 1986 - Archival Material. 
18 Juan Rada, former D41 Director General, former EVID Director General. 
11 
never had the economic grounds to perform the appropriate research. "" 
Thirdly, it was essential to question the teaching methods. "The privileged 
teaching method of Business Schools was the case study, which is very efficient 
from the analytic perspective. The more cases studied, the more analytic capacity 
is developed. However, it does not mean more management capacity 
necessarily. 
5120 
These three issues stipulated by the Commission 2000 were the main 
reasons for IMI to pursue the merger with IMEDE. " IMI saw that the world was 
becoming more and more internationalised and that global competition would 
become stronger. Thus, they would need a response to face its future issues. 
The Commission insisted on a trend towards the growth of in-company 
programs, which would require all three of the above mentioned issues. Besides, 
developing such programs would entail a closer relationship with the government, 
with the World Economic Forum (which had been established as a result of IMI's 
25 ffi anniversary) and with the business industry. 
But in order to meet these needs IMI would have to increase its critical 
resource: the Faculty. "At that time, M had between 16 and 17 professors and 
IMEDE had more or less the same amount. 
ý')22 
19 Juan Rada, former M Director General, former EVID Director General. 
20 Juan Rada, former M Director General, former ITMD Director General. 
21 Juan Rada, former M Director General, former EMD Director General. 
22 Juan Rada, former M Director General, former MID Director General. 
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Thus, it was at this point that IMI initiated a process of approach towards 
IMEDE. IMI Foundation Board's members thought that merging with IMIEDE 
would be the solution to the lack of critical resources and to the financial 
sustainability of both Schools. 
Figure 28 illustrates the History of IMI, founded in 1946 by a Canadian 
company called Alcan Aluminium Ltd. It shows the different Directors General 
that the School had and some key circumstances that the School went through. 
Among these: the year in which the School was linked to the University of 
Geneva, when the Business Associate Network was created; when there was an 
MBA degree for the first time; when it launched a new School; when it changed its 
name; when the Commission 2000 took place, and finally, the merger with 
MEDE. 
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2. History of IAMDE before the Foundation of IAM 
The end of World War 11 marked the beginning of the most dynamic 
phase of Nestle's history. Throughout this period, Nestle's growth was based on 
its policy of diversifying within the food sector to meet the needs of consumers. 
Growth at Nestle was a product of acquisition of different companies that 
allowed Nestle to develop its program portfolio. " Thus, by the mid '50s, Nestle 
Alimentana S. A. became a worldwide company with a pressing need to adapt to 
its new size. 
In June 1955, a number of Nestle's international executives met in 
Frankfurt in order to discuss sales organisation problems and general 
organisation within the group. At that meeting, a group of young men in 
managerial positions were asked to give their opinion as to what they thought 
was missing in their own backgrounds. These men talked about the major 
difficulties they had encountered in the past due to the lack of experience and 
knowledge to face their expansion throughout the world. They acknowledged 
their anxiety as regards managing a company which was growing at a 
tremendous speed. Moreover, their responsibilities were facing the first stages of 
mtemationalisation. 
After the meeting, Enrico Bignami (Managing Director of Nestle 
Alimentana SA between 1953 and 1968, and Vice-Chainnan of its Board of 
Directors) and his colleague, Mr. Jean-Constant Corthesy, had the opportunity to 
think over the whole issue. Both men started to dream of having some kind of 
23 
ww",. nestl6. com 
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management School for Nestle. 
So they went to the Director of CEI (later IMI) and proposed that Nestle 
should participate in the School. Since they had different perspectives (IMI's 
was to focus on the different business models all over the world, whereas Nestle 
wanted a School that would teach management as some of the traditional 
American Business Schools did) and did not come to any agreement, Bignami 
and Corthesy decided to meet the Dean of Harvard Business School (HBS), to 
seek his advice. 
With this purpose, the Dean of HBS asked two of BBS professors to 
guide the Nestle people, Carl Roland (Chris) Christensen and George Albert 
Smith. These professors suggested Nestle create a School not just for the 
Company but for other European companies as well. 
Consequently, in 1957, Nestle founded IMEDE with the academic 
support of HBS, in Lausanne. Clark Myers (Dean of the College of Business 
Administration at Ohio University) became INEDE's first Dean. IMEDE's 
main purpose was to become a Business School which would train managers 
within the European envirorunent but with a Harvard case-oriented 
methodology. 
Rapidly, WIEDE became a place where executives could obtain solid 
education in management. The Harvard community started to understand that 
MEDE could be their connection with European culture and style, since it had a 
16 
strong Harvard background. In recalling these years, Derek Abell (former 
INMDE professor and Dean) asserts, "Harvard was very influential in the early 
years in promoting a style of research, which was 'Let's go in and understand 
individual companies. Not do surveys of hundreds of things. "' " 
As regards the School's characteristics, IMEDE relied on Nestle. Nestle 
subsidised INMDE every year and it began to see that the School's dependence 
was getting stronger every year. 
IMEDE's structure and aims were supported by the authorities of the 
Canton of Vaud who, at first, were apparently concerned about the unfamiliar 
approach being taken as regards the Faculty, the proposed teaching language 
(English) and teaching methodology (case study method). However, they were 
soon won over by the innovative aspects of the idea and by the possibility of 
establishing a new international centre for higher education in Lausanne. 
Harvard's influence could be seen not only in RAEDE's teaching 
methodology, but in the Faculty's persistence that in order to make an impact on 
participants, courses had to be long. IMEDE also had HBS's perspective of the 
'American way', which was what European companies looked for at that time. 
As regards the Faculty, there were 14 Professors (most of them had 
studied at Harvard). Seven of them integrated the core of Full-Time Faculty. 
The other seven were visiting Professors who rotated every year. It was a very 
24 Derek Abell, former INEDE Dean, former IN4D Faculty. 
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homogeneous team. "I remember for example, that we would have, on a weekly 
basis, 'Monday morning agenda setting. We would meet very quickly 
informally, around the table on the cafeteria and set the agenda; tell ourselves 
what was going on and set the agenda for the week that followed. "2' Even 
though the Dean ran these meetings, the decisions were carried out on an 
informal basis. 
As time went by, the core of Full-Time Faculty began to grow, and it 
became established. It became increasingly international: a place for executives 
to acquire a solid education. Eventually, the culture of the School began to take 
shape. It was characterised by diversity, since the Faculty belonged to different 
fields and by backgrounds, since they came from different countries. 
Even though professors came from different fields and from different 
nations, they had a sense of belonging to the School, which they shared. "A 
great number of us were educated at HBS, so we had that sort of common 
element in our most recent training and development. "" 
IMIEDE had particular characteristics that made the School similar to 
IMI: both Schools were initiated by companies; both of them started providing 
participants with executive programs and they both needed financial assistance. 
IMEDE's weak financial situation came to the point when Nestle began 
to worry as it became aware that the School was far from heading towards self- 
25 Kamran Kashani, former IMEDE Faculty, EM Faculty. 
26 Kamran Kashani, former IMEDE Faculty, EVM Faculty. 
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sustainability. This weakness would be an obstacle for IMEDE to become a top 
Business School in the future. "Nestle played the founding role in tenns of the 
establishment of INMDE, and had always been prepared to respond to any 
operation. And this was systematic [ ... ] in the mid 1980s. [There was] a 
direction that said that no truly international School was going to build itself on 
the back of one company, which in this case was Nestle. "" 
Thus, Nestle decided not to subsidise IMEDE any longer. It suggested 
the School build a Business Associate Network as M had done in 1975, so that 
it would not have to keep on subsidising the School on its own. But the business 
industry refused to help two Swiss Business Schools. This triggered the IMEDE 
Foundation Board (most of its members were managers at Nestle) to start 
negotiations with IMI with the aim of merging both Schools. In this sense, Juan 
Rada posits, "Stephan Schmidheiny, who was my Chairman at M, sat at 
Nestle's Board. [ ... ] Some of them knew each other and others didn't, but they 
had a common denominator, Switzerland. And I say so because the role that the 
big Swiss multinationals played in the merger was fundamental. "" 
So the merger decision was analysed between both IMI and IMEDE 
Boards. Among the Swiss multinationals that were on these two Boards, were 
Ciba Geigy at the M Foundation Board and Nestle at the IMEDE Foundation 
Board. However, some of the Swiss companies (UVS and Credit Swiss for 
example) were at IMI's Board and at Nestle's Board too. Thus, both IMI and 
IMEDE Boards started negotiating the likelihood of a merger taking place, 
27 Jim Ellert, former MEDE FaCUlty, IMD Associate Dean. 
28 Juan Rada, former M Director General, former IMD Director General. 
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towards the end of the '80s. 
Figure 29 illustrates the History of IMEDE. It illustrates the date the 
School was founded, the different Deans it had, the year it was decided to effect 
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Figure 30 illustrates the IMD Foundation. It shows that it was bom in 
1990, from the merger of IN41 (founded by Alcan -Mr. Davis- in 1946) and 
IMEDE (founded by Nestle -Bignami and Corth6sy- in 1957). It also refers to 
the IMD's first Dean, Juan Rada, whose tenure ran fom 1990 to 1992. The 
different Director Generals (IMI) and Deans (ITVIEDE) from the founding 
Business Schools are listed. 






- 1946-1966 Director Paul M. Haenni 
1966-1968 Director Jean-Ives Eichenberger 
- 1968-1986 Director Bodhan Hawrylyshyn 'e (G, neva) \/I 
- 1986-1989 Director Juan Rada 
1990-1992 
Dean Juan Rada 





- 1957-1960 Dean Clark Myers 
- 1960-1964 Dean Thomas A. Graves 
- 1964-1966 Dean Chaffee E. Hall 
- 1966-1967 Ad Interim Professor Pierre Goetschin 
- 1967-1978 Dean Luigi Dusmet 
- 1978-1980 Dean Harry Hansen 
- 1980-1989 Dean Derek Abell 
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ENID Appendix IV: Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during the 
merger episode 
Data supporting theforegoing analysis 
In order to understand why some issues gain the agenda instead of others., it 
seems relevant to observe how each of the main actors prioritise their main generic 
interests and how they scan the most critical features of both inner and outer 
contexts that will be decisive in legitimating the prioritisation of some interests over 
others. 
Table 40 shows the main generic interests prioritised by each key actor. The 
importance of this rests on the fact that the political perspective emphasises the 
interplay of different interests among key actors and how these interact with each 
other to prevail their interests instead of others. Along this vein, Table 38 refers to 
the key actors (Dean, Faculty and Board) and to those characteristics that shape 
their interplay. 
To better understand why and how things happened, Table 41 shows an 
analytical view of the characterisation. of features of the inner context, and Table 42, 
the influence of the characterisation. of features of the outer context. Finally, Table 
42 adds to the prioritisation that each key actor does regarding their own interests, 
the column of 'real issue prioritisation of MGF, which refers to the identification of 
those genenc interests that prevail over others and lead the School's strategic agenda 
building and executing. Two other columns complete the table: firstly, 'issue 
legitimisation' that refers to the influence that features of inner and outer contexts 
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have in legitimating the prioritisation of certain interests that have been raised to the 
School's agenda instead of others. Secondly, the column of 'power mobilisation' 
completes the political perspective explaining how power is mobilised in order to 
make some interests prevail over others. To understand how power works, the study 
focuses on the concepts of power sources and uses (See Chapter 11) of each of the 
key actors. 
The following figures and tables provide the study with a complete and 
analytical perspective of the elements that shaped the strategic agenda building and 
executing over the period 1990-1991. Thus, the following step refers to the 
exploring and describing of the interrelations, dynamics and interconnections among 
these elements. Note that the tables that correspond to the reliability coding of the 
content analysis of the interviews and archival material, that support the foregoing 
information can be found in the Appendix 2. 




1) Strategic agenda building, executing & aligning 
Dean 2) Faculty & Board support 
Faculty 1) Collegial participation in key decisions 
2) Academic career 
Board 1) Performance 
2) Governance 
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Table 41: Key actors' characterisation during merger period 
Pe -d rio Characteristic Merger tor Key actor 1990-1991 
Leadership style Participative 
Dean Skills Intellectual 
Values Open minded- 
Consensus building 
Background Academic 
Background Macro (M) vs micro (EVIEDE) perspective Faculty Fragmentation M-57EDE 
Background Business CEOs & members Board Donors & benefactors 
Role of the chairman Executive director 
Active role in the merger 
Some overlap with Dean's role 
Table 42: Characterisation of features of inner context during merger period 
jo d Merger 
Key features 1990-1991 
Performance: 1990 19 1 
Income Income: 34.514 Income: 36.331 
Profits 
__Operating 





Culture 2 different cultures & backgrounds: IMI-IMEDE 
Systems Rewriting rules (unclear) 
Structure Multiple committees 
Academic departments 
Faculty college (informal structure) 
Possible overlapping ftitictions between Chairman of the Board and 
Director General 





Economic environment Gulf crisis (recession) 
Corporate customer Expectant 
Business Associate Network enlarged 
Competition INSEAD 
LBS 
Top US Business Schools 
Donors/benefactors NestI6 and Alcan dependency (ownership) 
Alumni Not critical 
Rankings Not cntical 
Accreditation agencies Not critical 
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1. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
ii. Issue Selling 
iii. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
iv. Agenda Structure 
V. Characterisation of features of both outer and inner context legitimating 
initiatives 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Although Dean Juan Rada was the issue sponsor regarding the set of initiatives 
-promoted to make the IMI & FvMDE merger successful, it is the Board that 
nominated Rada to lead the School into the merger process. Now, the study 
identified the relevance of the Board's background and the role of its Chainnan, 
regarding their impact on this first episode. Empirical data suggests that during 
Rada's tenure, top managers who were IMD's donors & benefactors mainly joined 
the Board. This fact contributed to the Board's sense of ownership towards MD and 
thus,, their interest in the School's financial outcome. 
Moreover, Kaspar Cassani, Chairman of the EAD Board at the time of Rada, 
had had an active role in the M& MEDE merger and thus, he was committed to 
its success. In addition, he was a highly respected professional who personally knew 
many top managers, members of MM's Foundation Board. Thus, not only did 
he 
27 
want EMD to be successful for the School's sake but also for his own reputation as 
Chairman of the IMD Board. In facing uncertainty, he would rather undertake 
executive functions (although this implied that his actions overlapped with the 
Dean's role) to prevent any critical situation. 
ii. Issue selling 
Even though Rada was the highest formal authority as Dean, the particular 
characteristic of Business Schools as higher education institutions requires other key 
actors' support. In this regard, the study did not find any evidence of an effective 
issue selling on behalf of Rada. He was mainly focused on medium and long term 
objectives related to the shape of the new School's identity: culture, policies and 
strategy. Moreover, data suggests Rada was aware of the importance of including the 
Faculty in this critical task; he spent a considerable amount of time to satisfy this 
demand. 
However, Rada's actions were not perceived by the other key actors, either 
because of his own leadership or managerial limitations to deal with the merger 
process and/or other issues, such as the overlap of ftmctions with the executive role 
of the Board's Chairman, the lack of positive economic results in the short term, in 
consonance with Board's expectations, or the unexpected recession produced by the 
Gulf War. Or maybe just because he did not undertake an effective issue selling, but 
the his failure to overcome those obstacles set by Cassani led him to a discredited 
position where confused, disoriented and annoyed Faculty would not dare to 
approximate. And even though he would have attained Faculty's support (which he 
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did not), it would have not been enough since this academic body was fragmented as 
a result of the different backgrounds of the IMI & IMEDE members. 
The weak financial and economic shape of the School fostered its dependency 
on the Board's economic contribution. In addition, the 1991 recession worsened this 
situation even more. As a result, the Board's power was strengthened and the 
Faculty could perceive this situation. In addition, the Faculty College was created by 
some members of the Faculty who wanted to lead the School's strategic direction in 
intent to solve the current lack of authority. Cassani facilitated the College's interest 
of collegial participation in key decisions by allowing Goetchin (Head of Faculty 
College) to attend Board meetings. This situation had a strong impact in INM's 
'balance of power', which clearly let Rada alone, in the weaker side. It would be 
very difficult for him to undertake any issue selling within this 'political map'. 
iii. Alignment of key actors' MGIprioritisation 
While Rada was oriented towards strategic agenda building & executing, the 
Board prioritised performance since its members aimed at restoring the School's 
financial situation in the short term. As for the Faculty, it claimed collegial 
participation in key decisions. But even though Rada facilitated the participation of 
the Faculty, they demanded a clearer definition related to direction setting, decision- 
making and execution. Moreover, the Faculty fragmentation due to the different 
background of the IMI & IMEDE members, constrained their cohesion as an 
academic body. 
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In addition, the Board sought economic stability to enable the merger to 
proceed and the Faculty recognised social organisational instability of the merger as 
potentially problematic and likely to be made more difficult as a consequence of 
economic instability-i. e. chance or circumstances combined to mean that both the 
Board and Faculty were opposed to Rada who became isolated. Power is a relational 
phenomenon. Thus, this isolation is what forced his resignation, not as an explicit 
result of specific steps by anyone but rather as a consequence of the interplay of 
situation and interests-as if it were an 'invisible hand' (Chandler, 1963). 
In summary, the study identified not only the different MGI prioritisation. 
among key actors but also lack of issue selling on behalf of the Dean and a clear 
failure in aligning key actors' MGI prioritisation at the time to define and implement 
the strategic agenda of IMD. 
iv. Agenda structure 
The entry of an issue onto the strategic agenda is facilitated or constrained by 
the number of issues, their sequencing and structure of the organisation's agenda at 
the time an issue is being raised. In this regard, Rada's long-term interest was 
constrained by the other short-term issues which presented more urgency and 
consequentiality due to their short-tenn relevance such as the Board's interest 
prioritisation related to the School's performance. 
The study noted the Board's power to influence EVM's agenda structure and 
how such influence was based on its sense of ownership that resulted from the 
30 
School's financial dependence. Moreover, the Board's power base was also 'fed' by 
the Faculty's support fostered by IMD's instability regarding both economic (weak 
performance) and political (weak authority) situation. 
v. Issue Legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that legitimated this 
first episode were the following: corporate customers' demands, donors & 
benefactors, competition and economic environment. As already mentioned, the 
world was going through a critical situation (recession, fall of the Berlin Wall, etc. ) 
that strongly impacted European countries (economic environment). Companies 
expected management education to lead them through this state of affairs (corporate 
customers' demands). 
IA41 & IMIEDE were no exceptions. Both schools were affected by these 
circumstances so with the intention of achieving critical size and financial stability 
to be able to become a top league Business School in the international market place 
(competitors), their Boards (donors & benefactors) decided on their merge. 
As for the inner context, there were features delegitimating among which the 
study found climate, culture, structure, systems and performance. After the merger, 
there was low morale, mistrust, annoyance and anxiety at MD (climate). Two 
completely different cultures (IMI & IMEDE's) had been merged and instead of 
defming what the BID culture would be like, people struggled in the intent of 
imposing one culture over the other (culture). 
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Moreover, the overlapping roles between the Cassani and Rada, and the 
creation of the Faculty College whose representative attended the Board meetings, 
enabled to visualise the confusing structure of the new School (structure). In 
addition, there were no clear rules and policies that fostered the Faculty mistrust and 
anxiety regarding their future (systems). This was also augmented with the school's 
weak financial situation (perfonnance). 
Table 45: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at INM between 1990 and 1992 
L"D 
I" episode 
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2. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following elements: 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
iii. Power sources 
32 
iv. Power uses 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
The fieldwork shows that the leadership style that identifies Rada mostly is his 
participative attitude to involve other people in the discussion and definition of the 
School's policies, rules, and strategies. He encouraged people to let him know their 
perspectives, letting others be awared of the different decisions he would undertake. 
He would listen to everyone and agree on others' suggestions. However, people 
recognised his lack of sharpness in defining decision-making processes and they 
recall his growing tendency towards individual agreements, which contributed to 
lack of clear rules and direction. 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
With regard to his skills & competences, the study identified Rada as 
visionary, entrepreneur and committed. Interviewees agree he was a smart person 
with strong analytical and strategic thinking capabilities. He wanted to transform 
IMD into an international top league Business School but the turbulent 
circumstances he had to go through and his lack of experience to deal with obstacles 
led him to failure. 
iii. Power sources 
Rada's power was mostly based in his authority (position power) as Dean of 
IMD. Thus, given the particular characteristic of such type of authority in higher 
education institutions, the fact that the Dean is a 'primus inter pares' makes position 
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a rather weak power source. He could have built his power base for example, by 
delivering results and thus, gaining other key actors' support. However, the 
unfavourable circumstance he had to deal with led him to isolation. 
iv. Polver uses 
In mobilising power to legitimate his initiatives, Rada showed rationality, 
consensus building and listening & scanning the environment. However, these 
power uses were not enough since they did not facilitate Rada to build his power 
base. The turbulent circumstance he had to deal with demanded him enough support 
to carry out decisions, which he was unable to find. 
Table 46: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at LNID between 1990 and 1992 
INIII) 
lst episode 
Type of initiative B 




Dean's skills & Delivers results 












_ Coalition format 
Rationality 






291t seems relevant to note that study has highlighted only those skills and competences 
that appeared as 
strengths. This does not mean that the person under characterization 
does not possess other skills and 
competences. 
34 
INM Appendix V: Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during the 
transition episode 
Data supporting theforegoing analysis 
The following tables depict the analytical tracing of the different aspects 
during the transition: key actors' characterisation (see Table 47), features of the 
inner and outer contexts (see Tables 48 and 49), key actors' prioritisation of main 
generic interests (see Table 50) and key actors' strategic agenda building and 
executing (SLP) through the prioritisation of their main generic interests (real 
prioritisation of MGI, issue legitimation and power mobilisation) (see Table 5 1). 
Table 47: Key actors' characterisation during transition period 
Characteristic Transition 
1992-1993 
Leadership style Directive 







Background Different cultures: macro vs micro 
Faculty perspectives 
Fragmentation Farmers & hunters 
Background Business CEOs & members 
Board Donors & benefactors 
Role of the chairman Active role in merger process with focus on 




Table 48: Characterisation of features of the inner context during transition 
period 
3. -od_ P : Transition ,7 Key f' eaZtttres 1992-1993 
Performance: 1992 1993 
Income Income: 37.645 Income: 35.212 




Culture 'Farmers', people who insisted to work for ND. 
'Hunters', people who had individual agreements with companies 
outside the School. 
Systems Adaptation 
Rewriting rules 
Structure Head count reduction of Staff 
Centralization 
Faculty college although less relevant (informal structure) 
Table 49: Features of the outer context during transition period 
e 
--j I, 0! 
ýýý feaý! eýt 
Transition 
1992-1993 
Economic environment Final stage of recession resultant of Gulf War 
Corporate customer Discredit 
Competition INSEAD 
LBS 
Top US Business Schools 
DonorsIbenefactors Board members mostly: expectation 
Alumni Not critical 
Ranldngs Not critical 
Accreditation agencies Not critical 
FG7o-vernment Not critical 
Table 50: Prioritisation of MGI by key actors during transition period 
Transition Period 
1992-1993 
Dean 1) Performance 
2) Faculty & Board support 
Faculty 1) Collegial participation in key decisions 
2) Academic career 
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2. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following elements: 
i. Issue sponsorship 
ii. Issue selling 
iii. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
iv. Agenda structure 
V. Characterisation of features of both outer and inner contexts legitimating 
initiatives 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Xavier Gilbert was clearly the issue sponsor supported by the other two key 
actors: the Board and the Faculty. Although the fact that he would be the Interim 
Dean for a short time until a new Dean was appointed could be regarded as an 
obstacle for the implementation of his decisions, his authority was strengthened due 
to the critical situation IMD was going through. He had sufficient power to influence 
IMD's strategic agenda. His power base was built on the following: on the one hand, 
the Board could not afford to lose the Interim Dean it had appointed, and on the 
other hand, the Faculty could not ignore the critical circumstances the School was 
going through. 
ii. Issue Selling 
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Even though he knew he would not stay for long and that his mandate did not 
imply a turning point in the School's agenda (incremental initiative) Gilbert 
understood the importance of making the Faculty focus on the urgency and 
consequentiality of restoring the School's financial situation. IMD's performance 
was a critical matter to all of them., not just for the Board and the Dean but also for 
the Faculty. Thus, there was no need to undertake much issue selling but just leading 
the people's attention towards the critical situation. 
iii. Alignment of key actors' MGIprioritisation 
Gilbert's clear alignment with the Board's MGI priorities of restoring the 
School's financial situation strengthened his position not only as ITMD's Interim 
Dean but also as the issue sponsor. He understood the Faculty's claim to participate 
in the School's key decisions and thus, aligned his own priorities with theirs too. 
Moreover, both the Board and the Faculty were concerned of the critical situation 
the School was going through. This facilitated Gilbert's job. 
iv. Agenda Structure 
Restoring the School's financial situation was a priority in 13"D's strategic 
agenda during Gilbert's deanship. All members of the IMD community understood 
they had to solve this critical problem, thus, decisions and actions were headed to do 
SO. 
v. Issue Legitimisation: Features of both outer and inner contexts 
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The study identified corporate customers' demands, donors & benefactors, 
competition and economic environment as those features from the outer context that 
legitimated episode 2. 
As it has already been mentioned, Gilbert was committed to accomplish the 
Board's mandate, since this body was joined by IMD's donors & benefactors, which 
still had ownership over the School. He prioritised program delivery so that 
corporate customers would be satisfied and would continue to demand BAD 
programs instead of those offered by any competitor. The end of Europe's recession 
favoured his decisions and propelled IMD's economic recovery. 
As for those legitimating features from the inner context, climate, structure, 
systems and performance were identified. Culture delegitimated episode 2. The 
study could visualise that during this episode, IMD's climate was characterised by 
much expectation regarding the future of the School and its community. This 
facilitated Gilbert's will to gain people's support. Moreover, there was sufficient 
space for collegial participation driven by Gilbert's purpose of developing internal 
communication. The shaping of rules and policies with the aim of providing much 
transparency also contributed to the alignment of MGI among key actors. Finally, 
the School's weak perfonnance and the people's will to change such situation also 
acted as a driver towards this aligranent. However, ='s culture acted as an 
obstacle to Gilbert's initiatives. The Faculty was still Eragmented into two groups: 
the fanners and the hunters. 
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Table 52: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at INID between 1992 and 1993 
2d episode 
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3. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following elements: 
a. Sponsor's leadership style 
b. Dean's skills& competences 
c. Power sources 
Power uses 
i. Sponsor's Leadership style 
Given Gilbert's determination, commitment, decisiveness and result 
orientation regarding the Board's mandate-restoring IMD's 
financial situation, 
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which the study identified along the fieldwork, his leadership style was classified as 
directive. 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
As the foregoing paragraph asserts, Gilbert was a committed Dean who 
showed consistent behaviour in promoting the integration of both interests and goals. 
He had both political and communication skills, and was result-oriented. In fact, his 
decision to undertake a head-count reduction within PvM's staff enabled the School 
to lower its costs and restore its situation. 
iii. Power sources and iv. Power uses 
Just as Rada, Gilbert also presents position as his structural power source. 
Unlike Rada, he took advantage of the difficult situation the School was undergoing. 
He took IMD's crisis as his main power source and began to build more power on 
this base. The fact that he was a referent leader among the IMIEDE Faculty enabled 
him to gain support among Faculty members. To do so, he undertook several tactics 
such as coalition formation,, delegation, execution, assertiveness and rationality. 
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Table 53: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at IMD between 1992 and 1993 
2 lid episode 
Type of initiative B 
I 




Dean's skills & Delivers results 



















1 Consensus build 
43 
Appendix VI: Analytical tracing of critical "issues" during 
IMID's Consolidation and Success episode 
Data supporting theforegoing analysis 
To better understand and analyse this period of IMD's Consolidation & 
Success, the following tables depict the analytical tracing of its different aspects. 
Table 51 facilitates the identification of those characteristics of key actors that shape 
their prioritisation of main generic interests. Tables 55 and 56 show an analytical 
view of the influence of the characterisation of features of both inner and outer 
contexts, and Table 57 focuses on the prioritisation of the main generic interests of 
each key actor. The importance of this rests on the fact that the political perspective 
emphasises the diversity of interests among key actors and what triggers some issues 
to prevail instead of others. 
Finally, Table 58 shows the prioritisation. that each key actor makes 
regarding their own interests, the identification of those generic interests that prevail 
over others and lead the School's strategic agenda building and executing, the 
influence that features of inner and outer contexts have in legitimating the 
prioritisation of certain interests that have been prioritised in the School's agenda 
instead of others, and how power is mobilised in order to make some interests prevail 
over others. 
Tables in the Appendix represent the reliability coding of the content analysis 
of archival material and interviews regarding the aspect tackled. 
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Table 54-. Key actors' characterisation during IMD's Consolidation & Success 
Characteristic 1993 -2004 
Leadership style Directive 
Delegates 
Visionary 
Skins Strong commercial vision 
Deliver results 
Decision & execution 









Background Academic oriented/business oriented 
Faculty Fragmentation 
Mixture of M& IN1EDE 
Farmers & hunters 
Background Business CEOs & members audit 
Board Donors & benefactors 













> u Q ) C) 
0 ler - .! Z +ý 9 e = Z. 5 
ý 
ZL, 
1 I - 
. - = (V 
rn 
CD 
+ ä .! Z - ti ci rq 4, -ý ' 
0 
rA n 
0', = CU ; - 
0 







'; ý M ;.. 4 ei -ý4 4 
u 
C) 'ýý u rA pý 








IJ 15 A 1. "c5 CU g> 
5 
* -"2 ? g, U 0 
NZ "= CA .- U 
%D. 4 e ý. - 
-ý ;4 
rz u = 
ý 
-e i> . 
C) (Z ýý 
eß -ý jý 0 U cn m u C> 0 ý 
5 2 2 CD Z Z CD Z Z ( -4 4 
U - ce rA U 0 
. r= cu ce (U r. 
(V Q) (V > -ci 2 
CD 


















ý n E' 
5 ,0 0 cn 
"ö 0 vý C) 
c2, 
-9 . 
-, Z = 1C 
C 
N) E gýW %Z c> n j. . C, - 
9 
M= 
= C) rA Z .5 t 










tZC, O= Z 
w C) 
r. lý la la -E9 
ÖD 9Z r. -ü 


























Table 57: Prioritisation of MGI by key actors during IMD's Consolidation 
Success 
Period 1993 -2004 
e -to y ar. 
Dean 1) Performance 1) Strategic agenda building & executing 
2) Faculty & Board support 2) Performance 
Faculty 1) Collegial participation in key decisions 1) Collegial participation in key decisions 
2) Fair work systems & compensation 2) Fair work systems & compensation 
Board 1) Governance 1) Reputation 
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In observing the episode related to the purpose of achieving IMD's 
consolidation & success in the top league of management education, the study 
suggests it consists of a successful breakthrough initiative since it implies an 
effective turning point in terms of the School's strategic direction, resource 
allocation and organisational capabilities, culture, systems and structure. 
1. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
ii. Issue Selling 
iii. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
iv. Agenda Structure 
v. Characterisation of features of both outer and inner context legitimating 
initiatives 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Peter Lorange sent a clear signal of being in command, setting the School's 
strategic direction, and inviting the entire community to contribute to make EMD a 
top international Business School. He validated his power by making explicit that he 
had received it from them. Thus, he would be able to lead only if they wanted him to 
do so. Moreover, he looked for their concrete support and involvement asking them 
to write down what things they expected him to do and what things they did not 
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want him to do. This way of validating the formal authority he had received, 
legitimated, broadened and strengthened his power base. 
ii. Issue selling 
Lorange made the BM community understand the urgency and 
consequentiality of those decisions and actions he promoted. He made people 
believe and commit themselves to achieve those goals -he suggested, with clear 
direction and transparency. 
iii. Alignment of key actors'MGIprioritisation 
From the beginning of his tenure, Lorange undertook an intense and effective 
aligmnent of key actors' MGI prioritisation. He listened and scanned both outer and 
inner environments and was keen to understand what other key actors looked for and 
thus, attend their needs. 
Lorange promoted the integration of interests and goals and adapted the 
School's systems, structures and policies to facilitate the articulation of his vision. 
iv. Agenda structure 
The study noted Lorange's ability to influence IMD's agenda structure. Such 
influence was based on the fact that he delivered results. In aligning both the Board 
51 
and Faculty's priorities with his, he gained the supported needed to raise his interests 
on to the School"s strategic agenda. 
v. Issue Legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that legitimated 
this third episode were the following: corporate customers' demands, donors & 
benefactors, competition and economic environment; whereas legitimating features 
of the inner context were climate and performance. 
As for the inner context, there were features delegitimating among which the 
study found culture, stritcture, and systems. 
Table 59: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at INM between 1993 and 2004 
fMD 
3 'd episode 
Type of initiative B 
I 
Issue selling 



























2. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following elements: 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
iii. Power sources 
iv. Power uses 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
The fieldwork shows that the leadership style that identifies Lorange mostly 
is his directive attitude regarding the active role he plays in problem solving and 
decision making. He guides people by setting a clear direction and motivating them 
towards specific goal attaimnent. 
ii. Dean's skills& competences 
Fieldwork also suggests the following skills & competences identify 
Lorange's characterisation: he is visionary and entrepreneurial, has both 
communication and political skills, he delivers results and shows commitment and 
consistency in integrating key actors' interests and goals towards EAD's strategic 
direction. 
iii. Power sources 
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Since the beginning of his mandate, Lorange counted on structural power 
sources such as position and reivard power and personal sources such as expertise 
and reputation. Over time, he was able to accrue much power on these bases and 
eventually, became a referent to the IMD community. 
iv. Polver uses 
In mobilising power to legitimate his initiatives, Lorange displayed lots of 
power uses-articulation, coalition formation, rationality, assertiveness, 
decisiveness, execution, delegation and listening & scanning the environment. These 
enabled him to deliver results and promote INM's transformation into a top 
international Business School. 
Table 60: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at IMD between 1993 and 2004 
INM 
3rd episode 
Type of initiative B 
I 




Dean's skills & Delivers results 
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INSEAD Appendix 1: INSEAD's history" 
1957 INSEAD founded, three months after the Treaty of Rome. 
1960 First MBA graduates in Fontainebleau: 52 students from 14 countries. 
INSEAD Alumni Association created. 
1968 First executive development programme. 
1969 Opening of the School's Fontainebleau forest campus. 
1971 Creation of CEDEp46 , the European Centre for Continuing Education. 
1974 First programme on Asian business. 
1976 Launch of the INSEAD Alumni Fund. 
1980 INSEAD Euro-Asia Centre opens in Fontainebleau. 
1989 Launch of the PhD programme. 
1995 Launch of the first INSEAD Development Campaign. 
2000 January: First Singapore MBA class - 53 students from 26 countries 
August: INSEAD's first development campaign achieves C120 million in 
corporate and private sponsorship. 
October: Official opening of the INSEAD Asia Campus. 
2001 March: Announcement of the INSEAD-Wharton Alliance. 
May: First Wharton MBAs study at INSEAD in Fontainebleau 
October: 25 INSEAD MBA participants study at Wharton's Philadelphia 
campus 
2003 Launch of the INSEAD Executive MBA programme 
2004 
Opening of the Plessis Mornay Learning Space in Fontainebleau 
Launch of the second development campaign: The INSEAD Campaign 
45 
www. insead. edu 
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INSEAD Appendix III: INSEAD in Figures 
2004 INSEAD's Resident Faculty by nationality 
Argentina I Hungary I Romania 2 
Austria 3 India 12 Russia I 
Belgium 13 Ireland I Spain 3 
Bulgaria I Israel 2 Switzerland 4 
Canada 5 Italy 6 Taiwan I 
China 2 Korea 2 Turkey 3 
Finland 2 The Netherlands 2 UK 8 
France 18 New Zealand I USA 33 
Germany 9 Norway 1 Venezuela I 
Greece 3 Poland I 
Hong Kong 1 Portugal I 
Five-year overview of INSEAD Resident Faculty 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Faculty members 135 145 141 147 144 
of whom are resident Faculty on 
Asian campus 




2004 MBA Profile by country or region of origin 
Five-year overview of INSEAD MBA Programme participants 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
MBA programme participants 681 773 836 829 870 
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INSEAD's place among world wide Business Schools as to Executive 
Education 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
INSEAD 15/11 1115 15/8 9 11 
Financial TimeS47 MD 4/3 5/3 11/2 6 4 
LBS 11/15 4/13 14/11 7 7 
INSEAD - 2 - 5 
Business Week DvID 8 8 
LBS 7 10 
Sources: www. ft. com; YT", w. businessweek. com 
INSEAD's place among European Business Schools as to the M[13A 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
INSEAD 2 2 1 1 1 
Financial Times EMD 3 3 3 3 3 
LBS 1 1 2 2 2 
INSEAD 1 1 1 1 3 
Business Week JIM 4 4 3 3 2 
LBS 2 2 4 4 5 
Sources: w%Arw. ft. com; www. businessweek. com 
4' a/b where 'a' corresponds to open-enrollment programs and W, to custom programs. 
Financial 
Times delivers combined rankings as from 2003. 
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INSEAD's place among world wide Business Schools as to the MBA 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
INSEAD 9 7 6 6 4 
Financial Times DAD 11 11 14 13 12 
LBS 8 8 9 7 4 
INSEAD I - 1 - 3 
Business Week 48 MM 4 3 2 
LBS 2 4 5 
Sources: "r"-A,. ft. com, www. businessweek. com 
48 Non-US Business Schools. 
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INSEAD Appendix IV: Analytical Tracing of critical "issues" 
between 1990 and 1995 
Data supporting theforegoing analysis 
To better understand and analyse this period of INSEAD, the following 
tables depict the analytical tracing of its different aspects. Table 61 facilitates 
the identification of those characteristics of key actors that shape their 
prioritisation of strategic issues. Table 62 and 63 show an analytical view of the 
influence of the characterisation of features of both inner and outer contexts, and 
Table 64 focuses on the prioritisation of the strategic issues by each key actor. 
The importance of this rests on the fact that the political perspective emphasises 
the diversity of interests among key actors and what triggers some issues to 
prevail instead of others. 
Finally, Table 65 shows the prioritisation that each key actor makes 
regarding their own interests, the identification of those generic interests that 
prevail over others and lead the School's strategic agenda building and 
executing, the influence that features of inner and outer contexts have in 
legitimating the prioritisation of certain interests that have been prioritised in the 
School's agenda instead of others, and how power is mobilised in order to make 
some interests prevail over others. 
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Table 61: Key actors' characterisation during INSEAD's period 1990 - 1995 
Key actor Characteristic 1990-1995 




Dean Ludo, Van der Heyden Leadership style Participative 
Skills Intellectual 












Faculty Background Entrepreneurial/ US/teaching/PhDs 
Fragmentation US vs. non-US-oriented 
Teaching vs. research-oriented 
Old vs. new comers 
Board Background Entrepreneurial 
Founders 
Role of Chairman Bridge 
Table 62: Characterisation of features of the inner context during INSEAD's 
period 1990 - 1995 
Key features Period 1990 - 1995 
Performance: Budget with economic difficulties 
Income/profits 
Climate Sense of crisis due to co-Deanship structure 
Tensions between teaching & research oriented Faculty 
old & new comers 
US education background & European 
Tensions due to economic constraints 
Culture Faculty with different background: teaching vs. research 
US vs. European 
Entrepreneurial 
No dominant nationality 
Strong sense of ownership 
Increasing US educational background 
Systems Faculty evaluation system 
Executive and academic committees 
Academic departments 
Reinforcement of Faculty recruitment & promotion systems 
Structure Dual governance structure 
90-93: complementary roles 
93-95: overlap roles 
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Table 63: Characterisation of features of the outer context during INSEAD's 
period 1990 - 1995 
Key features Period 1990 - 1995 
Economic environment Increasing globalisation in business 
Gulf War 
Corporate customer Decreasing due to economic recession 
Competition Stronger competition in the internationalisation & globalisation of management 
education industry 
Transition in School's positioning: from top European to top world-class 
N4BA top position in Europe 
I" league in executive education in Europe 
Donors/benefactors Not critical 
Alumni Not critical 
Rankings Not assessed yet 
Accreditation agencies Not critical 
Government Not critical 
Table 64: Prioritisation of MGI by key actors during the period 1990 - 1995 
Key actor 1990-1995 
Deans 1) Strategic agenda building 
2) Performance 
Faculty 1) Academic career 
2) Fair workload & compensation systems 
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I. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
Issue Selling 
iii. Aligranent of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
iv. Agenda Structure 
v. Issue legitimisation: features of both outer and inner 
context 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Antonio Borges sponsored this breakthrough set of initiatives. The 
creation of INSEAD's PhD programme and the recruitment of US PhD Faculty 
were an antecedent. The succession of Philippe Naert by Ludo Van der Heyden 
aimed at continuing to strengthen INSEAD's research strategy, competences 
and capabilities. During his co-Deanship with Claude Rameau, Van der Heyden 
was oriented towards the consolidation of the PhD Programme and promoting 
Faculty with a research profile. When Antonio Borges was appointed, he 
reinforced this strategy of enhancing the research profile of INSEAD. 
Improving INSEAD's research capabilities (launching PhD programme, 
hiring Faculty with strong research background, etc. ) was based mainly on the 
vision of the co-Deans (P. Naert, Claude Rameau, Ludo Van der Heyden and 
83 
Antonio Borges) rather than on the management education market demands. 
Thus, issue-sponsorship was the key driver in promoting and legitimating this 
strategic issue that critically influenced INSEAD's nature. 
ii. Issue Selling 
Antonio Borges carried out a strong issue selling process to make the 
Faculty understand and share these initiatives, underlying their relevance in 
reaching INSEAD's international strategy and success in order to be a top 
worldwide Business School. 
To do so, he appealed to the INSEAD community's background- 
strongly entrepreneurial- and focused on the need to launch a capital campaign 
aimed at achieving the economic resources that would finance the School's 
research activities. He counted on Claude Janssen's (Chainnan of the Board) 
support, an entrepreneurial and risk-taking business man who facilitated Borges 
to achieve the Board's approval. 
iii. Alignment ofMGIprioritised by key actors 
INSEAD was recognised as a top European Business School with strong 
international roots within the management education industry. However, within 
the academic community INSEAD's reputation was still weak in terms of 
research standards. Thus, the task of redirecting INSEAD's focus towards a 
more research-oriented institution became a major challenge particularly, 
84 
because that was not the usual market 'demand' that had motivated INSEAD's 
entrepreneurial spirit since its foundation. 
In this regard, legitimisation of these strategic initiatives required not 
only a clear vision and commitment, but also the capacity to communicate the 
vision in terms of a market claim if they wanted to reach the next stage for 
INSEAD to become a top tier Business School world-wide. In other words, they 
had the capacity to appeal to INSEAD's values of being market-driven for 
people to align. Borges displayed a clear activity of communication and political 
skills in articulating his interests with those of the other key actors. He appealed 
to both Faculty and Board's interests in order to make them understand that 
those initiatives he promoted were highly related with INSEAD's 
entrepreneurial and international culture. 
iv. Agenda structure 
Borges introduced such initiatives as sequential steps towards the 
evolution of INSEAD's direction according to the School's strategic agenda 
previously set by Rameau and Naert. 
v. Issue legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that 
legitimated this first episode were corporate customers' demands, donors & 
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benefactoi-s, and competition; whereas peiformance was the legitimating feature 
of the inner context. 
As for those features delegitimating the study found climate, ctilture, and 
systems inner context). 






























2. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
Sponsor Is leadership style 
Dean's skills & competences 
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Ill. Power sources 
iv. Power uses 
Sponsor's leadership style 
The fieldwork shows that the leadership style that identifies Borges 
mostly is his directive attitude to motivate others in order to support his interests 
and achieve his goals. 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
With regard to his skills & competences, the study identified Borges as 
visionary, with communicating, political and entrepreneurial skills. He showed 
to be able to integrate key actors' interests and goals and thus, achieve effective 
results. 
iii. Power sources 
Borges' power was based in diverse power sources such as position, 
reward and resource generation & allocation (structural power sources) and 
expertise, reputation and referent power (personal power sources). 
iv. Power uses 
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In mobilising power to legitimate his initiatives, Borges listened to other 
people. He showed he could articulate them with the School's vision. He was 
also rational, assertive and decisive in carrying out strategic directions and he 
built coalitions with other people. 
88 




Type of initiative B 




Dean's skills & Delivers results 





















49 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should 
be highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be 
present, although with less relevance. 
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INSEAD Appendix V: Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during 
Antonio Borges' episode (1995 - 1999) 
Data supporting theforegoing analysis 
In observing the episode related to the purpose of launching INSEAD's 
second campus during the period 1995 - 1999, the study suggests it consisted of 
a successful breakthrough initiative since it implied a turning point in terms of 
the School's strategic direction, resource allocation and organisational 
capabilities, culture, systems and structure. 
A clear vision validated by market trends and articulated with the 
INSEAD's culture and strategy, combined with the ability to build coalitions 
among key actors, together with a well gained reputation in strengthening the 
. school's economic and financial shape, were crucial for Antonio Borges to 
succeed in these bold initiatives. 
1. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
ii. Issue Selling 
iii. Aligmnent of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
iv. Agenda Structure 
90 
V. Issue legitimisation: features of both outer and inner context 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Antonio Borges sponsored this successfully implemented breakthrough set 
of initiatives. Just as in the foregoing episode (deepening INSEAD's research 
strategy and profile), Borges appealed to INSEAD's entrepreneurial and risk- 
taking culture to broaden the issue sponsorship and gain enough support. 
ii. Issue Selling 
For the past years, INSEAD had been a major executive education 
provider in Asia. Antonio Borges called upon both Faculty and Board's 
entrepreneurial and risk-taking spirit, getting the sufficient support to lead the 
INSEAD community towards such endeavour as part of a direction previously 
delineated. 
iii. Alignment ofMGIprioritised b key actors y 
Just as along the previous episode (deepening INSEAD's research strategy 
and profile), Borges aligned key actors' MGI towards that direction he meant to 
reach-launching a second campus. Claude Janssen's background 
(entrepreneurial and risk-taking) facilitated him to get the Board's support and 
encourage the Faculty about the convenience of his vision. 
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iv. Agenda structure 
Likewise episode 1, Borges introduced this set of initiatives as sequential 
steps towards the evolution of INSEAD's internationalisation. 
v. Issue legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that legitimated 
this second episode were corporate customers' demands, donors & benefactors, 
government, competition and location; whereas culture and performance were 
the legitimating feature of the inner context. As for those features delegitimating 
the study found alumni and economic environment (outer context). 
Table 68: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at INSEAD between 1995 and 
1999 
INSEAD 
2 nd episode 































2. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
iii. Power sources 
iv. Power uses 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
The fieldwork shows that the leadership style that identifies Borges 
mostly is his directive attitude to motivate others in order to support his interests 
and achieve his goals. 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
With regard to Borges' skills & competences, the study identified the 
following: visionary, communication, delivers results, political skills, 
entrepreneur, commitment and integration. 
iii. Power sources 
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Borges based his power on the following sources: position, reivai-d and 
resource generation & allocation (structural power sources) and expertise, 
reputation and referent polver (personal power sources). 
IV. Polver itses 
In mobilising power to legitimate his initiatives, Borges employed the 
following tactics: articulation, coalition formation, rationality, assertiveness, 
decisiveness, execution, delegation, and listening & scanning the environment. 
Table 69: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at INSEAD between 1995 and 
199910 
INSEAD 
2 nd episode 
Type of initiative B 
I 




Dean's skills & Delivers results 




















50 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should 
be highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be 
present, although with less relevance. 
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INSEAD Appendix VI: Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' 
during Gabriel Hawawini's episode (2000 - 2004) 
To better understand and analyse this period of INSEAD, the following 
tables depict the analytical tracing of its different aspects. Table 69 facilitates 
the identification of those characteristics of key actors that shape their 
prioritisation of strategic issues. Table 70 and 71 show an analytical view of the 
influence of the characterisation of features of both inner and outer contexts, and 
Table 72 focuses on the prioritisation of the strategic initiatives by each key 
actor. The importance of this rests on the fact that the political perspective 
emphasises the diversity of interests among key actors and what triggers some 
issues to prevail instead of others. 
Finally, Table 73 shows the prioritisation that each key actor makes 
regarding their own interests, the identification of those generic interests that 
prevail over others and lead the School's strategic agenda building and 
executing, the influence that characterisation of features of inner and outer 
contexts have in legitimating the prioritisation of certain interests that have been 
raised to the School's agenda instead of others, and how power is mobilised in 
order to make some interests prevail over others. 
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Table 70: Key actors' characterisation during INSEAD's period 2000 - 2004 
Key actor Characteristic 2000- 2005 
Dean Borges Leadership style Participative 







Faculty Background Entrepreneurial/ US/teaching/PhDs 
Fragmentation US vs. non-US oriented 
Teaching vs. research-oriented 
Board Background Conservative 
Alumni 
Role of Chairman Audit/conservative 
Table 71: Characterisation of features of the inner context during INSEAD's 
period 2000 - 2004 
Key features Period 2000 - 2005 
Performance: Financial recovery 
Income/profits 
Climate Worries about academic, commercial, economic & managerial challenges in slow down 
context due to SARS & terrorism 
Culture Entrepreneurial 
Strong roots in Asia 
Stress due to Singapore campus start-up & delivery 
Systems Economic incentives with facilities to Faculty established in Singapore 
Structure Committe of Deans 
Creation of two deputy Deans: Faculty & Research 
Administration & Operations 
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Table 72: Characterisation of features of the outer context during INSEAD's 
period 2000 - 2004 
Key features Period 2000 - 2004 
Economic environment SARS & global terrorism 
Market recovery after South-East Asia economic crisis 
Corporate customer 1" executive education provider in Asia for the last decades 
Competition Alliances (INSEAD - Wharton alliance) 
Donors/benefactors Not accredited 
Alumni Strong presence in INSEAD's Board 
Rankings Not accredited 
Accreditation agencies Not accredited 
Government Not accredited 
Table 73: Prioritisation of key actors' MGI during the period 2000 - 2004 
Key actor 2000- 2004 
Dean 1) Strategic agenda building & executing 
2) Performance 
Faculty 1) Collegial participation in key decisions 
2) Academic career 
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, Episode 3- Making the Singapore campus ivork 
In observing the episode related to the purpose of making the Singapore 
campus work between 2000 and 2003, the study suggests it consisted of an 
incremental initiative since it implied the continuity of a strategy which had 
been previously set in the School's strategic agenda. 
1. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
ii. Issue Selling 
iii. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
iv. Agenda Structure 
V. Issue legitimisation: features of both outer and inner 
context 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Gabriel Hawawini strongly sponsored this incremental set of initiatives 
since he was appointed to undertake the specific task of making the Singapore 
campus work. He was known as a man who delivered results and had enough 
expertise to align be able to align people's interest and accomplish such 
endeavour. 
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ii. Issue Selling 
Since he had been specifically appointed with the mandate of making the 
Singapore campus work, he had no need to undertake any issue selling. 
iii. Alignment of MGIprioritised by key actors 
Hawawini's interest was clearly aligned to those of the other key actors. 
They all wanted the Singapore campus to work and focused on achieving good 
results. 
iv. Agenda structure 
The Singapore campus was already part of INSEAD's strategic agenda at 
the time of episode 3. Thus, making it happen was merely incremental. 
v. Issue legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that 
legitimated this second episode were corporate customers' demands and 
competition; whereas climate, culture, systems, structure and performance were 
the legitimating features of the inner context. 
As for those features delegitimating the study found location and 
economic environment (outer context). 
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Table 75: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at INSEAD between 2000 and 
2004 
INSEAD 
3 rd episode 


























2. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills& competences 
iii. Power sources 
iv. Power uses 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
The fieldwork shows that the leadership style that identifies Hawawini's 
mostly is his participative attitude. 
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ii. Dean's skills & competences 
With regard to his skills & competences shown along episode 3, the 
study identified the following: visionary, communication, delivers results, 
entrepreneur, commitment and integration. 
iii. Power sources 
Hawawini based his power on the following sources: position, reivard 
and resource generation & allocation (structural power sources) and expertise, 
reputation and referent poiver (personal power sources). 
iv. Power uses 
In mobilising power to legitimate his initiatives, Hawawini employed the 
following tactics: articulation, coalition formation, rationality, assertiveness, 
decisiveness, execution, delegation, listening & scanning the environment and 
consensus building. 
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Table 76: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at INSEAD between 2000 and 
2004" 
INSEAD 
3 rd episode 
Type of initiative B 
I 
Sponsor's leadership style D 
Visionary 
Cornintmication 
Dean's skills & Delivers results 




















Episode 4- Launching INSEAD's third campus P 
In observing the episode related to the purpose of launching INSEAD's 
third campus in 2004, the study suggests it consisted of a breakthrough initiative 
since it implied a turning point in terms of the School's strategic direction, 
resource allocation and organisational capabilities, culture, systems and 
structure. 
From an overall perspective, the study considered the set of initiatives 
included in this fourth episode as blocked due to the following outputs: 
51 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should 
be highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be 
present, although with less relevance. 
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Hawawini had conditioned his reappointment to the Faculty's decision to launch 
INSEAD's third campus in the US; Claude Janssen was replaced by a new 
Chairman (Cees Van Lede) who was an alumni and who disagreed with 
Hawawini's decision; the members of the Board were mostly alumni and were 
conservative regarding the INSEAD brand; given that launching the Singapore 
campus had been quite an endeavour, the Faculty was not ready to repeat a 
similar experience in the US. 
1. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
ii. Issue Selling 
Ill. Aligmnent of key actors' MG1 prioritisation 
iv. Agenda Structure 
V. Issue legitimisation: features of both outer and inner context 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Gabriel Hawawini sponsored the set of initiatives intended to launch 
INSEAD's third campus. However, this sponsorship was weak since it had no 
support of the other key actors. 
ii. Issue Selling 
104 
The study did not find any evidence of an effective issue selling on 
behalf of Gabriel Hawawini. 
iii. Alignment of MGIprioritised by key actors 
The study identified different MGI prioritisation among key actors. In 
this regard, the Dean prioritised strategic agenda building & executing and both 
Faculty and Board prioritised performance. Thus, Hawawini's initiative was 
finally blocked. 
iv. Agenda structure 
To some extent, Hawawini did not identify the issue array within the 
School's strategic agenda. Making the Singapore campus work had been such an 
endeavour that INSEAD's strategic agenda was still 'overloaded' with that 
initiative, and had no further 'space' for any new one. 
v. Issue legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that 
legitimated this fourth episode were corporate customers' demands, donors & 
benefactors, competition and economic environment; whereas culture and 
performance were the legitimating feature of the inner context. 
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As for those features delegitimating the study found alumni (outer 
context) and climate, structure and systems (inner context). I 
Table 77: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at INSEAD during 2004 
INSEAD 
4'h episode 



























2. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
iii. Power sources 
iv. Power uses 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
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The fieldwork shows that the leadership style that identified Hawawini 
mostly was his participative attitude to make others join into decision-making 
processes. 
ii. Dean's skills& competences 
With regard to his skills & competences along episode 4, the study 
identified the following: visionary, delivers results, entrepreneur, commitment 
and consistency. 
iii. Power sources 
Hawawini based his power on the following sources: position, reward 
and resource generation & allocation (structural power sources) and expertise, 
reputation and referent power (personal power sources). 
iv. Power uses 
As for the power uses he employed, the study identified the following: 
decisiveness, execution and consensus building. 
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Table 78: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at INSEAD during 2004 
INSEAD 
40'episode 
Type of initiative B 
I 




Dean's sUls & Delivers results 
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INSEAD Appendix VII: Tables 
Period 1990 - 1995 
The following Table refers to the reliability coding of the content 
analysis of the archival material and the interviews, regarding the key actors of 
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LBS Appendix III: LBS Governance 
GOVERNANCE OF THE SCHOOL 
GOVERNING BODY 
I 




LBS Appendix IV: Rankings 
LBS's place among world wide Business Schools as to Executive Education 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
LBS 11115 4/13 14/11 7 7 
Financial TimeS67 E"D 4/3 5/3 11/2 6 4 
INSEAD 15111 1115 15/8 9 11 
LBS - 7 - 10 - 
Business Week INSEAD 2 5 
EMD 8 8 
Sources: wAw. ft. com; www. businessweek. com 
LBS's place among European Business Schools as to the MBA 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
LBS 1 1 2 2 2 
Financial Times IN4D 3 3 3 3 3 
INSEAD 2 2 1 1 1 
INSEAD 1 1 1 1 3 
Business Week LBS 2 2 4 4 5 
EWD 4 3 3 2 
Sources: www. ft. com; wwwbusinesswee&COM 
67 a/b where 'a' corresponds to open-enrollment programs and 
W, to custom programs. Financial 
Times delivers combined rankings as from 2003. 
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LBS's place among world wide Business Schools as to the M[BA 
Source Bs. School 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
LBS 8 8 9 7 4 
Financial Times INSEAD 9 7 6 6 4 
MM 11 11 14 13 12 
INSEAD I - I - 3 
Business Week 
68 
LBS 2 - 4 5 
MD 4 - 3 2 
Sources: Nv-vv,, v. ft. com; NNxNNv. businessweek. com 
68 Non-US Business Schools. 
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LBS Appendix V: Analytical Tracing of critical 'issues' between 
1990 and 1997. 
In order to understand why some initiatives gain the agenda instead of 
others, it seems relevant to observe how each of the main actors prioritise their 
main generic interests and how they scan the most critical features of both inner 
and outer contexts that will be decisive in legitimating the prioritisation of some 
interests over others. 
Table 79 shows the main generic interests prioritised by each key actor. 
The importance of this rests on the fact that the political perspective emphasises 
the interplay of different interests among key actors and how these interact with 
each other to prevail their interests instead of others. 
Along this vein, Table 80 refers to the characteristics of the key actors 
(Dean, Faculty and Board) that shape their interplay. 
To better understand why and how things happened, Table 81 shows an 
analytical view of the characterisation of features of the inner context, and Table 
82, the influence of the characterisation of features of the outer context. 
Finally, Table 83 adds to the prioritisation that each key actor does 
regarding their own interests, the column of 'real prioritisation of MGF, which 
refers to the identification of those generic interests that prevail over others and 
lead the School's strategic agenda building and executing. Two other columns 
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complete the table: firstly, 'issue legitimation' that refers to the influence that 
features of inner and outer contexts have in legitimating the prioritisation of 
certain interests that have been raised to the School's agenda instead of others. 
Secondly, the column of 'power mobilisation' completes the political 
perspective explaining how power is mobilised in order to make some interests 
prevail over others. To understand how power works, the study focuses on the 
concepts of power sources and uses (See Chapter 11) of each of the key actors. 
The following figures and tables provide the study with a complete and 
analytical perspective of the elements that shaped the strategic agenda building 
and executing over the period 1990-1997. Thus, the following step refers to the 
exploring and describing of the interrelations, dynamics and interconnections 
among these elements. 
Note that tables regarding the reliability coding that correspond to the 
content analysis of interviews and archival material can be found in the 
appendix. 
Table 79: Prioritisation of key actors' MGI during George Bain's tenure 
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Table 80: Key actors' characterisation during Bain's tenure 
Characteristic 1990-1997 
Leadership style Participative 
Directive 
Skills Political (coalition building) 
Interpersonal (communication; articulating vision, mission 
Dean & strategy) 
Delivers results 






Managerial (former Dean of WBS) 
Background British academics 
Teaching & research oriented (mostly finances & 
Faculty economics) 
Fragmentation 
Board Background British business people 
Role of the chairman Visibility of the School in British business 
Benefactor 
Table 81: Features of the inner context during the period 1990 - 1997 
Period. 1990-1997 
Key features 
Performance: From low to high performance 
Income 
Profits 
Climate Perceived need to change from being top UK to become an international 
Business School 
Culture British based on seniority 
Systems Egalitarian 
Structure Strong academic departments (fmances & economics) 
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Table 82: Features of the outer context during the period 1990 - 1997 
1990-1997 
Economic environment Recession due to Gulf War 
Corporate customer Looking for more internationalisation 
Competition INSEAD 
Top US Business Schools 
Donors/benefactors Lack of commitment 
No endowment 
No donation for fundraising 
Alumni Weak connection with the School 
Rankings ---- 
Accreditation agencies EFMII)/AACSB 
Government Reducing subsidies for higher education 
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I. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
i. Issue Selling 
ii. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation. 
Agenda Structure 
iv. Issue legitimisation: features of both outer and inner 
context 
i. Issue sponsorship 
During Bain's tenure, there was clear consensus regarding the need to 
drift LBS strategic direction so that the School would compete in the 
international arena. Still, Bain devoted several months meeting people who 
would provide him with a broader perspective of what LBS needed. He wrote 
down his conclusions in a document which he handled to most of LBS-Bias 
Towards Strategy. This documented referred to the strategic direction he would 
give to LBS, and to the way in which he would lead the School transfonning it 
into a top league. Bain was the key sponsor regarding episode 1. 
ii. Issue Selling 
Bain encouraged every member of the LBS community to carefully read 
the document and 'get on Board'. Even though the Faculty and Board 
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backgrounds were mostly British and conservative, he knew how to make them 
integrate his interests with their goals. 
iii. Alignment of MGIprioritised by key actors 
George Bain carefully aligned his interests with those of the Faculty and 
Board. The LBS community was unsatisfied with the fact that INSEAD had 
reached the top position within the management education industry and thus, 
they were eager to become a top international Business School. 
iv. Agenda structure 
George Bain's initiative to make LBS a top league international Business 
School quickly reached the School's strategic agenda due to the discomfort 
provoked by the fact that INSEAD had reached a top position over LBS. 
v. Issue legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that 
legitimated this first episode were the following: corporate customers' demands, 
donors & benefactors, government, competition, location and economic 
environment. 
As for the inner context, there were features delegitimating among which 
the study found culture, structure, and systems. 
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Table 84: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at LBS between 1990 and 1997 
LBS 
V episode 
Type of initiative B 
Issue selling 

























2. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. 'Sponsor's leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills& competences 
iii. Power sources 
iv. Power uses 
Sponsor's leadership style 
141 
The fieldwork shows that the leadership style that identifies Bain mostly 
is his directive attitude to motivate others and build commitment. Moreover, his 
active role in problem solving and decision making guided the LBS community 
towards the direction he set. 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
With regard to his skills & competences, the study identified Bain as 
visionary, with communicating, Political and entrepreneurial skills. His 
consistent behaviour enabled him to integrate key actors' interests and goals and 
thus, achieve effective results. 
iii. Power sources 
Bain's power was based in diverse power sources such as position, 
reward and resource generation & allocation (structural power sources) and 
expertise, reputation and referentpower (personal power sources). 
iv. Power uses 
In mobilising power to legitimate his initiatives, Bain 
listened to other 
people. He showed he could articulate them with the 
School's vision. He was 
also rational, assertive and decisive in carrying out strategic 
directions and he 
built coalitions with other people. 
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Table 85: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at LBS between 1990 and 19979 
LBS 
ei)is( 
Type of mitiative B 
I 




























69 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should 
be highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also be 
present, although with less relevance. 
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LBS Appendix VI: Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during 
the period 1999 - 2001 
To better understand and analyse this period of LBS, the following tables 
depict the analytical tracing of its different aspects. Table 85 facilitates the 
identification of those characteristics of key actors that shape their prioritisation 
of strategic initiatives. Table 86 and 87 show an analytical view of the influence 
of the characterisation of features of both inner and outer contexts, and Table 88 
focuses on the prioritisation of the strategic issues by each key actor. The 
importance of this rests on the fact that the political perspective emphasises the 
diversity of interests among key actors and what triggers some interests to 
prevail instead of others. 
Finally, Table 89 shows the prioritisation that each key actor makes 
regarding their own interests, the identification of those generic interests that 
prevail over others and lead the School's strategic agenda building and 
executing, the influence that features of inner and outer contexts have in 
legitimating the prioritisation of certain interests that have been raised to the 
School's agenda instead of others, and how power is mobilised in order to make 
some interests prevail over others. 
Tables that represent the reliability coding of the content analysis of 
archival material and interviews regarding the aspect tackled can be found in the 
appendix. 
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Table 86: Key actors' characterisation during LBSI period 1998 - 2001 
Key actor Characteristic 1998-2001 







Faculty Background Strongly British 
Fragmentation --- 
Board Background No sense of ownership 
Role of Chairman Audit 
Table 87: Features of the inner context during LBS' period 1998 - 2001 




Climate Lack of self-confidence 
Culture US orientation 
Systems Incorporation of US systems (tenure, titles) 
Structure Creation of Dean of Executive Education 
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Table 88-. Features of the outer context during LBS' period 1998 - 2001 
Key features Period 1998 - 2001 
Economic environment Favourable economic environment 
Corporate customer Growth as a result of increasing LBS visibility & focus on executive 
education 
Competition INSEAD/Top US Business Schools 
Location London advantage 
Donors/benefactor's 
Alumni Regional Advisory Boards 
Alumni clubs 
Rankings Number 8 according to Financial Times 
Accreditation agencies Not critical 
Government Not critical 
Table 89: Prioritisation of key actors MGI during the period 1998 - 2001 
Key actor 1998-2001 
Dean 1) Strategic agenda building & executing 
2) Performance 
Faculty 1) Academic career 
2) Fair workload & compensation systems 
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1. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
ii. Issue selling 
iii. Aligrunent of key actors' MGI prioritisation 
iv. Agenda structure 
V. Issue legitimisation: Features of both outer and inner context 
legitimating initiatives 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Quelch counted on a strong issue sponsorship since the beginning of his 
tenure-he was a BBS full professor, appointed by the LBS Faculty to continue with 
Bain's ongoing strategy. 
ii. Issue selling 
Given that he had been appointed to continue with Bain's previous strategy, 
Quelch had no need to undertake any issue selling. 
iii. Alignment of key actors'MGIprioritisation 
148 
Quelch was determined to strengthen the LBS brand, positioning the School in 
the management education industry. Thus, he worked with the alumni, business 
people and Faculty to pursue such goal. 
iv. Agenda structure 
Quelch strategic direction had low impact on the School's strategic agenda 
since it implied a 'continuum' of a strategy which had already been set. 
v. Issue Legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that legitimated this 
second episode were the following: corporate customers' demands, alumni, 
competition, governance, location and economic environment; whereas those 
features of the inner context that legitimated this episode were: climate, structure, 
systems and performance. 
However, there were also some features delegitimating. With regard to the 
outer context, donors & benefactors; and as for the inner context, culture. 
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Table 91: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at LBS between 1998 - 2001 
LBS 
2" episode 
Type of initiative B 
Issue selling 

























3. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following elements: 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
iii. Power sources 
iv. Power uses 
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i. Sponsor's Leadership style 
Given Quelch's determination, commitmentý decisiveness and result 
orientation his leadership style was classified as directive. 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
Among Quelch's skills & competences, data suggests he was an 
entrepreneurial Dean, strongly committed to his task. He had political skills and 
delivered results. 
iii. Power sources 
With regard to the power sources in which his authority was based on, Quelch 
presented both structural and personal sources of power-position, reward and 
resource generation & allocation (structural power sources), and expertise, 
reputation and referent (personal power sources). 
iv. Power uses 
In mobilising power to legitimate initiatives, Quelch employed his political 
skills and built coalitions with Faculty members in whom he delegated execution. 
Assertive, rational and decisive, he also listened and scanned the environment. 
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Table 92: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at LBS between 1998 and 200 170 
LBS 
Type of initiative B 
I 




Dean's skills Delivers results 




















70 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should be 
highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also 
be present. 
although with less relevance. 
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LBS Appendix VII: Analytical tracing of critical 'issues' during the 
period 2002 - 2004 
To better understand and analyse this period of LBS, the following tables 
depict the analytical tracing of its different aspects. Table 93 facilitates the 
identification of those characteristics of key actors that shape their prioritisation of 
strategic issues. Table 94 and 95 show an analytical view of the influence of the 
characterisation of features of both inner and outer contexts, and Table 96 focuses on 
the prioritisation of the strategic issues by each key actor. The importance of this 
rests on the fact that the political perspective emphasises the diversity of interests 
among key actors and what triggers some issues to prevail instead of others. 
Finally, Table 97 shows the prioritisation that each key actor makes 
regarding their own interests, the identification of those generic interests that prevail 
. over others and lead the School's strategic agenda building and executing, the 
influence that features of inner and outer contexts have in legitimating the 
prioritisation of certain interests that have been raised to the School's agenda instead 
of others, and how power is mobilised in order to make some interests prevail over 
others. Tables that represent the reliability coding of the content analysis of archival 
material and interviews regarding the aspect tackled are found in the appendix. 
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Table 93: Key actors' characterisation during LBSI period 2002 - 2004 
Key actor Characteristic 2002 -2004 
Dean Leadership style Participative 
Skills Political 





Faculty Background British 
Strong financial and economic orientation 
Fragmentation 
Background No sense of ownership 
Role of Chairman Audit role 
Table 94: Characterisation of Features of the inner context between 2002 - 2004 





Culture US orientation 
Systems Adapted to US model 
Structure Creation of hiring committee 
Strong delegation on Deputy Dean & Secretary 
Table 95: Characterisation of Features of the outer context during LBS' period 
2002-2004 
Key features Period 2002 - 2004 
Economic envirom-nent Recession due to terrorism & Iraq War 
Corporate customer School's stronger visibility in market 
Location London advantage 
Competition INSEAD/Top US Business Schools 
Donors/benefactors Focus on fundraising 





Government Not critical 
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Table 96: Prioritisation of key actors' MGI during the period 2002 - 2004 
Key actor 2002 -2004 
Dean 1) Strategic agenda building & executing 
2) Performance 
Faculty 1) Academic career 
2) Fair workload & compensation systems 
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2. Issue Legitimisation 
In analysing issue legitimisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Issue Sponsorship 
11. Issue selling 
iii. Alignment of key actors' MGI prioritisation. 
iv. Agenda structure 
V. Issue Legitimisation: Features of both outer and 
inner context legitimating initiatives 
i. Issue sponsorship 
Laura Tyson counted on a strong issue sponsorship since the beginning of 
her tenure-she had been appointed by the LBS Faculty while she was Dean of 
Haas, to enhance LBS visibility and fundraising activities. 
ii. Issue selling 
Given that she had been appointed to continue with Bain's and Quelch's 
previous strategy, Tyson had no need to undertake any issue selling. 
iii. Alignment of key actors'MGIprioritisation 
Tyson was expected to follow that strategy already initiated by Bain and 
continued by Quelch-transforming LBS in a top league Business School. Thus, 
she focused on keeping key actors' support by aligning their interests to hers. 
iv. Agenda structure 
Tyson strategic direction had low impact on the School's strategic agenda 
since it implied a 'continuum' of a strategy which had already been set by both 
Bain and Quelch. 
v. Issue Legitimisation: Features of the outer & inner contexts 
The study observed that those features of the outer context that legitimated 
this second episode were the following: corporate customers' demands, alumni, 
competition, governance, location and economic environment; whereas those 
features of the inner context that legitimated this episode were: climate, 
structure, systems and performance. 
Donors & benefactors (outer context) was the only feature delegitimating 
Tyson's decisions and actions. 
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Table 98: Analysis of Issue Legitimisation at INID between 2002 and 
2004 
LBS 
3" eni-, ( 
Type of initiative B 
I 
Issue selling 


























3. Power Mobilisation 
In analysing power mobilisation, the study observed the following 
elements: 
i. Sponsor's leadership style 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
iii. Power sources 
iv. Power uses 
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i. Sponsor's Leadership style 
The study classified Laura Tyson's leadership style as participative since 
she listened others actively and carefully, gaining their acceptance by engaging 
people in both planning and decision-making processes. 
ii. Dean's skills & competences 
Tyson showed a high profile combined with both interpersonal, 
communication and political skills. She is visionary and result oriented. 
iii. Power sources 
With regard to the power sources in which her authority was based on, 
. Tyson presented both structural and personal sources of power-position and 
resource generation & allocation (structural power sources), and expertise, 
reputation and referent polver. 
iv. Power uses 
In mobilising power to legitimate initiatives, Tyson employed articulation, 
coalition formation, rationality, assertiveness, decisiveness, delegation, 
listening 
scanning and consensus building. 
160 
Table 99: Analysis of Power Mobilisation at LBS between 2002 and 2004 71 
IMD 
3"' episode 
Type of initiative B 




Dean's skills Delivers results 




















71 Please, note that the shaded items correspond to those characteristics that the study 
found should 
be highlighted. However, this does not mean that the rest of the characteristics may also 
be 
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